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ABSTRACT 
Double Exposure: Picturing the Self in Russian Émigré Culture 
Robyn Jensen 
Double exposure has often been used as a metaphor for the condition of emigration: of 
being between two places simultaneously, of layering the memory of one place onto another. To 
extend the metaphor of double exposure, this study turns to the medium of photography itself to 
explore how it functions within Russian émigré narratives of the self. I examine how Vladimir 
Nabokov, Joseph Brodsky, Gary Shteyngart, and the visual artist Ilya Kabakov use photographs 
in their autobiographical works—from literary memoirs to art installations—as a device for 
representing the divided self in emigration. “Double exposure” works as a flexible concept in 
this dissertation: as a metaphor for exilic double consciousness; for the autobiographical tension 
between multiple selves; and as a model for the composite structure of these texts that join 
together word and image. 
Bringing together photography and autobiography in this study, I explore how the 
“objective” medium of photography offers these authors a version of the self as visual object to 
be used creatively within their own self-representations. Self-representation, after all, involves 
the transformation of one’s own subjectivity into an object of investigation. And the objectivity 
of the photograph cannot be divorced from the subjective experience of looking at and 
interpreting the sense data that the image supplies. The photograph’s uneasy relationship 
between objectivity and subjectivity makes it a rich source for autobiographical practices of self-
creation and self-investigation. The photographs and their textual mediation work as visual 
metonyms that stand in for the larger project of self-representation; they picture the act of 
picturing the self. 
 
This dissertation charts the critical ambivalence to family photographs in these works, 
how they stage a back-and-forth between an affective or nostalgic attitude to images and a sharp 
awareness of the limits or dangers of such an attitude. The subjects of this dissertation reveal a 
divided attitude to the visual medium, both attracted and repelled by the promise of photographs. 
The divided attitude to photographs in these works, I argue, stems in part from a crisis in vision. 
From the semiotic appraisal of photographs to the disciplinary and propagandistic abuses of 
photography, to see the photograph as an uncomplicated restoration of the past is no longer 
possible by the second half of the twentieth century (if, indeed, it ever was). And yet, it is the 
very losses of the twentieth century that make urgent the need to collect and preserve the 
fragments that remain. These authors exhibit an ambivalence about how photographs preserve 
the past and what kind of information they provide us with, about how these images represent the 
self (and the family), and finally about how this form of representation compares with the written 
word. Each of my four chapters examines a different modality of this ambivalent approach to 
photographs as they intersect with narrating the self: Nabokov’s agonistic contest between 
photography and his visual memory; Brodsky’s resignation to the modern photographic 
condition that ruptures the continuity of memory and experience; Shteyngart’s divided reading of 
the self from a hyphenated Russian-American perspective; and Kabakov’s ironically sincere 
recuperation of an affective response after postmodernism.  
Considering photos as both indexical documents that provide evidence but also as 
indeterminate images that demand interpretation, I read the photographs as an integral 
component of self-construction in these works, rather than as transparent illustrations of the self. 
These photographs offer a productive site for representing the divided self in emigration, the 
experience of trauma, and the convergence of personal and social history.
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Double Exposure: Narrating the Self in Emigration 
 
 In 1926, the Russian émigré poet Vladislav Khodasevich begins his poem about exile 
“Sorrento Photographs” (Sorrentinskie fotografii) with a double-exposed photograph.1 The 
scatterbrained photographer (fotograf-rotozei) forgets to advance the film, thus superimposing an 
image of two friends on a picnic alongside a goat in Capri onto an image of a friend atop a 
steamship departing from a bay. In the poem, this double exposure is experienced as a happy 
accident of the camera. The lyric narrator takes pleasure in the surprising juxtaposition of these 
two scenes: 
Хоть я и не люблю козляток 
(Ни итальянских пикников) – 
Двух совместившихся миров 
Мне полюбился отпечаток: 
В себе виденья затая, 
Так протекает жизнь моя. 
 
Though I don’t love baby goats 
(or Italian picnics) – 
The imprint of two superimposed worlds 
Caught my fancy: 
Concealing within itself an apparition, 
So flows my life.2  
 
 The double exposure produces a visual equivalent of the poetic device that Viktor Shklovsky 
would call ostranenie or estrangement, as theorized in his 1917 article “Art as Device” (Iskusstvo 
kak priëm). Neither goats nor picnics on their own produce delight, but once these quotidian 
images are placed in an unexpected context, they yield aesthetic delight. This collision of two 
                                               
1 Khodasevich had been living with Maxim Gorky in Sorrento from September 1924–April 1925. 
2 V. F. Khodasevich, Sobranie stikhov: v dvukh tomakh, ed. Iurii Kolker, vol. 2 (Paris: La Presse 
Libre, 1983), 27. 
 2 
worlds can be achieved through the photographic medium, but also through the lived experience 
of displacement. Exile itself makes the everyday strange. Indeed, as Svetlana Boym has noted, it 
was the experience of exile after the 1917 Revolution that proved to be a fertile testing ground 
for the Russian Formalists’ abstract theories of estrangement.3 In Khodasevich’s poem, the photo 
becomes the metaphor of choice for the estranged experience of exile; his current existence in 
Italy plays out against the background of Russia, as if in stereoscope.4 
It has become a commonplace to see Khodasevich’s double-exposed photograph as a 
fitting emblem for the exilic condition. Greta Slobin, for example, takes up Khodasevich’s trope 
of the double-exposed photograph in her analysis of émigré writers such as Teffi (Nadezhda 
Aleksandrovna Lokhvitskaya), Ivan Bunin, and Vladimir Nabokov as a metaphor for the 
bilingualism and split consciousness that mark their work. She primarily explores “double 
exposure” as a narrative device for representing the everyday experience of exile in a foreign city 
against the memory of the familiar one.5 Life in emigration, after all, is often conceived of as a 
peculiar condition of being between two places simultaneously, of layering the memory of one 
place onto another. Michael Seidel begins his book Exile and the Narrative Imagination with the 
claim that “an exile is someone who inhabits one place and remembers or projects the reality of 
                                               
3 Svetlana Boym, “Estrangement as a Lifestyle: Shklovsky and Brodsky,” Poetics Today 17, no. 
4 (Winter 1996): 511–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/1773211. 
4 For more on the significance of photography in Khodasevich’s poem, see Margarita 
Nafpaktitis, “Multiple Exposures of the Photographic Motif in Vladislav Khodasevich’s 
‘Sorrentinskie Fotografii,’” The Slavic and East European Journal 52, no. 3 (2008): 389–413. 
5 Greta Slobin, Russians Abroad: Literary and Cultural Politics of Diaspora (1919-1939) 
(Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2013), 78. She notes, for example, how in Nabokov’s Dar 
(The Gift, 1937), Fyodor’s memory of Russia is spectrally projected onto the cityscape of Berlin. 
Slobin, 86–88. 
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another.”6 Seidel dwells on the “aesthetic gain” of the creative writer in exile; separation from 
one’s homeland sharpens the imagination.7 Boym neatly summarizes these ideas when she writes 
that “the photographic double exposure exemplifies the exile’s double consciousness.”8 
Edward Said, who cautions against idealizing exile in his essay “Reflections on Exile,” 
does admit that there are positive gains to the exilic condition, such as seeing the world in a new 
fashion. “For an exile,” Said writes, “habits of life, expression, or activity in the new 
environment inevitably occur against the memory of these things in another environment. Thus 
both the new and old environments are vivid, actual, occurring together contrapuntally.”9 The 
Russian émigré writer Vladimir Nabokov, one of the figures of this dissertation, felt that the 
rupture of emigration gave him a “syncopal kick” that he privileged above the “anesthetic 
destinies” of remaining in the same place—a boring prospect characterized by a “primitive 
absence of perspective” (SM 250). This contrapuntal vision or “syncopal kick” of the émigré 
finds expression in the double-exposed photograph. On the other hand, David Bethea, in his 
study of the poet Joseph Brodsky (another figure in this dissertation), encourages us to not lose 
sight of the adverse effects of this “dual vision,” noting that “more often than not exile has had a 
disabling and crippling function precisely because the dual vision which is its essence has been 
not liberating but oppressive, a kind of linguistic death sentence.”10 Brodsky himself was reticent 
                                               
6 Michael Seidel, Exile and the Narrative Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986), ix. 
7 Seidel, x. 
8 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 296. 
9 Edward Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 186.  
10 David Bethea, Joseph Brodsky and the Creation of Exile (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 39. For a consideration of the creative potentials of bilingualism in exile, see 
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about romanticizing the position of the writer in exile.11 Indeed, not all manage to translate the 
disorienting perspective of emigration into an aesthetic object. 
In the chapters that follow, this dissertation asks what happens when Russian émigré 
authors dislocated from home attempt to narrate the self through the use of visual and verbal 
means. Concerned less with double exposure as a narrative device for representing the émigré’s 
experience of double consciousness, I turn to the medium of photography itself to explore how it 
functions within émigré narratives of the self.12 I examine how Vladimir Nabokov, Joseph 
Brodsky, Gary Shteyngart, and the visual artist Ilya Kabakov use photographs in their 
autobiographical works—from literary memoirs to art installations—as a device for representing 
the divided self in emigration and the traumas of the twentieth century.13 This dissertation 
                                               
Elizabeth Klosty Beaujour, Alien Tongues: Bilingual Russian Writers of the “First” Emigration 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Galya Diment likewise suggests that “literary 
bilingualism is one of the most fascinating developments of literature in exile.” Galya Diment, 
“English as Sanctuary: Nabokov’s and Brodsky’s Autobiographical Writings,” The Slavic and 
East European Journal 37, no. 3 (1993): 347, https://doi.org/10.2307/309281. 
11 See Brodsky’s essay “The Condition We Call Exile,” in On Grief and Reason (New York: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995). 
12 For more on the relationship between photography and literature in the Russian canon, see 
Katherine M. H. Reischl, Photographic Literacy: Cameras in the Hands of Russian Authors 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Stephen C. Hutchings, Russian Literary Culture in the 
Camera Age: The Word as Image (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Molly Thomasy 
Blasing, “Through the Lens of Loss: Marina Tsvetaeva’s Elegiac Photo-Poetics,” Slavic Review 
73, no. 1 (2014): 1–35, https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview.73.1.0001.  
13 Although they belong to different “waves” of emigration, these figures all spent some part of 
time in emigration in America in the second half of the twentieth century. For an overview of the 
history of Russian emigration, see John Glad, Russia Abroad: Writers, History, Politics (Tenafly, 
NJ: Hermitage & Birchbark Press, 1999). For a cultural history of the first-wave, see Marc Raeff, 
Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). For more on Russian Berlin, see Boris I. Nicolaevsky et al., eds., Russkii 
Berlin 1921-1923: po materialam arkhiva B.I. Nikolaevskogo v Guverovskom institute, 
Literaturnoe nasledstvo russkoi ėmigratsii (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1983). For studies on Russian 
émigrés in Paris, see Leonid Livak, How It Was Done in Paris: Russian Émigré Literature and 
French Modernism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); Leonid Livak, Russian 
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extends the trope of the double-exposed photograph to consider it as model for the genre of self-
narration. Given the retrospective nature of the autobiographical genre, the narratorial subject 
takes up her own past self as an object of study. The narrating “I” shapes, interprets, and 
constructs a narrative in which past and present self are imbricated. Multiple selves are layered 
within the narration, offering a textual variant of the visual double-exposed photograph. In 
addition, I take up the concept of double exposure to consider the hybrid nature of these texts 
which draw together verbal narrative and photographic images. The images in these works are 
not secondary to the text nor do they serve a purely illustrative function; they are part of the very 
fabric of the work. These works not only incorporate photographs, but actively interrogate their 
position within the work itself. Distinct from Khodasevich’s delight, the figures considered here 
display a more ambiguous relationship to photography. At times agonistic, at other times 
mutually reinforcing, the relationship between word and image takes center stage in these works. 
“Double exposure” thus works as a flexible concept in this dissertation: as a metaphor for exilic 
double consciousness and bilingualism; the autobiographical tension between multiple selves; 
and as a model for the composite structure of these texts that join together word and image.  
Bringing together photography and autobiography in this study, I explore how the 
“objective” medium of photography offers these authors a version of the self as visual object to 
be used creatively within their own self-representations.14 Self-representation, after all, involves 
                                               
Émigrés in the Intellectual and Literary Life of Interwar France: A Bibliographic Essay 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). For more on the third-wave, see Olga 
Matich and Michael Henry Heim, eds., The Third Wave: Russian Literature in Emigration (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1984). For a study of contemporary Russian émigré writers, see Adrian 
Wanner, Out of Russia: Fictions of a New Translingual Diaspora (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2011). 
14 Katherine Reischl’s book takes up a related subject but with a focus on pre-revolutionary and 
Soviet “author-photographers,” who “demonstrate how an authorial subject under creative duress 
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the transformation of one’s own subjectivity into an object of investigation. And the objectivity 
of the photograph cannot be divorced from the subjective experience of looking at and 
interpreting the sense data that the image supplies. The photograph’s uneasy relationship 
between objectivity and subjectivity makes it a rich source for autobiographical practices of self-
creation and self-investigation. The photographs and their textual mediation work as visual 
metonyms that stand in for the larger project of self-representation; they picture the act of 
picturing the self.  
Given that autobiography and photography were both highly politicized forms in the 
Soviet Union, what does it mean for émigré authors to take up these forms?15 How do they 
revive and subvert these forms? While the four figures of this dissertation belong to different 
epochs of emigration and represent different aesthetic sensibilities, each exhibits an ambivalence 
about how photographs preserve the past and what kind of information they provide us with, 
about how these images represent the self (and the family), and finally about how this form of 
representation compares with the written word. 
                                               
can reassert his own framing of an individual subjectivity through the hybrid intersections of text 
and image.” Reischl, Photographic Literacy, 11. 
15 The role of diaries and autobiographies as powerful forms that shaped Soviet subjectivity have 
recently been explored by Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck. Igal Halfin, Terror in My Soul: 
Communist Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Jochen 
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). In his work on autobiographies and the “Communist hermeneutics of 
the soul,” Halfin argues that narratives of the self—in the form of autobiographies, confessions, 
and self-criticism—were a crucial part not only of representing the New Soviet subject, but of 
actively forging it. The form of autobiography was prescribed: the eschatological narrative of 
Communism was the roadmap for an individual’s own journey towards the light. For more on 
photography as a propagandistic tool, see Margarita Tupitsyn, The Soviet Photograph, 1924–
1937 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
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Nabokov, in his autobiography Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited (1966), 
describes his flight from Russia after the Revolution and his years spent in Cambridge, Berlin, 
and Paris; the text concludes at the moment of his family’s second exodus, this time to America, 
as they narrowly escape German-occupied France in May 1940. Known as a highly visual writer, 
Nabokov reworks his autobiography and includes photographs for the first time during a period 
when he is actively shaping his authorial persona through visual media and paratextual elements. 
The photographs in Speak, Memory are an integral part of Nabokov’s authorial self-fashioning. 
Just 20 years later, Brodsky’s autobiographical essay “In a Room and a Half” (1986) meditates 
on his forced exile in 1972 and on how his expulsion from the Soviet Union prevented him from 
seeing his parents in Leningrad again as they were dying. Writing during a period steeped in 
photography theory, Brodsky does not include actual photographs in the essay, but photography 
emerges as one of the dominant metaphors for the discontinuities of memory. Shteyngart brings 
us into the age of social media with its new potentials for self-fashioning, but with his recent 
memoir Little Failure (2014) Shteyngart turns to the family archive of photos to examine his 
childhood in Leningrad and emigration to New York. This leads him to reflect on his family’s 
experience of the Holodomor (the Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932–33), the Second World War, 
and the Gulag, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, in order to consider how these events 
influence his hyphenated identity as a Russian-American.16 The visual artist Kabakov, known for 
                                               
16 Hyphenated identity refers to the immigrant-American identity. While the idea of the 
“hyphenated American” has been used as a derogatory category (othering one as not truly 
“American” or as unassimilable), at other times it has been embraced as a positive marker of 
multiculturalism and hybrid identities. For an overview on this issue, see Dominika Baran, 
“Hyphenated Identity,” in Language in Immigrant America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). For more on Shteyngart’s hyphenated identity, see Wanner, Out of Russia; Yelena 
Furman, “Hybrid Selves, Hybrid Texts: Embracing the Hyphen in Russian-American Fiction,” 
The Slavic and East European Journal 55, no. 1 (2011): 19–37. 
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his conceptualist works that interrogate and play with authorship, turns to an autobiographical 
mode after emigration. Creating installations and paintings that tell a narrative of the self through 
photographs and text, as well as several installations that present his mother’s self-narrative, 
Kabakov reflects on the traumas of the Soviet experience. 
As Walter Benjamin suggests in “The Storyteller,” death is the event that gives a life its 
“transmissible form” and thus this final ending is also the “sanction of everything that the 
storyteller can tell.”17 The end is what makes meaning, what allows us to understand a novelistic 
character’s life or indeed the narrative itself. Of course, a self-narrative will always necessarily 
be deprived of such an ending, for the story of one’s own life cannot be narrated from the 
privileged position of death. As I contend in this dissertation, emigration—although not a literal 
death—provides an ending within these self-narratives that retroactively determines the meaning 
of what came before. It is the sense of an ending that prompts these self-narratives, retrospective 
in nature, to look back on the past. For Nabokov, the rupture of emigration was made irrevocable 
by the revolution and the regime change. And although Brodsky was writing while the Soviet 
Union still existed, Shteyngart and Kabakov are both working after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In these narratives, the end of the Soviet Union stands as the event that confers meaning 
back onto the Soviet experience. And on a personal scale, the death of the parent haunts many of 
these texts but also generates and “sanctions” these stories. Various “endings” and deaths 
become entangled in these narratives. The personal narrative is inextricable from the larger 
historical narrative. The photographs, in turn, offer a way of mediating, exploring, accentuating 
those endings. In a moment of profound transition, these photographic objects enable continuity 
                                               
17 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1968), 94. 
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(or at least, the illusion of continuity), by offering access to a past that is irretrievable and yet 
preserved.  
The protagonists of this study all reveal an undecided attitude to the visual medium, both 
attracted and repelled by the promise of photographs. Their works pose a simple question: what 
is to be done with photographs in the second half of the twentieth century? What space do 
photographs hold in these works composed after the lessons of semiotics (and, with the 
exception of Nabokov’s text, after poststructuralism) have revealed that the photograph offers no 
more privileged access to reality than other forms of representation, just more adept in the 
practice of visual deception? Or with the knowledge that photographs are, by and large, ordinary 
and unexceptional, simply part of a social practice? In his sociological study of photography, 
Pierre Bourdieu shows how photographs, and family photographs in particular, are implicitly 
shaped by societal norms. The practice of photography is highly structured: “There is nothing 
more regulated and conventional than photographic practice,” he suggests, for people “obey 
implicit canons” of composition and subject matter when deciding what and how to 
photograph.18  
What happens when the everyday image is no longer transfigured through an estranged 
perspective as in Khodasevich’s double exposure, but remains banal, quotidian, just another 
family album photograph? Or when the photograph no longer necessarily holds the promise of 
connecting us with the past or resurrecting a lost loved one? And yet, most of the figures here 
find that photographs nonetheless exert some pull over them. There is a tension in these works 
                                               
18 Pierre Bourdieu, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1990), 7. For 
an ethnographic approach to amateur photography in America as a social form of visual 
communication, see Richard Chalfen, Snapshot Versions of Life (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling 
Green State University Popular Press, 1987).  
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between a suspicion about the limits of photographic representation and an imperative to 
preserve the traces of the past.  
The chapters of this dissertation examine the various modalities of this ambivalent 
approach to photographs as they intersect with narrating the self in emigration: Nabokov’s 
agonistic contest between photography and the visual word; Brodsky’s resigned acceptance of 
the modern photographic condition that ruptures the continuity of memory and experience; 
Shteyngart’s hyphenated suspension between two readings of the self from a Russian-American 
perspective; and Kabakov’s ironically sincere recuperation of an affective response after 
postmodernism. This ambivalence thus takes different forms in these works. At times, it surfaces 
with an ordinary photo from a family album unexceptional in its appearance but arresting for its 
revelation of the past. At other times, this ambivalence emerges around photographs that pale in 
comparison with memory and fail to resurrect the past. Or we encounter multiple readings of a 
single photograph that waver between irony and sincerity, between past and present selves, or 
between a “Russian” reading and an “American” one. In each case, this ambivalence invites us to 
consider the tension between an intellectual awareness of the limitations of photos and the 
affective power of photos. We will explore the trajectory that these modalities trace, moving us 
from modernism to postmodernism, and finally to the “new sincerity” after postmodernism.19 
Nabokov makes no secret of his disdain for the mechanical medium that fails to achieve 
what human memory can. He vaunts his own memory in opposition to the photographs included 
                                               
19 “New Sincerity,” often seen as a reaction to postmodernism, has been ascendant in 
Anglophone and Russian spheres since the 1980s. It trades ironic detachment for a renewed 
emotional sincerity. For more on sincerity in Russian culture, see Ellen Rutten, Sincerity after 
Communism: A Cultural History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). In the Anglo-
American context, see Adam Kelly, “The New Sincerity,” in Postmodern/Postwar and after: 
Rethinking American Literature, ed. Jason Gladstone, Andrew Hoberek, and Daniel Worden 
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2016). 
 11 
in Speak, Memory. And yet, the photos also prove to be an important and essential part of 
marketing the book, of maintaining and promoting his authorial image. We find him caught 
between the market demands of self-fashioning and the aesthetic imperative to preserve the 
auratic quality of his memory-text. He resolves this tension by attempting to reclaim authorship 
over these images. Brodsky also finds photos to be lacking, much like Nabokov. But rather than 
pitching photography against memory, he sees them in collusion. For Brodsky, both memory and 
photography are hopelessly fragmented, lacking in temporal continuity. Despite the failures of 
memory, however, Brodsky repeatedly turns to photos as traces of what remains. Brodsky’s 
essay articulates a resignation to the modern photographic condition, as these images are better 
than nothing and yet wholly not enough. 
While Shteyngart, like Brodsky, acknowledges that we should be suspicious of photos, as 
they are manipulable and deceptive, he ultimately devotes a great deal of narrative space to 
considering photographs within his memoir. Shteyngart delves into the family archive of 
photographs and engages in a kind of hyphenated reading: torn between an ironic reading of 
these images from an American perspective and an affective one from a Russian perspective. 
Ultimately, he insists on a connection with his Russian heritage that has been figured as tenuous 
or illegitimate given his young age at emigration. And Kabakov, the preeminent Russian 
postmodernist conceptual artist, shocks us as he too falls under the sway of the affective pull of 
photos of his mother, despite knowing all too well the constructed nature of photographic 
images.  
The photographs in these works become a productive site in Russian émigré culture of 
the second half of the twentieth century — a site for representing the divided self in emigration, 
the experience of trauma, and the convergence of personal and social history. The placement, 
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framing, and textual mediation of the images within these narratives will guide our attention. Our 
focus will be on how these authors make use of images as a space for critical reflection on the 
past, on the narratives they spin out of them, and on how they press them into service to narrate 
the self.20 
 
The Constructed Trace: Theories of Photography 
The ambivalent attitude to photographs that we will observe in these works cuts along 
similar lines to the critical divide that runs throughout the history of photography: between 
seeing photographs as evidentiary documents due to the indexical trace and seeing them as 
constructed images that are no more reliable than any other form of representation. 
Since its inception, photography has been seen as an exemplary method of objectively 
depicting nature. Mary Warner Marien suggests that before the invention of photography there 
existed what she refers to as the “idea of photography” in the Western cultural imagination: “the 
yearning in Western culture for a means of representation free from omission, distortion, style, 
murky subjectivity, or outside interference.”21 The camera obscura and the camera lucida offered 
more precise ways of copying from nature, but still required the skill of an artist’s hand. The 
                                               
20 I am influenced here by Marianne Hirsch’s theory of looking at family photographs. Hirsch 
suggests that the family album is an instrument of what she calls “the familial gaze,” which 
“situates human subjects in the ideology, the mythology, of the family as institution and projects 
a screen of familial myths between camera and subject.” The “familial look,” on the other hand, 
is “mediated by the familial gaze” but it is subjective, mutual, and specific (11). Hirsch argues 
that family photographs and the narratives that surround them can reveal the structures of the 
familial gaze and looks. Family photographs thus become a way of studying these visual 
relations through which the subject is constituted and constitutes herself. Marianne Hirsch, 
Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997).  
21 Mary Warner Marien, Photography and Its Critics: A Cultural History, 1839-1900 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5. 
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pervasive desire for an ever more objective way of representing the world, Marien suggests, is 
borne out by the fact that so many people were working toward fixing images by means of light 
at the same time: Thomas Wedgwood, William Henry Fox Talbot, and Sir John F. W. Herschel 
in England; Joseph Nicéphore Niépce and Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre in France. We cannot 
speak of a single inventor of photography; through their collective and individual 
experimentation, methods for impressing an image on light-sensitive material, preserving it, and 
reproducing it were eventually achieved.22  
Early practitioners and critics of photography emphasized the objectivity of the camera 
apparatus, its ability to record the impression of light on paper without the intervention of the 
artist’s hand. Daguerre declared his images to be “spontaneous reproductions” of nature: the 
apparatus “is not merely an instrument which serves to draw Nature; on the contrary it is a 
chemical and physical process which gives her the power to reproduce herself.”23 The title of 
William Henry Fox Talbot’s book of “sun-pictures” The Pencil of Nature (1844) also advanced 
the idea that it was nature herself who created these images, rather than the artist.24  
As such, photography has been seen as an objective ideal in its verisimilitude and to have 
strong referential power. To use Charles S. Peirce’s system of signs, the photograph is both icon 
                                               
22 For more on the history of photography, see Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography: 
From 1839 to the Present (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1982). For monographs on the 
history of photography in Russia and the Soviet Union, see David Elliott, ed., Photography in 
Russia 1840-1940 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1992); Elena Valentinovna Barkhatova, 
Russkaia svetopisʹ: pervyi vek fotoiskusstva: 1839-1914 (Sankt-Peterburg: Liki Rossii, 2009); 
Tupitsyn, The Soviet Photograph, 1924–1937. 
23 Alan Trachtenberg, ed., Classic Essays on Photography (New Haven, CT: Leete’s Island 
Books, 1980), 11, 13. 
24 In 1841, Fox Talbot had invented the calotype process (kalos means beautiful in Greek), which 
created a photographic negative that was strong enough that allowed for multiple copies to be 
produced. It is with the calotype process that the photograph becomes reproducible. 
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and index.25 Not only does the photograph iconically resemble the photographed object, but 
because of the photochemical process the image has been thought of as a causal trace of the 
referent. In André Bazin’s “Ontology of the Photographic Image” we find the classic argument 
that sutures together image and object. Bazin argued that photography surpassed painting in its 
referential ability, as it enjoys a certain “credibility” due to the mechanical apparatus of the 
camera and the photochemical process; “our obsession with realism” is finally satisfied with 
photography not because of the “result achieved but in the way of achieving it.”26 Thus in a 
photograph, he writes, “we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, 
actually re-presented, set before us, that is to say, in time and space.”27 He goes on to say 
emphatically that “the photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the 
conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no 
matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very 
process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.”28  
In his final text on photography, Camera Lucida (La Chambre claire 1980), Roland 
Barthes also articulates a physical, indexical connection between the photographed subject and 
                                               
25 “Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because we know 
that they are in certain respects exactly like the objects they represent. But this resemblance is 
due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were 
physically forced to correspond point by point to nature. In that aspect, then, they belong to the 
second class of signs, those by physical connection.” Charles S. Peirce, “Logic as Semiotic: The 
Theory of Signs,” in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1955), 106. 
26 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in What Is Cinema?, trans. Hugh 
Gray, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 12. 
27 Bazin, 13–14. Italics in the original. 
28 Bazin, 14. Italics in the original. 
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the photograph. “It is as if the Photograph always carries its referent with itself,” he writes, 
imagining the image and the model to be as if “glued together, limb by limb.”29 According to 
Barthes, the photograph constitutes “an emanation of the referent” which produces “radiations” 
from the “real body” of the referent that was there, and these rays of light “ultimately touch me, 
who am here.”30 For Barthes, the referential power of the photograph—the unshakeable 
affirmation that «ça a été» (this-has-been)—is the noeme or essence of the medium.31  
A semiotic appraisal of photography would caution, however, that such images are just as 
constructed as any other system of signs. Barthes’s earlier structuralist analysis of the 
photograph, as put forward in “The Photographic Message” (1961), splits the photograph into 
two levels of signification: denotation and connotation. This, says Barthes, is the “photographic 
paradox.”32 On the one hand, the “special status” of photography lies in its pure denotation: it is 
“a message without a code.”33 Nonetheless, the photograph is also a culturally coded message 
(connotation), which makes the photo legible as a system of signification. Barthes thus both 
insists on the force of the indexical trace of reality (the uncoded part of the photograph—what he 
would later call the photograph’s “punctum”) but also on its rhetorical power as a coded message 
                                               
29 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 5–6. 
30 Barthes, 80. 
31 Barthes had already focused on this denotative “having-been-there” aspect of photography 
prior to writing Camera Lucida, in his essay “Rhetoric of the Image.” Roland Barthes, Image–
Music–Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 44. 
32 Barthes, 19. 
33 Barthes, 17. 
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that can be analyzed. What is unique about the photograph—as opposed to other forms of 
representation—is that its coded message “develops on the basis of a message without a code.”34  
Although the image is constructed and can be decoded semiotically like any other form of 
representation, the indexical claim of the photograph seems to set it apart. The index is one of the 
defining features theorists have turned to in order to argue for the photograph’s distinction from 
other forms of representation.35 And it is the power of indexical presence that makes 
photography compelling for many of the figures considered in this dissertation.  
However, other critics have brought into question just how privileged or legitimate 
photography’s claim to indexicality or referentiality truly is. In his work on aesthetics, Nelson 
Goodman reminds us that the system of linear perspective for realistic depiction is conventional 
and culturally constructed, and that the highly “realist” depiction we find in photography is no 
exception.36 Arguing against Ernst Gombrich and others who view linear perspective (a method 
for depicting the illusion of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional plane) as simply the 
                                               
34 Barthes, 19. 
35 The index is also the element of the photograph that has interested many contemporary visual 
artists. It is this uncoded indexical certificate of bodily or physical presence that, according to art 
theorist Rosalind Krauss, serves as the unifying thread of the disparate artworks of the 1970s art 
scene, such as installation pieces, conceptual art, and earthworks, as well as video, performance, 
and body art. The idea of the photograph as index becomes a model for abstract art (a lineage she 
traces from Marcel Duchamp’s readymades), as these works operate on a “pure installation of 
presence by means of the index.” Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in 
America,” October 3 (1977): 80, https://doi.org/10.2307/778437. Krauss describes the index as 
resulting from “the natural world that imprints itself on the photographic emulsion and 
subsequently on the photographic print. This quality of transfer or trace gives to the photograph 
its documentary status, its undeniable veracity.” Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies 
Art in America. Part 2,” October 4 (1977): 59, https://doi.org/10.2307/778480. 
36 Goodman writes: “Pictures in perspective, like any others, have to be read; and the ability to 
read has to be acquired.” Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of 
Symbols (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1968), 15. 
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geometrically correct way to transcribe the way objects appear,37 Goodman suggests that 
perspective is pure convention by dismantling the idea that it accords with the laws of optics and 
geometry.38 The vision of the world that photography creates is a no less constructed form of 
representation. The way we have learned to read photographs is culturally constructed; Goodman 
notes ethnographic accounts of how those who have never before seen a photograph do not 
instinctively or naturally recognize them as images of the “real,” but rather need to learn how to 
read and decipher them.39  
We need only consider the history of the camera apparatus to see why photographic 
images, like a painting that employs orthogonal lines or foreshortening to create the illusion of 
depth and perspective, must be learned how to be read. As the art historian Joel Snyder reminds 
us, the camera is not a “natural machine” that magically delivers up the world as it really is; the 
camera was invented as a tool and was developed over time in accordance with such 
conventional principles and schemata as linear perspective “to aid painters and draughtsmen in 
the production of certain kinds of pictures.”40 In addition, Snyder repudiates the oft-cited idea 
                                               
37 Linear perspective was first theorized by Leon Battista Alberti in De pictura (1435). In his 
book Art and Illusion, Gombrich argues that perspective, the geometrical technique of pictorial 
representation, is the objectively correct way of representing reality. E. H. Gombrich, Art and 
Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1960). 
38 To illustrate his point, Goodman uses the example of how railroad tracks running into the 
distance are drawn so that they are converging whereas telephone poles that extend upward are 
drawn in parallel, even though geometry would dictate that they too should be drawn as 
converging. Thus, he concludes that “the artist who wants to produce a spatial representation that 
the present-day Western eye will accept as faithful must defy ‘the laws of geometry.’” Goodman, 
Languages of Art, 16. 
39 Goodman cites ethnographer Melville J. Herskovits who describes this as a common 
occurrence in cultures where photography is an alien form of representation. Goodman, 15n15. 
40 Joel Snyder, “Picturing Vision,” Critical Inquiry 6, no. 3 (1980): 510–11. See also Joel Snyder 
and Neil Walsh Allen, “Photography, Vision, and Representation,” Critical Inquiry 2, no. 1 
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that the photographic image is produced through the direct “impression” of the object onto the 
surface, noting that this is a false premise for indexicality: “Objects are not active in the 
photographic process, rather it is light that effects a change in the photosensitive medium.”41 
Nonetheless, even with this knowledge that light alone is responsible for the image or 
that it is just another two-dimensional image with no more purchase on the truth than any other 
form of representation, this is not how we tend to relate to photographs. Although the belief in 
the photograph’s special status—the causal link to the referent—has fallen out of favor among 
critics, Mitchell has asked why this “naïve” view nonetheless remains so intractable. Returning 
us to Barthes’s division of the photograph into the denotative and the connotative, Mitchell 
suggests that “one connotation always present in the photograph is that it is a pure denotation.” 
One of the coded meanings of the photograph that we “read” in the image—and what irreducibly 
separates it from other forms of representation—is its denotative “uncoded” aspect. As a result, 
“the photograph is ‘read’ as if it were the trace of an event.”42  
Like Mitchell, Corey Creekmur has also expressed reservations about how those who 
“respond to photographs as evidence of the actuality of the objects they represent” are cast as 
                                               
(1975): 149. They note that the technology the camera grew out of—the camera obscura with a 
lens—had been used for over 200 years prior to the experiments of Daguerre and others to 
capture the image; the design of the camera over this time had thus evolved in accordance with 
the way artists used the device to aid them in their work. 
41 Snyder, “Picturing Vision,” 508. In an earlier article, Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen make 
a similar point that the commonly held notion that the object photographed produces the image is 
not entirely accurate: it is the light and light alone reflecting off the object that creates the 
photograph, not the object itself. They also take issue with the idea of the object imprinting its 
image onto the light-sensitive material, reminding us that “an image is simply not a property 
which things naturally possess in addition to possessing size and weight. The image is a crafted, 
not a natural, thing.” Snyder and Allen, “Photography, Vision, and Representation,” 151.  
42 W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 284. 
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“(ideological) dupes.”43 He wonders: “Might the realist belief in photographic truth be at times a 
conscious, even if desperate, fantasy of the sort acknowledged by disavowal: ‘I know [a 
photograph doesn’t guarantee a pre-photographic referent], but…?’”44 Creekmur thus leaves 
aside the question of the indexical status of photographs and investigates “how photographs are 
emotionally consumed.”45 He writes, “I believe a photograph of a lost loved one might have the 
affective power to make even a semiotician, who knows better, weep.”46 This divided response 
cuts along the same lines as Barthes’s dual system in analyzing the photograph: connotation and 
denotation, as well as his later division of the photograph into studium (the information of the 
photograph) and punctum (the uncoded detail of the photograph that pierces the viewer). It is this 
divided response—between a semiotic awareness of photographs as constructed and an affective 
response to the indexical certificate of presence—that we will see in the works considered in this 
dissertation. 
The critical, divided, uncertain attitude to photos we see in these works fits in with what 
Martin Jay has seen as the “anti-ocular” turn in Western thought, especially in France, in the 
twentieth century. He contends that twentieth-century Western discourse betrays “a profound 
suspicion of vision and its hegemonic role in the modern era,”47 tracing this ocular-skepticism 
                                               
43 Corey K. Creekmur, “Lost Objects: Photography, Fiction, and Mourning,” in Photo-
Textualities: Reading Photographs and Literature, ed. Marsha Bryant (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1995), 75. 
44 Creekmur, 75. Brackets in original. 
45 Creekmur, 75. 
46 Creekmur, 75. 
47 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 14.  
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back to the nineteenth century, when the previous “hegemonic scopic regime” of Cartesian 
perspectivalism had already begun to shift in large part because technological innovations, such 
as the invention of photography, changed the way we see.48 Photography—as well as other 
optical technologies, such as the diorama, the stereoscope, chronophotography, and finally 
cinema—offered an unprecedented realist vision of the world, but simultaneously inaugurated 
great doubt in our ability to see. The practice of retouching photographs and spirit photography 
illuminated how susceptible we are to being tricked by illusory visions. Moreover, these optical 
devices offered a challenge to the naked eye, revealing details that could otherwise not be 
discerned, thus making clear the limits of vision. As with the paradigmatic example of Eadweard 
Muybridge’s stop-action photographs of a galloping horse (1878), what we see is not always 
what actually is. 
Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century these new ways of seeing had led to a 
peculiar paradox: a profusion of ever more realistic depictions of the visible world, and yet a 
deepening distrust in vision. No longer could the veracity of vision be trusted. Indeed, one of the 
lessons of the twentieth century must be how easily we can be fooled by such documents—from 
the Nazi propaganda film at the Theresienstadt concentration camp to the erasure of victims of 
Stalin’s Purges from photographs. The manipulation of photography by totalitarian regimes, such 
as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, furthers this crisis in representation—in what it is we think 
a photograph can do, what we take it to be.  
Put simply, what is to be done with photographs not only after the lessons of 
poststructuralism and semiotics, but also after the manipulation of images in authoritarian 
governments? At the end of his memoir, Nabokov caustically describes his acquaintance with a 
                                               
48 Jay, 113. 
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German student “whose hobby was capital punishment” during his period of emigration in Berlin 
(SM 278). Assiduous in his pursuit of public executions, the student (a humanities PhD student, 
no less) derived pleasure from capturing on film spectacles of death and torture. Nabokov 
imagines his delight now showing “the absolutely wunderbar pictures he took during Hitler’s 
reign” (SM 279). Nabokov presents photography as a medium compromised by its association 
with authoritarian violence. Brodsky, on the other hand, turns his photographic fragments of 
memory into a kind of protest—he sees the preservation of his memory as acting against the 
interests of the Soviet state. Shteyngart and Kabakov both use photos to interrogate the end of 
the Soviet Union and the legacy of the Soviet experience, albeit from different perspectives and 
with different claims on that experience. A divided attitude to the photographic medium marks 
these works, caught between a suspicion about the evidentiary aspect of photographs and a need 
to preserve the trace fragments of the past given the century’s scale of loss. 
 
Autobiography and Photography 
“A photograph is a reduction of the endless and unmanageable 
world to a little rectangle. A photograph is our measure of the world. 
A photograph is also a memory. Remembering means reducing the 
world to little rectangles. Arranging the little rectangles in an album 
is autobiography. Between these two genres, the family album and 
autobiography, there is undoubtedly a connection: the album is a 
material autobiography, autobiography is a verbal album.”49 
Dubravka Ugrešić, The Museum of Unconditional Surrender 
 
As Ugrešić suggests, “there is undoubtedly a connection” between autobiography and the 
family photograph album. Indeed, the genres of autobiography and photography both have in 
common the fact that they claim to represent a real-life referent. Similar questions about the 
                                               
49 Dubravka Ugrešić, The Museum of Unconditional Surrender (New York: New Directions, 
1999), 27. 
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referentiality of the photograph also irk the study of autobiography and self-narration. Just as the 
claim for photography’s “special status” that separates it from other forms of visual 
representation has been the subject of debate, so too has the claim that autobiography is 
generically distinct from a first-person fictional narrative, such as David Copperfield, rested on 
autobiography’s special claim to referentiality. Does the autobiography refer to a real-world 
subject, or does it actively create a subject? Does a coherent self write her own autobiography, or 
it is through the act of writing that the self is created?  
Philippe Lejeune defines autobiography as a “retrospective prose narrative written by a 
real person concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the 
story of his personality.”50 How can we know the narrator, protagonist, and author share the 
same identity? To whom does the pronoun “I” refer in these first-person narratives? Lejeune 
acknowledges that there is little within the text that enables a reader to distinguish an 
autobiography from a fictional first-person narrative. Rather, we must turn to extra-textual 
markers, such as the author’s name on the title page, to verify the coincidence of author and 
narrator. Thus, Lejeune claims that part of what defines autobiography is contractual: there is an 
autobiographical pact made between author and reader. The pact indicates that the author, 
narrator, and protagonist of the narrative are all the same person and that the autobiography 
references this subject.51 That the subject tries to tell the truth of his life as he understands it is, 
for Lejeune, the “referential pact” that the author enters into in good faith. This pact can be 
                                               
50 Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography, ed. Paul John Eakin, trans. Katherine M. Leary 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 4. 
51 For Lejeune, biography and autobiography (unlike fiction) “are referential texts: exactly like 
scientific or historical discourse, they claim to provide information about a ‘reality’ exterior to 
the text, and so to submit to a test of verification” Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography, ed. Paul 
John Eakin, trans. Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 22. 
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“badly kept” and result in a wholly inaccurate depiction, but nonetheless the autobiography will 
remain distinct from fiction. “Even if the story is, historically, completely false, it will be on the 
order of the lie (which is an ‘autobiographical’ category) and not of fiction.”52  
Such a claim should sound familiar. Lejeune’s insistence on autobiography’s enduring 
reference to a real-world person even in the face of an account that does not resemble the subject 
in many ways rehearses Bazin’s claim that a photograph, no matter how distorted, still refers to 
the subject. (A claim that Snyder and others, as we saw, categorically refute.) The photographic 
image of the author within a self-narrative would seem to support Lejeune’s autobiographical 
pact that insists on the unity of author, narrator, and protagonist and on the narrative’s ability to 
refer to the world beyond the text, as the photograph seems to indexically “point” to the author.  
Theorists of the autobiographical act have since debated the referential claim of the 
genre. The idea of the autobiographical author as a sovereign coherent subject who can set forth 
the story of her life has been challenged by post-structuralist theory that proclaimed the death of 
the author. Barthes’s “The Death of the Author” (1967) and Michel Foucault’s “What is an 
Author?” (1969) exhorted readers to disregard the author and to focus on the text. 53 The author 
was dethroned as the sole authority governing the meaning of the text.54 Such a move is 
                                               
52 Lejeune, On Autobiography, 17. 
53 Svetlana Boym has questioned whether “the death of the author” is an appropriate framework 
for Russian works of the twentieth century, given the reality of the literal death of so many 
authors under the Soviet regime. Svetlana Boym, Death in Quotation Marks: Cultural Myths of 
the Modern Poet (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
54 As Seán Burke points out, Barthes’s account of the death of the author in this essay is 
predicated on conceiving of the author as highly authorial. His conception of what an author is 
harks back to a particular brand of authorship that is more in keeping with a 19th century 
sensibility, which figures the author as a God-like figure. Burke notes that this is the concept of 
the author that Barthes’s argument rests on, however it ignores the contemporary status of the 
author in the twentieth century after Russian Formalism, which sought to concentrate on the text 
and not the author, or American New Criticism’s formalist approach that spoke about the 
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underwritten by the idea (as found in linguistics, semiotics, as well as psychoanalysis) that 
subjects both use and are used by language. As Emile Benveniste writes, “It is in and through 
language that man constitutes himself as a subject.”55 Thus in an article positing the “end” of 
autobiography, Michael Sprinker notes that, if we accept the idea that “the self is constituted by a 
discourse that it never completely masters,” how can we claim the author of an autobiography to 
be in control of the text she produces?56 Judith Butler, in Giving an Account of Oneself, 
approaches a similar question but from the standpoint of how this affects our ethical relationship 
to and responsibility for others. Butler argues that the subject is opaque to herself because she is 
fundamentally formed in relation to another and that this formation is in many ways 
“irrecoverable” to the conscious mind.57 Furthermore, she points to how the “terms” or language 
we have at our disposal to narrate ourselves are already social and so are chosen but not fully 
chosen freely.58 Thus, the “subject’s self-crafting” unfolds “in relation to an imposed set of 
norms.” The self is “produced by a world, even as one must produce oneself in some way.”59 
Essentially, Butler argues that a large part of what constitutes the self is not produced by the self 
                                               
intentional fallacy. See Chapter One in The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and 
Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992). 
55 Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral 
Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 224. 
56 James Olney, ed., Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 342. 
57 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 20. 
58 Butler, 21–26. 
59 Butler, 19. 
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nor is it consciously accessible to or retrievable by the subject, and so as relational beings this 
opacity in our self-knowledge means that we can never give a full account of the self.   
In his 1979 essay “Autobiography as Defacement,” Paul de Man points to how the 
account we give of the self is determined by language, by genre, and by the structures of 
narrative we are given to make meaning out of our lives. He suggests that “the autobiographical 
project may itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact 
governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by 
the resources of his medium.”60 De Man suggests that the act of writing produces the self, rather 
than documents it.61 The form of the autobiographical narrative prescribes how the author will 
portray herself, and the desire for an apt metaphor or a poetic coincidence introduces fiction into 
the work.62 He thus argues that autobiography is a mode of reading rather than a referential 
                                               
60 Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 69. 
61 We would be remiss not to note the irony of de Man’s argument, given the role that his own 
biography would go on to play in the reception of his work posthumously. As Seán Burke notes 
in the prologue to his classic study that deconstructs the poststructuralist theory of the death of 
the author, when de Man’s biography came to haunt him after his literal death, those on either 
side of the debate invoked his biography as an attempt to expiate or condemn his work. Either 
critics understood his later work to be a kind of oblique confession written out of a desire to 
distance himself from his previous collaborationist texts or they saw it as a continuation of his 
earlier work and his collaborationist opinions. Although de Man had argued for the removal of 
the author from the work, his own biography then came to be central to many interpretations of 
his work. Burke, The Death and Return of the Author. 
62 Paul John Eakin has also put forward the idea that fiction is a necessary part of any 
autobiographical act. He writes that autobiography is “both an art of memory and an art of 
imagination” and that many autobiographers see fiction as “a central feature” of the “truth they 
propose to tell,” “an ineluctable fact of the life of consciousness.” Eakin demonstrates that self-
invention, however, does not occur only when writing the autobiography, but in lived 
experience.  Paul John Eakin, Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 7. 
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genre, as we are caught up “within an undecidable situation” between autobiography and fiction 
when we read.63  
It is striking, though, that de Man introduces the seeds of doubt about the referential 
status of autobiography by comparing it with photography: “But are we so certain that 
autobiography depends on reference, as a photograph depends on its subject or a (realistic) 
picture on its model?”64 De Man holds up photography as an exemplar of referentiality that 
autobiography can only aspire to. However, as we have already explored in this introduction, 
photography’s referential force is perhaps less certain than de Man suggests. 
How, then, are we to understand the status of the photograph within an autobiographical 
work? Does it secure the referential claim of the narrative by visually pointing to the 
autobiographical subject? Or does the instability of photographic signification and its disputed 
evidentiary claim simply retrace similar fault lines that mark the autobiographical project?  
Linda Haverty Rugg and Timothy Dow Adams have both taken up these questions in 
their explorations of the relationship between photography and autobiography. In Picturing 
Ourselves, Rugg notes that photographs within autobiographies both “disrupt the singularity of 
the autobiographical pact by pointing to a plurality of selves” but also give physical expression 
to the idea of “the embodied subject.”65 If the autobiographical narrative works to posit a 
continuous, fully integrated subject, then the inclusion of photographs from different life periods 
                                               
63 de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement,” 70. While de Man suggests that autobiography is 
less a genre than a mode of reading, Elizabeth Bruss argues that autobiography as a form is best 
understood as a speech act. Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation 
of a Literary Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
64 de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement,” 69. 
65 Haverty-Rugg, Picturing Ourselves, 13.  
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can work to undermine this stance. At the same time, these photographs also seem to reinforce 
the textual narrative’s reference to the physical body out in the world. For, if we set aside the 
critique of photography as a constructed form of representation like any other, the everyday use 
of photographs as a form of identification (passports, driver’s license, ID cards) also seems to 
operate within autobiography as proof of the author’s identity.  
In addition to the question of referentiality that both these forms pose, Rugg notes that the 
autobiographical imperative to take up one’s former self as the object of study is also played out 
when we look at photographs of ourselves, an experience that offers a glimpse of the self as 
other.66 As Barthes writes, the photo is “the advent of myself as other.”67 The photograph offers 
a way of seeing myself in a way that otherwise I never can. For Susan Sontag, this edges on a 
kind of symbolic violence: “To photograph people is to violate them, by seeing them as they 
never see themselves, by having knowledge of them they can never have; it turns people into 
objects that can be symbolically possessed.”68 And yet, to see this only as a form of violence 
leaves out the fact that we are relational beings, forged in connection with others, and that we are 
always being seen by others in ways we cannot fully know. The photograph dramatizes this 
scene, as an other’s vision of us becomes externalized as an object that we too can tangibly 
grasp. And so, while photography might commit a kind of symbolic violence as Sontag suggests, 
it can also aid us in our attempt to understand the self. The experience of seeing the self as other 
through photographs becomes part of how these authors navigate the challenge of narrating the 
                                               
66 Linda Haverty Rugg, Picturing Ourselves: Photography and Autobiography (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5. 
67 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 12. 
68 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), 14. 
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self. The nexus of photography and narration in these works puts forward a vision of the self as 
something to be constructed but also as already constructed through the very objects, photos, and 
narratives we have at our disposal to understand the self. 
Considering photographs as indexical documents that seem to provide evidence but also 
as highly indeterminate images that tell alternative narratives and demand interpretation, I read 
the photographs as an integral component of self-construction in these works, rather than as 
transparent illustrations of the self. Guided by the idea that the archive actively produces 
knowledge, rather than being a mere repository of meaning, I approach the inclusion and 
arrangement of photographs within these works as a key element of self-construction.69 In 
navigating the family archive of photographs as well as in arranging, selecting, and captioning 
the photos within their text or installation, these authors produce a new archive of photos that 
tells a particular narrative of the self and of the family, rather than merely presenting this 
material. Indeed, this is the very principle of autobiography—by selecting and arranging parts of 
one’s life into a particular narrative form a version of the self is produced. 
 
Word and Image 
Bringing together photography and autobiography, these works demand to be read both 
verbally and visually. In my consideration of the interart nature of these works, I am guided by 
W. J. T. Mitchell’s extensive work on the relationship between the visual and the verbal.70 
                                               
69 Derrida notes that the structure of the archive inevitably determines what can be archived and 
how it is archived, thus shaping and producing the historical record. He writes, “archivization 
produces as much as it records the event.” Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian 
Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 17. 
70 By “interart,” I refer to the tradition of comparison between art forms. Horace’s analogy “Ut 
pictura poesis” (as is painting so is poetry) serves as the classic formulation motivating this 
comparison. A full bibliography of interart studies (or even just word-and-image studies) would 
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Mitchell intervenes in the interdisciplinary study of literature and the visual arts to suggest that 
we should move beyond what he calls the “Sister Arts” method of criticism which compares one 
art form with another from a given period (pairing a cubist painting, for example, with a poem by 
Ezra Pound). Instead, Mitchell suggests we should engage with the “image/text problem” by 
considering the relationship between the visual and verbal within a given work. Such an 
approach lends itself most obviously to analyzing composite works that combine text and image 
(illustrated books, photographic essays, comic strips, as well as the synthetic forms of theater and 
cinema), but Mitchell goes so far as to say that all works negotiate this tension between image 
and text:  
The image/text problem is not just something constructed ‘between’ the arts, the media, 
or different forms of representation, but an unavoidable issue within the individual arts 
and media. In short, all arts are ‘composite’ arts (both text and image); all media are 
mixed media, combining different codes, discursive conventions, channels, sensory and 
cognitive modes.71 
 
                                               
be extensive, but see James A. W. Heffernan, Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from 
Homer to Ashbery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Wendy Steiner, The Colors of 
Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation between Modern Literature and Painting (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982); Molly Brunson, Russian Realisms: Literature and Painting, 
1840–1890 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2016); Andreas Huyssen, Miniature 
Metropolis: Literature in an Age of Photography and Film (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2015); François Brunet, Photography and Literature (London: Reaktion Books, 2009); 
Jefferson Hunter, Image and Word: The Interaction of Twentieth-Century Photographs and Texts 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Karen Beckman and Liliane Weissberg, eds., 
On Writing with Photography (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).  
71 Mitchell, Picture Theory, 94–95. One of his fundamental examples for this claim that there is 
no such thing as a purely visual or purely verbal work comes from a consideration of the medium 
of writing. “Viewed from either side, from the standpoint of the visual or the verbal, the medium 
of writing deconstructs the possibility of a pure image or pure text, along with the opposition 
between the ‘literal’ (letters) and the ‘figurative’ (pictures) on which it depends. Writing, in its 
physical, graphic form, is an inseparable suturing of the visual and verbal, the ‘imagetext’ 
incarnate” (95). 
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When considering a work as a composite imagetext, Mitchell encourages us to look at its specific 
“image-text structure” to consider what determines the particular kind of relationship between 
the visual and verbal in this work.72 Elsewhere, Mitchell contends that the relationship between 
text and image should be understood “as a social and historical one.”73 What, Mitchell asks, are 
the ideological underpinnings that structure how the boundary between word and image is 
figured. Thus the debates over the relative merits of the arts, or paragone (“comparison”), that 
animated theoretical discussions during the Renaissance (and beyond) should be historicized, 
rather than taken as absolute definitions of what a given form can and should do. Put simply, 
what are the forces (social, historical, aesthetic) that shape the presentation of word and image in 
a given work or in a theoretical tract on aesthetics? 
And so, when Nabokov stages a highly agonistic encounter between the word and the 
photographic image in Speak, Memory, we will consider how the boundary drawn between these 
two forms is neither neutral nor natural, but is instead indicative of a suspicion of the mechanical 
medium and an aesthetic valorization of the human capacity for memory indebted to Henri 
Bergson’s philosophy of duration. Moreover, we will examine how the division of labor between 
word and image as articulated in the memoir intersects with a desire for authorial control on the 
one hand and the creation of an authorial persona on the other. While Nabokov sharply 
differentiates between the verbal and the photographic, in Brodsky’s autobiographical essay “In 
a Room and a Half” the two are drawn into an uneasy alliance. Brodsky’s essay—which proffers 
up descriptions of photographs but withholds the actual images—aligns the limitations of 
                                               
72 As he writes, “The relative value, location, and the very identity of ‘the verbal’ and ‘the visual’ 
is exactly what is in question.” Mitchell, 90. 
73 W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 157. 
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memory with the fragmentary quality of photographs. I suggest that, formally, we can see the 
textual narrative as remediated through the newer medium of photography, as it unfolds in 
photographic fragments that accentuate the discontinuities of memory and experience.74 As I 
argue, this relationship between word and image in Brodsky’s essay is postmodern in its 
privileging of spatial forms that emphasize discontinuity and rupture, as opposed to the temporal 
continuity of duration. While in Shteyngart’s work the relationship between word and image is 
more harmonious, each illuminating the other, in Kabakov’s installations word and image are 
often presented as discordant, thus raising questions about the relationship between 
representation and reality in general. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
In the first half of this dissertation, I consider photography and the problem of visual 
memory in Nabokov and Brodsky’s work. I explore how both authors disparage photography, 
which I suggest can be traced back to Bergson’s concept of duration (durée) and his critique of 
the photographic snapshot.75 While both Nabokov and Brodsky’s engage in a similar critique of 
                                               
74 Here I am influenced by Andreas Huyssen’s use of Marshall McLuhan’s concept of 
“remediation,” the process by which a new form like film or photography remediates the older 
form of the novel. Huyssen describes a process of “remediation in reverse,” in which the 
emergence of a new medium (such as photography) influences an older form (such as literature), 
in his account of the modernist miniature in German literature of the early 20th century. Huyssen, 
Miniature Metropolis. 
75 Lev Loseff notes that Brodsky and his generation eagerly read “prerevolutionary editions of 
Nietzsche, Bergson, Freud.” Lev Loseff, Joseph Brodsky: A Literary Life (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2011), 33. Nabokov cited Bergson as one of his “top favorites” when he was in 
Western Europe from the ages of 20 to 40. Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1973), 43. For more on Nabokov and Bergson, see Leona Toker, “Nabokov and 
Bergson,” in The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov, ed. Vladimir E. Alexandrov (New 
York: Garland, 1995); Michael Glynn, Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Formalist 
Influences in His Novels (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Marijeta Bozovic, “Bergson 
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photography, as we will see they interpret memory’s relationship to the photographic medium 
quite differently. 
In his theory of duration, first put forward in Time and Free Will (1889), Bergson argues 
that inner experience is in a constant state of flux, ever changing and flowing between states, and 
thus cannot be quantified, measured, or divided. We encounter difficulties in thinking duration, 
however, because of the constraints of language, the homogenized time of the clock, and other 
aspects of social life that lead us to fragment, abstract, and spatialize the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of temporal duration. In the final chapter of Creative Evolution (L’Évolution 
créatice, 1907), Bergson describes this false consciousness through an extended discussion of 
what he calls the “cinematographical character of our knowledge.”76 Instead of perceiving the 
flow of becoming, we abstract this perpetual process of change and break it down into discrete 
states; the cinematograph, he suggests, offers a metaphor for the mind’s false perception of 
duration. If we wanted to portray a “living picture” of a marching band on screen, we might take 
a series of photographs of the soldiers and then project these images through a cinematograph at 
rapid succession. While this may give the impression of movement, Bergson contends that such a 
method fails to truly animate the images: “with immobility set beside immobility, even 
endlessly, we could never make movement.”77 This mechanical form of perception is akin to our 
vision of reality. Bergson writes: 
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside 
them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of 
the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string 
                                               
and The Texture of Time,” in Nabokov’s Canon: From Onegin to Ada (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2016). 
76 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998), 306. 
77 Bergson, 305. 
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them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus 
of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming 
itself.78 
 
The cinematograph can never escape the fact that its illusory moving picture is produced through 
static still images that fragment and abstract true movement. This cinematographic trick is 
emblematic of the way our mind encounters difficulties in thinking duration. However, for 
Bergson, it is art that can overcome this “cinematographic” cast of mind. Art brings us closest to 
intuiting the true nature of things, to experiencing pure duration. In his essay on laughter, 
Bergson suggests that “between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own 
consciousness a veil is interposed: a veil that is dense and opaque for the common herd,—thin, 
almost transparent, for the artist and the poet.”79 The artist can creatively intuit the flow of 
duration and perceive the “inner life of things.”80  
Bergson’s thought accords with Nabokov’s modernist belief in art’s ability to break 
through the “veil” of habituated perception and discern the inner reality of things through their 
form. And like Bergson, Nabokov too finds fault with the photograph: its flat and static 
representation lacks movement, color, and the subtle vibration of the inner existence of things. 
Nabokov contrasts this photographic mode of representation with his rich visual memory, which 
allows him to vividly paint a vision of the past that he then steps back into, escaping the “prison 
of time” (SM 20). Chapter One examines how the inclusion of photographs in the third version of 
Nabokov’s autobiography, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited stages an agonistic 
                                               
78 Bergson, 306. 
79 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton 
and Fred Rothwell (London: Dodo Press, 2007), 74. 
80 Bergson, 76. 
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encounter between the photographic medium and the visual word. Nabokov, I suggest, treats 
these photographs as an incursion into his territory as a visual writer but also a necessary part of 
his social capital. After all, Nabokov is known as a highly visual writer who claimed a high level 
of control over meaning in his texts. However, the photographs pose a potential stumbling block 
for the visual writer’s investment in control, both because he is not the author of the images and 
because of the indeterminacy of meaning in photographs. In Chapter One, we will see how 
Nabokov seeks to position himself as the photographs’ true author, with the ability to fix their 
meaning, through the captions. He does so by disparaging the photographs, denying their ability 
to represent accurately, accentuating their falsity, ultimately in order to position his own visual 
memory as superior. For Nabokov, as for Bergson, the photograph lacks the vitality and 
movement of temporal duration. It is through the written word — his captions — that Nabokov 
attempts to reanimate these images, injecting time and movement into them. 
Nabokov’s agonistic approach to the photographs within his autobiography is attenuated 
by the presence of two snapshots taken by his wife Véra. The divisive encounter between photo 
and caption that characterizes the other photographs now transforms into a positive relationship, 
as word and image mutually reinforce each other. This example of artistic coproduction between 
Nabokov and Véra approaches a more dialogic model of authorship. Véra’s photographs open up 
memory, rather than foreclose it.   
In Chapter Two, I explore how Brodsky critiques photography along similar lines in his 
essay “In a Room and a Half.” Like Nabokov, Brodsky bemoans photographs as fragmented, 
lacking movement and continuity. They offer a false representation of our lived experience of 
duration. However, while Nabokov contrasts the photographic medium’s inferior preservation of 
the past with the transfigurative power of his visual memory to regain lost time, Brodsky 
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conceives of memory as all too photographic. In Brodsky’s essay, memory ruptures continuity 
and preserves only an arbitrary assortment of details. In stark contrast with Nabokov’s memory 
that preserves the past as an “exquisite simulacrum—the beauty of intangible property” (SM 40), 
Brodsky sees memory as “an ally of oblivion, […] an ally of death” (LTO 492). Memory 
fragments experience like the camera does; he reproaches the “missing frames” of memory that 
disrupts the “film” of lived experience. Brodsky’s conception of memory in this essay thus draws 
on Bergson’s idea of the cinematographic mind that falsely perceives temporal duration: his 
memory operates photographically, spatializes time, fragments continuous experience—but 
ultimately Brodsky casts doubt on the very possibility of duration. The artist’s ability to lift the 
“dense and opaque” veil to reveal the true nature of things and to be in tune with duration is 
denied. He writes that “the conviction that we are somehow remembering the whole thing in a 
blanket fashion […] is groundless” (LTO 489). The possibility of intuiting the temporal flow of a 
continuous durational experience no longer seems attainable. There are no Nabokovian (or 
Proustian) moments of time regained through art. Instead, for Brodsky the visual aspect of 
memory ties it to the principles of space rather than time, leading to fragmentation rather than 
unity. I explore theories of spatial memory, such as the ancient art of memory as well as 
Bachelard’s poetics of space which view space as the repository of memory. In Brodsky’s 
thought, space is typically figured as the lesser category when compared with time. Infinite and 
indivisible, time triumphs over space, which obeys the logic of reduction. “If there is an infinite 
aspect to space,” Brodsky writes, “it is not its expansion but its reduction” (LTO 452). In this 
chapter, I argue that in Brodsky’s essay the fragmentation of the photographic mode coincides 
with a spatial, rather than temporal, conception of memory, thus giving expression to the 
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postmodern condition of rupture. The limits of photography become a metaphor for the 
discontinuities of memory and modern experience, compounded by the experience of exile.  
In these two chapters, exile—the physical separation from the past, their homeland, and 
their parents—proves to test these writers’ mnemonic faculties to restore or recuperate lost time. 
How they respond to this challenge diverges, and it is here that we see a difference in their 
poetics as well as their own conception of the phenomenology of memory. 
The second half of the dissertation focuses on the tension between postmodern skepticism 
about the limits of photographs, on the one hand, and the affective power of family photographs, 
on the other. This tension rehearses the divided critical approach to photographs explored earlier: 
between the semiotic reading of the photograph as constructed and the “naïve” belief in indexical 
presence, between coded studium and the uncoded punctum. I identify this affective turn with 
what has been called the “New Sincerity” after postmodernism, which witnesses a return to 
authenticity, sincerity, and emotional honesty as opposed to the cool, detached, playfully ironic 
distance of postmodernism. In these chapters, I explore how Shteyngart and Kabakov revive an 
emotional response to family photographs that allows for a sincere engagement with the past, 
despite drawing our attention simultaneously to the very aspects of photography that frustrate 
such a response: the banality and ubiquity of the family photo album; the socially-conditioned 
nature of such images; the way photographs lie.  
Chapter Three identifies “double exposure” as a mode of reading photographs in 
Shteyngart’s memoir Little Failure. Shteyngart engages in a dual reading of photographs, 
balancing the estranged perspective of an American looking back ironically at his Soviet 
childhood in Leningrad and the attempt to recuperate the sincerity of his experience as a child. In 
a dramatic shift from his previous work that trades in exaggerated, stereotypical, ironic 
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representations of “Russianness” for a Western reader, Shteyngart here risks a more nuanced and 
emotionally vulnerable reflection on his hyphenated Soviet-Jewish-American identity. In 
navigating the family archive of photographs, Shteyngart creates a web of associations that 
connect his own traumatic experiences with the cataclysmic events of the 20th century. It is 
through an exploration of the passage of these intergenerational traumas that Shteyngart makes 
the case most emphatically for his Russian cultural identity.  
In Chapter Four, I trace a constellation of family photographs across several art 
installations and paintings by Kabakov: Mother and Son (1990), Labyrinth: My Mother’s Album 
(1990), On the Roof (1996), and They are Looking (2010). While Kabakov is known for his 
conceptualist works that play with the category of the author, often inventing personae and 
attributing his pieces to them, these installations and paintings illuminate a counternarrative of 
self-representation in Kabakov’s oeuvre. Like Shteyngart, Kabakov delves into the family 
archive in these pieces, incorporating photographs by his uncle, his mother’s diary, and hundreds 
of family photographs of him and his wife Emilia. Many of these same objects recur across the 
installations and paintings, and I argue that when analyzed collectively these works attempt to 
reckon with the legacy of the Soviet experience through personal history. All too aware of the 
photograph’s manipulability and the prescribed forms of self-narrative, Kabakov exposes the 
falsity of official narratives by bringing to light the alternative narratives housed within the 
family archive—but, in the process, he also undoes the veracity of his own narratives. For, at the 
same time, Kabakov’s self-representation exposes the ubiquity of such family photographs, often 
thwarting the viewer’s ability to make easy correspondences between the documents of the past 
and the reality they supposedly represent.   
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The figures in this dissertation explore how the ubiquitous family photograph can move 
beyond an unreflective nostalgia for the past. They find themselves caught between a naïve 
realist belief in what the photograph represents and a critical awareness of the limits of its 
representational capacity. The ambivalent or critical attitude to photographs in these works opens 
up questions about memory, trauma, and the relationship between self and other. This 
dissertation suggests that the photographs are an integral part of these autobiographical works, as 
the tensions inherent within any autobiographical work between self and other, subjective and 
objective perspectives, and the referential and the fictional are brought to the fore through 
another medium. The moments in which another form of representation enters the text throw into 
relief the very process of picturing the self. At times, they vividly present the moment of reading 
oneself, of encountering the self as other. They seem to aid in the struggle to give a full account 
of ourselves that is, as Butler argues, ultimately inaccessible to us. At other moments, they are 
seen as unruly intrusions, presenting counter-narratives to the author’s vision. The main 
contention of this dissertation is that if we ignore the photographs within these texts, we risk 
missing how these texts articulate the limits and possibilities of representation in creating a 
narrative of the self through the relationship between word and image. It is precisely in these 
interart moments, as narrative and photographic image collide, that we can glimpse a heightened 




Authorizing the Image: Photography in Nabokov’s Speak, Memory 
 
 
“Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, 
everything changes: I constitute myself in the 
process of ‘posing,’ I instantaneously make another 
body for myself, I transform myself in advance into 
an image. […] In front of the lens, I am at the same 
time: the one I think I am, the one I want others to 
think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and 
the one he makes use of to exhibit his art.” 
Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (1980)1 
 
Vladimir Nabokov knew how to pose himself in front of the camera, to transform himself 
into an image for an audience. When Life magazine contacted Nabokov in 1951 about the 
possibility of doing a profile on him and butterfly hunting, Nabokov gave detailed instructions 
on how he should be photographed:  
Some fascinating photos might be also taken of me, a burly but agile man, stalking a 
rarity or sweeping it into my net from a flowerhead, or capturing it in midair. There is a 
special professional twist of the wrist immediately after the butterfly has been netted 
which is quite fetching. Then you could show my finger and thumb delicately pinching 
the thorax of a netted butterfly through the gauze of the netbag. And of course the 
successive stages of preparing the insect on a setting board have never yet been shown 
the way I would like them to be shown. All this might create a sensation in scientific and 
nature-lover circles besides being pleasing to the eye of a layman. I must stress the fact 
that the whole project as you see it has never been attempted before.2 
  
Emphasizing the originality of the photographic series and foreseeing the “sensation” it will 
cause, Nabokov playfully directs the photographer on which details should be captured—the 
delicate twist of his wrist, his thumb and finger—noting the best angles to display the artistry of 
                                               
1 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 10–13. 
2 Vladimir Nabokov, Vladimir Nabokov: Selected Letters, 1940-1977, ed. Dmitri Nabokov and 
Matthew J. Bruccoli (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), 114–15.  
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the lepidopterist. The letter testifies to his understanding of the power of photographic images 
and his acute sense of how to present himself before the camera to create an effect.3 It is also 
exemplary of his desire to exercise artistic control over his authorial image. 
Maintaining control over his authorial image becomes of central importance in his 
autobiography, a key site in Nabokov’s project of fashioning and representing the self. Some 
intimation of how troublous but also fecund this project was for Nabokov is offered in the fact 
that he wrote and rewrote the autobiography over the span of three decades. Like its author’s 
migratory path, the autobiography had its own circuitous and multilingual journey. In 1936, 
Nabokov published a short essay in French, “Mademoiselle O,” which would later become part 
of the memoir. After emigrating to America in 1940, he began to publish autobiographical essays 
in English. In 1951, these essays took the shape of Conclusive Evidence. In 1954, Nabokov 
translated his memoir into Russian and expanded it, giving it the title Drugie berega (Other 
Shores). To conclude this exercise in autobiographical self-translation, in 1966 he published 
Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. As he put it, this version was a “re-Englishing of a 
Russian re-version of what had been an English re-telling of Russian memories in the first place” 
(SM 12). He intended to write a second volume of memoirs (possible titles included Speak On, 
Memory and Speak, America), but it never materialized. 
No autobiography is ever complete—for the final event that concludes the life cannot be 
narrated—but Nabokov it would seem rejected the idea of placing a final end point on his self-
narrative. Indeed, Nabokov addressed the difficulties of self-representation in the unpublished 
                                               
3 Although this particular project never came to fruition, Life did later do a profile on Nabokov 
entitled “The Master of Versatility: Vladimir Nabokov: Lolita, Languages, Lepidoptera,” 
November 20, 1964. Photographs of Nabokov hunting butterflies were taken by Jean 
Schlemmer. Another shot shows Nabokov sitting in front of a chessboard, framed by the pieces.  
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final chapter of Conclusive Evidence. Nabokov had originally considered publishing an 
additional chapter to bookend the memoir, “‘Chapter Sixteen’ or ‘On Conclusive Evidence,’” in 
which he poses as the book’s reviewer. In this capacity, he writes about the limits of self-
representation: 
But one is inclined to think that his true purpose here is to project himself, or at least his 
most treasured self, into the picture he paints. One is reminded of those problems of 
‘objectivity’ that the philosophy of science brings up. An observer makes a detailed 
picture of the whole universe but when he has finished he realizes that it still lacks 
something: his own self. So he puts himself in it too. But again a ‘self’ remains outside 
and so forth, in an endless sequence of projections, like those advertisements which 
depict a girl holding a picture of herself holding a picture of herself holding a picture that 
only coarse printing prevents one’s eye from making out.4 
 
One of the fundamental problems of self-representation is occupying both the subject and object 
position. The impossibility of achieving a complete and objective view of the self—pace 
Montaigne’s claim to have “painted myself complete and in all my nakedness” in his 
autobiographical essays—results in an mise-en-abîme. Duncan White notes that it is the 
“materiality” of the printing that “sets the final limit” of the recursive image.5 Nabokov faults the 
literal ink and pigment for making difficult the task. It is the very means of representation itself 
that ensures that the depiction of the self will always fall short. 
It is striking that here Nabokov likens the difficulties of representing the self to a visual 
self-portrait, rather than a textual one. For in addition to the verbal metamorphoses of the self 
across the various editions, Nabokov eventually introduced a new visual component into the text. 
When Nabokov published the third version of his autobiography, Speak, Memory: An 
                                               
4 Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited (New York: Everyman’s 
Library, 1999), 254. Chapter Sixteen is included as an appendix to the memoir in this edition. 
5 Duncan White, Nabokov and His Books: Between Late Modernism and the Literary 
Marketplace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 14. 
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Autobiography Revisited (1966), he included photographs in the text for the first time. Nabokov, 
of course, is known as a visual writer. He insisted that he thought “in images,” not words.6 He 
drew maps and diagrams to help university students properly visualize works of literature.7 He 
likened his writing process to that of a painter, and he has been called “a painter with words.”8 
He even described writing a memoir in visual terms: the “good memoirist” discerns “the right 
spot on his canvas for placing the right patch of remembered color.”9 The “bad memoirist,” on 
the other hand, “re-touches his past, and the result is a blue-tinted or pink-shaded photograph 
taken by a stranger to console sentimental bereavement.”10 Nabokov here draws familiar battle 
lines between painting and photography, but it is the characterization of the bad memoirist not 
only as a photographer, but as a stranger that should give us pause. For despite the avowed 
visuality of his work, Nabokov did not create any of the photographic images that illustrate his 
autobiography.  
This might seem like a trivial detail. Indeed, most critics have treated the photographs in 
Speak, Memory as uncomplicated illustrations that supplement Nabokov’s visual imagination. 
                                               
6 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 14. 
7 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 156–57.  
8 Gerard de Vries and D. Barton Johnson, Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Painting 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 20. For the importance of painting in 
Nabokov’s oeuvre, see also Gavriel Shapiro, The Sublime Artist’s Studio: Nabokov and Painting 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2009). 
9 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 186. Here we might detect an echo of Bergson’s description of the 
artist, who perceives the individuality of things rather than their generalized form, in his essay on 
laughter. Bergson writes: “What the artist fixes on his canvas is something he has seen at a 
certain spot, on a certain day, at a certain hour, with a colouring that will never be seen again.” 
Bergson, Laughter, 79. 
10 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 186. 
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Maria Malikova, for example, ascribes little significance to the way Nabokov wields 
photographs in the text. She suggests that Nabokov exhibited an “amazing blindness in regards 
to the art of photography,” which led to the “inclusion of photographs in Speak, Memory 
apparently without a conscious aesthetic plan, but just as a clear illustration to the text, a tribute 
to the reader’s expectations.”11 John Burt Foster Jr. takes a similar approach, writing that the 
photographs and images in the text “are simply a more literal variant of the text’s repeated 
attempts to visualize the past.”12 But when we consider how Nabokov cultivated the posture of a 
highly controlling author, the issue of these foreign elements embedded in his text comes into 
sharper focus. After all, in his works patterns and puzzles remind the reader of the author’s hand, 
suggesting firm control over the text’s meaning. And beyond the text, he availed himself of 
forewords, indexes, book covers, annotations, commentaries, and interviews to craft this 
commanding and demanding authorial persona.13 He was “the perfect dictator,” his characters 
“galley slaves.”14  
                                               
11 Maria Malikova, “Nabokov’s Photo-Biography,” trans. Alexander Ponomariov, Nabokov 
Online Journal 8 (2014).  
12 John Burt Foster, Nabokov’s Art of Memory and European Modernism (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 182. For an insightful reading of the photographs in Speak, 
Memory see the Conclusion of Katherine Reischl’s recent book on author-photographers. Reischl 
suggests that “photographic illustration is both transformed by the hand of the author and 
transformative for the author himself.” Reischl, Photographic Literacy, 207. 
13 For more on Nabokov’s use of paratextual elements to shape his authorial persona, see White, 
Nabokov and His Books; Nicholas O. Warner, “The Footnote as Literary Genre: Nabokov’s 
Commentaries to Lermontov and Puškin,” The Slavic and East European Journal 30, no. 2 
(1986): 167–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/307594; Rebecca Stanton, “Talking Back to Nabokov: A 
Commentary on a Commentary,” Ulbandus Review 10 (2007): 212–21; Jacqueline Hamrit, 
Authorship in Nabokov’s Prefaces (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2014).  
14 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 69. 
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More importantly, for our purposes, Nabokov often looked to the visual as a means of 
asserting greater control over his verbal art. Nabokov repeatedly compared his writing with 
painting. When asked in an interview about his writing process, Nabokov answers that he does 
not proceed chronologically, but rather “I just fill in the gaps of the picture, of this jigsaw puzzle 
which is quite clear in my mind, picking out a piece here and a piece there and filling out part of 
the sky and part of the landscape and part of the—I don’t know, carousing hunters.”15 Or, from 
another interview: “Since this entire structure, dimly illumined in one’s mind, can be compared 
to a painting, and since you do not have to work gradually from left to right for its proper 
perception, I may direct my flashlight at any part or particle of the picture when setting it down 
in writing.”16 These interviews, in which Nabokov envisions himself as a painter or visual writer, 
emphasize his ability to create a unified picture that has no ending or beginning. But as much as 
these passages describe his process as a writer, they also address his relationship with the reader. 
For within Nabokov’s repeated comparison of visual art with verbal art rests the question of 
artistic control. 
In the essay “The Art of Literature and Commonsense,” Nabokov compares his writing 
with painting. He suggests that the principle of contiguity, or “sequence” as he puts it, that 
determines narrative prose exists only because “words have to be written one after the other on 
consecutive pages, just as the reader’s mind must have time to go through the book, at least the 
first time he reads it.” However, Nabokov contends that the form of the novel and the experience 
of reading do not accord with the author’s artistic vision since “no time element and no space 
element had ruled the initial vision.” If only books could be read like paintings, Nabokov muses, 
                                               
15 Nabokov, 16–17.  
16 Nabokov, 32. 
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then we could do away with “the bother of working from left to right” and “the absurdity of 
beginnings and ends.”17 Nabokov here subscribes to the notion, which we can trace back to G. E. 
Lessing’s Laocoön (1766), that paintings are spatial and atemporal; that they can be perceived as 
a unity all at once, unlike a narrative that unfolds over time.18 While this binary has been called 
into question by contemporary critics, nonetheless it is revealing what Nabokov thinks images 
can do.19 He determines that a narrative in the form of a painting “would be the ideal way of 
appreciating a novel, for thus the author saw it at the moment of its conception.”20 Part of the 
appeal of the visual arts for Nabokov would seem to be the fantasy of communicating to the 
viewer exactly what the artist envisioned, as he conceived it. Although the validity of such a 
claim is suspect, Nabokov seems to suggest that a painting would offer greater control over the 
reception and interpretation of his works, as the reader would share more precisely in the 
author’s vision.  
                                               
17 Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, ed. Fredson Bowers (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1980), 379–80. 
18 Conall Cash takes up this idea in an article on the function of photography and painting in Pale 
Fire. Cash argues that the images in Pale Fire do not behave in the way Nabokov suggests they 
do in his lecture; instead, the static images are swept up in the temporality of the unfolding 
narrative and our understanding of these images changes as we read and, as Nabokov prescribes, 
re-read. Cash Conall, “Picturing Memory, Puncturing Vision: Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire,” in 
Goalkeeper: The Nabokov Almanac, ed. Yuri Leving (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 
2010). 
19 For a critique of Lessing’s argument, see Mitchell, Iconology. The art historian Norman 
Bryson also undercuts the notion of images as atemporal by drawing attention to the physiology 
of the eye’s saccadic movements, noting that “in actual experience, looking at an image is a 
radically temporal process, which changes from moment to moment. If we think of the saccadic 
movements of the eye, what vision experiences is an image distributed across discontinuous 
leaps. Each act of looking attends to a different area of the image and discloses a partial view, as 
vision transits through the image in endless stops and starts.” Norman Bryson, “Intertextuality 
and Visual Poetics,” Style 22, no. 2 (1988): 184.  
20 Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, 379–80.  
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To not have created the images in his own autobiography, then, seems to unsettle 
Nabokov’s vaunted position as the preeminent visual author, in control over the text and its 
reception. The photographs “taken by a stranger” introduce other voices, or rather, other visions. 
Critically, these images offer an external representation of the author, not a form of self-
representation fashioned by Nabokov. 
Not only do the photographs introduce a competing authorial vision into Nabokov’s text, 
but photographs, as a medium, frustrate the kind of control Nabokov sought to exert over the 
interpretation of his works. Unlike paintings, photography has often been seen as an authorless 
artform. As André Bazin writes:  
For the first time, between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes 
only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For the first time an image of the world is 
formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man. […] All the arts are 
based on the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence.21 
    
The photograph introduces contingency.22 Whatever happens to be there at that moment becomes 
impressed on the photographic record, where one detail does not necessarily have more weight 
than another. Moreover, as Jefferson Hunter notes, photographs resist the possibility of a 
“singular, authoritative, stable meaning.”23 For although photographs, due to the photochemical 
process, offer an index of reality and are thus readily taken as confirmation of an event, they are 
                                               
21 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 13. 
22 For more on contingency in photographs, see Linda Connor et al., “Notes from the Field: 
Contingency,” The Art Bulletin 94, no. 3 (2012): 344–61. In this collection, Peter Geimer writes 
that “photographers are only partly aware of what they are doing, and the aesthetic or epistemic 
value of their pictures often depends precisely on this blind spot. Much about a photograph is 
calculable, foreseeable, and leaves open the potential for formal intervention. However, there is 
also a dimension of the unforeseen. A photograph is, in this respect, also an occurrence: 
something in the image occurs or something falls into the image” (351).  
23 Hunter, Image and Word, 15. 
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also highly ambiguous images; a single moment unmoored from its place in time and space 
becomes subject to multiple interpretations depending on context, caption, and editing. While 
verbal texts are undoubtedly open to multiple interpretations just as visual images are, Nabokov 
endeavors to present his own verbal texts as closed systems that foreclose the possibility of 
unauthorized interpretations.24 Taking up the question of whether they actually are closed 
systems is beyond the scope of this chapter; relevant for our purposes is merely the performance 
of positing such control. He positions himself as the creator of an entire universe, where 
everything is set in motion at his behest, where meaning resides in his hands.25  
Thus, the photos pose a potential stumbling block for Nabokov’s investment in control: 
both because he is not the author of the images and because of the indeterminacy of meaning in 
photographic images. The photographs, created by others, seem to be an element of the material 
book that threatens to elude his authorial grip. Speaking in such terms of an author’s control over 
a text and its reception will no doubt set some teeth on edge. Only a couple of years after Speak, 
Memory’s publication, Jacques Derrida exposed the instability of language, while Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault pronounced the death of the author, demonstrating that meaning 
cannot be fixed in the way that Nabokov desires it to be. To be clear, my claim is not that 
                                               
24 Indeed, Nabokov involved himself in the burgeoning scholarship on his works, guiding critics 
such as Carl Proffer, Alfred Appel, and Andrew Field toward “correct” interpretations. Julian W. 
Connolly asks whether Nabokov’s works are “closed systems” whose puzzles are designed to 
lead to a single correct answer and determines that “the fact that Nabokov was so careful in 
planting clues as well as false leads indicates that he might have wished his readers to arrive at 
what he would regard as a “correct” interpretation.” Julian W. Connolly, “The Challenge of 
Interpreting and Decoding Nabokov: Strategies and Suggestions,” Cycnos 24, no. 1 (2007). 
25 He describes the “real writer” as “the fellow who sends planets spinning and models a man 
asleep and eagerly tampers with the sleeper’s rib, that kind of author has no given values at his 
disposal: he must create them himself.” Vladimir Nabokov, “Good Readers and Good Writers,” 
in Lectures on Literature, ed. Fredson Bowers (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 2. 
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Nabokov lost control over his text once photographs were included; he never actually enjoyed 
such control. Instead, my argument attends to how the presentation of the photographs within the 
text stages the threat of such a loss—and overcomes it.  
Indeed, the precarious position of the author haunts Nabokov’s work from this period. 
Duncan White has recently shown how, even before such pronouncements about the death of the 
author, Nabokov had already experienced the limits of his authorial control through his 
encounters with the American literary marketplace and the book as a material commodity. White 
suggests that the realization of this loss in turn “animates the very fictions themselves, in which 
manuscripts are revised, redacted, misread, purloined, and posthumously published.”26 We might 
think of Pale Fire (1962), in which Nabokov dramatizes the dangers of the double author, as 
Charles Kinbote attempts to gain purchase on John Shade’s poem through his commentary. But 
who is Nabokov in relation to the photographs in his autobiography: commentator or author?  
I would suggest that Nabokov positions himself not as a commentator, who merely 
describes the photograph or provides information about it. Instead, he attempts to authorize the 
photographs through the captions. Captions offer a way of managing the indeterminacy of 
meaning in a photograph. The caption’s power derives from its ability to appear natural, much 
like the photograph itself. The caption purports merely to describe what is already depicted in the 
photo. However, in his essay “The Photographic Message” (1961), Roland Barthes alerts us to 
the fact that the caption “appears to duplicate the image” and yet the inscription can invent “an 
entirely new signified which is retroactively projected into the image, so much so as to appear 
                                               
26 White, Nabokov and His Books, 14. 
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denoted there.”27 In other words, the captions give Nabokov creative license to place his own 
narratives onto the images, in effect re-authoring the photographs.  
It would not be the first time that Nabokov attempted to re-author another’s work. His 
translation and commentary of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin,28 the annotations to his translation of 
Lermontov’s Hero of Our Time,29 his lectures on Cervantes’ Don Quixote:30 all these offer 
examples of Nabokov asserting his own authorial voice while occupying the role of commentator 
or explicator of a text. We can even consider the images he created for the books he taught in 
American universities as falling under this general rubric. Nabokov advocated drawing maps and 
diagrams for his students so that they could properly visualize the novelistic worlds of Flaubert, 
Tolstoy, Joyce, and others.  
In my academic days I endeavored to provide students of literature with exact 
information about details, about such combinations of details as yield the sensual spark 
without which a book is dead. […] in order to enjoy Tolstoy’s art the good reader must 
wish to visualize, for instance, the arrangement of a railway carriage on the Moscow-
Petersburg night train as it was a hundred years ago. Here diagrams are most helpful. […] 
instructors should prepare maps of Dublin with Bloom’s and Stephen’s intertwining 
itineraries clearly traced. Without a visual perception of the larch labyrinth in Mansfield 
Park that novel loses some of its stereographic charm, and unless the façade of Dr. 
                                               
27 Barthes, Image–Music–Text, 26–27. Barthes describes how photographs communicate two 
messages: one message is without a code (denotative) and the other with (connotative). The 
denotative appears natural, it serves as evidence. The connotative is the rhetoric of the image.  
28 Nicolas O. Warner argues that Nabokov’s annotated translation of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin is 
be more “authorial” than “editorial.” Warner, “The Footnote as Literary Genre,” 178.  
29 Stanton, “Talking Back to Nabokov.” 
30 Duncan White notes that Nabokov was interested in the false Quixote plot in the second part 
of Don Quixote. In his lectures, Nabokov promoted the theory that Cervantes himself had written 
the apocryphal Quixote published by Alonso Fernández de Avellanda, a metafictional device that 
Nabokov would go on to use in Pale Fire, as White points out. In his lecture, Nabokov takes the 
liberty of proposing a scene that Cervantes should have written: a fight between the real and false 
Don Quixote. For more on Nabokov’s lectures on Quixote, see White, Nabokov and His Books, 
15–21. 
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Jekyll’s house is distinctly reconstructed in the student’s mind, the enjoyment of 
Stevenson’s story cannot be perfect.31  
 
Nabokov figures these illustrations as integral parts of the book, without which something is lost. 
Nothing less than the fate of the book is at stake: the diagrams illustrate details that “yield the 
sensual spark without which a book is dead.”32 These maps and diagrams present another 
example of Nabokov’s attempt to co-author his admired texts, this time through images. If he 
creates images to assert a degree of authorship over another’s text, then he creates captions to re-
author photos taken by others in his own text. 
Through the captions in his autobiography, Nabokov seeks to position himself as the 
photographs’ true author, with the ability to fix their meaning. He does so by disparaging the 
photographs, denying their ability to represent accurately, accentuating their falsity, ultimately in 
order to position his own visual memory as superior. Nabokov’s verbal art emerges as capacious 
enough to subsume or assimilate the visual within it. In her article on photographs in Speak, 
Memory, Laurence Petit has suggested that the photographs in the text function to foreground 
how Nabokov’s verbal acrobatics triumph over the visual images; the verbal is figured as denser 
than the visual. Petit argues that, in the captions, Nabokov prizes the written word’s “capacity to 
be opaque and misleading, and thus to obscure rather than clarify the meaning of the 
photographic image.”33 While agreeing with the idea that Nabokov engages in something like a 
                                               
31 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 156–57. Looking back on his teaching career, he also said “My 
best reward comes from those former students of mine who ten or fifteen years later write to me 
to say that they now understand what I wanted of them when I taught them to visualize Emma 
Bovary’s mistranslated hairdo or the arrangement of rooms in the Samsa household.” Quoted in 
Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, xxiv. 
32 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 157. 
33 Laurence Petit, “Speak, Photographs? Visual Transparency and Verbal Opacity in Nabokov’s 
Speak, Memory,” Nabokov Online Journal 3 (2009).  
 51 
paragone, or comparison between two art forms, by setting the photos and captions in 
opposition, I would argue that the photos are anything but transparent; images seldom are. I read 
Nabokov’s textual inscriptions less as an effort to obscure the meaning of the image, than as an 
attempt to gain control over their meaning. It is a struggle for authorship.  
And yet, as I will show, this assertion of total authorial control over the images is 
attenuated by the inclusion of two snapshots of Nabokov taken by his wife Véra. If it is the 
figure of the “stranger” taking tinted photographs of the past that defines the bad memoirist, then 
it is fitting that Véra’s photos operate differently in the text. The agonistic encounter between 
photo and caption that characterizes the other photographs transforms into a positive 
relationship, as word and image mutually reinforce each other. This example of artistic 
collaboration between Nabokov and Véra approaches a more dialogic or co-creative model of 
authorship.  
 
Nabokov and Photography 
Nabokov’s general attitude to photographs could be characterized as less than 
enthusiastic. In his 1937 lecture “Pushkin, or the Real and the Plausible” (Pouchkine, ou le vrai 
et le vraisemblable), Nabokov remarks on the absence of a photographic record for Pushkin. 
Pushkin died in 1837, just two years prior to Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre’s presentation of his 
invention to the French Academy of Sciences in 1839. “Imagine,” Nabokov writes, “if Pushkin 
had lived another two or three years we would have had his photograph.”34 Nabokov’s injunction 
                                               
34 The lecture, delivered in French, was subsequently published in Nouvelle revue française 
(March 1, 1937). All quotations here are from the translation by Dmitri Nabokov, “Pushkin, or 
the Real and the Plausible,” New York Review of Books, March 31, 1988. 
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to “imagine” at first seems to suggest that the existence of such an image might be desired.35 
Having a photograph of Pushkin could bring us closer to the poet. After all, photographs have 
long been considered traces of their referent, with the power to make present what is absent. For 
example, The French writer Honoré de Balzac, a contemporary of Pushkin, believed the 
photograph to be a physical trace of the subject to such an extent that he feared the body was 
made up of spectral layers, with each Daguerreotype removing a layer.36 While Balzac’s fear of 
the photograph stripping away bodily layers is unfounded, the conception of the photograph as 
an indexical link to its referent has remained a common place in photographic theory. André 
Bazin urged that in a photograph we must “accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, 
actually re-presented, set before us, that is to say, in time and space. Photography enjoys a 
certain transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction.”37 A photograph of Pushkin, 
then, could serve as a medium of contact with the great poet. 
                                               
35 Andrei Bitov’s 1987 story “Pushkin’s Photograph” (Fotografiia Pushkina) plays with this 
desire to have a photograph of Pushkin. A philologist from the year 2099 travels back in time in 
an attempt to snap a photograph of Pushkin. He fails in his endeavor, and Pushkin’s visage 
remains enigmatic. 
36 According to the photographer Felix Nadar, in his memoir. Félix Nadar, When I Was a 
Photographer, trans. Eduardo Cadava and Liana Theodoratou (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2015), 4. 
37 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 13–14. The causal connection between the 
photographed subject and the photograph has been elaborated on by many critics. Roland 
Barthes also insists on the physical connection between the photographed subject and the 
photograph: “The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. From a real body, which 
was there, proceed radiations which ultimately touch me, who am here.” Barthes, Camera 
Lucida, 80–81. Art theorist Rosalind Krauss has noted the causal connection between a body and 
a photograph of that body, suggesting that the photograph provides a trace of that person’s 
presence much like fingerprints or footprints do. Krauss writes that a photograph “is a 
photochemically processed trace causally connected to that thing in the world to which it refers 
in a manner parallel to that of fingerprints or footprints or the rings of water that cold glasses 
leave on tables.” Rosalind Krauss, “The Photographic Conditions of Surrealism,” October 19 
(1981): 26, https://doi.org/10.2307/778652.  
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Instead, though, Nabokov celebrates that Pushkin did not live to have his photograph 
taken. “Just one more step and he would have emerged from the night, rich in nuance and filled 
with picturesque implications, wherein he resides, to stride firmly into the wan daylight that is 
now a whole century old.”38 Such a step, according to Nabokov, would diminish the complexity 
of Pushkin’s image. Nabokov privileges the rich darkness of painting over the weak daylight of 
photography. The association of Pushkin with the dark of night, however, reverses the familiar 
image of the poet as the “sun of Russian poetry” (solntse russkoi poezii) and the general 
connection of Pushkin with light.39 More important, though, is the characterization of painting as 
more nuanced and suggestive than photography.  
Nabokov goes on to say that photography inaugurated a new “visual era” that 
transformed portraiture. The genre of photographic portraiture is “so familiar to our present-day 
sensibilities that latter nineteenth-century celebrities assume the appearance of distant relatives—
shabbily dressed, all in black as though they were in mourning for the iridescent life of 
yesteryear, invariably relegated to corners of somber, melancholy rooms, against a background 
of dust-laden drapery.” Despite photography’s status as a new technology, Nabokov 
characterizes its products as dusty and mournful. Moreover, the conventions of the genre have 
rendered people indistinguishable from one another, in a manner that disrupts established 
hierarchies — “celebrities” look like one’s relatives. The potential loss of the author’s elevated 
                                               
38 Vladimir Nabokov, “Pushkin, or the Real and the Plausible,” trans. Dmitri Nabokov, NYRB 
March 31, 1988. 
39 Stephanie Sandler, Commemorating Pushkin: Russia’s Myth of a National Poet, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 10. The idea of Pushkin inhabiting the night could be a 
reference to the fact that Pushkin was buried secretly at night. Pushkin’s burial at night informed 
Osip Mandelstam’s image of the “night sun” (nochnoe solntse) in his poem “V Peterburge my 
soidemsia snova…” (1920) and his essay “Pushkin and Scriabin” (1919–25). 
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status unsettles Nabokov. He notes that, in addition to Pushkin, Byron and Goethe were not 
subjected to this new brand of portraiture. The implication is that those writers who were not 
photographed remain original, while those who follow appear more conventional or 
undifferentiated.40 
He sees it as a “stroke of luck for our imagination” that Pushkin “has never had to wear 
that heavy fabric with its grotesque folds, that funeral clothing of our grandparents, with a little 
black cravat devoured by the mandibles of a stiff collar.” As a result, “Pushkin has not aged.” 
Since a photograph of Pushkin does not exist, the imagination is free to create a subjective 
portrait of the poet.  
In an earlier essay “Les Écrivains et l’époque,” published in the June 1931 issue of the 
French monthly Le Mois, Nabokov wonders what the twenty-first century will make of the 
current epoch. We think, he writes, that we have found a way to permanently preserve time with 
technologies such as photography and film and that, as a result, future generations will have a 
clear and accurate image of the age. However, he dismisses this idea:  
La méthode cinématographie contemporaine qui, à nos yeux, semble nous donner l’image 
parfaitement exacte de la vie sera probablement si différente de la méthode 
qu’emploieront nos arrière-petits-neveux, que l’impression qu’ils se feront du 
mouvement de notre époque (tremblotement blafard d’un coin de rue grouillant de 
véhicules à jamais disparus) sera faussée par le style même de la photographie, par cet air 
vieillot et gauche que prennent à nos yeux des gravures représentant les événements d’un 
siècle passé. En d’autres mots, nos descendants n’auront pas la sensation directe de la 
réalité.  
 
                                               
40 Nabokov expresses disdain for photography here because the conventions of portraiture make 
everyone look the same. To some extent, this is consonant with his objection to Freud; according 
to Nabokov, Freudian analysis converts all singular, specific details to general patterns. For more 
on Nabokov and Freud, see Jenefer Shute, “Nabokov and Freud,” in The Garland Companion to 
Vladimir Nabokov, ed. Vladimir E. Alexandrov (New York: Garland, 1995); Catharine Theimer 
Nepomnyashchy, “King, Queen, Sui-Mate: Nabokov’s Defense against Freud’s ‘Uncanny,’” 
Intertexts, no. 1–2 (2008): 7–24.  
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The contemporary cinematographic method that, to our eyes, seems to give us a perfectly 
precise image of life will probably be so different from the method that will be used by 
our great-grandnephews, that the impression that they will form of movement in our 
epoch (pale trembling of a street corner swarming with vehicles that have disappeared 
forever) will be distorted by the very style of the photograph, by that old-fashioned and 
awkward air that, to our eyes, engravings representing the events of the past century 
acquire. In other words, our descendants will not have the direct sensation of reality.41 
 
With advances in technology, images of a previous epoch acquire a certain antiquated look that 
inaccurately ages the subjects. What looks to be an accurate depiction of reality to someone in 
the present will look quaint and old-fashioned to someone in the future. This helps us to 
understand what Nabokov means when he says that “Pushkin hasn’t aged” because his image 
hasn't been fixed in a photograph. In this essay, Nabokov suggests that only those who live in a 
certain age can truly experience it. He writes that neither the historian of his own time or a 
previous period can tell us much about the actual experience of reality. “Tout ce que nous 
pouvons dire de notre siècle est toujours plutôt art que science” (All that we can say about our 
century is always more art than science). Although images might preserve traces of that reality, 
the way we perceive that reality is distorted (faussée) by the medium’s representational 
capabilities. Like the images of Pushkin, what we see is not “true” reality, but something 
plausible.  
We might wonder, then, why Nabokov included photographs in the third version of his 
autobiography. The inclusion of photographs of the author could be seen as bending to the 
conventions of the genre. Photographs, after all, are often mobilized in autobiography to refer to 
                                               
41 Vladimir Nabokov, “Les Écrivains et l’époque,” Le Mois: Synthèse de l’activité mondiale 
(June–July 1931), 137. My translation. 
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the autobiographical subject.42 In this particular case, the need to distinguish this edition from its 
predecessors might have further motivated the inclusion of photos. Indeed, the publishers 
worried that the book would not attract enough readers, given that a previous English version 
was already in circulation. Nabokov countered: “The new material alone, with the photographs, 
would make quite a presentable book, so that you are not right in stressing the selling 
problems—if the book is properly launched: It should be made clear to the prospective buyer that 
at least one third (if not more) of it is new.”43 The inclusion of photos reflects Nabokov’s 
understanding of the literary marketplace; they will help to sell the book.  
Indeed, the sudden inclusion of photographs in the autobiography comes at a decisive 
moment in Nabokov’s career. The version of the autobiography with photographs (1966) was the 
only one to be published after the critically and financially successful Lolita (French publication, 
1955; US publication, 1958), Stanley Kubrick’s controversial film of Lolita (1962), the 
publication of his English translation of his Russian novels, and the public feud with Edmund 
Wilson over Nabokov’s Eugene Onegin translation (1964).44 This succession of causes célèbres 
transformed Nabokov’s status as an author. Lolita secured Nabokov’s position as an American 
author, the film brought Nabokov into popular culture, while the translation and erudite 
                                               
42 For more on the relationship between photography and autobiography, see Timothy Dow 
Adams, Light Writing and Life Writing: Photography in Autobiography (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2000). Rugg, Picturing Ourselves.  
43 Letter from Vladimir Nabokov to Walter Minton (March 26, 1966), Vladimir Nabokov Papers, 
The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American Literature, The New 
York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
44 Wilson criticized Nabokov’s literal translation of Eugene Onegin and commentary in the 
article “The Strange Case of Pushkin and Nabokov, New York Review of Books July 15, 1985. 
Nabokov fired back in a letter to the editor, published in the August 26, 1965 edition of the 
NYRB.  
 57 
commentary to Pushkin’s novel in verse figured Nabokov as the inheritor of pre-revolutionary 
Russian literature.45 The third version also comes in the wake of Nabokov’s first television 
interviews.46 As Brian Boyd notes, Nabokov’s career had changed dramatically within a mere 
decade: “by the second half of the 1960s he was often acclaimed the greatest writer alive, the 
standard against which other writers should be measured, the one certain choice for a Nobel 
Prize.”47 Simply put, at the time of writing the third version of his autobiography, Nabokov has 
more symbolic capital than he did when he released Conclusive Evidence in 1951.  
In fact, when finishing the manuscript for Conclusive Evidence, Nabokov had sought 
advice from The New Yorker editor Katharine White about how to garner some publicity:  
May I ask you for a piece of very confidential advice. I am determined to make some 
money with the book and think of enlisting the services of a good press agent—I wonder 
if you could assist me in finding out where and how one finds such people? Or perhaps 
you would advise me against any such move? All my previous books have been such 
dismal financial flops in this country that I don’t trust the pure fate of unaided books any 
more.48  
 
Ultimately, despite disinterested claims of art for art’s sake, Nabokov proved adept at 
maneuvering the American publishing industry, understanding that to sell books it helps to sell 
                                               
45 For more on Nabokov’s English-language career, see Neil Cornwell, “From Sirin to Nabokov: 
The Transition to English,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nabokov, ed. Julian W. Connolly 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 151–169. For more on how Nabokov 
used the Onegin commentary to create a transnational canon and secure his own position within 
it, see Marijeta Bozovic, Nabokov’s Canon: From Onegin to Ada (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2016). 
46 Nabokov gave his first television interview after the US publication of Lolita on November 26, 
1958. For a list of Nabokov’s interviews, see Dieter E. Zimmer, “Vladimir Nabokov: The 
Interviews,” http://www.d-e-zimmer.de/HTML/NABinterviews.htm. 
47 Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The American Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 518. 
48 Selected Letters, 96.  
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the author.49 He built up an industry of literary criticism around his own work, and he made his 
stamp of “authorization” on critical studies of his works and biographies of him something 
valuable. As I will argue, his captions also serve to “authenticate” the images. 
Thus, the photographs in the text should be read in the context of his rise to fame, as 
Nabokov becomes a household name and his image proliferates. But with the proliferation of his 
image comes the need to reassert control over this medium that, on the one hand, can help to 
project his authorial persona and secure his growing readership but that also threatens to slip 
beyond his control. The photos are thus something of a double-edged sword for Nabokov, as 
they both promote his authorial image and contribute to his loss of control over it. 
When Nabokov assures his publisher in a letter that the inclusion of photographs would 
help to sell the book, he tellingly associates the photos with other paratextual elements that he 
typically uses to assert his authorial persona. He writes that he had not only substantially revised 
and expanded the English text, but had also included some new additional elements: “fifteen 
photographic illustrations (members of the family, the Nabokovs’ St. Petersburg house, and a 
rare butterfly I discovered); also a rather detailed index, copious captions—and one of those big 
nasty forewords that some readers seem to like.”50 Nabokov here aligns the photographs and 
captions with the index and foreword, both of which are familiar devices that Nabokov uses to 
play games with his reader, to encourage certain readings of the text, and to establish his 
authorial control. For example, several critics have shown how a game of cross-referencing in 
                                               
49 For more on Nabokov and the publishing industry, see Yuri Leving and Frederick H. White, 
Marketing Literature and Posthumous Legacies: The Symbolic Capital of Leonid Andreev and 
Vladimir Nabokov (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013).  
50 Letter from Vladimir Nabokov to Walter Minton (March 7, 1966), Vladimir Nabokov Papers, 
The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American Literature, The New 
York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
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Speak, Memory’s index illuminates the connection between different themes in the text.51 And in 
his forewords, which he began to affix to his novels after penning the afterword to Lolita, 
Nabokov would offer clues and set traps for his reader. As Brian Boyd writes, “His forewords 
formed part of the irascible and arrogant Nabokov persona, in part a game, a parody, a running 
joke.”52 I read the photographs and their “copious captions” in a similar vein, as a medium he 
can harness to fashion his authorial image and to assert his control over the work’s reception.  
Indeed, the drafts for Speak, Memory show that, as his work on the manuscript 
progresses, Nabokov includes more photographs and begins to extend the captions. At first, the 
captions are perfunctory: they detail who is in the picture; when and where it was taken. But in 
successive drafts he expands them, making them more detailed. He recognizes their potential for 
guiding our interpretation of the photographs. Nabokov often attempts to determine the meaning 
of these images through the captions. The captions impose onto the photographs the kinds of 
patterns that mark Nabokov’s literary work. Like the foreword and the index, the photograph 
captions demand to be read as fundamental elements of the text.   
                                               
51 Brian Boyd has called this “thoroughly Nabokovian index […] a master key to unlock the 
book’s themes.” Boyd, American Years, 507. For other discussions of the index, see Foster, 
Nabokov’s Art of Memory and European Modernism, 29–31; Dabney Stuart, “The Novelist’s 
Composure Speak, Memory as Fiction,” Modern Language Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1975): 177–92, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/00267929-36-2-177; Michael Nieto Garcia, “Nabokov’s Index Puzzle: 
Life and Art Transcendent in Speak, Memory,” Nabokov Studies 13, no. 1 (2015 2014): 167–91, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/nab.2014.0007. 
52 Boyd, American Years, 476–77. John Pilling also discusses the foreword to Speak, Memory in 
John Pilling, “A Tremulous Prism: Nabokov’s Speak, Memory,” in Autobiographical Statements 
in Twentieth-Century Russian Literature, ed. Jane Gary Harris, Studies of the Harriman Institute 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 155–159. More recently, Duncan White has 
analyzed the forewords in general as a paratextual element Nabokov used to assert his authorial 
control. White, Nabokov and His Books, 149–155.  
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In fact, the significance of photographs and their captions is taken up at the beginning of 
the foreword to the revised version of Speak, Memory. Nabokov describes an instance of 
misrecognition of his photographic image. A photograph of Nabokov had recently appeared in 
Gisèle Freund’s book of photographs James Joyce in Paris: His Final Years (1965). The 
photograph (not included in Speak, Memory) features Nabokov with the editorial board of the 
French journal Mesures gathered around a garden table as they gaze, presumably, at a copy of 
the journal (fig. 1). The photograph, Nabokov informs us in the foreword, was taken after the 
publication of Nabokov’s essay-memoir “Mademoiselle O” in the April 1936 issue of Mesures 
(SM 9). However, the caption in Freund’s book mistakes Nabokov for another writer, Jacques 
Audiberti.53 As Nabokov writes in the preface, “I am wrongly identified […] as ‘Audiberti’” (SM 
9).54  
 
Figure 1. Nabokov with Mesures editorial board. Photo Gisèle Freund/IMEC/Fonds MCC. 
                                               
53 Jacques Audiberti (1899–1965) was a French playwright, poet, and novelist.  
54 It is understandable why Nabokov is not recognizable: in the photograph his face is cast in 
shadow as he looks down at something in his hand. Brian Boyd conjectures that it “must surely 
be a butterfly” in his hand. There is no reason why it “must” be a butterfly that has caught 
Nabokov’s attention. In fact, it seems rather unlikely. But the manner in which Boyd reads this 
photograph of the author attests to the influence of Nabokov’s crafted image of himself as 
writer/lepidopterist. Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 437.  
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Freund, the celebrated German-born French photographer, was renowned for her 
photographic portraits of writers, such as James Joyce and Samuel Beckett. For there to be a 
Freund photograph of Nabokov that confuses him with the French writer Jacques Audiberti 
implicitly denies him entry to the pantheon of great twentieth-century writers.55 It suggests that 
he is not as recognizable an icon as these writers, an offense that Nabokov attempts to correct. 
He might have been erased from the photograph by Freund’s caption, but the foreword now 
reinstates him. Indeed, Nabokov goes so far as to suggest not only that he was present, but that 
the photograph “commemorates” the publication of his essay “Mademoiselle O” (SM 9). 
Nabokov places himself at the center of the photograph’s signification. 
But the matter does not end there. Nabokov, too, misreads the photograph. He dates the 
photograph to April 1936, which would coincide with the publication of “Mademoiselle O” in 
Mesures. However, Freund’s caption clearly dates the photograph to the following year, April 
1937.56 Is this just a careless error on Nabokov’s part? What was happening in April 1937?   
That month, Nabokov sold his story “The Outrage” to Mesures for the May issue. In a 
letter dated April 15, 1937 to his wife, Véra, Nabokov details how he sold the story and then 
lunched with the editorial group. He even comments on the photographic event in question: 
“After lunch there was something on the order of a meeting of the Mesures editorial board, and a 
lady photographer took fifteen shots of us.”57 He describes how he was “much ‘feted’ and was in 
                                               
55 Katherine Reischl connects this scene of photographic misrecognition with the existential 
plight of “the displaced émigré who is unseen, unrecognized, who must ask, ‘what if I did not 
exist?’” in Nabokov’s fiction. Reischl, Photographic Literacy, 205. 
56 Gisèle Freund, James Joyce in Paris: His Final Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1965).  
57 Nabokov, Selected Letters, 23.  
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great form” at the lunch and had “total success with ‘The Outrage.’”58 His previous letters to 
Véra attest to the long process of trying to get this story published. Ultimately, however, the 
story never appeared in the journal.59  
Whether Nabokov intentionally alters the date in Speak, Memory to allow the photograph 
to signify the commemoration of his publication of “Mademoiselle O”—rather than have it stand 
as a harbinger of the failed publication of “The Outrage”—is unclear. Brian Boyd notes that, 
despite Nabokov’s exacting precision, eye for detail, and firm authorial control, “dates are a 
common source of error in Nabokov.”60 And yet, while working on his translation and 
commentary for Eugene Onegin, Nabokov himself raises the idea that such errors might be 
intentional: “Even obvious misprints should be treated gingerly; after all, they may be supposed 
to have been left uncorrected by the author.”61 This is, after all, the man who insisted in his study 
of Gogol (1943) that facts can be imagined.62 
                                               
58 Nabokov, 22–23.  
59 Boyd, Russian Years, 437. 
60 In the chapter, “Even Homais Nods: Nabokov’s Fallibility,” Boyd highlights the fact that 
Nabokov inaccurately dates his grandfather’s birth, his father’s graduation, and other such 
details. Brian Boyd, Stalking Nabokov: Selected Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011), 300.  
61 Quoted in Boyd, 299. 
62 He writes that Gogol had “lost the gift of imagining facts and believed that facts may exist by 
themselves.” Quoted in Galya Diment, “Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Autobiography,” in 
Nabokov and His Fictions: New Perspectives, ed. Julian W. Connolly (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 51note6. And on Nabokov’s art of memory, John Burt Foster, Jr. wrote 
that Nabokov believed “that artifice is an unavoidable part of remembering and counts as much 
as fact.” John Burt Foster, Jr., “Nabokov before Proust: The Paradox of Anticipatory Memory,” 
The Slavic and East European Journal 33, no. 1 (1989): 80, https://doi.org/10.2307/308385. 
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If imagination is as important as fact, then I am inclined to call Nabokov’s treatment of 
the photograph an imaginative error—one that helps to establish the “thematic designs” and 
patterns of life that Nabokov held to be “the true purpose of autobiography” (27).63 His 
description of the photograph in the foreword links the image to the autobiography, as 
“Mademoiselle O” was its first published chapter. The chapter is, as Nabokov calls it, the 
“cornerstone” of the entire autobiography (SM 11). Thus, with Nabokov’s amended caption in 
the foreword, the Freund photograph comes to serve as a tableau of the whole project’s genesis, 
complete with initial readership. By transforming the context, Nabokov attempts to reclaim 
authorial control over the photograph from Freund and fit the image to his own artistic pattern. 
The treatment of the Freund photo presages the way in which the other photographs will be dealt 
with. The Freund photo illustrates how Nabokov wrests control away from the photographers 
and positions himself as the true author, even if it means inventing facts to create the artistic 
pattern.  
Nevertheless, whichever way you turn it—Freund’s misreading of Nabokov; Nabokov’s 
misreading the occasion—this photograph alerts the reader to the fact that photographs can be, 
indeed are liable to be, misread. Nabokov prefaces his autobiography by revealing to his readers 
that the meaning of a photograph can be manipulated by words alone. This recognition of the 
photographic image’s instability—that they are not “conclusive evidence” despite their indexical 
quality—leads Nabokov to position himself as the authority in relation to the photographs. The 
autobiographical genre invests him with this authority; he is the one who can set the record 
                                               
63 My contention that photographic misreadings can be seen as more than just careless errors is 
influenced by Margaret Olin’s illuminating discussion of Roland Barthes’ misreading of the 
James VanDerZee photograph in Camera Lucida. Margaret Olin, Touching Photographs 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 51–69. 
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straight. And yet, Nabokov’s error betrays the fact that he too is vulnerable to misreading these 
documents. Indeed, despite Nabokov’s attempts to control the image through his text, the 
admission that a caption can alter one’s interpretation of a photograph opens the door for the 
reader to question Nabokov’s own seemingly authoritative annotations of the photographs. As 
Susan Sontag writes, “even an entirely accurate caption is only one interpretation, necessarily a 
limiting one, of the photograph to which it is attached.”64 His interpretation of the image is only 
one among many.  
 
Visual Memory and Photography in Speak, Memory 
Like the maps and diagrams Nabokov created for his literature students, a map of his 
family’s estates leads us into the autobiography. Rather than use a pre-existing map, Nabokov 
drew the map himself (1965). Unlike the photographic images, the map offers an instance of an 
image that he created himself. The map illuminates how Nabokov asserts his authorial vision 
through images. 
The map pictures the Vyra, Rozhestvenno, and Batovo estates, located to the south of St. 
Petersburg. Although Nabokov insists on the utmost precision in visualizing, for example, Dr. 
Jekyll’s house, the map of the Nabokov estates is far from an objective depiction of space. The 
sketch of the Parnassius mnemosyne butterfly encourages us to read the map as a subjective 
representation of Nabokov’s home. The image of the butterfly functions as a kind of artist’s 
signature.65 Freighted with significance in the lepidopterist’s oeuvre, the butterfly conjures up the 
                                               
64 Sontag, On Photography, 109. 
65 He describes in the autobiography how he hunted this butterfly in Vyra, on the banks of the 
Oredezh river (SM 210). 
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themes of memory, migration, and metamorphosis that will run throughout the text.66 Moreover, 
butterflies come to be associated with the deception that Nabokov prizes in art. In Chapter Six, 
Nabokov describes how he found in nature “an artistic perfection usually associated with man-
wrought things,” citing a species of butterfly that bears remarkable resemblance to a leaf, 
complete with “markings mimicking grub-bored holes,” as “a form of magic, […] a game of 
intricate enchantment and deception” (SM 124–25).67 The presence of the butterfly invites us to 
read the map beyond its utilitarian purpose, and instead as an artistic image.  
Like the butterfly masquerading as a leaf, the map is deceptive. The traditional compass 
points have been inverted: South is at the top; North at the bottom. 68 The purpose of the map is 
not utility; it literally disorientates you. Through this sleight of hand, he estranges our 
perspective. Nabokov exercises creative license over the spatial representation of the family’s 
estates.69 The transformation of the landscape asserts his ownership over this place that he has, 
                                               
66 Siggy Frank writes, “Unsteady, flighty and ephemeral, butterflies in Nabokov’s work 
encapsulate the inherent instability of the self in fiction and life. They come into existence 
through a remarkable transformation from wingless caterpillar into soaring butterfly, and they 
survive by mimicking something or someone else. With their capacity for enchanting 
metamorphoses and deceptive imitation, butterflies are suggestive of the essentially theatrical 
nature of identity.” Siggy Frank, Nabokov’s Theatrical Imagination (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 192. John Burt Foster Jr. suggests that “Nabokov’s pursuit of these 
elusive but vivid creatures would seem to parallel the retrieval of mnemonic images, while their 
colorful wings could be viewed as an emblem of colored hearing.” Foster, Nabokov’s Art of 
Memory and European Modernism, 183.  
67 He is here describing the Kallima paralekta butterfly, whose underside resembles a dead leaf. 
68 On August 22, 1966 Nabokov first writes to his publisher Minton about including the map in 
the text, “I am enclosing with the proofs a sketch map I have made of the Nabokovs’ lands in the 
St. Petersburg region. […] The south (at the top) and the north (at the bottom) should remain 
where I put them.” Letter from Vladimir Nabokov to Walter Minton (August 22, 1966), Vladimir 
Nabokov Papers, The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American 
Literature, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
69 Incidentally, Brian Boyd has pointed out that the map is full of inaccuracies. He writes, 
“Nabokov’s map of the Vyra region in the endpapers of the revised Speak, Memory is thoroughly 
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physically, lost. The inversion of the map seems to concede that he cannot return by a regular 
route. His return can only take place in a creative realm.70 We are encouraged to see this as 
imagined geography, one that only he can grant us access to. As a paratextual element, the map 
works as the entry point into the imaginative landscape of Nabokov’s memory. It is as if we just 
need to follow the butterfly, and then we too can enter this world with Nabokov, the 
“passportless spy,” as our guide (SM 99).71  
Indeed, the idea of stepping into a painting appears explicitly later in the text. Inspired by 
a fairy tale in which a “small boy stepped out of his bed into a picture,” Nabokov describes how, 
as a child, he “imagined the motion of climbing into” an aquarelle painting of a forest “and 
plunging into that enchanted beechwood” (SM 86). And, sure enough, by the chapter’s end we 
see Nabokov strolling through a beech forest with his drawing teacher Mstislav Dobuzhinsky, a 
member of the artistic movement Mir iskusstva, who taught Nabokov about the “precision of 
linear expression,” a technique that has helped him with the “camera-lucida needs of literary 
composition” (SM 92). It is this action of stepping into a painting, which seems to offer the 
possibility of escaping the “prison of time” (SM 20), that Nabokov so adeptly performs time and 
again in his memoir.72 He vividly paints Mademoiselle O’s arrival in Russia so as to place 
                                               
muddled. What looks like a small tributary coming past the Batovo estate is in fact the Oredezh 
itself; the river labeled ‘Oredezh’ running past the Rozhdestveno estate is actually the Gryazno, a 
very short-lived little stream; and when the Oredezh passes the Vyra estate it does not continue 
west and away from Siverskaya but turns to flow east toward the town.” Boyd, Stalking 
Nabokov, 299–300. 
70 For more on Nabokov’s imagined returns through memory and art, see Svetlana Boym, 
“Vladimir Nabokov’s False Passport,” in The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 
2001), 259–83.  
71 Nabokov insists that “The writer’s art is his real passport.” Strong Opinions, 63.  
72 John Pilling makes a similar claim that this fairy tale “describes what Nabokov is doing in 
Speak, Memory, stepping as he is into a picture of prerevolutionary Russia and plunging into a 
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himself within the scene, a move that Dabney Stuart notes is “similar to stepping into the 
painting of the beech forest.”73 He has the ability to cheat time through his painterly recreation of 
the past through memory.  
But while optical technologies abound as metaphors for the workings of his visual 
memory—from microscopes and telescopes to magic lanterns—the actual photos included within 
the autobiography do not seem to offer the same possibility of stepping into these images. As we 
will see, Nabokov routinely derides photographs as false, as less vivid than his own painterly 
vision as a writer. For example, Nabokov dismisses his mother’s treasured collection of 
photographs in exile as inferior to her memory. Emphasizing the fragility of the photographs, he 
writes that “the dim little photographs in crumbling frames” were in “a soapbox covered with 
green cloth.” Their frames are crumbling; the images have faded; they are housed in a makeshift 
soapbox. And although they are precious to her, Nabokov deems them unnecessary: “She did not 
really need them, for nothing had been lost. As a company of travelling players carry with them 
everywhere, while they still remember their lines, a windy heath, a misty castle, an enchanted 
island, so she had with her all that her soul had stored” (SM 49–50).74 Photographs, it would 
seem, are not needed as a memory aid. Her memory, and his, is powerful enough on its own. 
Indeed, it was his mother who enjoined young Nabokov to commit to memory the details of their 
surroundings («вот запомни», she instructs him) which allows him, as he puts it, to “inherit[…] 
                                               
time that the power of art has filled with fairy-tale enchantment.” Pilling, “A Tremulous Prism: 
Nabokov’s Speak, Memory,” 162. 
73 Stuart, “The Novelist’s Composure Speak, Memory as Fiction,” 183. 
74 And, similarly, he says in an interview that he will “never go back [to Russia], for the simple 
reason that all the Russia I need is always with me: literature, language, and my own Russian 
childhood.” Strong Opinions, 9–10.  
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an exquisite simulacrum—the beauty of intangible property, unreal estate—and this proved a 
splendid training for the endurance of later losses” (SM 40). 
 And, in a similar fashion, he disparagingly compares the vivid reality of his son Dmitri 
on the beach to its black-and-white representation in a photograph: “There our child kneeled 
motionless to be photographed in a quivering haze of sun against the scintillation of the sea, 
which is a milky blur in the snapshots we have preserved but was, in life, silvery blue, with great 
patches of purple-blue farther out” (SM 308). The photograph fails to capture the true colors of 
the scene as Nabokov remembers it. 
But perhaps the best emblem to exemplify the contest between Nabokov’s visual writing 
and photography is the “penholder with a tiny peephole of crystal in its ornamental part,” a 
souvenir from his time in Biarritz with Colette, one of his childhood romances (SM 151). 
Looking through the crystal produces a “miraculous photographic view,” the recollection of 
which allows him to recover the forgotten name of Colette’s dog. Here it is not incidental that the 
pen, or verbal art, creates this “photographic view,” making an argument for how his own verbal 
art assimilates the visual. Actual photographic illustrations will not be necessary, it would seem, 
for he creates far greater pictures with his pen.  
Nabokov provocatively dismisses many of the photographs as staged and, thus, 
inaccurate representations of reality or as less vivid than his memory. If we consider the 
description for a photograph of his family on their estate Vyra in August 1908, we can see how 
he disparages the posed photographs. The photograph was taken “between my father’s return 
from prison and his departure on the following day, with my mother, for Stresa” (SM 140). The 
photograph captures a brief moment when father and son are reunited. Earlier in the memoir, 
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Nabokov describes the day of his father’s joyful return to the family after his three-month 
imprisonment in great detail:  
It is when I recall that particular day that I see with the utmost clarity the sun-spangled 
river; the bridge, the dazzling tin of a can left by a fisherman on its wooden railing; the 
linden-treed hill with its rosy-red church and marble mausoleum where my mother’s dead 
reposed; the dusty road to the village; the strip of short, pastel-green grass, with bald 
patches of sandy soil, between the road and the lilac bushes behind which walleyed, 
mossy log cabins stood in a rickety row; the stone building of the new schoolhouse near 
the wooden old one; and, as we swiftly drove by, the little black dog with very white 
teeth that dashed out from among the cottages at a terrific pace but in absolute silence, 
saving his voice for the brief outburst he would enjoy when his muted spurt would at last 
bring him close to the speeding carriage. (SM 30)   
 
The language of the passage emphasizes the idea that he can see these environs again, while the 
paratactic syntax captures the restless movement of an eye alighting on the surroundings, 
transformed by the speed of the carriage careening towards the long-awaited return of a beloved 
parent. Distinct from the caption to the photograph, in this passage we are in the realm of the 
proto-cinematic with the ceaselessly unfolding view as seen from the window of the moving 
carriage.75 This passage attempts to recreate through art the experience of Bergsonian duration. 
But the photograph does not elicit the same flood of visual memories. What is missing from the 
photograph, crucially, is movement. The photograph seems to foreclose any possibility of seeing 
beyond the frame, of opening up a world that has since disappeared, of allowing us to regain lost 
time.  
                                               
75 Nabokov’s cinematic syntax in this passage calls to mind one of the features Nabokov saw to 
be distinctive about Gustave Flaubert’s style: his use of the semicolon to accumulate visual 
impressions. He links this punctuation technique with what he terms Flaubert’s “unfolding 
method.” This method entails the “successive development of visual details, one thing after 
another thing, with an accumulation of this or that emotion.” When discussing this “unfolding 
method” in a passage from Madame Bovary, Nabokov suggests the effect is cinematic: “A 
camera seems to be moving along and taking us to Yonville through a gradually revealed 
unfolded landscape.” Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, 171–72. 
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Perhaps this is because in the caption, Nabokov stresses how the photograph is posed 
and, therefore, false. The image is remarkable for the network of linkages among the family 
members: the grandmother holds Nabokov’s two sisters; Nabokov’s hand rests on his sister 
Olga’s knee, while his aunt’s hand “supports” him in turn; his brother Sergei’s arm is intertwined 
with his aunt’s arm. Only the parents are set apart, both from each other and the rest of the 
family. Nabokov, however, jests that the family’s dog is actually “photophobic” and points out 
that his “paternal grandmother is holding, in a decorative but precarious cluster, my two little 
sisters whom she never held in real life” (SM 140). According to Nabokov, the posture adopted 
by his grandmother propagates a false image of her relationship with her grandchildren, as it 
does not reflect her attitude toward them in “real life.” Indeed, it is possible that her loving pose 
is dictated by nothing other than the mechanics of sitting for a photograph. No stranger to 
artifice, Nabokov nonetheless finds fault with the posed aspect of the photograph. The 
photographic medium mechanically creates a mimetic reproduction of reality, but without the 
“game of intricate enchantment and deception” that he finds in nature’s “mysteries of mimicry” 
(SM 125). The photograph lacks the magic of transformation as the illusion gives way (the 
“tangle of twigs and leaves” suddenly revealing a disguised bird (SM 298); the ship’s funnel 
emerging from the jumbled skyline (SM 310)), but in the caption Nabokov performs the act of 
revealing what is hidden from the reader’s eye.  
There is one small detail in the background that Nabokov draws our attention to. Amidst 
the description of his family members in the photograph, Nabokov casually remarks, “The round 
thing on the tree trunk is an archery target” (SM 140). Although he does not accord it much 
significance, he nonetheless highlights this chance detail that might otherwise go unnoted. In 
Nabokov’s literary work, archery and its appurtenances are often associated with time. Ardis, 
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arrow in Greek, would be the name of the Veens’ lost paradise in Nabokov’s next work, Ada, or 
Ardor (1969). In Ada, the arrow recalls Zeno’s paradox of the flying arrow and, moreover, Henri 
Bergson’s refutation of Zeno’s paradox.76  
The paradox of the flying arrow suggests that the arrow is motionless at each moment, as 
it can occupy only one position at a time in its trajectory toward the target. And, thus, if it is 
constantly motionless, the flying arrow is not moving. Bergson, however, refutes this paradox by 
saying that we must conceive of the trajectory as an indivisible whole: “To suppose that the 
moving body is at a point of its course is to cut the course in two by a snip of the scissors at this 
point, and to substitute two trajectories for the single trajectory which we were first 
considering.”77  
 Zeno’s paradox of the motionless arrow offers a metaphor for the photograph. It is a 
symbol of arrested motion, suspended in time and space, much like a photograph. Indeed, 
Bergson himself makes the link between the arrow and photography. Bergson introduces the 
paradox of the arrow after turning to the snapshot and cinema to describe our experience of 
duration. For Bergson, time and duration are immeasurable— space is a “discrete multiplicity,” 
whereas time is a “virtual multiplicity”—which leads him to argue against the tendency to 
spatialize time. In conceiving of time, he argues, we divide time into identical units and place 
them in succession, which is something we can do with space. We think that, in so doing, we are 
measuring duration, when actually we are treating time as we would space. Time cannot be 
broken down into discernable units, no matter how small, for there would always be a gap 
between these intervals. Instead, time is pure duration. “Duration,” Bergson explains, “properly 
                                               
76 See Bozovic, “Bergson and The Texture of Time.” 
77 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 309. 
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so called has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially 
heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to number.”78 Our inner life is pure duration; the 
states of being are perpetually in motion, perpetually in a state of becoming and cannot be 
broken up into discrete identical units, as they permeate one another. These inner states cannot 
be measured or quantified.  
However, we attempt to distinguish, to categorize, to make sense of this unordered inner 
state. We want to impose order where there is none. It is an abstraction of the mind, one which 
photography supports, as it seems to spatialize time, setting certain moments apart. To exemplify 
his point about the process of becoming, Bergson looks to photography and cinema. If we 
wanted to depict a regiment marching, we might take a succession of photographs to capture 
their movement at various stages. However, Bergson notes that “however much we might look at 
them, we should never see them animated: with immobility set beside immobility, even 
endlessly, we could never make movement.”79 The apparatus of the film camera can give the 
illusion of movement by projecting these images so rapidly, but this illusion of movement is 
analogous to how we fail to attach “ourselves to the inner becoming of things” and instead “place 
ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially.”80  Just as we make the 
mistake of spatializing time, so too do photographs set time apart. The way we spatialize time so 
that we perceive moments in succession is similar to film, where the images succeed each other 
rapidly and we think we are perceiving movement, but of course this is just a trick of the eye. I 
                                               
78 Henri Bergson, Key Writings, ed. Keith Pearson and John Mullarkey (New York: Continuum, 
2002), 68. 
79 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 305. 
80 Bergson, 306. 
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would suggest that Nabokov’s critique of photographs is informed by Bergson’s treatment of 
photographs as they relate to duration. The staged photographs, thus, fall short because of the 
absence of movement and duration. This experience of what Nabokov called “the pure element 
of time”—that “radiant and mobile medium”—is what he tries to capture in the memoir writ 
large and what he attempts to restore in the photographs through the captions by introducing 
movement and the passage of time beyond the singular, static moment captured by the image 
(SM 21). 
In the singular moment captured by this photograph, his father has not yet left for a 
holiday in Stresa; he is eternally home on the Vyra estate, which is not yet lost to the Bolsheviks. 
And yet, according to Bergson’s refutation of the paradox, the arrow will reach the end of its 
trajectory—a trajectory that expels Nabokov from the gardens of Vyra and lands him in 
America. If we play into the kind of reading that Nabokov often encourages in his readers—
following details to discover some hidden pattern or meaning—then the mention of the archery 
target conjures up these resonances. While the posed photo had previously been derided as false, 
this detail functions as an authorial stamp, similar to the butterfly in the prefatory map that 
Nabokov drew.  
 Nabokov also derides other photographs as false. The caption for a photograph of 
Nabokov, his siblings, and their dog taken in Yalta accentuates the falsity of photographic 
representation. Nabokov points out how his brother Sergei is “unfortunately disfigured by flaws 
in the picture” (SM 214). The photograph, for all its purported indexicality, fails to capture 
Sergei as he was. In what sense does the photograph disfigure Sergei? Perhaps Nabokov means 
the effect of Sergei’s rimless pince-nez, which creates a line across the bridge of his nose. 
However, the emphasis on his “disfigurement” is perhaps an instance of reading the photograph 
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retrospectively, with the knowledge of the future violence that would be inflicted upon Sergei. 
Sergei met a tragic end, as Nabokov briefly mentions towards the end of the autobiography. 
Unlike Nabokov, Sergei did not escape Europe during World War II. He was arrested and died in 
1945 in the Nazi concentration camp of Neuengamme. It is as if Nabokov reads this photograph 
through Sergei’s death, as if it predicts what would later come to pass.  
Or, perhaps it is simply meant to draw our attention to the photograph’s inaccurate 
depiction of reality. In an earlier draft, a holograph manuscript of the captions, Nabokov initially 
notes that the photograph also distorts his sister’s image, but then crosses out this detail. “She 
[Elena] and Sergey are disfigured by flaws in the picture. Flaws in the picture disfigure Sergey.” 
He also goes on to elaborate that “The photographer, an old Tatar, seems to have been a great 
retoucher of noses—even that of the dog is not spared.”81 The ability to retouch photographs 
further reinforces the unreliability of the medium. The caption drafts attest to how Nabokov was 
trying out different methods for pointing out the failures of the photograph to capture the siblings 
as he remembers them. The effect is a competition between the photographic medium and 
Nabokov’s prose. The caption silences the photos as inexpressive images. 
However, we should note that in a letter dated April 4, 1932, to Véra, Nabokov describes 
a reunion with his mother, sisters, and brother Kirill in Prague. He writes, “In a couple of days, 
Seryozha may come, and then all of us together will have our picture taken in exactly the same 
poses as one of our Yalta photographs. Boxy [the dog], too.”82 This photograph of the siblings 
                                               
81 [Speak, Memory], Notes for Illustrations, Holograph draft, unsigned and undated, Vladimir 
Nabokov Papers, The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American 
Literature, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
82 Vladimir Nabokov, Letters to Véra, ed. and trans. Brian Boyd and Olga Voronina (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 171. 
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with their dog refers to the one described above. To recreate the photograph “in exactly the same 
poses” is a way of marking time, a means of commemoration. It suggests that this photograph, 
despite the supposed distortions, was perhaps more valuable to Nabokov than the caption in 
Speak, Memory admits. 
The caption for the photograph of the Nabokov house in Petersburg offers another 
example of how Nabokov asserts authorship over the photographs. Always one for staging an 
agonistic encounter, Nabokov does not miss the opportunity to pit word against image in this 
caption that takes up almost as much space on the page as the photograph: 
This photograph, taken in 1955 by an obliging American tourist, shows the Nabokov 
house, of pink granite with frescoes and other Italianate ornaments, in St. Petersburg, 
now Leningrad, 47, Morskaya, now Hertzen Street. Alexander Ivanovich Hertzen (1812–
1870) was a famous liberal (whom this commemoration by a police state would hardly 
have gratified) as well as the talented author of Bïloe i Dumï (translatable as ‘Bygones 
and Meditations’), one of my father’s favorite books. My room was on the third floor, 
above the oriel. The lindens lining the street did not exist. Those green upstarts now hide 
the second-floor east-corner window of the room where I was born. After nationalization 
the house accommodated the Danish mission, and later, a school of architecture. The little 
sedan at the curb belongs presumably to the photographer. (SM 18)  
 
If we compare the final version of the caption with an earlier draft of the manuscript, we see that 
Nabokov significantly expanded the caption: 
The Nabokov’s house of pink granite, with frescoes, in St. Petersburg. (47, Morskaya 
street, now Hertzen str.) The author’s room was in the middle of the third floor, above the 
oriel. He was born in the corner room of the second floor, far right (hidden by the 
lindens). The house is at present a School of Architecture. Photograph taken in 1955.83 
 
The draft version is more perfunctory than the final version. The final version admits more of the 
quiddities of Nabokov’s authorial voice. He shifts into first-person. He adds in the digression 
about Herzen and his memoir Byloe i dumy (usually “translatable” as My Past and Thoughts, not 
                                               
83 [Speak, Memory], Notes for Illustrations, Holograph draft, unsigned and undated, Vladimir 
Nabokov Papers, The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American 
Literature, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
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Bygones and Meditations), perhaps in an effort to link his own work with this famous memoir, 
also written in exile. He reveals that the lindens “did not exist” when he lived there. Svetlana 
Boym notes that what is important in this photograph for Nabokov is “not in what is represented, 
but in what remains invisible.”84 The focus on the lindens that were not there during his 
childhood creates the effect—verbally—of a double-exposed photograph. The ghostly house of 
his memory shows through the house that we see. The revisions to the caption insist on his 
authorship, with his ability to provide a fuller verbal portrait of the house than the photograph 
alone could hope to achieve. 
This photograph of the family home corresponds with the home movie filmed just shortly 
before Nabokov was born. Speak, Memory begins with a description of the “panic” the “young 
chronophobiac” experiences watching this film: “He saw a world that was practically 
unchanged—the same house, the same people—and then realized that he did not exist there at all 
and that nobody mourned his absence” (SM 19). While the film documents the house before his 
birth, the photograph documents it well after his departure. Both create an uncanny effect of the 
familiar house made strange by his absence. Nabokov’s experience of watching the film reminds 
us that photographs and films can be read not only for what they show and preserve, but also for 
what they leave out, what remains beyond the frame. What he perceives in both the photograph 
and the film is less evidence of presence, than of absence. He wants us to visualize it exactly as it 
was, similar to how he made the diagrams for his students. He positions himself as the ultimate 
authority because he is endowed with memory. He knows the house and its history better than 
                                               
84 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 264.  
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the photographer. Indeed, how could an American tourist visualize the house better than 
Nabokov? 
 What is curious, though, about attributing the photograph to a seemingly random 
American tourist is that the photographer was, in fact, a friend of Nabokov’s sister.85 The 
mention of the American tourist, “the little sedan at the curb,” and the 1955 date work together to 
bring to mind Nabokov’s novel Lolita (1955). Like the match theme that develops in Speak, 
Memory, there seems to be some artistic pleasure in the coincidence that at the moment a 
displaced Russian is writing an America road novel, an American is driving around Russia and 
snapping photographs of the Nabokov house. Attributing the photograph to “an obliging 
American tourist” allows him to gesture beyond the photograph and create resonances with his 
own artistic work. It is another case of Nabokov inventing facts to fit the aesthetic scheme of his 
authorial world.  
In marked contrast to these photographs that Nabokov finds some fault with, he also 
includes within the text a photograph of himself that offers a suitable authorial portrait. The 
image pictures Nabokov writing at his desk. The extensive caption guides our reading of the 
photograph, pointing out elements to be noted: 
My wife took, unnoticed, this picture, unposed, of me in the act of writing a novel in our 
hotel room. The hotel is the Établissement Thermal at Le Boulou, in the East Pyrenees. 
The date (discernible on the captured calendar) is February 27, 1929. The novel, 
Zashchita Luzhina (The Luzhin Defense), deals with the defense invented by an insane 
chess player. Note the pat pattern of the tablecloth. A half-empty package of Gauloises 
cigarettes can be made out between the ink bottle and an overfull ashtray. Family photos 
are propped against the four volumes of Dahl’s Russian dictionary. The end of my robust, 
dark-brown penholder (a beloved tool of young oak that I used during all my twenty 
years of literary labors in Europe and may rediscover yet in one of the trunks stored at 
                                               
85 When he received the photograph from his sister Elena Sikorski, Nabokov wrote in a letter 
dated September 6, 1958 “Thank you very much for the heartwrenching pictures. The lindens, of 
course, were not there, and everything is greyer than the painting of memory, but still very 
detailed and recognizable.” Quoted in Boym, 264. 
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Dean’s, Ithaca, N.Y.) is already well chewed. My writing hand partly conceals a stack of 
setting boards. […] Seldom does a casual snapshot compendiate a life so precisely. (257) 
 
The photograph’s caption trains the reader to associate certain symbols with Nabokov: pens, the 
setting boards for butterflies, chess, dictionaries, and so on. If in the Onegin commentary “we 
become Nabokov reading Pushkin” (according to Clarence Brown), then with this caption we 
become Nabokov reading Nabokov.86 This photograph gives us an opportunity to see how 
Nabokov reads himself, a performance of his experience of looking at himself. Nabokov draws 
our attention to the “pat pattern of the tablecloth,” and indeed the image is brimming with 
patterns. The tablecloth naturally calls to mind Nabokov’s love of chess, but the wallpaper and 
his diamond-patterned sweater further enhance the texture of the photograph. The visual effect is 
that of the author as if mimetically blending into his densely patterned surroundings, performing 
an act of mimicry like the butterflies he draws artistic inspiration from. This would seem to be 
the authorized icon of Nabokov. 
It is a classic shot: the writer at his desk, so absorbed in his work that he does not notice 
the photographer (or so he would have us believe). What the caption does, though, is make this 
generic photograph specific. That is, it takes a photograph that could, quite broadly, signify 
“writer at desk.” In the Pushkin lecture, mentioned above, Nabokov worries that everyone looks 
the same in photographs; he dislikes the generic quality of photographs.87 This caption returns 
specificity to the image by situating it within a unique context. As Nabokov emphasizes, the 
                                               
86 Clarence Brown, “Nabokov’s Pushkin and Nabokov’s Nabokov,” Wisconsin Studies in 
Contemporary Literature 8, no. 2 (1967): 292, https://doi.org/10.2307/1207106. 
87 Nabokov’s dislike of the generic quality of photographs relates to his disdain for generalities. 
As Leland de la Durantaye writes, Nabokov believed in “the inviolability of the particular, and 
what he professed to loathe above all else in art and life was the loose-fitting generality.” Leland 
de la Durantaye, “The Pattern of Cruelty and the Cruelty of Pattern in Vladimir Nabokov,” The 
Cambridge Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2006): 326. 
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photograph was taken on February 27, 1929 while he was writing The Luzhin Defense (Zashchita 
Luzhina). Nabokov’s third novel, it was first published in 1929–30 in the leading Paris-based 
Russian émigré journal Sovremennye zapiski. It garnered much acclaim and brought the young 
writer attention from the literary center of Russia Abroad.88 Thus, the mention of this novel links 
this photograph to the moment just before Sirin-Nabokov’s career was launched, similar to how 
he linked the Freund photograph in the foreword with the “Mademoiselle O” chapter. Moreover, 
Nabokov’s English language translation of The Defense had just been published by Putnam in 
1964.  
And yet, simultaneously, his caption manages to transform this incidental photograph, 
taken at a single point in time, into a photograph that summarizes his entire career. Through the 
caption, the photograph’s indexical quality is not delimited to this specific point in time and 
space. Significantly, it is the pen, Nabokov’s chief tool, that transcends temporal boundaries: 
“The end of my robust, dark-brown penholder (a beloved tool of young oak that I used during all 
my twenty years of literary labors in Europe and may rediscover yet in one of the trunks stored at 
Dean’s, Ithaca, N.Y.) is already well chewed.” This proleptic aside about the penholder 
anticipates the rest of his career in Europe and his second emigration, to America. Nabokov, of 
course, does “not believe in time” (139), and the verbal caption transfigures this photograph into 
an eternal image of the author. As he puts it, the photograph “compendiates” his life, thus 
providing a densely patterned visual analogue to the entire autobiography. 
                                               
88 Nina Berberova wrote in glowing terms about the discovery of the new writer Sirin in 1929: 
“A great Russian writer, like a phoenix, was born from the fire and ashes of revolution and exile. 
Our existence from now on acquired a meaning. All my generation were justified. We were 
saved.” Quoted in Stephen Jan Parker, “Critical Reception,” in The Garland Companion to 
Vladimir Nabokov, ed. Vladimir E. Alexandrov (New York: Garland, 1995), 68.  
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Nabokov calls this image a “casual snapshot,” differentiating it from the portraits taken 
by professional photographers that are also included in the text. Those photographs, as we have 
seen, are routinely derided as false because they are posed. For Nabokov, the snapshot reveals 
more about its subject than a staged studio portrait does. In the second paragraph of the caption, 
Nabokov offers a mocking contrast to his author photograph when he recalls the staged portrait 
of a tram conductor-cum-poet:  
Many years ago, in St. Petersburg, I remember being amused by the Collected Poems of a 
tram conductor, and especially by his picture, in uniform, sturdily booted, with a pair of 
new rubbers on the floor beside him and his father’s war medals on the photographer’s 
console near which the author stood at attention. Wise conductor, farseeing 
photographer! (SM 257)  
 
By picturing the poet in uniform and showcasing his father’s medals, this photograph 
mechanically tries to achieve what is done—supposedly—without artifice in the snapshot of 
Nabokov at the desk. The caption emphasizes the superior artistry of the snapshot that has 
skillfully captured the details metonymically associated with the writer. 
And it is here we must turn to the figure behind the camera: Nabokov’s wife Véra. Véra 
occupies a peculiar position in the autobiography. On the one hand, the autobiography is 
dedicated to her and the narrative addresses her as “you,” establishing her as the intended reader. 
On the other, she is scarcely named in the book and little detail is given about her. Often 
portrayed as highly private, Véra once said that her husband “had the decency to keep me out of 
his books.”89 And yet, she is all over his books: as the muse, dedicatee, reader, copyist, and 
correspondent with publishers. Elizabeth Bruss, in her chapter on Speak, Memory, writes that 
Vera’s “presence is marked only by a pronoun” (you) in the autobiography, but this is to ignore 
                                               
89 Boyd, Stalking Nabokov, 32.  
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the two snapshots taken by Véra and the photograph of her.90 The photographs are, arguably, the 
most overt presence of Véra in any of his texts, while the privilege of the photographer’s position 
behind the camera allows her to remain unseen. The photographs incorporate Vera’s artistic 
vision into her husband’s work and offer an opportunity for collaboration between the two. And 
a successful collaboration at that. Her role as his ideal reader seems to enable her to “read” 
Nabokov correctly here, to capture him not as he happens to be but to discern his true aspect.91 
She alone is able to author the true image of her husband.  
The second snapshot taken by Véra follows on the next page. It pictures Nabokov and his 
son Dmitri in front of their boarding house in Mentone, in 1937. Like the snapshot of Nabokov at 
his desk, this image is accompanied by an extended caption: 
A snapshot taken by my wife of our three-year-old son Dmitri (born May 10, 1934) 
standing with me in front of our boardinghouse, Les Hesperides, in Mentone, at the 
beginning of December 1937. We looked it up twenty-two years later. Nothing had 
changed, except the management and the porch furniture. There is always, of course, the 
natural thrill of retrieved time; beyond that, however, I get no special kick out of 
revisiting old émigré haunts in those incidental countries. The winter mosquitoes, I 
remember, were terrible. Hardly had I extinguished the light in my room than it would 
come, that ominous whine whose unhurried, doleful, and wary rhythm contrasted so 
oddly with the actual mad speed of the satanic insect’s gyrations. One waited for the 
touch in the dark, one freed a cautious arm from under the bedclothes—and mightily 
slapped one’s own ear, whose sudden hum mingled with that of the receding mosquito. 
But then, next morning, how eagerly one reached for a butterfly net upon locating one’s 
replete tormentor—a thick dark little bar on the white of the ceiling! (SM 256–57) 
 
Connecting the two images are the appearance of winged insects, emblematic perhaps of their 
own rootless existence: the “rare Pugs” that they capture in the first snapshot and the more 
prosaic mosquitoes in the second. Svetlana Boym reads the winter mosquitoes as a corrective to 
                                               
90 Bruss, Autobiographical Acts, 160. 
91 In an interview with Robert Hughes, Nabokov described Vera as his ideal reader: “She [Véra] 
and I are my best audience. I should say my main audience.” Quoted in Robert Golla, ed., 
Conversations with Vladimir Nabokov (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2017), 99. 
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any elegiac or nostalgic impulses in recollecting these émigré lodgings.92 And yet, the mention of 
mosquitoes, if we are keeping track of such things, refers us back to Nabokov’s first poetic 
creation, after which his mother passed him a small mirror “so that I might see the smear of 
blood on my cheekbone where at some indeterminable time I had crushed a gorged mosquito by 
the unconscious act of propping my cheek on my fist” (SM 227). Leaving aside the significance 
of the mosquitoes and the bloodmark (Vivian Bloodmark, after all, is an anagram of the author’s 
name), I would suggest that what is remarkable about this snapshot is that it prompts any 
recollection at all. In the captions to both of Véra’s snapshots, Nabokov uses the phrase “I 
remember,” a common refrain in the rest of the text but largely absent in the other photo 
captions. These two snapshots give rise to more lyrical reminiscences than any of the other 
photographs in the text. Nabokov’s treatment of these two photographs sharply diverges from his 
other captions. He does not reprove the photos for their faults or antagonize them, as he did with 
so many of the others. Instead, they inspire his memory; the images work in conjunction with his 
verbal art. Véra’s snapshots are an extension of her work with him as secretary, reader, 
dedicatee, addressee—they are another way in which they can co-author something.93 
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93 Indeed, in her biography of Véra, Stacy Schiff notes that the pair collaborated on the final 
chapter of the autobiography. Nabokov asked Vera to write her memories of Dmitri’s childhood 
before he wrote that chapter of the autobiography. Some of the details from Véra’s account 
worked their way into the text. Schiff quotes from the impressions that Véra wrote for her 
husband about standing on a railroad bridge near Nestorstrasse with Dmitri: “my feet hurting 
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(that incredible amount of heat his big baby body generated!)” In Speak, Memory this passage 
becomes “and the fervency of his faith kept him glowing, and kept you warm too, since all you 
had to do to prevent your delicate fingers from freezing was to hold one of his hands alternately 
in your right and left, switching every minute or so, and marveling at the incredible amount of 
heat generated by a big baby’s body.” Quoted in Stacy Schiff, Vera (Mrs. Vladimir Nabokov) 
(New York: Modern Library, 2000), 76.  
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Nabokov once remarked on the veiled presence of Véra in his works: “Most of my works 
have been dedicated to my wife and her picture has often been reproduced by some mysterious 
means of reflected color in the inner mirrors of my books.”94 Nabokov reproduces an actual 
photograph of Véra in the autobiography, in addition to the photographs taken by Véra. But 
instead of a personal snapshot of Véra, it is a standard document of identity: the final image in 
the autobiography is a reproduction of Véra and Dmitri’s Nansen passport.95 While Nabokov 
claimed that “The writer’s art is his real passport,”96 the image of the passport insists on the 
historical reality of the Nabokovs’ escape to America. They were granted exit visas in mid-May 
of 1940, just as Germany had invaded France, where they were living. As the final image of the 
book, the passport is an emblem of the next chapter of their life.  
In the caption to the image, Nabokov briefly comments on the circumstances of the 
passport, and then gestures beyond the caption to the last chapter of the book: “A Nansen 
passport picture taken in Paris in April 1940, of the author’s wife, Véra, and son Dmitri, aged 
five. A few weeks later, in May, the last chapter of our European period was to end as it ends in 
this book” (SM 294). Except for the dedication and the index, it is the only time Véra is named in 
the autobiography. Moreover, centered at the bottom of the passport page is her signature: Véra 
Nabokoff. The signature, of course, performs a bureaucratic function as it validates the document 
of identity. But removed from its legal context and seen as an artistic image within the 
                                               
94 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 191. 
95 In the manuscript draft, there is a note from Nabokov that the photograph of the Nansen 
passport should come last. It is clear that he was in control of how the photographs should be 
ordered in the book. [Speak, Memory] Notes for Illustrations, Holograph draft, unsigned and 
undated, Vladimir Nabokov Papers, The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and 
American Literature, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations. 
96 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 63.  
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autobiography, the prominent signature begins to look more like the signature of an artist. 
Commenting on the central role Véra played in the production of Nabokov’s literary works, 
Alfred Appel suggested that “the monument called ‘Nabokov’ (his collected work) is really a 
variegated work of two, that if he had indeed been a sculptor she would have written her name at 
the base, in very tiny print so that no one could have read it.”97 And indeed, her name is inscribed 
in the final image of the autobiography.  
I would suggest that Véra’s signature in this image speaks to her hidden authorship, 
showing her hand in making this book. Together with the signed passport photo, the two 
snapshots that Véra took put forward the idea that she is a co-producer of the work.98 Although 
Nabokov is not the author of any of the photos in the autobiography, his wife is. The snapshots 
taken by Véra instantiate her participation in the creation of the literary work.99  
In the original edition, on the reverse side of the passport image that bears Vera’s 
signature, Nabokov presents photographs of two specimens of the butterfly he discovered in the 
southeast of France, near the village Moulinet, Alpes Maritimes, in 1938: Plebejus (Lysandra) 
cormion Nabokov. The organization of these photographs side by side invites the reader to draw 
a comparison between the two sets of images. If we see the passport photo as a veiled admission 
of Vera’s authorship, then the butterfly photo pairs nicely with it as the image in the text that 
most forcefully puts forward Nabokov’s own artistic signature. We might even say that this is the 
one photographic image that he did create.  
                                               
97 Quoted in Schiff, Vera (Mrs. Vladimir Nabokov), 374. 
98 In 1965, Nabokov said of Véra, “She is my collaborator. We work together in the warmest and 
most candid friendship.” Quoted in Schiff, 297. 
99 Here we might think of the relationship between Van and Ada Veen in Ada or Ardor: A 
Family Chronicle (1969), as Van’s manuscript is edited and annotated by both of them. 
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Indeed, the practices of taking photographs and collecting butterflies bear certain 
similarities, as both involve capturing a live object, preserving it, making it still. The parallel 
between collecting butterflies and taking photographs has been suggested by Roland Barthes: 
“When we define the photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean only that the figures 
it represents do not move; it means they do not emerge, do not leave: they are anesthetized and 
fastened down, like butterflies.”100 This idea establishes some correspondence between Nabokov 
the lepidopterist and the photographer. 
Earlier in the memoir, Nabokov describes his childhood “longing to describe a new 
species” of butterfly (SM 123). He sees it as akin to poetic creation. Of these butterflies, he 
writes in the caption: “It may not rank high enough to deserve a name, but whatever it be—a new 
species in the making, a striking sport, or a chance cross—it remains a great and delightful 
rarity” (SM 274). He makes much of the fact that they are appearing as photographs for the first 
time here, thus noting the originality of the image; despite the image’s reproducible capacity, it is 
figured here as singular. Thus, including this image of the butterfly is akin to including an image 
of his own creation, unlike the other photographs in the text created by others that he has 
attempted to “authorize.” 
Pictured are photographs of the holotype and paratype of the butterfly. A holotype is the 
single specimen that serves as the representative of a new species. However, it is not uncommon 
for other specimens to be collected as well to create the description of a new species. The 
paratype serves as an additional specimen of the species. The paratype can be of vital importance 
if the holotype is ever lost or destroyed. There is, then, something pleasingly Nabokovian about 
the inclusion of both the holotype and the paratype, as it invokes the trope of the double. We 
                                               
100 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 57. 
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might even go so far as to say that Nabokov, with his avowed affinity for the migratory and 
metamorphosing aspect of butterflies, finds an analogy in the holotype and paratype to his own 




If we return to the image of the “bad memoirist” as a stranger taking photographs, we see 
how Nabokov tries to transform those posed photographs taken by strangers into images that are 
“Nabokovian” through his textual mediation. Although he is not the photographer of these 
images, he positions himself as their author, in control of setting their meaning. He points to the 
photograph’s referential failures, claiming that the posed photographs only approximate or, 
worse, distort the subjects. Through this staged back and forth between the word and image in 
his textual inscriptions, he vaunts his memory as superior to the images. Véra’s snapshots, 
however, recast this struggle between authors competing for the last word in a more benevolent 
light. While the captions to photos taken by other people tend to be antagonistic, highlighting the 
flaws and inaccuracies in their depiction, the captions to the photographs taken by Véra are his 
most poetic. Her visual images inspire his verbal descriptions; they work together. Nonetheless, 
Nabokov claims the ability to control how much the photograph reveals through his captions. 
The question, though, is whether the photographs resist these readings, whether they speak back. 
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Chapter Two 
Missing Frames: The Limits of Photographic Memory in Brodsky’s ‘In a Room and a Half’ 
 
“To picture is not to remember.” 
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (1896)1 
 
“The Photograph does not call up the past (nothing Proustian in a photograph).” 





Brodsky often claimed that he did not experience exile as a qualitative break or rupture in 
his life. In a 1976 letter to his friend and fellow poet Lev Loseff, who was himself in the process 
of emigrating, Brodsky wrote “in the end, any country, any place is simply a continuation of 
space and changes, as such, don’t actually take place.”3 This became a phrase that he would 
often repeat: every country is just a continuation of space.4 For example, in his 1977 lecture 
“Language as Otherland,” he addressed the question of exile and its effects on language. He 
suggested that “exile is bearable in terms of writing. For any country is but a continuation of 
space. All these ravings of a writer being cut out of his roots, deprived of his soil, are drivel.” 
                                               
1 Henri Bergson, Henri Bergson: Key Writings, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Ó Maoilearca 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 153. 
2 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 82. 
3 «В конце концов, любая страна, любое место есть всего лишь продолжение 
пространства, и перемены, как таковой, на самом деле не происходит». My translation. Lev 
Loseff Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (unprocessed).  
4 For example, in an interview with Eva Burch and David Chin in 1979, Brodsky said that he 
tried not to see exile as a “big deal” because “basically every country is just a continuation of 
space.” Joseph Brodsky and Cynthia L. Haven, Joseph Brodsky: Conversations (Jackson, MS: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2002), 65.  
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Brodsky repeatedly insisted that exile had not affected him; that what matters was whether he 
could continue to write. 
However, in his essay “In a Room and a Half,” Brodsky describes space not as 
continuous, but as all too fragmented and reduced. The very title of the essay attests to the 
reduction of space, which is then bodied forth in the text’s fragmentary structure. The essay 
begins in a manner that defies his usual stance on exile as a non-event, that every country is but a 
“continuation of space.” Now, he writes, he stands “on the Atlantic seaboard” and “there is a 
great deal of water” that creates a “real chasm” separating him from Leningrad (LTO 448).5 The 
Atlantic becomes a Stygian boundary between him and his deceased parents and the world he 
left behind. The vast expanse of the world has been fractured by exile and death. There are 
borders that one simply cannot cross.  
And yet, the essay seems to try to bridge this gap. The essay attempts to place us back in 
the room and a half of Brodsky’s childhood. In the drafts of the essay, Brodsky changes the title 
from “The Room and a Half” to “In a Room and a Half.”6 That small preposition accomplishes 
quite a lot: it situates us in that faraway place. Like Nabokov slipping back into the past through 
the art of memory, Brodsky also attempts to return once again to the lost space of his childhood 
home by conjuring it up in vivid detail. Brodsky figures his memory as highly visual, or more 
precisely, as photographic. However, while Nabokov vaunts the power of his visual memory that 
                                               
5 In these lines, we might hear an echo of Czesław Miłosz’s poem “Elegy for N.N.” (1962). 
Written in exile in Berkeley, the poem begins “Tell me if it is too far for you. / You could have 
run over the small waves of the Baltic / and past the fields of Denmark, past a beech wood / 
could have turned toward the ocean, and there, very soon / Labrador, white at this season.” A 
line from the same poem stands as the epigraph to the collection of essays Less Than One: “And 
the heart doesn’t die when one thinks it should.” 
6 Joseph Brodsky Papers GEN MSS 613, Box 81, Folder 1983. Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
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allows him to travel as a “passportless spy” back to the Russia of his childhood, Brodsky’s essay 
increasingly reckons with the failures of memory.  
As we saw in Chapter One, Nabokov critiques photography by setting it in opposition to 
his own superior visual memory. Brodsky also launches an attack on photography; however, 
unlike Nabokov, he does so not in order to demonstrate his unassailable memory by comparison. 
The limits of photographs instead provide an apt visual metaphor for the failures of memory in 
Brodsky’s essay. In Brodsky’s essay there are bright spots of memory that seem to preserve 
faultlessly some scene of the past, so much so that he is transported back to that moment. 
However, those are but a few vivid frames, unloosed from the whole, deprived of temporal 
continuity. There are too many “missing frames” in memory, as Brodsky puts it (LTO 492). The 
distinction that Nabokov draws between a lesser photographic recall of the past and a deeper 
memory that engages all the senses collapses in Brodsky’s notion of memory as visual but not 
visionary: it is flat, random, lacking in continuity. It is, in short, photographic—unable to conjure 
up the past in a Proustian scene of resurrection and recovery, as Barthes remarks in the epigraph 
to this chapter.  
This chapter traces the way in which Brodsky’s writing on photography disavows 
photography’s ability to ameliorate the loss of past time and space. Brodsky instead deplores 
photography as a spatial medium of fragmentation and reduction, one that disrupts temporal 
continuity. Brodsky takes up this idea of the photograph as a fragmented spatial image that does 
not preserve duration and presses it into service as a metaphor for memory’s lack of continuity. 
This chapter examines the implications of such a photographic model of memory that 
foregrounds spatial discontinuity and fragmentation. 
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Brodsky’s interest in photography stems in part from the fact that his father, Aleksandr 
Ivanovich, was a professional photographer. Brodsky’s father taught him how to use a camera 
and, on a few occasions, Brodsky picked up work as a photographer.7 Lev Loseff, in his 
biography of Brodsky, suggests that Brodsky’s poetic eye was trained by the viewfinder of the 
Leica.8 In addition, I would emphasize that Brodsky’s use of photography as a metaphor for 
memory springs from the intellectual milieu in which Brodsky wrote the essay, a moment that 
witnessed a veritable flowering of theoretical writings about photography. By the time Brodsky 
writes “In a Room and a Half,” Sontag’s series of essays on photography had been published in 
the New York Review of Books (NYRB),9 Barthes’s Camera Lucida had appeared in English in 
1981, and the pages of the NYRB (where Brodsky was a frequent contributor) regularly featured 
essays on photography’s practitioners and theorists.10 Given this context, this chapter offers a 
serious appraisal of the significance of photography within Brodsky’s thought, focusing 
primarily on his essay “In a Room and a Half.” Although this essay is not as explicitly about 
                                               
7 Loseff, Joseph Brodsky, 10. 
8 Loseff writes that Brodsky’s “verse is clearly written by a man with a trained eye, and much of 
that training may have come by looking through the viewfinder of a Leica.” Loseff, 10. 
9 From 1973 to 1977, Sontag published a series of essays on photography that would later be 
collected in the book On Photography: “Photography,” October 18, 1973 (“In Plato’s Cave” in 
OP); “Freak Show,” November 15, 1973 (“America, Seen Through Photographs, Darkly” in 
OP); “Shooting America,” April 18, 1974 (“Melancholy Subjects”); “Photography: The Beauty 
Treatment,” November 28, 1974 (“The Heroism of Vision”); “Photography in Search of Itself,” 
January 20, 1977 (“Photographic Evangels”); and “Photography Unlimited,” June 23, 1977 
(“The Image-World”). 
10 For example, On December 17, 1981, a review by Clive James (“That Old Black and White 
Magic”) of the recently published English translation of Camera Lucida (among other some 24 
other books on photography) was printed in NYRB. In that same issue, Brodsky’s poem “The 
Berlin Wall Tune” also appeared. What I am suggesting, in other words, is that Brodsky would 
likely have been familiar with, if not Camera Lucida itself, then at least the reviews that detailed 
Barthes’s final work. 
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photography as Camera Lucida, nonetheless we will see how the resurgence of interest in 
photography during this period is refracted in Brodsky’s essay.  
Like Barthes, Brodsky brings together the loss of his parents with a consideration of the 
photograph’s (in)ability to restore such loss. Although actual photographs are not included in the 
essay, Brodsky explores the photographic condition of memory. Akin to the way objects are 
impressed on the photographic plate, so too, Brodsky suggests, are perceptions imprinted onto 
our retina. These photographic traces preserved in memory entail the continued survival of the 
other even after death in our memory. However, the photographic aspect of memory also renders 
these impressions discontinuous and fragmentary. In this essay, photography becomes a way of 
thinking about the limits of memory and of elegy, as Brodsky foregrounds the inability to 
resurrect the past fully in visual or verbal form. Thus, Brodsky practices what Jahan Ramazani 
has suggested is characteristic of the elegy in the 20th century—an “immersion” in loss rather 
than its “transcendence or redemption.”11 This insistence on loss that stands unredeemed 
distinguishes Brodsky from Nabokov who, like Proust, offers a paradigm of time regained 
through memory and art. Rather than Bergsonian temporal continuity, Brodsky explores the 
postmodern condition of rupture through an assemblage of spatially discontinuous elements: the 
fragmentation of architectural space, photographic snapshots, and gaps in memory.  
 
The Method of Loci: Architecture and Spatial Memory 
 
                                               
11 Jahan Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning: The Modern Elegy from Hardy to Heaney (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 4. 
 92 
When Brodsky taught poetry at colleges in America, one of the writing prompts he gave 
students asked them to write a poem about a room, an ekphrastic exercise that calls to mind his 
own essay about a domestic space, “In a Room and a Half.”  
Concern yourself with any aspect(s) of this room, but mainly with its geometry: try to 
establish a connection between how you feel yourself in this room (secure, a bit 
uncomfortable, cozy, strange) and its rectangular regularity or irregularity. Concentrate 
on the notion of enclosure, and try to animate the available furniture (chairs, for instance, 
always look like skeletons of some creatures we don’t encounter in flesh). Your room can 
be a real one or imagined; the main thing to remember though is that being in a room is 
such a universal experience that to say something novel about is [sic] bound to be 
difficult: mere description won’t do.12 
 
He emphasizes that the poem should capture the “geometry” of the interior, with all its 
irregularities. The spatial form of the room here produces not only the poem’s content but 
inspires its very form. The shape of the room should inform the poem’s structure: “your room 
itself has a definite shape to which your lines should correspond.” Indeed, Brodsky’s own poems 
have been called “architectural”13 and, like the Acmeist poets whose legacy he inherited, he 
obeys architectural principles of order and proportion, taking inspiration from stone and marble, 
ruins and built structures. As much as he was a student of Akhmatova and Mandelstam, he also 
insisted that his poetics were informed by the classical architecture of Petersburg. The 
correspondence between architectural and poetic form that Brodsky impresses on his students 
(and which informs the architectonics of his own poetry) also becomes a guiding principle in his 
prose essay “In a Room and a Half.” 
                                               
12 Lev Loseff Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (unprocessed).  
13 For example, the poet Elena Shvarts said in an interview that Brodsky introduced her to the 
idea of poetry’s “kinship with architecture” and that his poems are like “a complex building.” 
Valentina Polukhina, Brodsky Through the Eyes of His Contemporaries (Academic Studies 
Press, 2008), 263.  
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One of the defining features of the space he details in the essay is its architectural 
irregularity: the room and a half. In the opening line of the essay, Brodsky wonders whether such 
a term “makes any sense in English” (LTO 477). He explains that each person was allotted 9 
square meters of space but, because of the irregular shape of their room, they received an extra 
13 meters resulting in “a total of 40 meters” (LTO 452). The Russian word that remains 
unspoken here is poltora, which more literally means “two minus a half” (coming from the 
words polovina and vtoroi) rather than “one and a half.” In Russian, this spatial unit 
simultaneously accentuates both excess and absence, as the half room is additional space but one 
that lacks wholeness. In this respect, the title of the essay echoes the title of the essay collection: 
Less than One. This theme of lack speaks to the experience of emigration, of occupying the 
space in between two places, as well as the loss of his parents which haunts this essay. By noting 
the lack of an English idiom for the room and a half, Brodsky emphasizes the particularity of this 
space, but he also signals that translation is at work on two levels in this essay: from Russian into 
English, and from the visual medium of architecture into the verbal medium of prose. The result, 
Brodsky seems to suggest, will be imperfect, incomplete, less than whole.14 
This particular configuration of space, born of the communal apartment, already bears 
meaning in the Russian context as a productive and prevalent metaphor for social relations and 
the Soviet experience. As Svetlana Boym writes, “If there had been such a thing as a Soviet 
cultural unconscious, it would have been structured like a communal apartment—with flimsy 
                                               
14 Svetlana Boym notes that “Brodsky loves the titles that contain a ‘one’ that is not one, that is 
more or less than a statistical or bureaucratic unit of identity and space.” She suggests that his 
English-language prose makes use of a language “that is not one,” as it is marked by “cultural 
and linguistic untranslatables.” Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 294–95. 
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partitions between public and private, between control and intoxication.”15 As we will see in 
Chapter Four, many of Kabakov’s works make productive use of the communal apartment as a 
storehouse for memory, but in a more explicitly spatialized way through the total installation.  
Brodsky describes how the enfilade of rooms in the Muruzi house, built in the Moorish 
style in 1903, was broken up into separate rooms. “After the Revolution,” he writes, “in 
accordance with the policy of ‘densening up’ the bourgeoisie, the enfilade was cut up into pieces, 
with one family per room. Walls were erected between the rooms—at first of plywood. 
Subsequently, over the years, boards, brick, and stucco would promote these partitions to the 
status of architectural norm” (LTO 452). One of the paradoxes of this transformation of the space 
as part of the communalization process is that the architectural principle of the original enfilade 
structure actually encourages communal life within the household.16 Thus, we can note the irony 
that the design of the enfilade style—which is born of the idea that we are social creatures, 
forged in relation to others—is then divided into discrete parts of the “communal apartment” in 
which one now strives to carve out a private corner to find refuge. As Svetlana Boym notes, in a 
communal apartment “the minimum of privacy is not even a room but a corner in a room, a 
                                               
15 Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), 123. Irina Paperno also notes that many memoirs about the 
Soviet experience use the communal apartment as a guiding metaphor for their texts. Irina 
Paperno, Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2009), xiv. 
16 In his essay “Figures, Doors and Passages,” Robin Evans discusses the shift in European 
architectural design from creating domestic structures that allow for the easy circulation of all 
members of the household—through an enfilade structure and rooms with multiple doors that 
leads to a less solidly differentiated division between rooms and passageways of the house—to 
designing interior spaces that allowed for privacy and refuge from the rest of the house (by 
creating rooms with only one door that leads into a passageway), beginning in the 18th century as 
new ideas of privacy take hold. Robin Evans, “Figures, Doors and Passages,” in Translations 
from Drawing to Building and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
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hidden space behind the partition.”17 Brodsky’s essay details his attempts to manipulate the 
spatial configuration of the room and a half to create some semblance of privacy and separation 
between him and his parents. Ultimately, though, it is this separation that he seeks to overturn, 
desiring connection; however, the textual structure of the essay reinforces that separation through 
the fragmentary form. The essay consists of 45 fragments, broken down into discrete parts much 
like the Muruzi house was divided into the rooms of the communal apartment. 
 Beyond its correspondence with the formal structure of the essay, the architecture of the 
space guides him through the essay, as the text describes in great detail the various parts of the 
room and a half. The space becomes a repository of memory; by recollecting the physical space, 
he also recalls the memories that those spaces hold. This connection between architecture and 
memory is one with a long history. The poet Simonides of Ceos, commonly thought to be the 
inventor of mnemonics, devised a device for memory known as the method of loci, which makes 
explicit the relationship between architectural spaces and memory. The story goes that, during a 
banquet hosted by a man named Scopas, Simonides recited a poem that praised his host but also 
paid tribute to the gods Castor and Pollux.18 Feeling cheated by this praise of others, Scopas 
refused to pay the full amount for the poem meant to honor him. Simonides was then called out 
of the house by two visitors. In his absence, the roof of the hall caved in and all the guests were 
killed—their bodies so mangled that relatives could not identify them. Aided by his memory of 
where each man sat at the table, though, Simonides proved able to identify them. In On the 
                                               
17 Boym, Common Places, 150. 
18 The account of Simonides’ discovery of the loci method comes from Cicero’s On the Orator. 
It is discussed in Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1966), 1–2. Svetlana Boym also turns to this famous scene in connection with the topography of 
a city and nostalgia. The Future of Nostalgia, 77.  
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Orator, Cicero tells Simonides’ story and promotes the method of loci as an aid to memorizing 
speeches; he encourages the speaker to learn the interior of a space and to associate the distinct 
sections of a speech with a specific place in the structure.19 By following the architecture, the 
speaker recalls his way through the speech. In her classic study on the art of memory, Frances 
Yates writes, “we have to think of the ancient orator as moving in imagination through his 
memory building whilst he is making his speech, drawing from the memorised places the images 
he has placed on them.”20 Such a technique, Yates notes, requires “visual impressions of almost 
incredible intensity.”21 
Simonides’ spatialized “art of memory” resonates with the workings of memory in 
Brodsky’s essay, not only the technique but also the event that led to its invention. Working with 
the ruins of the palace, Simonides reconstructs what once was through his visual memory. From 
the bodily remains, he resurrects the living. It is a poignant story that speaks to the experience of 
loss that haunts Brodsky’s essay. In the essay, Brodsky seeks to rescue those rooms and people 
from oblivion through the spatial form and memory technique of the essay. Brodsky suggests 
that writing the essay and describing the space “is the only way for me to see [my parents] and 
our room” (LTO 457). Brodsky uses the topos of the eponymous room and a half to narrate his 
childhood memories and recollections of his parents. The structure of the space calls forth his 
memories. He describes in detail the 14-feet high ceiling, both the ornamental moldings on the 
                                               
19 Cicero writes that Simonides discovered “the truth that the best aid to clearness of memory 
consists in orderly arrangement. He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select 
localities, with the result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order of the 
facts.” Cicero, On the Orator: Books 1–2, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical 
Library 348 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), 467.  
20 Yates, The Art of Memory, 3. 
21 Yates, 4. 
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walls as well as the cracks and stains. He describes the windows, the balcony, the arch between 
the two rooms, the various configurations of bookcases and suitcases and chests that he brought 
together to devise a divider between his half and his parents’ room; he details his parents’ 
beloved bed, his desk, his father’s darkroom, as well as the communal kitchen and bathroom. 
Recalling the space in detail allows him to relive the past, to revisit that space again through a 
highly visual description.  
The connection between domestic space and memory has been explored more recently by 
the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard in The Poetics of Space (La Poétique de l’Espace, 
1958), a text that Brodsky placed on his great books list that he would give to university students 
when teaching in America. In Poetics of Space, Bachelard explores the lived experience within 
the protective shelter of the home, paying particular attention to the imaginative and emotional 
life encouraged by the various corners and spaces within the house. Although Bachelard’s 
phenomenological study of interior spaces implicitly assumes a particular type of home to be a 
universal experience—a comfortable, middle-class French home with attic, cellar, and staircases 
quite different from the architectural structure of Brodsky’s kommunalka—his insights into the 
emotional power of lived spaces remain valuable. For Bachelard, as for Simonides and the 
practitioners of the method of loci in antiquity, it is the spatialization of memory that ensures its 
preservation and retrieval. He affirms that “the more securely [memories] are fixed in space, the 
sounder they are.”22 
Thus, according to Bachelard, many of our childhood memories are stored within the 
physical structures of the home. And, vice versa, “the house we were born in is physically 
                                               
22 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964), 9. 
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inscribed in us.”23 It is “thanks to the house,” he writes, that “a great many of our memories are 
housed, and if the house is a bit elaborate, if it has a cellar and a garret, nooks and corridors, our 
memories have refuges that are all the more clearly delineated.”24 In his essay, Brodsky draws 
attention to the ornamental flourishes of the Moorish architecture, the odd spaces and corners of 
the room and a half, and the communal corridor as spaces that elicit strong memories. The 
unique architectural features become a storage space for memory. 
Consider, for example, Brodsky’s detailed description of their ten-foot-high chest of 
drawers as his family’s “joined, collective subconscious” (LTO 459). Brimming with letters, 
cameras, dishes, linen, tools, clothes, the chest becomes a psychologically rich space invested 
with their memories. Indeed, Bachelard devotes an entire chapter in his study to “Drawers, 
Chests and Wardrobes,” which he views as “veritable organs of the secret psychological life.”25 
Bachelard begins the chapter with a discussion of Bergson’s “derogatory” use of the “drawer” 
metaphor for memory in his works.26 While Bergson, he writes, dismisses the idea that memory 
functions like “a wardrobe of recollections,” Bachelard favors the notion of the wardrobe as an 
intimate space in which memories are stored.27  Brodsky here takes a Bachelardian, rather than 
Bergsonian, approach to the chest of drawers, figuring them as the storehouse of memory. The 
objects within the chest, he writes, “were part of my parents’ consciousness, tokens of memory: 
of places and of times by and large preceding me; of their common and separate past, of their 
                                               
23 Bachelard, 14. 
24 Bachelard, 8. 
25 Bachelard, 78. 
26 Bachelard, 74. 
27 Bachelard, 75–79. 
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own youth and childhood, of a different era, almost of a different century” and finally “of their 
freedom” (LTO 459). Freedom, one of the paramount concerns in the essay, is preserved not only 
through these objects but through his recollection of these objects. He affirms that he can give 
his parents “a margin of freedom,” a freedom that was taken away from them by the Soviet 
government, by recalling these memories and preserving them in writing (LTO 460).   
For Bachelard, the strength of spatial memory can lead to the recovery of the past; he 
writes, “To inhabit oneirically the house we were born in means more than to inhabit it in 
memory; it means living in this house that is gone.”28 This utopian hope of inhabiting once more 
the lost home through the art of memory recalls Nabokov’s memoir and his inheritance of 
“intangible property, unreal estate” thanks to mnemosyne. In Brodsky’s essay, the verbal 
reconstruction of the room and a half would seem to promise this recovery of the past. However, 
such a technique ultimately proves impossible for Brodsky. It is this spatial aspect of memory 
that is problematic in Brodsky’s essay, because space obeys a reductive logic. Brodsky suggests 
that space is defined by the principle of reduction: “if there is an infinite aspect to space, it is not 
its expansion but its reduction. If only because the reduction of space, oddly enough, is always 
more coherent. […] Expanses have only a broad gesture” (LTO 452). 
 The architectural art of memory that Brodsky explores in this essay finds an analogue in 
another visual medium: photography.29 For if space is treated as fragmented, ever reducing into 
                                               
28 Bachelard, 16. 
29 The connection between architecture and photography is further encouraged by the fact that, 
when the essay was originally published in the New York Review of Books, the photographs 
included to illustrate the text were all of architectural sites: the Muruzi building where Brodsky 
grew up and the Cathedral of the Savior of Her Imperial Majesty’s Transfiguration Battalion, as 
seen from the apartment balcony. This balcony was also the place where Brodsky’s father took a 
photograph of his son each year on his birthday. “The way other people mark the growth of their 
children with pencil notches on the kitchen wall, every year on my birthday my father took me 
out to our balcony and photographed me there” (LTO 489). The balcony where the yearly photo 
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smaller parts, then the photograph, another fragmented vision of space, becomes another medium 
that represents the reductive quality of memory. If the ancients saw architecture as a storehouse 
of memory, in Brodsky’s essay it is photography that becomes the metaphor par excellence for 
conceptualizing the workings of memory. But whereas the loci technique of antiquity promises 
the faultless cultivation of memory by attaching an idea to a physical place, Brodsky’s 
photographic model of memory speaks to the inevitable limitations and gaps of memory. As we 
will see, the photographic, for Brodsky, emphasizes the failures of memory. 
 
Photographic Memory 
The essay presents memory in markedly visual terms. Brodsky repeatedly says that he 
can “see” himself back in the scenes that he describes, and photography increasingly becomes a 
metaphor for the workings of memory (LTO 456). Early in the essay, Brodsky draws attention to 
his ability to perfectly visualize his parents and himself back in the room and a half. He recalls 
his mother in detail, picturing her “most frequently in the kitchen, in her apron, face reddened 
and eyeglasses a bit steamy, shooing me away from the stove as I try to fish this or that item 
from the burner. Her upper lip glistens with sweat; her short, cropped, dyed-red but otherwise 
gray hair curls disorderedly” (LTO 456). Slipping into the present tense, Brodsky zooms in on a 
few vivid visual details: her glasses, her upper lip, her curls in disarray. While this fairly banal 
domestic scene is itself unexceptional—the son bothering the mother as she prepares dinner, then 
sitting at the table with the father—Brodsky nonetheless marvels at the fact that he can see this 
                                               
took place thus becomes a marker of time’s passage: in the physical structure, in the photos of 
Brodsky there, and now in the photographs of the balcony itself. Architecture, photography, and 
memory become triangulated at the site of the balcony. 
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scene so clearly. “How is it possible,” he muses, “that I see myself in this scene? And yet, I do; 
as clearly as I see them” (LTO 456).  
While in an earlier draft, he tentatively questions the veracity of this vision, asking “Do I 
see myself in this scene? Yes, I do; as clearly as I see them,” Brodsky ultimately changes the 
question to: “How is it possible that I see myself in this scene?”30 A minor change, perhaps. And 
yet the phrasing changes the tenor of the question about memory. He shifts from asking merely 
whether he truly sees himself in this scene to wondering how it is possible that he does see 
himself in that scene. How is it possible, essentially, that his memory is able to transport him 
back to that domestic scene? As we will see, photography becomes the dominant metaphor to 
explain such a border crossing.  
This link between photography and memory becomes more explicit later in the essay, 
when he recalls the evening of his father’s unexpected return from World War II. His father and 
his friend Captain F.M. enter the apartment and display the gifts they have brought home. “I 
remember one dark cold November evening in 1948,” he begins. Brodsky narrates the scene in 
the present progressive, as if he were re-living it. “I remember the doorbell ringing and my 
mother and I rushing to the dimly lit landing,” as his father and colleague are “carrying three 
huge crates.” And then a little later “Captain F.M. and I are sitting at the table, while my father 
unpacks the crates,” his mother is “clasping her hands and exclaiming,” and the captain is 
“winking at me as to a grownup” (LTO 464). The scene plays on the familiar trope of unexpected 
homecomings, exemplified in Ilya Repin’s painting “They Did Not Expect Him” (Ne zhdali, 
                                               
30 Joseph Brodsky Papers GEN MSS 613, Box 81, Folder 1983. Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
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1884–88).31 Despite the typicality of such a scene, Brodsky accentuates the clarity with which 
his memory operates, despite the passage of time: “Now I am exactly the age my father was that 
November evening: I am forty-five, and again I see the scene with an unnatural, high-resolution-
lens clarity, although all its participants save me are dead” (LTO 464). This layering of time—as 
he is now the same age that his father was then—seems to heighten the power of memory to 
place him back within this scene. The strength of his memory lies in the fact that it is able to defy 
the natural order, to cheat death; all the others are dead, he notes, and yet they seem reanimated 
through his vivid recollection. It might seem, then, that photographic memory offers a palliative 
for the exilic condition in which one is split between two places, or more generally for the 
fundamental divide between past and present. Photography, and visual memory, would seem to 
offer a means of suturing the gap between different places and times. 
As the drafts of the essay demonstrate, Brodsky increasingly relied on the language of 
photography as a metaphor for memory. In an earlier version, Brodsky writes that he sees “the 
scene with almost supernatural clarity.”32 In the final version, though, he changes it to “an 
unnatural, high-resolution-lens clarity” (italics mine). In effect, he shifts the vocabulary from 
superstition to science, from magic to photography in order to explain his ability to visualize this 
remembered scene. So clear is his vision of this scene that he seems almost projected back into 
it; he says that now he is able to correct his behavior as a child; at the time, he failed to wink 
back at his father’s colleague, but now he claims, “I see [the scene] so well that I can wink back 
at Captain F.M” (LTO 464). The “mesmerizing clarity” of his memory allows him to step back 
                                               
31 I am grateful to Boris Gasparov for pointing out this connection. 
32 Joseph Brodsky Papers GEN MSS 613, Box 81, Folder 1983. Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
 103 
into this scene, in a manner not unlike Nabokov’s ability to step back into the image of the past 
that he so vividly paints (LTO 464–65). But if Nabokov’s memory of the past is painterly, then 
Brodsky’s is decidedly photographic. He suggests that he is able to remember so vividly 
“because you are a son of a photographer and your memory simply develops a film. Shot with 
your own two eyes, almost forty years ago. That’s why you couldn’t wink back then” (LTO 465). 
A passive recorder, unable to “wink back” at his father’s friend, his camera eye documents the 
evening which now, forty years on, he can experience again through the “high-resolution lens” of 
memory.  
Memory, in this scene, is associated with the technology of cameras: he recalls the scene 
as if through a lens and his memory is faultlessly preserved like a roll of film. Svetlana Boym 
has noted that photography works as a “metaphor for memory” in Brodsky’s essay; however, she 
leaves unexplored how precisely this metaphor works and what it reveals about Brodsky’s 
conception of both memory and photography.33 Brodsky’s essay engages less with actual 
photographs than with conceiving of memory as photographic, of the experience of vision as if 
the human eye were the objective camera eye. What are the implications of likening the eye to 
the camera lens, of memory to the photographic plate? 
While the essay begins with a more optimistic portrait of memory—a kind of memory 
akin to Nabokov’s visual memory with the power to transcend time and space—this attitude 
quickly gives way to a more critical appraisal of memory. Ultimately, Brodsky deplores memory 
precisely because of what he considers to be its photographic quality. The “film” of the past that 
his memory developed, despite its clarity, is found to be profoundly lacking. 
                                               
33 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 296. 
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Since its inception, photography has been seen as an aide-mémoire because of its strong 
referential power, but also as an apt metaphor for the workings of memory itself; as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes put it in 1859, the daguerreotype was a “mirror with a memory.”34 The 
impression of objects on light-sensitive paper becomes an analogy for the recording of sensory 
impressions on the brain.35 Photography belongs to a long lineage of visual metaphors for 
conceptualizing memory. In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates compares memory with a wax 
tablet upon which our memories are inscribed. The quality of wax may differ within each of us, 
accounting for one’s propensity to forget or another’s to retain memory well, but our thoughts 
and memories are imprinted in the wax: 
We may look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses. We make 
impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember among the things we have seen 
or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our perceptions and thoughts and 
take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings. 
Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image 
remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not 
know. (191d)36 
 
In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates offers yet another metaphor for the workings of memory, this time 
one that brings together words and images. The soul, he claims, is like “a book” (38e) upon 
which a scribe writes words while a painter “provides illustrations to his words in the soul” 
                                               
34 Trachtenberg, Classic Essays on Photography, 74. 
35 For an overview of the use of photography as a metaphor for memory, see Douwe Draaisma, 
Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas about the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 119–134. 
36 Plato, “Theaetetus,” in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. M. 
J. Levett (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1997), 212.  
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(39b).37 The parallels between the impressions made in the wax tablet or the inscriptions within 
the book of the soul and the indexical trace imprinted in the photograph are clear.  
But if Plato’s wax tablet model of memory endows the subject with agency over which 
memories should be imprinted upon the wax (“we make impressions […] of everything we wish 
to remember” and “we hold the wax under our perceptions”), the photographic model of memory 
instead emphasizes the idea of a passive recording of sense data onto the mind. Indeed, Freud 
takes up the trope of the unconscious mind operating like a camera to explain the workings of 
trauma, as we shall explore more in Chapter Three. If the avant-garde hailed the aesthetic 
potential of the objective mechanical apparatus that could record beyond what the human eye 
could perceive (consider surrealist André Breton’s praise of the camera as a “blind instrument”38 
or Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov’s theory of the “kino-eye”39), others have shuddered at the 
camera’s revelation of our own contingency as a perceiving subject.40   
                                               
37 Plato, “Philebus,” in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. 
Dorothea Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1997), 427–28. 
38 André Breton, “Max Ernst,” in Beyond Painting: And Other Writings by the Artist and His 
Friends, ed. Robert Motherwell (New York: Wittenborn, Schultz, 1948), 177. For more on 
Surrealism’s fascination with the automatism of photography, see Krauss, “The Photographic 
Conditions of Surrealism.” 
39 In 1923, Vertov argues cinema should no longer “copy the work of our eye,” for the camera’s 
kino-eye is “more perfect than the human eye.” He writes: “I am kino-eye, I am a mechanical 
eye. I, a machine, show you the world as only I can see it.” Dziga Vertov, Kino-Eye: The 
Writings of Dziga Vertov, ed. Annette Michelson, trans. Kevin O’Brien (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 15–17. 
40 In her article “L’Imparfait de l’Objectif: The Imperfect of the Object Glass,” Ann Banfield 
gives an account of how the photograph records sense-data in the absence of a perceiving 
subject, thus revealing the contingency of the subject. This is experienced as a startling, almost 
traumatic, shock in Proust’s A la recherche and Barthes’ Camera Lucida. Ann Banfield, 
“L’Imparfait de l’Objectif: The Imperfect of the Object Glass,” Camera Obscura 8, no. 24 
(1990): 64–87, https://doi.org/10.1215/02705346-8-3_24-64. 
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Thus, when Brodsky likens his eye to the camera eye, his memory to light-sensitive film, 
he expresses both the visual clarity of his memory but also its impersonal mechanical quality. It 
is this mechanical aspect of the photographic model of the mind that troubles Brodsky in this 
essay. For memory to operate like the camera apparatus implies the absence of the embodied 
position of the perceiving subject; as Ann Banfield notes, the camera offers a “subjective but 
subjectless” perspective.41 We witness this erasure of the perceiving subject when Brodsky 
suggests that he “couldn’t wink back” during the scene of his father’s arrival home from the war, 
for it was as if he were turned into a mechanical apparatus impassively recording the scene. In 
Brodsky’s conception of the photographic model of the mind, memory operates mechanically 
and thus randomly, impersonally; it fails to capture the perceiving subject’s experience of 
temporal duration.  
As we saw in Chapter One, Bergson also turns to photography as a metaphor for the 
mind’s false perception of the durational process of becoming. Bergson’s durée réelle or pure 
duration offers a conception of time and inner experience that is in a constant state of flux, ever 
changing and flowing between states, that cannot be quantified, measured, or divided.42 Bergson 
admits that in our daily lives “we find it extraordinarily difficult to think of duration in its 
original purity.”43 We (falsely) bring our inner experience of duration together with the external 
marking of time, the regulated time of the clock which consists of homogeneous measurable 
                                               
41 Banfield, 77. 
42 Bergson first puts forward his concept of duration in Time and Free Will (1889). Duration, the 
continual process of becoming and changing, is to be conceived of as “succession without 
distinction,” a “mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of 
which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract 
thought.” Bergson, Henri Bergson: Key Writings, 73. 
43 Bergson, 76. 
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units of time. Thus, according to Bergson, we fall into the habit of spatializing the inner 
experience of duration:  
We introduce [space] unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession; we set our states of 
consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in 
one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express 
duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or 
a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another.44  
 
Such a spatialization of time thus fragments the ceaseless continuity of duration. It is this 
spatialization of time into discrete fragments that corresponds with the camera. Just as the 
cinematographic apparatus gives the illusion of movement as it unfolds a series of immobile 
photographs, so too does the mind habitually fragment the process of movement:  
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside 
them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of 
the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string 
them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus 
of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming 
itself.45  
 
Bergson’s theory attempts to overturn this “cinematographical method” of perception in order to 
return us to intuiting the constant inner movement of becoming.46 The “snapshot” is thus linked 
with our perceptual misapprehension of duration which fragments continuous experience as it 
would space into immobile units.47  
                                               
44 Bergson, 73. 
45 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 306. 
46 Bergson, 307. 
47 Martin Jay, in his study of the rise of “antiocular” thought in 20th-century French theory, 
includes Bergson as one of the first Western philosophers to distrust sight. Jay’s study suggests 
that this doubt in vision was in part inaugurated by optical inventions like the camera, which 
paradoxically offered a highly realist vision of the world, but also made people aware of the 
limits of our own vision, of how susceptible we are to being tricked by illusory visions. See 
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  Following Bergson, Brodsky envisions a model of the mind that operates like the 
camera, fragmenting temporal experience into discrete spatialized images. Brodsky’s critique of 
memory firmly rests on the contention that it lacks continuity and produces mere fragments. He 
writes:  
What memory has in common with art is the knack for selection, the taste for detail. 
Complimentary though this observation may seem to art (that of prose in particular), to 
memory it should appear insulting. The insult, however, is well deserved. Memory 
contains precisely details, not the whole picture; highlights, if you will, not the entire 
show. (LTO 489)  
 
The passage of time has rent asunder the continuity of memory, leaving behind only shards. It is 
as if a “time bomb” had gone off in the room and a half, far more destructive than a “neutron 
bomb,” he claims, for time “splinters even one’s memory” (LTO 496). Now his memories of his 
parents are only “fragments, details” (LTO 492). It is this quality of memory—sharply visual and 
yet discontinuous—that finds an analogy in the photographic medium. In fragment 37, Brodsky 
writes that he sees his parents’ faces “with great clarity, in the variety of their expressions—but 
these are fragments also: moments, instances. These are better than photographs with their 
unbearable laughter, and yet they are as scattered” (LTO 492).48 While here memory comes out 
just slightly ahead of snapshots, both exhibit similar tendencies. Brodsky expresses frustration 
with the way memory and photographs fragment, reduce, and flatten real life. Indeed, at the end 
of this short fragment, he once again likens the mind to the impersonal mechanical camera: “One 
                                               
Chapter Three, “The Crisis of the Ancien Scopic Regime: From the Impressionists to Bergson” 
in Jay, Downcast Eyes. 
48 This phrase about the “unbearable laughter” of photographs is one that Brodsky would return 
to. He makes a similar statement in his essay in memory of the poet Stephen Spender: “Ah, this 
unbearable snapshot laughter! That’s what one is left with—with these arrested instants stolen 
from life” (OGR 466). He also notes in the Spender essay that as he is writing this passage he is 
looking at this photograph, as if it were needed for inspiration, and yet it proves not to be 
enough. 
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shouldn’t expect so much from memory; one shouldn’t expect a film shot in the dark to develop 
new images. Of course not. Still, one can reproach a film shot in the daylight of one’s life for 
missing frames” (LTO 492). Memory, for Brodsky, is akin to a collection of photographic 
fragments, rather than a continuous, unblemished film record. It is a film stripped of movement, 
transformed into isolated static images. 
 By conceiving of memory as if it were a camera that operates independent of the subject, 
Brodsky expresses a divide in the self between the perceiving subject and the mechanical device 
of memory that records and stores impressions at random. This divide is similar to the distinction 
Bergson makes between the “fundamental self” that experiences a fluid succession of states and 
the “superficial ego” that experiences clearly delineated states that are quantifiable.49 While our 
internal experience of duration involves an unending succession of states that mutually 
interpenetrate, we also engage with the outside world, and in so doing we project our internal 
experience onto the external objects that surround us.50 By externalizing our inner state of 
duration, we create two selves. Our fundamental self becomes obscured, as we lose our 
                                               
49 Bergson, Henri Bergson: Key Writings, 86–88. In Time and Free Will, Bergson admits that 
this split is necessary for social functioning: “As the self thus refracted, and thereby broken to 
pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in 
particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self.” Bergson, 
88. 
50 Bergson writes: “We confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with 
its permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object. In the 
same way as the fleeting duration of our ego is fixed by its projection in homogeneous space, our 
constantly changing impressions, wrapping themselves round the external object which is their 
cause, take on its definite outlines and its immobility.” Bergson, Henri Bergson: Key Writings, 
89. 
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connection with our inner states “except in the homogeneous medium in which we have set their 
image.”51   
Bergson’s shallow self that projects time into space and endows external objects with the 
inner experience of duration returns us to the spatialized memory systems of Simonides’ method 
of loci and Bachelard’s poetics of space. But what Bergson disparages, the classical art of 
memory actively encourages. For Bachelard or Simonides, the projection of memory onto 
external objects is to be cultivated, for it is through the spatialization of our impressions that we 
can preserve our memory. As we recall, Bachelard explicitly engages with Bergson’s concept of 
duration, but in order to insist that memory is best preserved precisely when we store it away in 
physical space. For Bachelard, “space contains compressed time” and it is space that we 
remember.52 He thus suggests that space is more important than time in recovering the past:  
Memory—what a strange thing it is!—does not record concrete duration, in the 
Bergsonian sense of the word. We are unable to relive duration that has been destroyed. 
We can only think of it, in the line of an abstract time that is deprived of all thickness. 
The finest specimens of fossilized duration concretized as a result of long sojourn, are to 
be found in and through space.53  
 
In accord with Bachelard’s spatial art of memory, Brodsky presents memory as spatial—from the 
essay’s emphasis on the space of the room and a half as a repository of memory to the idea that 
memory works like the photographic apparatus that produces spatial images of time. And yet 
                                               
51 Bergson, 93. 
52 Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, 8. 
53 Bachelard, 9. Bachelard’s image of “fossilized duration” calls to mind his contemporary André 
Bazin, who claimed that cinema gives us “change mummified,” for he suggests that the 
photographic image is similar to how “bodies of insects are preserved intact, out of the distant 
past, in amber” Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 14–15. 
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Brodsky also shares Bergson’s critique of how such spatialization introduces fragmentation and 
betrays the “qualitative multiplicity” of temporal duration.  
In his frustration with memory as photographically fragmented in “In a Room and a 
Half,” Brodsky accedes that perhaps he is asking too much of memory: “I fully realize how 
absurd the grounds of my resistance are: these fragments’ lack of continuum” (LTO 492). He 
goes on to say in the next fragment (38) that this desire for continuity goes against the laws of 
nature: “Presumably the whole point is that there should be no continuum: of anything. That 
failures of memory are but a proof of a living organism’s subordination to the laws of nature. No 
life is meant to be preserved. Unless one is a pharaoh, one doesn’t aspire to become a mummy” 
(LTO 493).54 Brodsky’s photographic model of memory longs for but ultimately disavows the 
possibility of the indivisible temporal flow of Bergsonian duration that would preserve all the 
details of a life. The formal structure of the essay follows this principle of reduction and 
fragmentation: it consists of short, non-chronological fragments. This fragmented narrative 
structure is the verbal equivalent of his visual memory, and of photographs. Even though 
Brodsky resists the reduction of space, both in memory and photography, he cannot help but 
succumb to a fragmented narrative structure. Ultimately, Brodsky reconciles himself to the idea 
that nothing can be preserved completely, that fragmentation is inevitable.  
In Brodsky’s essay it is the infinitely reductive quality of space that confirms memory to 
be spatial, rather than temporal. Brodsky attributes the fragmented state of memory to what he 
calls the “economy of space”—for who could have room enough to save all the fragments of a 
                                               
54 The mention of preservation and mummification again recalls Bazin’s essay “The Ontology of 
the Photographic Image,” in which he describes the impulse to preserve a subject through 
representation as the “mummy complex” of the plastic arts, the apogee of which is the 
photographic representation of the subject. André Bazin, What Is Cinema? trans. Hugh Gray 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 9. 
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life (LTO 492). As mentioned earlier, in this essay Brodsky suggests that “if there is an infinite 
aspect to space, it is not its expansion but its reduction” (LTO 452). The essay thus makes a 
connection between the reduction of space and the fragmentation of memory, reinforcing the 
idea of memory as a spatial medium (à la Bachelard) that thus finds commonality with the 
photographic medium. Brodsky links this fragmentary quality of memory to photographs, 
because of their propensity for reducing and flattening space, of preserving one moment over 
another. As Susan Sontag writes in On Photography, “A photograph is only a fragment, and with 
the passage of time its moorings become unstuck.”55 
In accordance with Brodsky’s premise that memory obeys the laws of space, which can 
be infinitely reduced, then memory is always under threat of being broken down into smaller and 
smaller photographic fragments. For Brodsky, the categories of space and time are charged with 
meaning, and so it is not insignificant that memory is critiqued as primarily spatial in the essay. 
In Brodsky’s work, the category of time is often valorized over space. In the poem “Lullaby of 
Cape Cod” (Kolybel’naia Treskovogo mysa, 1975) the cod’s “soft song” reminds us that: 
Time is far greater than space. Space is a thing.  
Whereas time is, in essence, the thought, the conscious dream  
of a thing. And life itself is a variety  
of time […] 
 
Время больше пространства. Пространство — вещь.  
Время же, в сущности, мысль о вещи.  
Жизнь — форма времени […]56  
 
                                               
55 Sontag, On Photography, 71. 
56 Joseph Brodsky, Chastʹ rechi: stikhotvoreniia 1972-1976 (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1977), 106. 
Joseph Brodsky, Collected Poems in English, ed. Ann Kjellberg (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2000), 124. English translation by Anthony Hecht. 
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His essay “Flight from Byzantium” (1985) also draws a sharp contrast between time and space. 
In the essay, Brodsky claims that the “East” is overly invested in the ornamental, decorative, 
visual; he thus categorizes it as a purely spatial realm, as opposed to the “West” which is 
temporal (LTO 433). Such a distinction is no doubt specious. Brodsky admits that such a position 
will provoke ire from those who actually study Eastern civilizations (“Oh, I foresee 
objections!”), but nonetheless he persists to reprise his dichotomy between space and time: 
“space to me is, indeed, both lesser and less dear than time. Not because it is lesser but because it 
is a thing, while time is an idea about a thing. In choosing between a thing and an idea, the latter 
is always to be preferred, say I” (LTO 435). Or, we can consider Watermark, Brodsky’s book-
length essay on Venice, which offers several meditations on the difference between space and 
time. In that essay, time (as if often the case in Brodsky’s work) is coupled with water. He 
writes: “I always adhered to the idea that God is time” and thus that “if the Spirit of God moved 
upon the face of water,” as in the opening of Genesis, then “the water was bound to reflect it. 
Hence my sentiment for water, for its folds, wrinkles, and ripples, and—as I am a Northerner—
for its grayness. I simply think that water is the image of time” (W 42–43). Brodsky opposes the 
architecture of the city with the “anarchy of water that spurns the notion of shape” to assert that 
in Venice, more so than anywhere else, space is more aware of “its inferiority to time” and thus it 
responds “with the only property time doesn’t possess: with beauty” (W 44). The infinite, 
unbounded, and indivisible nature of water—ceaseless in its movement, in a constant state of 
change—thus embodies Bergsonian temporal duration, whereas space, that lesser thing, is visual, 
aesthetic, and immobile.  
The figuration of memory as spatial rather than temporal in “In a Room and a Half” links 
with his discussion of space and time more generally. If we have an overriding concern with 
 114 
space in this essay, as opposed to time, it is because time itself—along with memory—has 
become spatialized. We are betrayed, as he says, by memory that does not preserve the duration 
of temporal flow, but rather spatializes it, turning our experience into a lesser object. Thus, the 
idea of continuous temporal duration is held in tension with fragmentary spatial memory in the 
essay. “In a Room and a Half” clearly presents a spatialized model of memory, through his 
detailed recollection of his Leningrad home and the memories stored within. And yet he also 
rails against the limits of a spatialized memory system, which inevitably fragments, and longs for 
an experience of duration that allows for continuity. Brodsky’s essay, though, suggests that this 
Bergsonian fundamental self who experiences the ceaseless continuity of duration is 
inaccessible, and that all we are left with now is the fragmented self with a spatialized, 
photographic memory. Although in the essay Brodsky aspires to a Bergsonian concept of 
duration, he ultimately rejects it as an unattainable fantasy, finding it nearly impossible to escape 
the spatialization of memory and time. Brodsky writes, contra Bergson, that “the conviction that 
we are somehow remembering the whole thing in a blanket fashion, the very conviction that 
allows the species to go on with its life, is groundless” (LTO 489).  
As we saw in Chapter One, Nabokov’s critique of the photograph is also indebted to 
Bergson’s concept of duration. For Nabokov, as for Bergson, the photograph lacks the vitality 
and movement of temporal duration. However, while Nabokov does subscribe to the idea that he 
is able to access the inner experience of duration through the art of memory, Brodsky does not 
vaunt his memory in such a manner. The opposition that Bergson sets up between a false 
photographic perception of the world and the experience of pure duration collapses in Brodsky’s 
vision of memory as decidedly spatial and photographic. The essay presents memory and 
perception as photographic, with no recourse to the continuous experience that Bergson insists is 
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there, if only we manage to intuit it. While for Bergson, it is the artist who can break through 
habituated perception and creatively intuit the flow of duration to perceive the “inner life of 
things”57 (the paradigmatic example of this being Proust’s mémoire involontaire), Brodsky offers 
a collage of photographic fragments that do not transcend their flatness. Brodsky’s essay 
suggests that there is no longer, it would seem, the possibility of Bergsonian continuity. After all, 
the twentieth century is the century of fragmentation, rupture. Michel Foucault, in “Of Other 
Spaces,” contended that in the twentieth century, an era “of space,” spatial concerns should take 
precedence over the temporal: “We are in the age of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, the near 
and the far, the side by side and the scattered.”58 And the photograph becomes the art form par 
excellence for representing the fragmentation or atomization of modern society, which the 
experience of exilic discontinuity is part and parcel of. 
Indeed, Walter Benjamin critiqued Bergson’s philosophy of duration for not recognizing 
the specific historical circumstances in which it developed. In his essay “On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire” (1939), Benjamin historicizes Bergson’s concepts of memory and duration in 
Matière et mémoire, a move that Bergson himself was not interested in (“he rejects any historical 
determination of memory”).59 For Benjamin, Bergson’s philosophy is inextricably linked with its 
historical conditions, as it “evolved” in response to “the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale 
                                               
57 In his essay on laughter, Bergson suggests that “between nature and ourselves, nay, between 
ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed: a veil that is dense and opaque for the 
common herd,—thin, almost transparent, for the artist and the poet.” Bergson, Laughter, 74–76. 
58 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias,” in Rethinking Architecture: A 
Reader in Cultural Theory, ed. Neil Leach (New York: Routledge, 1997), 330. 
59 Benjamin, Illuminations, 157. Brodsky included Illuminations on his great books list that he 
would give to students. Lev Loseff Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European 
History and Culture, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (unprocessed). 
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industrialism.”60 The shocks of modernity and industrialization transformed our experience of 
time—and it is this, in Benjamin’s view, that leads Bergson to develop his philosophy of 
memory and experience. For Benjamin, Bergson is implicitly responding to modern society’s 
sudden transformation of time into a visible, tangible, spatial medium.61 Bergson’s philosophy is 
an attempt to defy the very fragmentation of time and experience that Benjamin sees as typical of 
modernity. In Benjamin’s reading, Bergson’s philosophy is engaged in the work of mourning, as 
it attempts to restore a kind of continuity that has been lost. Brodsky too is mourning this loss. 
And while “In a Room and a Half” appeals to this promise of continuity, it ultimately inscribes 
the experience of fragmentation as a fundamental condition into the very form and content of the 
essay, pointing to the impossibility of overcoming it in the post-war moment.62  
In this respect, the form of Brodsky’s essay displays an affinity with Benjamin’s own 
autobiographical writings. In Berlin Chronicle, the unfinished autobiographical piece Benjamin 
began writing in 1932, he distinguishes his own recollections—nonchronological short 
fragments—from autobiography proper along the dividing line between space and time: 
                                               
60 Benjamin, 157. 
61 For more on this transformation of time, see Mary Ann Doane’s discussion of how the spread 
of pocket watches and railroad schedules towards the end of the nineteenth century led to an 
increased rationalization and uniformity of time. Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic 
Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
4–6. 
62 We should note that this dynamic between continuity and rupture also relates to Brodsky’s 
cultural position as part of the “generation after,” who sought to rectify the disruption of cultural 
continuity in the wake of cataclysmic events such as the Holocaust or Stalin’s Purges. This 
generation “aspired precisely to the re-creation of the effect of culture’s continuity,” as he puts it 
in his Nobel Lecture “Uncommon Visage” (OGR 55–56). “The fact that not everything got 
interrupted, at least not in Russia, can be credited in no small degree to my generation, and I am 
no less proud of belonging to it than I am of standing here today. And the fact that I am standing 
here today is a recognition of the services that generation has rendered to culture; recalling a 
phrase from Mandelstam, I would add, to world culture” (OGR 55). 
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Reminiscences, even extensive ones, do not always amount to an autobiography. And 
these quite certainly do not, even for the Berlin years that I am exclusively concerned 
with here. For autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and what makes up the 
continuous flow of life. Here, I am talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities.63 
 
In a 1978 essay in the New York Review of Books, Sontag reviewed the recently published 
Reflections (a collection of Walter Benjamin’s essays in English that contained Berlin 
Chronicle), in which she discusses Benjamin’s autobiographical piece extensively (as well as the 
companion piece Berlin Childhood around 1900, which remained untranslated in English at that 
point).64 Referring to the passage just quoted above, Sontag observes that “Benjamin, the 
translator of Proust, wrote fragments of an opus that could be called A la Recherche des espaces 
perdues. Memory, the staging of the past, turns the flow of events into tableaux. Benjamin is not 
trying to recover his past, but to understand it: to condense it into its spatial forms, its 
premonitory structures.”65 This turn to spatial fragments as opposed to temporal duration in 
Benjamin’s autobiographical writings could just as well describe the essay that Brodsky would 
later write. In both autobiographical works, memory is characterized not by Proustian time (or 
Bergsonian duration) but rather by spatial fragments and discontinuity—perhaps because both 
were writing from the position of exile to create an archive of spaces that were on the brink of 
disappearing.  
                                               
63 Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter 
Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 28. 
64 Sontag’s review, entitled “The Last Intellectual,” was published in the New York Review of 
Books’s 15th anniversary issue on October 12, 1978. Brodsky’s poem “Lithuanian 
Divertissement” also appeared in this same issue of the magazine, which suggests that Brodsky 
would likely have read Sontag’s review. 
65 Susan Sontag, “The Last Intellectual,” New York Review of Books, October 12, 1978. 
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In the approach to memory that Bergson, Proust, and Nabokov shared, voluntary visual 
memory (often coded as photographic) is placed in opposition to the depths of involuntary 
memory. In Sontag’s reading of Proust, she highlights the inadequacy of photographs and a 
strictly visual memory:  
Whenever Proust mentions photographs, he does so disparagingly: as a synonym for a 
shallow, too exclusively visual, merely voluntary relation to the past, whose yield is 
insignificant compared with the deep discoveries to be made by responding to cues given 
by all the senses—the technique he called ‘involuntary memory.’ One can’t imagine the 
Overture to Swann’s Way ending with the narrator’s coming across a snapshot of the 
parish church at Combray and the savoring of that visual crumb, instead of the taste of 
the humble madeleine dipped in tea, making an entire part of his past spring into view.66   
 
In Brodsky’s essay, however, it would seem that there is only the limited visual kind of memory. 
There is no Proustian (or Nabokovian) moment of mémoire involontaire which witnesses the 
transfiguration of an ordinary material object redeemed through the aesthetic treasures it yields. 
Instead, his memory is characterized by disjointed visual images. Consider his recollection of 
their first telephone number, a fragment of the past that he admits “is of no use to me now” (LTO 
495). Or the “longish, stainless-steel key” that he suddenly recalls, but that does not unlock a 
metaphorical door to the past: “I don’t understand why I recall it now, for that place doesn’t 
exist” (LTO 496). Why he recalls “the wrinkles on my father’s forehead” or his mother’s 
“reddish, slightly inflamed left cheek” similarly remains a mystery (LTO 496). Or if we return to 
the earlier scene in which he visualizes with “high-resolution-lens clarity” his father’s return 
from the war, we notice that he poses the question here as well about the purpose of such vision: 
“why this clarity, what is it for?” (LTO 464). What is the point of preserving such a vivid 
recollection of this scene? He searches for an answer: “Is there, in these winks over the space of 
                                               
66 Sontag, On Photography, 164. Brodsky quotes from this section of the essay for an epigraph to 
the essay “Guide to a Renamed City”: “To possess the world in the form of images is, precisely, 
to reexperience the unreality and remoteness of the real.”  
 119 
nearly forty years, some meaning, some significance that eludes me?” (LTO 464). He tests out 
various theories, but the question remains unanswered. These moments suggest a typology of 
memory in which the fragments of the past are gathered together at random, with no discernible 
profit, unlike the redemptive logic of involuntary memory. The chance objects that his memory 
throws up to the surface (the keys, their first telephone number) do not afford the retrieval of lost 
time, unlike the cup of tea and the scalloped little cake. They remain, intractably, everyday 
objects—visualized with photographic clarity but converted into nothing more remarkable than 
their simple thingness. 
Brodsky thus emphasizes the pointlessness of our memory, with its camera-like 
mechanical preservation of odd details. Memory is part of what should allow him timelessness 
(or continuity), but instead he experiences only the spatial quality of memory, ever reducing and 
ever betraying him. “Memory” he writes, “betrays everybody, especially those whom we knew 
best. It is an ally of oblivion, it is an ally of death.” Even though his memories exhibit “great 
clarity,” he finds unacceptable the fact that they are only fragments. As such, it proves to be 
impossible to “reconstruct anybody” solely from memory (LTO 492).  
While the fragments of memory offer little consolation for the gravity of loss, Brodsky 
also suggests in his other memorial and elegiac works that it is through another’s memories that 
the survival of the deceased is at least partially ensured.67 “People are what we remember about 
them,” he writes in his 1995 memorial essay for Stephen Spender.  
                                               
67 In an article on the philosophical underpinnings of Brodsky’s elegiac verse, Aaron Beaver 
connects this imperative to remember in Brodsky’s poetic work with Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept 
of being in-itself and for-itself. Beaver writes that “Because time and nothingness are functions 
of human consciousness, then for the past to be at all depends on its perspective being extended 
in the life of someone’s present being.” Therefore, memory is the only way to preserve 
someone’s life. Aaron Beaver, “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky’s Elegiac Verse,” Slavic 
Review 67, no. 3 (2008): 601, https://doi.org/10.2307/27652941. 
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What we call life is in the end a patchwork of someone else’s recollections. With death, it 
gets unstitched, and one ends up with random, disjointed fragments. With shards, or, if 
you will, with snapshots. Filled with their unbearable smiles. Which are unbearable 
because they are one-dimensional. I should know; after all, I am a photographer’s son. 
And I may even suggest a link between picture-taking and verse-writing—well, insofar as 
the fragments are black-and-white. Or insofar as writing means retention. Yet one can’t 
pretend that what one beholds goes beyond its blank reverse side. (OGR 480)  
 
Death unravels continuity. Memory and art can try to repair this loss, but it remains insuperable. 
Brodsky here establishes a connection between his father’s métier of photography and his own 
poetry, a connection we will further explore later in this chapter. Both forms capture a single 
ephemeral moment with the aim to retain or preserve their subject, and yet both forms—in their 
flat, black-and-white representation—fall short of restoring fully what has been lost.68 Or 
consider Brodsky’s eulogy for Carl Proffer from 1985, the same year he is writing “In a Room 
and a Half.” Speaking of the imperative to remember, Brodsky suggests that “those who are gone 
have left a certain part of themselves with you, for you to keep, and you have to carry on because 
you have to carry them on. […] For practically everybody you happen to rub your shoulders with 
for some time, leaves an imprint on your retinae, not to speak of your psyche. The stronger the 
individual was, the deeper his imprint sinks.”69 Brodsky again offers a vision of the mind 
operating like the camera apparatus. Imprinted on the retina, the other survives in the form of a 
trace preserved in the photographic plate of memory, thus giving an ontological charge to 
memory. This is why the stakes of memory are so high. Even if duration is not preserved, even if 
full recovery of the past is impossible, the trace remains.  
                                               
68 For more on the connections between photography and Brodsky’s own poetry, see Molly 
Thomasy Blasing, “Writing with Light: Photo-Poetic Encounters in Tsvetaeva, Pasternak and 
Brodsky” (PhD diss., 2014). 
69 Lev Loseff Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (unprocessed). 
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These works affirm the importance of preserving these chance remembrances even 
though they do not offer the full consolation of time regained. In his essay for his parents, he 
does so not in the hope of resurrecting the past but as a form of protest: “I simply think that 
natural laws denying continuum to anyone in concert with (or in the guise of) deficient memory 
serve the interests of the state” (LTO 494). He commits himself to recalling these fragments not 
in order to transfigure them into something higher, but simply to preserve these chance details as 
proof of their existence—a move that attempts to restore his parents’ freedom.   
 
“Two pictures of my parents”: A New Photographic Fragment 
After the essay was first published in the New York Review of Books in February 1986, 
Brodsky revised the essay for his collection of essays Less Than One, which was published by 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux later that year, in the spring. Brodsky introduced a new fragment and 
placed it in the penultimate position of the essay. What is notable is that, despite his expression 
of deep frustration with photography and its reductive principle, the new fragment added to the 
essay describes two photographs of his parents: 
There are two pictures of my parents taken in their youth, in their twenties: He, on the 
deck of a steamer: a smiling, carefree face, a smokestack in the background; she, on a 
footboard of a railroad carriage, demurely waving her kid-gloved hand, the buttons on the 
train conductor’s tunic behind. (LTO 500)  
 
A photograph of his father (fig. 2) from Brodsky’s archive of photographs fits the description 
and is presumably the photograph Brodsky had in mind. (I have yet to locate the one he describes 
of his mother.) Given Brodsky’s strong critique of photography in this essay, why then include a 
description of these two photographs? What does this inclusion reveal about the status of 
photography in the essay? 
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Figure 2. Photograph of Joseph Brodsky’s father. Joseph Brodsky Papers, GEN MSS 613, Box 154, Folder 3449, Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
It is perhaps surprising that the new fragment focuses on photographs of the parents, 
given that Brodsky feared reducing his parents to a singular, all-encompassing image. As he 
writes in the essay, “At times, I begin to suspect my mind of trying to produce a cumulative, 
generalized image of my parents: a sign, a formula, a recognizable sketch; of trying to make me 
settle for these” (LTO 492). There is an ethical concern in the essay that photographs, real and 
imagined, would further reduce his parents, strip them of their complexity and individuality. 
They would become a symbol of his parents, rather than individuals with their subjectivity intact. 
Following Sontag’s logic that a photograph takes part “in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, 
vulnerability, mutability,”70 to include photographs of his parents would further their absence or 
death, rather than resurrect them through this visual form. It would be to participate in their 
death. He attempts to offer a different kind of elegy in memory of his parents. 
What then are we to make of the essay’s later inclusion of an ekphrastic description of 
two photographs of Brodsky’s parents? The description of the two photos are not on the order of 
the famous Winter Garden photo where Barthes “finds” his mother. There is no discussion of a 
                                               
70 Sontag, On Photography, 15. 
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punctum that pierces him, no sudden recuperation of the past through a faded two-dimensional 
image. Nor is the absence of the actual photographs within the text analogous to Barthes 
withholding the Winter Garden photograph of his mother. Perhaps it is not even right to speak of 
the absence of these photographs in this text, for they are not pointedly concealed. Barthes, 
unlike Brodsky, overtly refuses to reveal the crucial photograph—“the only photograph which 
assuredly existed for me” and from which he decides to “derive” the essence of photography—in 
order to preserve its punctum. Indeed, just before introducing the Winter Garden photograph, 
Barthes begins to outline a rather curious program for looking at photographs that advocates not 
looking (“in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your eyes”), thus 
laying the groundwork for our ability to best see the mother’s photograph without actually 
looking it. It is with the Winter Garden photograph of his mother as a young girl that Barthes 
“rediscovered her.”71 He recognizes her finally not as he knew her—it is not a mimetic 
recognition based on resemblance—but on a deeper level; in his words, this photo (unlike the 
others) preserves her image not in a merely “analogical” form but in an “essential” form.72 
Unlike in the quotation that serves as epigraph to this chapter, the Winter Garden photograph 
does produce in Barthes a Proustian experience of involuntary memory: “For once, photography 
gave me a sentiment as certain as remembrance, just as Proust experienced it one day when, 
leaning over to take off his boots, there suddenly came to him his grandmother’s true face, 
‘whose living reality I was experiencing for the first time, in an involuntary and complete 
memory.’”73 
                                               
71 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 69. 
72 Barthes, 70–71. 
73 Barthes, 70.  
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There are no such photographic epiphanies in Brodsky’s essay. The images of his 
parents, like the other photographic fragments of memory evoked in the text, do not contain a 
punctive element. There is no magical moment of “finding” his parents through photographs as 
there is for Barthes. There is no Proustian moment of mémoire involontaire (or Nabokovian 
moment of voluntary memory) that witnesses the transfiguration of an ordinary material object 
redeemed through the aesthetic treasures it yields. There is no hope here in recovering the riches 
of past time through the spatial image. Instead, all that remains are the photographic fragments of 
memory. There can be no photographs in the text, then, not because they are too precious (too 
punctive) and must be preserved from the gaze of others, but because they are so ordinary. 
Ordinary as the two photos of the parents may be, they differ in significant ways from the 
other photographic images mentioned in the rest of the essay. These images are not subjected to 
the kind of criticism that the other photos and photographic fragments of memory receive. In 
contrast with the portrait he has painted of them in their old age in the essay, these images offer a 
vision of his parents as young and “carefree.” These images come from a time before Brodsky 
was born, even before his parents knew each other. Like the Winter Garden photograph, they 
reveal an image of his parents before he knew them. By focusing on these images of them that 
predate his existence, these photographs open up a space that activates his imagination (rather 
than memory) and invites him to meditate on this “as-yet-unharmed” moment captured on film 
that precipitates the eventual losses they would sustain.74 On the one hand, these photographs 
                                               
74 I borrow this phrase “as-yet-unharmed” from Stephen Cheeke’s work on photographic 
ekphrases in poetry. In an analysis of Philip Larkin’s poem “MCMXIV” (1960) that describes a 
photograph of men queuing up to enlist in the British army in 1914, Cheeke suggests that the 
poem’s emphasis on the “innocence” of this scene (“Never such innocence again”) is bound up 
with what he calls the “as-yet-unharmed” quality that the photograph endows to this scene. 
Looking back at this photograph from the vantage point of 1960, the poem locates an innocent 
moment that is shot through with the awareness of what was to come for these soldiers. Stephen 
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give access to a present moment within the past when the youthful parents still have their future 
ahead of them, with a number of possible opportunities and paths still open to them. These 
photographs—of his parents as individuals, with their lives ahead of them, poised on these 
vehicles of motion that seem to promise the freedom of mobility—restore to them their 
individuality, their freedom. The photograph becomes a space in which alternative futures are 
not yet foreclosed and can still be imagined. (A future in which they are not yet destined to die as 
“slaves.”) And yet, the drama of the photograph comes from the retrospective position of the 
beholder in the present who cannot uncouple the picture of their innocence in the now of the past 
from their eventual fate. Such knowledge colors the photograph, endowing it with an elegiac 
quality as the photographs seem to proleptically anticipate future losses.  
Now that his parents are dead, Brodsky writes, he is all that is left of them—he is the 
“sum” of his parents (LTO 500). Which, as he says, is yet another reduction: of two people into 
one. If the essay expresses anxiety about the reduction of memory and the reduction of his 
parents into him, then these photos offer a corrective. Crucially, these photographs restore a 
vision of his parents in which they are not reduced to or dependent on his own consciousness. 
Ann Banfield’s article on the epistemological consequences of the photograph’s perspective of 
the external world independent of a perceiving subject is useful here, especially as it allows us to 
see how Brodsky’s reaction to this fact greatly differs from Barthes’s (and Proust’s). Banfield 
writes that the photograph affirms the presence of what Bertrand Russell calls sensibilia: objects 
that are metaphysically the same as sense-data (the information about objects given to the senses) 
but in the absence of a mind present to perceive them. The photograph thus gives us “a 
                                               
Cheeke, “Photography and Elegy,” in Writing for Art: The Aesthetics of Ekphrasis (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), 151. 
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perspective unoccupied by any subject,” a vision of the world that is “subjective yet 
subjectless.”75 The photographic record proves the existence of the external world in the absence 
of a perceiving subject, thus offering a way out of Berkeleyan idealism, but in so doing the 
photograph also startles us by revealing our superfluity.  
Banfield shows how Barthes is confronted with just such a realization in the famous 
scene where he finds the Winter Garden photograph of his mother. By “preserving the sensibilia 
of no living percipient, the photograph records the contingency of the subject as such,” and in 
this moment the observer encounters his own death (not only the premonitory death of the 
referent) inscribed in the field of the photograph.76 Jolting us out of a solipsistic vision of the 
world, “the photograph makes clear that it is the continued existence of things outside the mind 
which is disturbing to the individual and not their non-existence.”77 Building on Banfield’s 
argument about the contingency of the perceiving subject, Dora Zhang offers a similar account 
of photographic vision as “traumatic” in Proust’s Recherche.78 Returning home unannounced, 
Proust’s narrator glimpses as if through a photographic lens his beloved grandmother, unaware 
of his presence. This vision of her shocks him. Zhang argues that in this moment he discovers a 
simple but uneasy fact: “Just as the material world depends on no mind, he realizes with horror 
                                               
75 Banfield, “L’Imparfait de l’Objectif,” 76–77. 
76 Banfield, 78. 
77 Banfield, 79.  
78 Dora Zhang, “A Lens for an Eye: Proust and Photography,” Representations 118, no. 1 (2012): 
103–125. Zhang writes that this scene of photographic vision “turns out to be traumatic not 
because it reveals to us the future nonexistence of things, but, rather because it reveals their 
continued existence in our absence” (104).  
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that his being is in no way necessary for hers. The beloved is suddenly shown to have an 
independent existence for which we are completely irrelevant.”79 
Perceiving a beloved parent or grandparent and realizing suddenly that your presence is 
not necessary for the other’s existence proves to be profoundly disturbing for Proust and Barthes, 
but not, I would emphasize, for Brodsky. If the passage out of solipsism is painful in Proust and 
Barthes, in Brodsky it takes on a more positive valence. Writing of the photos taken before his 
parents had met, he notes: “Neither of them is as yet aware of the other’s existence; neither of 
them, of course, is me” (LTO 500). None of them is aware of the others (one is even yet to be 
born), but the photographs taken prior to his existence do not cause alarm about his own 
superfluity. Instead, they help to repair the “solipsistic feat” he is forced to perform by imagining 
them as existing now only as part of him (LTO 500). “Should I settle for the contents of my skull 
as what’s left of them on earth?” he asks (LTO 500). Such a prospect involves yet another 
reduction: “their shrinkage to the size of my, lesser than their, soul” (LTO 500). But these two 
photos reveal that their existence was not always contingent on his perception or memory, which 
enables him to restore, however briefly, proof of their existence as individuals separate from 
him. Contrary to how similar moments are figured in Camera Lucida or the Recherche, here the 
photos’ affirmation of the parents’ independent existence offers a welcome corrective to the 
solipsistic position that would collapse them into his memory. The photograph’s refutation of 
solipsism that shocks Barthes (seeing his own death prophesied), comforts Brodsky.80  
                                               
79 Zhang, 104. 
80 The effort to move beyond solipsism in this essay is connected more generally, I would 
suggest, with how Brodsky strives for a non-egocentric perspective in his elegies. As he writes in 
his essay on Tsvetaeva, every “on the death of” poem is akin to a “self-portrait” because the 
author also “mourns—directly, obliquely, often unwittingly—himself” (LTO 195). The elegy’s 
focus on the mourning poet rather than the mourned is a “shortcoming” of the genre (LTO 196).  
Aaron Beaver thus suggests that Brodsky’s elegies engage with the problem of “how to retain the 
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The inclusion of the new fragment that offers a description of these two photographs after 
the initial publication of the essay speaks to the divided attitude to photographs in the text, as 
Brodsky both disparages photographs but also cannot help but turn to them. Intellectually he 
knows they fail him, and yet photographs still exercise an affective power over him. Although 
they may reduce their subjects by transforming them into objects, they can also move us beyond 
solipsism as we glimpse a vision of the other as distinct from our mind. They are not enough to 
reconstruct what has been lost, but they are what remains. The fragments preserved are hopeless 
in their ability to literally resurrect those who have passed, but to fail to preserve these trace 
fragments would be tantamount to what Bazin calls a “second spiritual death.”81 Thus, Brodsky 
suggests that he preserves these traces of his parents—fractured and fragmented as they 
inevitably are—as a form of protest against a system that would deny them their humanity. 
In this essay, photography represents both the vividness of presence and the pain of 
absence. It both seems to suture the gap, but also to accentuate that gap. Which makes it a 
particularly effective metaphor for the experience of loss, a universal experience no doubt, but 
heightened by the experience of emigration. The irretrievability of home for the émigré, the 
impossibility of return, the break in continuity (what Nabokov would call the “syncopal kick”) 
encourages a fragmentary presentation, it necessitates a photographic style. Thus, photography 
becomes the metaphor par excellence for the experience of emigration and loss. In Brodsky’s 
                                               
lyricism of the elegy but control the lyric ego.” Beaver, “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky’s 
Elegiac Verse,” 591–92. Ian K. Lilly also notes the avoidance of using a first-person subject, 
characteristic of Brodsky’s detached tone, in his centenary poem for Akhmatova. Ian K. Lilly, 
“The Metrical Context of Brodsky’s Centenary Poem for Axmatova,” The Slavic and East 
European Journal 37, no. 2 (1993): 212, https://doi.org/10.2307/309215. 
81 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 10. 
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essay there is a conflicted struggle against, but ultimate acquiescence to, photography and to the 
condition of exile that disrupts continuity.  
 
Conclusion: Time, Photography, Poetry 
While we have seen that Brodsky is critical of the photograph’s propensity to flatten, 
reduce, and fragment the continuity of experience into a purely spatial form, unable to capture 
the passage of time, in this concluding section I would like to turn our attention to the essay’s 
investigation of the act of taking photographs (rather than photographs as material objects). 
Indeed, we will see how the process of taking photographs restores a sense of temporal duration 
as well as creative agency. 
Svetlana Boym and Sanna Turoma have both noted Brodsky’s disdain for the practice of 
photography because of its association with tourism and its promotion of an inauthentic 
experience.82 Boym writes that Brodsky is “critical of the photographic quick fix (the formula of 
contemporary tourism).”83 As Brodsky himself writes in “After a Journey,” his essay about a trip 
to Brazil in which he failed to truly “travel” and was instead merely a tourist: “There is 
something revolting in all this drifting along the surface, a camera in your hands, with no 
particular goal in mind” (OGR 69). Or in his essay “A Place as Good as Any,” which imagines a 
                                               
82 Sanna Turoma argues that Brodsky’s travel essays respond to the postmodern tourist 
condition. She notes that in these essays (in particular “A Place as Good as Any”) Brodsky 
critiques the endless visual reproductions of popular tourist sites as they “have engulfed the 
original sight” leaving behind in our memory only “images of reproductions, signs of signs with 
a fleeting referent.” She suggests that Brodsky’s thinking on contemporary tourist culture is in 
keeping with Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum, and that he longs (belatedly) for an 
authentic experience of travel to make contact with history. Sanna Turoma, Brodsky Abroad: 
Empire, Tourism, Nostalgia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 57. 
83 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 296. 
 130 
nightmarish “composite city” (OGR 43) made up of ubiquitous tourist sites, he declares that 
taking pictures, like shopping, is one of the preeminent ways of “sparing one’s subconscious an 
alien reality” (OGR 40). Snapping photos is part and parcel of the tourist condition, in which one 
does not actually see or experience the foreign landscape but rather commodifies and consumes 
it. The connection Brodsky draws between tourism and photography is no doubt influenced by 
Sontag’s writing on the topic in On Photography, in which she observes the way the Kodak aids 
and abets the acquisitive modality of tourism. (“It seems positively unnatural to travel for 
pleasure without taking a camera along. Photographs will offer indisputable evidence that the trip 
was made, that the program was carried out, that fun was had. Photographs document sequences 
of consumption carried on outside the view of family, friends, neighbors”).84 So it is perhaps 
surprising that we will see how in “In a Room and a Half” the process of taking photographs is 
figured as a creative act, revalorized as an exercise of freedom. Specifically, it is his father’s 
photographic practice that opens up an alternative approach to photography, one that invites us to 
see it as analogous to Brodsky’s own poetic work.  
Brodsky’s father, Aleksandr Ivanovich, was a photographer; his darkroom was housed in 
Brodsky’s part of the room. He says that his father “took the best pictures I’ve seen in print of 
the city under siege” (LTO 462). When Brodsky was a boy, his father worked in the Naval 
Museum’s photography department. In 1950, Brodsky’s father was demobilized; he eventually 
found work as a photojournalist for the newspaper of Leningrad branch of the Merchant Marine 
(LTO 471). Working in the Leningrad harbor, he was always on the go “among ships, sailors, 
captains, cranes, cargo” in search of a story. “In the background, there was always a rippled zinc 
sheet of water, masts, the black metal bulk of a stern with a few white first or last letters of the 
                                               
84 Sontag, On Photography, 9. 
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ship’s home port” (LTO 471). It is his father’s propensity for photographing water that 
introduces the notion of expansive freedom and time into the art of photography—an art that, as 
we have seen, otherwise is figured as spatial and reductive. 
As we recall, in Brodsky’s oeuvre, water is connected with time and the infinite. In his 
essay on Leningrad, “A Guide to a Renamed City,” Brodsky articulates an idea that he would 
often repeat—that water is “a condensed form of time” (LTO 77).85 Brodsky links his 
predilection for water to his native Leningrad, with its canals and rivers. In “Flight from 
Byzantium,” he writes that as a “child of the Baltic,” he is unable to “rid himself of the old 
sensation that this rolling, non-stop, lapping substance itself is time, or that this is what time 
would look like had it been condensed or photographed” (LTO 441).  
In “Room and a Half,” Brodsky describes how his father shared his love of water: “He 
liked to be near the water, he adored the sea. In that country, this is the closest one gets to 
freedom. Even looking at it is sometimes enough, and he looked at it, and photographed it, for 
most of his life” (LTO 471). Brodsky suggests here that the sea—its vast, open space; its 
connection with time—offers an intimation of freedom. The sea, and water in general, becomes a 
metaphor for the fluidity of time, resistant to the reductive principle of atomization or 
spatialization. It offers an endless horizon, the promise of escape. In contrast to the other places 
in Brodsky’s work where the photographic act is disparaged, here it is dignified as his father 
                                               
85 In Watermark, Brodsky writes “I simply think that water is the image of time” (42–43). In 
“Flight from Byzantium,” he writes that the water of the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara is 
“the color of time itself” (LTO 441). David Bethea notes that “Water, beginning with the Neva, 
would always be an essential element in Brodsky’s native idiom, its Stevensian ‘ghostlier 
demarcations’ setting off thoughts on time, origins, death, and eternity.” David M. Bethea, 
Joseph Brodsky and the Creation of Exile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 18. 
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attains a modicum of freedom by photographing the sea.86 This focus on his father’s freedom 
through photography is significant because, in the essay, Brodsky talks at length about how his 
parents were deprived of their freedom, that they were “born free” but died as “slaves” (LTO 
479). He sees their death then as the “ultimate insult, the ultimate irreversible stealing of their 
freedom” (LTO 479). 
Indeed, he employs water imagery to describe their lack of freedom when he quotes 
Akhmatova’s lines from Northern Elegies to express their interrupted lives:  
Just like a river,  
I was deflected by my stalwart era.  
They swapped my life: into a different valley,  
past different landscapes, it went rolling on.  
And I don’t know my banks or where they are. (LTO 482) 
 
This of course could also apply to Brodsky’s own life in emigration as he “switched Empires” 
(as he puts it in “Lullaby of Cape Cod”). In his discussion of these lines as they relate to his 
parents’ fate, he again relies on the trope of the reduction of space. Their diverted stream has 
been “reduced and misdirected” which led to a “reduction of options” for their lives. Their 
freedom under the Soviet regime was circumscribed. The sea that his father looks at and 
photographs is, then, some way of communing with or reclaiming that potential of unbounded 
freedom, a way of returning back to his original source.   
Water flows; it has the continuum that photographs, fragments of space and time, do not 
have. They are fixed, immobile. Indeed, water for Brodsky is filmic rather than photographic.  
Brodsky’s description of the canals in Petersburg emphasizes how the water reproduces the city 
by reflecting it. The surface of the water offers mimetic reproduction like a film. “Reflected 
                                               
86 Molly Thomasy Blasing also notes the relationship between water, photography, and freedom 
in this passage. Blasing, “Writing with Light: Photo-Poetic Encounters in Tsvetaeva, Pasternak 
and Brodsky,” 226. 
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every second by thousands of square feet of running silver amalgam, it’s as if the city were 
constantly being filmed by its river, which discharges its footage into the Gulf of Finland, which, 
on a sunny day, looks like a depository of these blinding images” (LTO 77). By likening the 
Neva’s reflective surface to “silver amalgam,” Brodsky conjures up the Daguerreotype process, 
which produces images of silver amalgam on polished silver-plated sheets of copper,87 thus 
marking the water’s mimetic reflections as photographic. However, these photographic images 
are infused with time, movement, and duration, making them more filmic than photographic. 
Water, the medium of time, offers the durational ideal that photographic memory fails to live up 
to.88 And by taking photographs of it, his father produces these images of “condensed time” that 
offer him a kind of inner freedom. 
The other form of condensed time for Brodsky is, of course, language. “Prosody,” he 
claims in an essay on Akhmatova (1982), is “simply a repository of time within language” (LTO 
52). Akhmatova’s poems will therefore survive no matter what “because they are charged with 
time.” In “To Please a Shadow,” Brodsky’s essay for W. H. Auden, the subject of time and 
language again comes to the fore. He describes reading Auden’s elegy for Yeats and being struck 
by the lines: 
Time that is intolerant 
Of the brave and innocent, 
And indifferent in a week 
To a beautiful physique, 
 
                                               
87 For a summary of the Daguerreotype process, see Newhall, The History of Photography, 18. 
88 Blasing also looks to this passage in “A Guide to a Renamed City.” She suggests, however, 
that “water operates as a kind of developing solution for memory,” as she sees the water not only 
reflecting his memory but even metaphorically “developing” it. However, I would emphasize 
that this passage is less connected with memory as it is with articulating another medium that can 
capture and express time. Blasing, “Writing with Light: Photo-Poetic Encounters in Tsvetaeva, 
Pasternak and Brodsky,” 231–32. 
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Worships language and forgives 
Everyone by whom it lives; 
Pardons cowardice, conceit, 
Lays its honours at their feet. 
 
Struck by the assertion that “Time…worships language,” Brodsky expounds on the relationship 
between the two categories:  
If time worships language, it means that language is greater, or older, than time, which is, 
in its turn, older and greater than space. That was how I was taught, and I indeed felt that 
way. So if time—which is synonymous with, nay, even absorbs deity—worships 
language, where then does language come from? For the gift is always smaller than the 
giver. And then isn’t language a repository of time? And isn’t this why time worships it? 
And isn’t a song, or a poem, or indeed a speech itself, with its caesuras, pauses, spondees, 
and so forth, a game language plays to restructure time? (LTO 363) 
 
Language is thus both greater than time and a medium of time. It transcends time and embodies 
time. By giving linguistic form to his memories of his parents, fragmented as they are, they too 
become “charged with time.” Writing the essay—writing these spatial mnemonic fragments into 
language—becomes a way of preserving them in time, and of granting them freedom. “I write 
this in English,” Brodsky explains, “because I want to grant them a margin of freedom” (LTO 
460).89  
What I would like to suggest is that we can see a parallel between how Brodsky 
condenses time through poetic language, while his father does so through his photographs of the 
sea. It is through this relationship with time that he recuperates his freedom. While Brodsky 
might critique photos as material objects in this essay (and others), the act of taking photos 
emerges as a creative one that offers a degree of freedom. It is an artistic act akin to Brodsky’s 
poesis. Despite the objectivity of the mechanical apparatus, photography does affirm the 
subjective vision of the photographer; from the choice of subject matter to the composition of the 
                                               
89 For more on Brodsky’s use of English to give his parents freedom, see Diment, “English as 
Sanctuary.” 
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shot, peering through the viewfinder offers a private and individual mode of expression. 
Ultimately it valorizes your singular perspective and documents your presence. It is the 
individual freedom of expression that the practice of photography offers which sets it apart from 
the reductive principle of photographic images. Photography affirms the singularity of your 
vision and, in this way, it is akin to writing poetry; both are fragments, capturing ephemeral 
moments of time.90 
Indeed, we recall that Brodsky makes this comparison between his father’s métier of 
photography and his own poetry in a memorial essay for Stephen Spender. “I am a 
photographer’s son,” he declares, “and I may even suggest a link between picture-taking and 
verse-writing—well, insofar as the fragments are black-and-white. Or insofar as writing means 
retention. Yet one can’t pretend that what one beholds goes beyond its blank reverse side” (OGR 
480).91 Brodsky emphasizes how both poetry and photography attempt to preserve, and yet are 
ultimately inadequate in restoring fully that which they seek to retain. In this regard, photography 
finds common ground with elegy in particular, as both attest to life’s essential transience while 
trying to overcome it through the permanence of the form.92 As Sontag writes, “photography is 
                                               
90 Boym contrasts the father’s image-making work (through photos) and the son’s (through 
language): “The passage has the punctuated rhythm of pictures being snapped, yet the father 
takes his pictures quickly, while the poet-son lets them develop slowly, in the darkroom of 
memory.” Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 296.  
91 Brodsky’s emphasis on the one-dimensional aspect of photographs in this passage recalls 
Barthes’s admission near the end of Camera Lucida: “I must therefore submit to this law: I 
cannot penetrate, cannot reach into the Photograph. I can only sweep it with my glance, like a 
smooth surface. The Photograph is flat, platitudinous in the true sense of the word, that is what I 
must acknowledge.” Barthes, Camera Lucida, 106. 
92 For works on the significance of ekphrastic descriptions of photographs within elegies, see 
Andrew D. Miller, Poetry, Photography, Ekphrasis: Lyrical Representations of Photographs 
from the 19th Century to the Present (Oxford University Press, 2015); Cheeke, “Photography 
and Elegy.” For an overview of the elegiac aspect of photography (rather than an interart 
comparison between poetic elegies and photography), see Josh Ellenbogen, “On Photographic 
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an elegiac art” and “all photographs are memento mori.”93 The photograph arrests a single 
moment from the flow of time, a testament to what was and now is no more, thus offering a 
foretaste of the final end—at the same time, it seems to vanquish death through the immortal 
preservation of the subject.94 André Bazin famously connected the modern scientific technology 
of photography with the “primordial” religious practice of mummification (as both respond to 
the human desire to preserve life through representation), claiming that photography “embalms 
time, rescuing it from its proper corruption.”95 By saving the subject from a “second spiritual 
death,” the photograph performs a memorial function similar to the elegy.96 In Camera Lucida, 
Barthes places the revelation of the subject’s mortality at the center of each photograph; time is 
the photograph’s “second punctum” that foretells death. When looking at a photograph of Lewis 
Payne shortly before he was condemned to death, Barthes realizes that the young man whose 
presence the image seems to affirm “is going to die. I read at the same time: This will be and this 
has been; I observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. By giving me the 
                                               
Elegy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Elegy, ed. Karen Weisman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010).  
93 Sontag, On Photography, 15. 
94 The perceived connection between death and photography was perhaps encouraged by the 
popularity of spirit photography or the practice of post-mortem photographs as a way to 
memorialize the dead in the nineteenth century. For more on spirit photography, see Clément 
Chéroux et al., The Perfect Medium: Photography and the Occult (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005); Tom Gunning, “Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, 
Magic Theater, Trick Films, and Photography’s Uncanny,” in Fugitive Images: From 
Photography to Video, ed. Patrice Petro (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Marien, 
Photography and Its Critics, 75–76. 
95 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 14. 
96 Bazin, 10. 
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absolute past of the pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future.”97 This strange 
temporality of photographs both foretells death and seems to forestall it.  
Like the photograph, the poetic elegy mourns the loss of the dead even as it provides a 
metonymic substitute in place of that absence. And yet, in his memorial essay for Spender, 
Brodsky notes the inadequacy of these two forms; although they seem to restore what has been 
lost, we are ever reminded of the “blank reverse side” that throws into relief the limits of the 
elegiac promise. In his elegiac works, including his memorial essays, Brodsky repeatedly 
exposes the failures of memory and mourning, thus resisting a poetics of consolation. This is in 
keeping with Jahan Ramazani’s account of the elegiac genre’s transformation in the 20th 
century.98 The modern elegy, according to Ramazani, challenges the genre’s conventions by 
foregrounding “anti-elegiac” elements, such as the “anti-consolatory and anti-encomiastic.”99 If 
traditional elegies hinge on the translation of “grief into consolation” over the course of the poem 
as the deceased is transfigured into an object that takes on new life and makes recompense for 
loss, then modern elegies “refuse such orthodox consolations as the rebirth of the dead in nature, 
                                               
97 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 96. Already in 1931 Benjamin had expressed the existence of 
something like Barthes’s punctum when he spoke of his feeling of “unruly desire,” when 
beholding David Octavius Hill’s photograph of the Newhaven fishwife, “to know what her name 
was, the woman who was alive there, who even now is still real.” For he writes that “seared” into 
the photograph is the “tiny spark of contingency, the here and now,” which leads us to search for 
the “inconspicuous place where, within the suchness of that long-past minute, the future nests 
still today.” Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” in The Work of Art in the Age of 
Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, trans. Edmund Jephcott and 
Kingsley Shorter (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 277–78. 
98 For an overview of the anti-elegy in modern poetry, see also R. Clifton Spargo, “The 
Contemporary Anti-Elegy,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Elegy, ed. Karen Weisman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
99 Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning, 2. 
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in God, or in poetry itself.”100 The psychic work of mourning that the elegy often charts is now 
left incomplete, unresolved. 
At this point, we might briefly consider the two elegies that Brodsky wrote for his 
parents: “Pamiati ottsa: Avstraliia” (In Memory of My Father: Australia, 1989) and “Mysl’ o 
tebe udaliaetsia…” (The thought of you is receding…, 1987). In “Pamiati ottsa,” the father 
comes back to life (ozhil) in the dream, however his sudden removal to Australia and the patchy 
phone conversation that ensues only further underscores his fundamental absence.101 Aaron 
Beaver notes that Brodsky here defies the generic convention in elegy of recalling past moments 
from when the deceased was alive.102 Instead of revisiting memories and thus resurrecting the 
past within the space of the elegy, Brodsky centers the elegy on an appearance of his father in a 
dream. Thus Beaver argues that, for Brodsky, the past is cast as irretrievable as opposed to 
traditional elegies which figure the past as “lost but retrievable, accessible through the memory 
of the elegist.”103 As Beaver notes, Brodsky incorporates the elegiac tropes of apostrophe (the 
elegist’s address to the dead) and eidolopoeia (speech attributed to the deceased) but in a deflated 
key: they speak over the phone with a bad connection, as the father complains about the weather, 
wallpaper, and the difficulties of renting his apartment. The final lines of the elegy insist on the 
                                               
100 Ramazani, 3–4. 
101 Joseph Brodsky, Stikhotvoreniia i poemy, ed. Lev Loseff, vol. 2 (Sankt-Peterburg: Lenizdat, 
2017), 160. 
102 Irena Grudzinska-Gross notes that Brodsky also confounds the traditional elegiac form by 
decentering himself, as typically more emphasis is placed on the lyric subject and his experience 
of mourning than on the deceased. However, in this elegy (and the elegy for his mother) “it is the 
mother and father who are subjects of these poems, and not the grieving son—‘you’ is here more 
alive than ‘I.’” Irena Grudzińska-Gross, Czeslaw Milosz and Joseph Brodsky: Fellowship of 
Poets (Yale University Press, 2009), 31.  
103 Beaver, “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky’s Elegiac Verse,” 593. 
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physical reality of the father’s irreversible loss, as we are pulled away from the dream and back 
to the “miagkii pepel / krematoriia v banke” (the soft ash / in the crematorium’s can).104   
A similar anti-elegiac strain figures in Brodsky’s elegy for his mother. Contra Horace’s 
“Exegi monumentum” or Pushkin’s “Ia pamiatnik sebe vozdvig nerukotvornyi” (I have erected a 
monument to myself not built by hands), the lyric subject pronounces the failure to create a 
lasting memorial to the mother: “Vidimo, nikomu iz / nas ne sdelat’sia pamiatnikom. Vidimo, v 
nashikh venakh / nedostatochno izvesti” (Apparently, none of us / will be made into a 
monument. Apparently, in our veins / there is not enough limestone).105 If the elegy itself 
typically works as a memorial that hopes to repair, in part, what has been lost, such a possibility 
is foreclosed in Brodsky’s elegy for his mother. Rather than gathering together memories of his 
mother to ensure the continuation of her life even after death, the poet instead dwells on the 
impossibility of keeping his memory of her whole and complete as new visions intervene and 
take her place: new faces, places, and reflections in the Neva “zapolniaiut vakuum” (fill in the 
vacuum). The final lines of the poem locate the site of memory on the poet’s retina:  
Остается, затылок от взгляда прикрыв руками, 
бормотать на ходу “умерла, умерла”, покуда 
                                               
104 Brodsky, Stikhotvoreniia i poemy, 2:160. Here we might think of one of Brodsky’s earlier 
poems “Evreiskoe kladbishche okolo Leningrada” (Jewish Cemetery near Leningrad, 1958) as 
another anti-consolatory elegiac poem that focuses on the deterioration of matter rather than on 
the renewal of life. In opposition to the Christian idea of the grain of wheat that falls to the 
ground and dies and brings forth much fruit (John 12:24), we learn that “И не сеяли хлеба. / 
Никогда не сеяли хлеба. / Просто сами ложились / в холодную землю, как зерна. / И навек 
засыпали” (They did not sow grain. / They never sowed grain. / They simply lay themselves 
down / into the cold earth, like seeds. / And forever went to sleep). Instead, he emphasizes at the 
end of this stanza that they achieve calm (успокоение) “в виде распада материи” (in the form 
of decaying matter), thus drawing attention only to the decomposition of matter rather than what 
flowers after death. The poem mourns the dead in the graveyard but without any hope of 
resurrection or transcendence through the work of the poem. Joseph Brodsky, Sochineniia Iosifa 
Brodskogo, ed. Gennadii Komarov, vol. 1 (Sankt-Peterburg: Pushkinskii fond, 1997), 20. 
105 Joseph Brodsky, Uraniia (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1987), 189. My translation. 
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города рвут сырую сетчатку из грубой ткани, 
дребезжа, как сдаваемая посуда. 
 
All that remains, having covered the back of your head from glances with your arms, 
is to mumble on the way “she has died, she has died,” while  
cities rip the raw retina of coarse fabric, 
clattering, like dishes being returned.106 
 
The ruptures in memory are thus figured here as violence done to the eye. This ocular metaphor 
connects to the network of images in “In a Room and a Half” that likewise imagine the 
fragmentation of memory to be connected with the photographic eye. Even by the poem’s end, 
there is little consolation for the speaker, as he is reduced to simply repeating the hard fact of 
death to himself: “umerla, umerla” (she has died, she has died).107 Such an emphasis on loss is 
typical of the modern elegy, according to Ramazani, which does not attempt “transcendence or 
redemption of loss but immersion in it.”108 There is nothing that can transform this loss, even if 
this is the traditional function of the elegy.  
This non-redemptive and anti-consolatory approach to mourning informs not only 
Brodsky’s elegies for his parents, but also his prose essay about them. “In a Room and a Half” 
similarly dwells on the limits of memory and leaves incomplete the work of mourning. There are 
no Proustian moments of involuntary memory that witness the transfiguration of an ordinary 
object as it conjures up the past. The memories that are recalled in the essay, photographic in 
their fragmentary flatness, do not comfort or revive the dead.  
                                               
106 Brodsky, 189. My translation. 
107 Because there is no pronoun, this phrase could also be translated as an address to the mother: 
“you have died, you have died.” 
108 Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning, 4. 
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Elegy and photography meet in the tombstone of Brodsky’s parents. Carved into their 
joint gravestone is a photographic likeness of Brodsky’s mother, Maria Volpert (fig. 3).109 Since 
the late nineteenth century, it has been common practice in Russia to include a photographic 
etching or a photograph encased in glass on the tombstone as a memorial to the deceased.110 The 
Russian practice of etching a photographic image on gravestones seems to confirm what we have 
known all along about photography’s intimate connection with death. The photo-epitaph on the 
tombstone offers a ghostly image of Brodsky’s mother that seems to evoke her presence while 
ultimately marking her absence. In his essay for his parents, Brodsky offers a different kind of 
elegy to the photo-epitaph that meditates on the very limits of the elegiac form, centered on a 
critique of memory as photographic. 
                                               
109 In Brodsky’s archive, there are several photographs of the grave, likely sent to him by friends; 
Brodsky, of course, was unable to return to Russia neither to see them while they were alive, nor 
to visit their grave. 
110 The Russian practice of including a photographic image of the deceased on the gravestone 
was noted by John Berger in his essay “In a Moscow Cemetery.” He writes that “on some of the 
headstones there were sepia oval photos behind glass.” John Berger, The Sense of Sight (Knopf 
Doubleday, 2011), 123. In an article on the shifting rites of the dead in Russia over the course of 
the twentieth century, Catherine Merridale observes that the practice of engraving a photographic 
likeness of the deceased onto the gravestone became popular in Russia towards the end of the 
nineteenth century as stonemasonry became less expensive. Merridale speculates that this 
practice could be related to the icon tradition. Catherine Merridale, “Revolution among the Dead: 
Cemeteries in Twentieth-Century Russia,” Mortality 8, no. 2 (May 2003): 178, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1357627031000087415. In her article on the iconography of the mafia 
gravestones of post-Soviet Russia, Olga Matich notes the appearance of life-size photographs 
etched into the tombstones (as opposed to the smaller oval photographic etching typically found). 
For Matich, these photographic etchings function to reconstitute the mangled body of the 
mobster as whole, offering an image of the “resurrected mafioso radiating physical and economic 
power” (83). Matich also notes that “the photographic image at the gravesite can be said to reify 
the identification of photography with death” (103). “Mobster Gravestones in 1990s Russia,” 
Global Crime 7, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 79–104, https://doi.org/10.1080/17440570600650158. 
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Figure 3. Photograph of Joseph Brodsky's mother's grave. Joseph Brodsky Papers, GEN MSS 613, Box 154, Folder 3452, 
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
Underlying this anti-elegiac stance in Brodsky’s work is an ethical obligation to the dead. 
Brodsky himself connects ethics with elegy in his essay on Akhmatova when he suggests that 
“death is a good litmus test for a poet’s ethics.” He notes that “the ‘in memoriam” genre is 
frequently used to exercise self-pity or for metaphysical trips that denote the subconscious 
superiority of survivor over victim” (LTO 50). Refusing to exalt the poet at the expense of the 
dead, Brodsky voices an anxiety about what Ramazani calls the “economic problem of 
mourning,” which witnesses real loss transformed into “aesthetic gain.”111 Thus, in 
memorializing the dead, one must expose the necessary limits of such an attempt. Moreover, an 
anti-elegiac ethics can be seen as issuing a protest against any system—whether aesthetic or 
political—that would try to make sense of or justify such loss.112  
                                               
111 Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning, 6–7. 
112 In a chapter on the anti-elegiac form in contemporary poetry, Spargo also suggests an “ethical 
posture” in the anti-elegiac treatment of loss, connecting the “politics of mourning” with the 
“politics of dissent” that seeks to disrupt the status quo. “In dramatizing the temporality of 
mourning, anti-elegy arises as a species of ethical complaint, turning against the history of 
consolation precisely so as to find fault with the strategies of commemoration the poet-mourner 
inherits as normative in her society, accusing successful acts of mourning and the mourners who 
achieve them of happy complicity with the status quo.” Spargo, “The Contemporary Anti-
Elegy,” 417. 
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Such a stance is articulated in the final fragment of “In a Room and a Half,” but it is 
Brodsky’s father-photographer who advances it. Brodsky recollects a walk he and his father once 
took in the Summer Garden when Brodsky was about 20 years old. His father stops to take some 
photographs. It is a scene full of life: a brass band is playing, the statues are dappled with 
sunlight filtered through the trees, children are running around. The locale in which they find 
themselves—with the marble statues—could be the setting of one of Brodsky’s poems. Against 
this vibrant backdrop, however, they find themselves discussing the horrors of the twentieth 
century. Brodsky asks his father whether he thinks the Nazi concentration camps were worse 
than the Gulag. His father replies: “As for myself, I’d rather be burned at the stake at once than 
die a slow death and discover a meaning in the process.” “Then,” Brodsky closes the essay, “he 
proceeded to snap pictures” (LTO 501).  
The scene startles in its juxtaposition of the grim conversation with the bright, lively 
park, an effect enhanced by the abrupt shift from the father’s response to then taking 
photographs. This scene offers a photographic coda to the essay’s concern with the freedom that 
art and memory can provide, a concern that Brodsky increasingly turns to in the final pages of 
the essay as he laments that his parents died as “slaves,” despite having been born free. Hope for 
a better future, he says, was all they had left. In the final section, though, Brodsky writes that he 
“would like to think that they didn’t allow themselves to build up their hopes too high” about the 
possibility of attaining freedom once again (LTO 501), and it is this sentiment that prompts this 
recollection about his father. In this passage, it would seem that his father does not have any 
illusions, no false sense of hope. The father’s stated preference to die all at once, even such a 
terrible death, rather than slowly try to make meaning out of the state of “slavery” they were 
reduced to entails a strong indictment of the Soviet system. Moreover, the father’s final words 
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suggest that there is no consolation for the losses endured, that such suffering cannot be 
transfigured or redeemed through knowledge gained. It is not a triumphant ending that finds 
recompense in loss or suffering, but rather dwells in the absence of such meaning that would 
make whole.  
Although such a position refuses to find easy closure through a poetics of consolation, it 
does not ultimately advocate hopelessness or resignation in the face of such senseless suffering. 
The father’s reach for the camera involves an engagement with the world, a move that goes some 
way towards recuperating the photographic quality of memory that Brodsky mourns. On the one 
hand, taking photos after such a statement suggests that nothing more can be said in the face of 
such tragedies: that there is nothing to gain from such suffering. Nonetheless, the choice to 
preserve the present moment by taking a photo seems somehow affirmative: here we are among 
the living. To photograph is to capture the world as you see it in that moment, so that it endures 
beyond your own time. Taking photographs at this moment suggests a will to persevere and the 
imperative to bear witness.113 Like any other art form, photography must negotiate the line 
between aestheticizing (and thus profiting from or participating in) another’s suffering and 
bearing witness to another’s suffering—and here the father’s warning about the impulse to 
extract meaning from suffering (as if it would then justify or redeem such loss) is then balanced 
with the need to document and preserve. As Brodsky notes earlier in the essay, his father bore 
                                               
113 In a 1973 interview with Anne-Marie Brumm, after a brief discussion of Brodsky’s early 
poem “The Jewish Cemetery near Leningrad” (Evreiskoe kladbishche okolo Leningrada), 
Brumm asks Brodsky: “Over and over again in your poetry, you seem to be saying be steadfast, 
persevere, stand alone. Is this your basic philosophy?” He affirms this idea and elaborates: “I 
would call it a philosophy of endurance—of the possibility of endurance. It’s very simple. When 
you have some bad situation, there are two ways to deal with it—just to give up or to try to stand 
it. Well, in some sense, I prefer to stand it as far as I can.” Brodsky and Haven, Joseph Brodsky, 
17. I would suggest that the ending of the essay also speaks to this philosophy: of enduring 
suffering but without necessarily figuring that endurance as redemptive.  
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witness through his photography; he documented Leningrad during the siege, taking “the best 
pictures I’ve seen in print of the city under siege” (LTO 462). This act of taking photos, much 
like Brodsky’s choice to write the essay, insists on the expression of an individual perspective in 
the face of a system that would deny you it.  
In the father’s hands, the camera offers a way of quietly resisting this “slow death” that 
robs you of your freedom. The ending of the essay reinstates the potential power of the 
photographic fragment as a subjective vision of the world, even as it notes the limitations of such 
a form. Although throughout the essay Brodsky critiques photos as material objects for their 
fragmented and reductive qualities, the process of taking photographs is seen as an artistic act of 




Navigating the Family Archive of Photos in Shteyngart’s Little Failure 
 
Introduction 
Gracing the front cover of Gary Shteyngart’s memoir Little Failure (2014) is a black-
and-white photograph of the author as a young boy in 1974. Against the curtain backdrop of the 
photography studio, he sits in a child-sized model of a 1950s Studebaker car. His doleful eyes 
and serious expression seem out of keeping with the scene. The memoir’s title marches across 
the cover in a thick green font that seems to announce his status, even here, as a “little failure” or 
failurchka, his mother’s name for him. On the back cover, the adult Shteyngart looks out at his 
prospective reader with a resigned air: his palm cradles his stubbled chin as a faint smile plays 
across his lips. The juxtaposition of these two photographs on the book jacket captures the 
tension inherent in any autobiographical work between multiple selves. How are we to reconcile 
these two figures? How does one become the other? How does Igor become Gary? How, for that 
matter, do we get from “little failure” to “bestselling author”?  
While charting a multiplicity of identities is a mainstay of the autobiographical genre—as 
authors take us through the changes they undergo across time—the divided self is foregrounded 
in Shteyngart’s memoir. The experience of emigration amplifies his sense of a multiplicity of 
selves. Indeed, in his memoir, Shteyngart jokes that as a boy he is diagnosed with “Dissociative 
Identity Disorder,” suggesting that he has at least four identities (LF 144). After changing his 
name from the Russian Igor to the American Gary and the shift from speaking Russian to 
English, he feels his identity has become divided. The diptych on the memoir’s cover visually 
expresses the multiple identities that Shteyngart explores as part of his hyphenated identity as a 
Russian-American writer. Linda Haverty Rugg has observed that the inclusion of photographs 
within autobiographies “disrupt the singularity of the autobiographical pact by pointing to a 
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plurality of selves” but also give expression to “the embodied subject” of the author.1 Shteyngart 
makes use of the photographs in his memoir to give expression to these multiple selves, as a way 
of representing his experience of the rupture of emigration, but also in service of reconciling 
these identities into a single whole. As we will see, this attempt to reconcile his different 
identities is fraught, as it engages questions about how he relates to this Russian heritage and 
how his perspective on his childhood has changed after emigration.  
This leads to what I call the “double exposure” of photographs in the memoir, as 
Shteyngart’s readings of these childhood photographs balance the adult’s retrospective, 
estranged vision with an attempt to recuperate the sincere, authentic experience of the child 
within the frame. He now looks at these images of childhood, like the one on the front cover, 
both in a mocking way but also with a kind of sincerity. Part of reclaiming his Russianness in a 
non-ironic way involves a deeper look at his familial history which will be mediated, in part, by 
the family archive of photos. A chance encounter with an ordinary photograph of a landmark 
from his childhood in Leningrad reveals a traumatic event in his past. In his search for the source 
of this trauma, Shteyngart critically engages with the narratives contained within the archive of 
family photographs. This excavation of his family’s history becomes entangled with the traumas 
and catastrophes of the Soviet experience. As I will argue, at stake in these photographic 
readings is a reconciliation of his hyphenated identities, as well as an attempt to reclaim his 
contested Russian cultural identity. It is through the medium of photography, with its 
preservation of the indexical trace, that Shteyngart works through his inheritance of the past.  
 
 
                                               
1 Rugg, Picturing Ourselves, 13. 
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Hyphenated Identities: Between Irony and Sincerity 
Shteyngart emigrated from Leningrad with his family in 1979, at the age of 7, during the 
third wave of emigration. In 1971–72, the Soviet Union began to allow some people to emigrate, 
inaugurating the third wave which was primarily made up of Soviet Jews. Between 1970 and 
1988, approximately 290,000 Russian-speaking Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union, leaving 
for Israel and North America.2 Svetlana Boym has written about the third wave, when the 
possibility of return was foreclosed, as qualitatively different from the fourth wave of 
emigration, after perestroika, where you could come and go as you please, saying that they “were 
uniquely unsentimental; theirs was an old-fashioned exile without return.”3 And yet, soon 
enough those who emigrated during the third wave were able to return, if they chose, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. By the time Shteyngart reached young adulthood, the Soviet Union 
had dissolved. Unlike Nabokov or Brodsky before him, Shteyngart has been able to return to 
Russia and does so yearly. As Yelena Furman notes, the increasingly transnational nature of the 
world transforms the immigrant experience and the ability to move between places, “greatly 
contribut[ing] to the internal freedom of movement between and among their different 
identities.”4 
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the terms of the Russian diaspora 
by allowing for more movement and the possibility of return, it nonetheless makes final and 
irreversible the expulsion from that place. To adapt the title of Alexei Yurchak’s book, the Soviet 
                                               
2 Zvi Y. Gitelman, ed., The New Jewish Diaspora: Russian-Speaking Immigrants in the United 
States, Israel, and Germany (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016), 5. 
3 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 328–29. 
4 Furman, “Hybrid Selves, Hybrid Texts,” 25. 
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Union was forever, until it was no more. Adrian Wanner notes that the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union “precludes any kind of literal return to the ‘home country’” and thus complicates 
Shteyngart’s relationship to home.5 It is a reverse situation of what happened to Nabokov: he left 
Russia and it became the Soviet Union; Shteyngart left the Soviet Union and it became Russia. 
By the time Shteyngart emerged as a writer (his first novel, The Russian Debutante’s Handbook, 
was published in 2002), the Soviet Union was a thing of the past. An anecdote in Shteyngart’s 
memoir summarizes the strange disappearance of his homeland: when Shteyngart tells a young 
interviewer that he is from the Soviet Union, the dazed interviewer asks “And, like, what is 
that?” (LF 70). Shteyngart considers the question: “What is the Soviet Union? Or, more 
accurately, what was it? This is not an outlandish question. That particular nation passed away 
more than twenty years ago, a millennium in our speedy times” (LF 70). The end of the Soviet 
Union concretizes the premature end experienced in emigration, and it stands as the event that 
confers meaning back onto the Soviet experience. This double loss of home motivates, in part, 
Shteyngart’s retrospective look at his childhood before and after emigration in an effort to 
reconcile these multiple identities and to make sense of the loss of home. 
This loss is further complicated by the fact that, as Wanner reminds us, the Soviet Union 
“never was a real home in the first place given the discriminatory practices directed against the 
Jewish minority.”6 Although the Soviet Union was officially opposed to anti-Semitism, anti-
Jewish policies and sentiment persisted, especially under Stalin. Because of Soviet nationalities 
                                               
5 Wanner, Out of Russia, 10. 
6 Wanner, 10. As Larissa Remennick writes in her book on Soviet Jews in diaspora, “since the 
end of World War II Soviet Jews were subjected to covert institutional policies of exclusion from 
higher education and prestigious careers and lived in the shadow of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli 
media campaigns, augmented by everyday social anti-Semitism.” Larissa Remennick, Russian 
Jews on Three Continents: Identity, Integration, and Conflict (Transaction Publishers, 2013), 3. 
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policy, Jews were perceived as an ethnic “other” in Soviet Russia, as decidedly not Russian. 
One’s Jewish nationality would be stamped on the fifth line of an internal passport and in school 
rosters. Yuri Slezkine writes that once “Jewish” was seen as a nationality, Soviet Jews became 
“an ethnic diaspora potentially loyal to a hostile foreign state.” In the context of the Cold War 
and the recently established state of Israel in 1948, they were “presumed to be beholden to an 
external homeland and thus congenitally and irredeemably alien.”7 Beginning in 1948, the 
campaign against the “rootless cosmopolitan” (bezrodnyi kosmopolit), a coded reference to Jews, 
led to the discrimination against Soviet Jews, as they were barred from university, fired from 
work, and dismissed from the Komsomol.8 On August 12, 1952, the Night of the Murdered 
Poets, 13 former members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, five of whom were prominent 
Yiddish writers, were executed in the Lubyanka.9 The “rootless cosmopolitan” campaign 
culminated in the so-called The Doctor’s Plot, orchestrated by Mikhail Riumin, which 
                                               
7 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 206. 
8 As Yuri Slezkine writes, during this period “being Jewish became a crime: those who claimed a 
separate Yiddish culture were ‘bourgeois nationalists’; those who identified with Russian culture 
were ‘rootless cosmopolitans.’” Slezkine, 206.  
9 The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC) was founded in 1942 in response to Hitler’s invasion 
of the Soviet Union in 1941. The committee, led by the popular actor Solomon Mikhoels, aimed 
to organize financial and political support for the Soviet Union from the West. During the war, 
the Yiddish newspaper Eynikayt (Unity) was established and Jews were able to write and speak 
openly about Jewish suffering in the war, as well as to celebrate Jewish culture and endorse 
Zionist aspirations. However, with the start of the Cold War and the beginning of the campaign 
against rootless cosmopolitanism, the JAC fell under suspicion for its international connections, 
especially its links with Jewish organizations in America. The JAC was disbanded in November 
1948. Mikhoels was assassinated in Minsk in January 1948; 15 members of the JAC began to be 
arrested in 1948 and 13 of them were executed in 1952. For more on the JAC trial and the Night 
of the Murdered Poets, see Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir Pavlovich Naumov, eds., Stalin’s 
Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2005). 
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“uncovered” a group of primarily Jewish doctors accused of attempting to kill Soviet leaders. It 
was only with the death of Stalin in 1953 that the plot was abandoned. 
Later, after the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, the USSR cut diplomatic 
relations with Israel and anti-Zionist campaigns increased. Zionism was attacked as racist, 
nationalist, anti-communist, and colonialist, and thus enabled anti-Semitic rhetoric to flourish 
during this period. Indeed, it was after Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War and the increase in 
anti-Semitism that Soviet Jews began to emigrate to Israel. However, in August 1972 a “diploma 
tax” was imposed on those who wanted to emigrate to combat the perceived “brain drain,” the 
exorbitant fee acting as a strong deterrent against emigration. In October 1972, U.S. Senator 
Henry Jackson began to draft legislation that would become the Jackson–Vanik amendment to 
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, which put pressure on the Soviet Union to allow Jews to emigrate 
from the Soviet Union. In exchange for normal trade relations with the United States, the 
amendment required the Soviet Union, as a non-market economy, to comply with free-
emigration requirements.10 
Although it was their identity as Jews that had defined them in the Soviet Union and had 
enabled them to emigrate, in America and Israel their Jewish identity was redefined. Coming 
from an atheist society that persecuted Judaic practices, most Soviet Jews were secular. 
Ultimately, Wanner writes, “they were seen as not Jewish ‘enough,’ or even as not Jewish at all, 
by their fellow Jews in their host countries.”11 And so while in Soviet Russia the Jewish 
population was not considered Russian, in America Soviet Jews were received not as Jews but as 
Russians. In the popular imagination, the Soviet Union was thought of as synonymous with 
                                               
10 Slezkine, The Jewish Century, 353–358. 
11 Wanner, Out of Russia, 6. 
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Russia and since most Soviet Jews spoke Russian and identified with Russian culture, they were 
now considered Russian in way they had not before. Writing about the paradox of Shteyngart’s 
tripartite identity as a Soviet Jew who grew up in America, Wanner notes that “Soviet Jews only 
became ‘Russians’ after they left Russia.”12 Lara Vapnyar, another Soviet-Jewish-American 
writer of Shteyngart’s generation, notes this irony of identity; while in the Soviet Union she had 
always been identified as a Jew and never Russian, but “in the United States, I was finally 
granted the identity I had been denied my whole life. Here I became a Russian.”13  
And yet, Shteyngart is not seen as fully Russian—Russian in a cultural sense—by fellow 
Russians. In part, because he left as a child aged 7, in part because he writes in English, in part 
because his novels mock post-Soviet Russia. Even fellow Soviet émigrés question Shteyngart’s 
Russianness. For instance, the Leningrad-born writer Mikhail Iossel, who emigrated to North 
America in 1986 at the age of 30, ironically suggests that he wishes he too “were a Soviet émigré 
child” like Shteyngart and his peers. Although just a child, he would already have 
keen insights and inner conflict and geo-psychological torment; already, even by the age 
of seven or eleven, having retained enough memories and insights into the ugliness of the 
Soviet totalitarian system to last me the rest of my literary life, feeling suspended 
between two worlds, as it were, the worlds of Russia and America, America and Russia, 
forever, and forever wondering as to who I am, in fact, who I am more of—Russian or 
American, American or Russian?14 
 
                                               
12 Wanner, 6. 
13 Lara Vapnyar, “The Writer as Tour Guide,” in The Writer Uprooted: Contemporary Jewish 
Exile Literature, ed. Alvin H. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 105. 
She goes on to say that it was only by becoming a writer that she was able to bring these three 
identities together. 
14 Quoted in Val Vinokur, “The Russians Came!,” Boston Review, November 13, 2014, 
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/val-vinokur-the-russians-came. 
 153 
Iossel here denies Shteyngart and other contemporary Russian-American writers the authenticity 
of their “hyphenated” experience because they emigrated when they were still children.15 He 
suggests that they should “stop wringing [their] figurative hands” over their identity. “There is 
no need to negotiate any complicated paths between the two supposedly severed halves of your 
lives, your past and your present. Your lifeline has never been interrupted.” They are, according 
to Iossel, indisputably American. 
It seems curious to discredit the validity of what he dismissively calls their “geo-
psychological torment” simply because they were children when they emigrated, given that most 
psychoanalytic theories—from Freud’s Oedipal complex to D. W. Winnicott’s good-enough 
parenting and Melanie Klein’s good breast—revolve around the everyday traumatic experiences 
of childhood. Leaving that aside, he comes down hard on the idea that they are not Russian, but 
rather fully American. Yelena Furman invokes the binary opposition of svoi/chuzhoi (our 
own/other) to explain this type of refusal to acknowledge someone like Shteyngart’s 
Russianness. She argues that this binary “renders those who emigrate automatically foreign—not 
ours—in the Russian national consciousness,” but that “the immigrants themselves 
fundamentally challenge such either/or thinking by asserting the continued existence of their 
Russian identities in diaspora.”16 As we will see, this svoi/chuzhoi binary generates the “doubly 
                                               
15 Shteyngart’s debut novel inaugurated a slew of other narratives about the Russian-American 
immigrant experience by authors such as Lara Vapnyar, Anya Ulinich, David Bezmozgis, and 
others. Adrian Wanner has written about this generation of writers who emigrated in the third 
and fourth waves and wrote of their hyphenated experiences in their adopted tongues. Wanner, 
Out of Russia. For more on this explosion of Russian-American immigrant literature, see: 
Alexandra Tatarsky, “Land of Plenty? The Russian-Jewish-American-Post-Soviet-Immigrant-
New York Novel,” The Calvert Journal, April 20, 2015, 
https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/3967/land-of-plenty-russian-jewish-american-post-
soviet-immigrant-novel. 
16 Furman, “Hybrid Selves, Hybrid Texts,” 33–34.  
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exposed” photographic readings in Shteyngart’s memoir, which ultimately gives way to an 
attempt to reconcile or collapse this distinction. 
Nonetheless, Iossel urges those who emigrated as children to accept their identity as 
Americans and to give up their “somewhat artificial and manufactured” torment over their 
identity. He even invokes Nabokov and Brodsky as comparisons, pointing to them as exemplary 
émigrés who did not worry over their identity. Although Shteyngart belongs to the third wave of 
emigration, like Brodsky who was forced into exile in 1972, his situation differs significantly. 
Whereas Brodsky was already an established poet in Russian at the time of his emigration, 
Shteyngart was just a child. And while Brodsky, like Nabokov, began to write in English when 
he came to America, Shteyngart has only ever written in English despite being bilingual. 
Undoubtedly, Shteyngart’s experience of emigration differs greatly from Nabokov’s and 
Brodsky’s. Indeed, one could argue that it is precisely because Nabokov and Brodsky emigrated 
at an older age, with established literary careers, that they felt that their identity was not 
ambiguous. Both Nabokov and Brodsky are able to discuss their “hyphenated” identities not as a 
struggle, but more as a proud mark of cosmopolitanism.17 Nabokov’s answer to questions of his 
identity was to flaunt his transnational upbringing: “I am an American writer, born in Russia and 
educated in England where I studied French literature, before spending fifteen years in 
Germany.”18 Brodsky would reply that he was “a Russian poet, an English essayist—and, of 
                                               
17 The term “cosmopolitan” traces its roots to Diogenes of Sinope, who claimed he was a 
cosmopolitēs or citizen of the world.  
18 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, 26? 
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course, an American citizen.”19 Iossel’s comments valorize the cosmopolitan émigré writer but 
dismiss the immigrant writer who claims to wrestle with a hybrid or hyphenated identity.20  
While Iossel upbraids Shteyngart and his peers for publicizing their “inner torment” 
about their identities, he ultimately contributes to this very confusion of identity by denying them 
any connection to Russia or their Russian cultural heritage and insisting that they are all 
Americans. Shteyngart and his fellow writers are always seen as the Other: as Jews in the Soviet 
Union, Russians in America, and Americans in post-Soviet Russia (and émigré circles).21  
In his memoir, Shteyngart explores how his confused identity relates to his writing. He 
describes a story he once wrote in college that attempts to pay tribute to his great-uncle who was 
sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. His teacher praises the story, but when he shows it to his 
                                               
19 Quoted in Alexandra Berlina, Brodsky Translating Brodsky: Poetry in Self-Translation 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 3. David Bethea has called Brodsky “one of the most 
cosmopolitan poets in the history of Russian poetry” and argues that his poetry is defined by his 
“triangular vision,” which incorporates Western and Russian sources with Brodsky in between. 
Bethea, Joseph Brodsky and the Creation of Exile, 49. 
20 Yasha Klots has argued, in his article on the representation of New York in contemporary 
Russian-American immigrant fiction, that such authors as Shteyngart have “broken away from 
the Russian literary tradition, including that of third-wave émigré writers, and gone far enough to 
enter the wider corpus of pan-immigrant city narratives, whose authors come from various 
cultures and whose backgrounds are blurred in the ‘melting pot’ of New York.” He suggests that 
these writers belong less to the specifically Russian émigré literary tradition, and more generally 
to narratives about immigrants in America broadly defined. Yasha Klots, “The Ultimate City: 
New York in Russian Immigrant Narratives,” The Slavic and East European Journal 55, no. 1 
(2011): 54. 
21 Because of these multiple identities, we run into trouble when trying to find a proper term for 
writers such as Shteyngart: while the appellation “Russian American” is the most common and 
concise, it leaves out their identity as Jewish and could be misleading about ethnicity. Yelena 
Furman suggests that “Russian-American writers can thus be accurately, if not succinctly, 
defined as Russian-speaking Jewish emigrants from the (former) Soviet Union, citizens of the 
United States/Canada, and producers of English-language texts on Russian-related themes, most 
notably the experience of immigration and the hybrid cultural and linguistic selves this 
experience engenders.” Yelena Furman, “Hybridizing the Canon: Russian-American Writers in 
Dialogue with Russian Literature,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 58, no. 3 (September 2016): 206. 
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mother she feels he has misrepresented it: “That’s not how it happened,” she tells him with a sigh 
(LF 280). This painful charge of inaccuracy recalls for him his experience at Hebrew school 
when he arrived in America: “There, I was ridiculed for being an inauthentic American, and now 
I am being charged with being an inauthentic Russian. I do not yet understand that this very 
paradox is the true subject of so-called immigrant fiction” (LF 280). Shteyngart’s works explore 
what it is to be seen as American by Russians and Russian by Americans, and the effort to carve 
out some third term that fits.22 Indeed, in his essay “The New Two-Way Street,” he affirms a 
positive transnational, cosmopolitan identity for himself, writing that he does not “need to 
choose a single, exclusive identity” because as “global citizens of an increasingly borderless 
world” he and others like him are “equally at home (and equally homeless) in both cultures.”23  
In his previous work, Shteyngart has been seen as exploiting his hyphenated identity, 
positioning himself well in a literary marketplace hungry for immigrant literature in an 
increasing effort to represent a diversity of voices.24 And yet, his works complicate this 
multicultural imperative by exposing and mocking those very forces that made him successful in 
                                               
22 My use of the phrase “third term” is similar to Yelena Furman’s use of the postcolonial term 
“third space,” as theorized by Homi Bhabha, to describe the hybridity of these writers’ identities 
and their literary works. Furman, “Hybrid Selves, Hybrid Texts.” 
23 Gary Shteyngart, “The New Two-Way Street,” in Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New 
Immigrants and What It Means To Be American, ed. Tamar Jacoby (Basic Books, 2004), 290. 
24 Geoff Hamilton, in his monograph on Gary Shteyngart, suggests that his literary success in 
indebted to the American narrative of self-betterment: “Part of his appeal in the contemporary 
marketplace no doubt has to do with his alignment with an enduringly alluring narrative of 
national success, for Shteyngart’s story is in an important sense a retelling of the great American 
myth: a plucky ascent from nothing or very little to great professional and material achievement, 
a marvelous transformation undertaken in defiance of limiting origins and made possible by 
committed individual effort.” Geoff Hamilton, Understanding Gary Shteyngart (Columbia, 
South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2017), 97.  
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the literary marketplace.25 Natalie Friedman writes that his first novel “capitalizes on the 
American desire for Eastern Bloc authenticity,” but that it also exposes this desire by offering “a 
cynical look at the American craze for Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, shortly after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall” and the “fascination with post-Communist Eastern Europe, as 
hundreds of young Americans flocked to Eastern capitals once closed to them, in search of a 
sentimental ideal.”26 Adrian Wanner also sees what he calls Shteyngart’s “immigrant chic” to be 
“a (self-)ironic performance that allows him to capitalize on his Russianness while at the same 
time mocking the multiculturalist assumptions that have been fueling his popularity.”27 He gains 
from, while at the same time exposing, the fetishization of Eastern Europe. 
Beyond his novels, Shteyngart has fashioned an authorial persona in which he knowingly 
performs “Russianness” for an Anglo-American audience.28 As we explored in the case of 
Nabokov, autobiography and photography, because of their referential status as well as their 
ability to be manipulated, allow authors to fashion an authorial self. Like Nabokov, Shteyngart 
                                               
25 For an analysis of how Shteyngart dismantles the false promises of cultural tolerance and 
multiculturalism in his novel Absurdistan, see Steven S. Lee, “‘Borat,’ Multiculturalism, 
‘Mnogonatsional’nost’’,” Slavic Review 67, no. 1 (2008): 19–34, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/27652764. 
26 Natalie Friedman, “Nostalgia, Nationhood, and the New Immigrant Narrative: Gary 
Shteyngart’s The Russian Debutante’s Handbook and the Post-Soviet Experience,” Iowa Journal 
of Cultural Studies 5 (Fall 2004): 83. 
27 Wanner, Out of Russia, 17. 
28 Geoff Hamilton has remarked on Shteyngart’s performative self-fashioning as Russian: “A 
curious irony of Shteyngart’s self-constructions as a Russian, which become increasingly self-
conscious in Absurdistan and in his author interviews after the publication of that novel, is that 
he has seemingly had to play, and play up, the role of Russian to Americans in order to become a 
successful author, whereas as a child he had to act the role of an American, leaving behind 
obvious markers of his Russianness in order to be accepted by his young peers.” Hamilton, 
Understanding Gary Shteyngart, 12. 
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harnesses the power of photographs to craft and sell his authorial identity. The difference 
between Nabokov’s high modernist and Shteyngart’s postmodern attitudes, however, is how the 
latter blatantly reveals this game of commodification and makes it the object of open satire 
shared with the reader. Social media has multiplied the possibilities for self-fashioning, as 
anyone can cultivate a particular narrative of their life for mass public consumption through 
visual and verbal means. As Shteyngart put it in an essay he wrote for The New Yorker about 
testing the (now defunct) technology product Google Glass, he became “a curator” of his life 
“rather than a participant.”29 Shteyngart is no stranger to self-fashioning; he is adept at using 
social media platforms such as Twitter and Instagram, as well as para-textual elements such as 
author photographs, book trailers with celebrities such as James Franco, and even his ubiquitous 
blurbs on others’ works to cultivate his comic, self-mocking literary persona.30 He has made use 
of such elements to cultivate his multiple selves—at times to play up his Russianness, at others 
to play up his identity as New Yorker.  
The author photo for his debut novel The Russian Debutante’s Handbook, for example, 
brazenly plays on his Russian identity. The image pictures him in a thick winter coat with a fur-
lined collar, with a bear cub in tow on a leash, thus metonymically telegraphing “Russianness.” 
Adrian Wanner sees the image as “an emblematic illustration of Shteyngart’s self-lampooning” 
                                               
29 Gary Shteyngart, “O.K., Glass,” The New Yorker, August 5, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/05/o-k-glass. 
30 Geoff Hamilton estimates that Shteyngart has written blurbs for over two hundred books. 
There is even a short documentary entitled Shteyngart Blurbs. Hamilton points to the “canniness 
of having one’s name appear on the covers of numerous books by other writers, for such 
visibility contributes to an impression of the author’s centrality to the current literary 
marketplace and the commodities circulating there.” Hamilton, Understanding Gary Shteyngart, 
99. 
 159 
in which Shteyngart preempts any charge that he might be exploiting his identity in the literary 
marketplace by ironically broadcasting a stereotypical Russian figure:  
His implicit response to the charge of playing a ‘professional immigrant game’ is not to 
deny it, but to point out that all literature is a game of identities. […] In a world where all 
identity is performative and ‘invented,’ the distinction between authentic and inauthentic 
Russianness has become in itself meaningless. After all, it seems pointless to accuse a 
writer of engaging in clichés if the clever manipulation of clichés is exactly his point.31 
 
Indeed, his awkward smile in the photo cuts both ways: the smile is part of the character posing 
and showing off his bear cub, but it is also a knowing smile to the reader that he is in on the joke.  
While Shteyngart has long exploited the potentials of photographic self-fashioning to 
play up his multiple identities, one of the contentions of this chapter is that Little Failure 
represents a new stage in that endeavor. In the past, his authorial self-fashioning pointedly 
mocked his multiple selves by performing the American idea of Russianness. However, the 
cover of Little Failure—and the text within—is different because he is no longer playing at an 
idea of representing Russianness. These images are sincere, even if presented for an ironic effect. 
By incorporating photographs of young Igor in his Soviet attire that were taken in earnest, the 
memoir attempts to recuperate a more authentic expression of his Russian identity than the 
version performed with a wink and a bear cub.  
We can see this shift in Shteyngart’s career as part of the larger trend of “New Sincerity” 
in contemporary literature in reaction to postmodernist irony. In the Anglo-American context, it 
is often linked with David Foster Wallace’s essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. 
Fiction” (1993), which is taken as an unofficial manifesto for this new style of literature that 
returns to authenticity, sincerity, and emotional honesty as opposed to maintaining a cool, 
                                               
31 Wanner, Out of Russia, 133. 
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detached, ironic distance.32 Wallace closes his essay by addressing this yet-to-come band of 
“anti-rebels” who will shock us by risking sincerity; they will be “the ones willing to risk the 
yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the ‘Oh how 
banal.’ To risk accusations of sentimentality, melodrama. Of overcredulity.”33 As we will see in 
the next chapter, the visual artist Ilya Kabakov’s turn to self-representation in his installations 
and recent paintings also exhibits an unexpected interest in sincerity, kept in tension with the 
lessons of conceptualism and poststructuralism. Likewise, in Little Failure Shteyngart still 
maintains a balance between the cynical satirical irony that his work is known for and this new 
attempt at emotional authenticity. 
 
Affect, Index, Trauma: The Chesme Church Photograph 
Early in the memoir, Shteyngart takes up the question of whether a straightforward, 
emotional relationship to photos is still possible. Is it not naïve to be duped by the photograph’s 
image? He admits the potential pitfalls of using photographs within his narrative: “One is 
cautioned by the better critics never to write about photographs. They are an easy substitute for 
prose, a hackneyed shortcut, and, besides, they lie like all images do” (LF 87). Shteyngart here 
valorizes the word over the image. He suggests that images are deceptively simple, that they lack 
the rigor or depth of narrative. Photographs have become ubiquitous and trite, even. He invokes 
the idea that photographs lie and deceive, despite their indexical aspect. After all, 
poststructuralism has taught us that photographic images are just as constructed as other signs, 
                                               
32 David Foster Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” in A Supposedly Fun 
Thing I’ll Never Do Again: Essays and Arguments (London: Abacus, 2011). For more on New 
Sincerity in the Anglo-American context, see Kelly, “The New Sincerity.” 
33 Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” 81. 
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that they do not give us a privileged or objective slice of the world. In other words, we should 
know better than to take them as evidence. However, we will see how Shteyngart encounters 
photographs that seem to leave him no choice but to have an emotional reaction.  
Directly after this cautionary word, Shteyngart goes on to describe a photograph of him 
and his parents from their time in Italy, en route to America: “So what am I to make of the photo 
of my small family—Mama and Papa and me between them—sitting on a worsted blanket in a 
chipped, dingy apartment in Ostia, a seaside suburb of Rome?” (LF 87). He describes their poses 
in the photograph: his father has his arm around his mother, with young Igor sitting between 
them; all three are smiling. He emphasizes the love and happiness that they exude in the 
photograph. Despite acknowledging that photographs can lie, he takes this photograph to 
represent their genuine happiness during this time: “This photo is the first indication I have of all 
three of us together happy, ecstatic, as a family. If I may go so far, it is the first anecdotal 
evidence I have that joy is possible and that a family can love each other with as much abandon 
as it can muster” (LF 87–88). Shteyngart retracts the idea that photos deceive to take the 
snapshot as “evidence” of family happiness. Despite knowing that photographs are coded, he 
consciously disavows that stance in favor of a naïve reading of the image that allows for an 
emotional response.34 As Corey Creekmur writes, “I believe a photograph of a lost loved one 
                                               
34 See W. J. T. Mitchell’s “The Photographic Essay: Four Case Studies” for a discussion of this 
“naïve” view that has fallen out of favor among critics: that “photographs have a special causal 
and structural relationship with the reality they represent.” He asks why this “naïve” view 
nonetheless remains so intractable, ultimately to suggest that “photography both is and is not a 
language,” in other words that it is both coded and uncoded, borrowing Roland Barthes’ terms 
from his essay “The Photographic Message.” Mitchell posits that the image’s denotation and 
connotation are coextensive, which leads to the naïve view, as “one connotation always present 
in the photograph is that it is a pure denotation.” Mitchell, Picture Theory, 282–85. 
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might have the affective power to make even a semiotician, who knows better, weep.”35 We 
might detect something of the New Sincerity in Shteyngart’s relationship to these photographs, 
as he rejects the detached, unaffected postmodern approach for a newfound emotional sincerity. 
And there is perhaps some “risk,” as Wallace suggests, in attempting to express how such photos 
engender a sentimental response. 
As we will see, images prove to be an integral part of the memoir. In the end, these 
images are not an “easy substitute for prose,” which suggests one mode of representation 
supplanting the other. Rather, word and image work in concert with each other. The photographs 
do not provide shortcuts, but demand narration, explanation, investigation. They invite 
revelations. 
Indeed, a photograph sets Little Failure in motion. The memoir begins with an account of 
how Shteyngart suffered a series of panic attacks, each set off by the image of the Chesme 
Church in Petersburg’s Moskovsky District, where he and his family used to live. The first attack 
occurs during a lunch-hour visit to the Strand bookstore. At this point in his life, Shteyngart is at 
work on his first novel, drinking heavily, and “full of vile, unanalyzed […] rage” (LF 14–15). At 
the bookstore, he begins to peruse the coffee table book St. Petersburg: Architecture of the 
Tsars. Looking at the familiar haunts from his Leningrad childhood, he experiences “the vulgar 
nostalgia, the poshlost’ Nabokov so despised” (LF 7), until he turns to page 90 and confronts a 
photograph of the Chesme Church. It is this image that leads him “back to the uncomfortable 
place” (LF 6). The photograph of the church sends him into an inexplicable panic attack.  
Memories surrounding the church flood back to him, but he cannot piece together what 
induces this panic attack. His memories are seemingly happy ones. He recalls how, at age five, 
                                               
35 Creekmur, “Lost Objects: Photography, Fiction, and Mourning,” 75. 
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he and his father visited the nearby church, which had been transformed into a naval museum 
during the Soviet period. In these memories, he pictures his “preimmigrant father” as “childish 
and bright,” full of love for him. He recalls that he and his father had launched a toy helicopter 
outside the church. “This must be the happiest day of my life,” he writes (LF 17). So how does it 
follow that this image of the church now inspires such panic in him?  
Shteyngart then recounts how, in 1999, during his first visit back to Petersburg since 
emigrating, he suffered another attack while in the vicinity of the church. He was in the middle 
of trying to secure a stamp for his exit visa—a protracted process that leads him back to the 
neighborhood of his youth—when the attack occurs. Shteyngart writes that, at the time, to make 
sense of this episode, he saw it as “an off-shoot of my parents’ fear twenty years ago: the fear of 
being refused permission to emigrate, of becoming what was then called a refusenik (a 
designation that brought with it a kind of jobless state-sanctioned purgatory). Part of me believed 
that I would not be allowed to leave Russia” (LF 17). Indeed, in a 2002 profile of the author in 
the New York Times Magazine, Shteyngart was quoted as saying “I get terrible panic attacks 
sometimes. […] In St. Petersburg, it was the worst. One day when I was there, I realized that my 
visa was missing a stamp. I had a meltdown: sweating, racing heart, everything. I was convinced 
that they weren't going to let me go home.”36 In Little Failure, though, he writes that he now 
understands that the attack “wasn’t about the visa stamp, the bribe, the refusenik status, any of it” 
because what he can’t stop thinking about is the Chesme Church (LF 17), even though it is 
unclear what occurred there. He repeats several times the question: “What happened at the 
                                               
36 Daniel Zalewski, “From Russia With Tsoris,” The New York Times, June 2, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/02/magazine/from-russia-with-tsoris.html. 
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Chesme Church twenty-two years ago?” (LF 18). This question, unanswered for now, hovers 
over the rest of the memoir. 
The inability to find an answer, to locate the source of his panic attacks, leads to a 
breakdown in language as the narrative briefly devolves into a list of fragmented memories: 
“Father. Helicopter. Church. Mother,” and so on (LF 17). As he later writes, his memory of his 
early years “is attuned, vibrant, and frighteningly perfect” and that “there are no gaps. Except for 
one” (LF 46). The memoir is structured around this lacuna.  
The question concerning the source of these attacks remains unanswered until the 
memoir’s final chapter, when he returns to Petersburg with his parents in 2011. Although 
Shteyngart first returned to Russia in 1999 and has since been back almost every other year, this 
is the first time he has returned with his parents (LF 323). The reason for this collective trip is the 
fact that he is about to start writing his memoir (LF 324). He writes that they are only making 
this trip because he has asked them to accompany him. He understands that his parents “have 
traveled to a country they don’t particularly want to remember” (LF 325).  
As they walk around their former neighborhood, they visit their old apartment building 
and then pass by the Chesme Church. He and his father enter the church, and his father brings up 
the story of how they used to fly a toy helicopter around the church. But it is only after they 
leave the church that his father reveals the incident that has led to his panic attacks:  
“one day when we were walking down this street after launching our helicopter by the 
church, we were going back to our house and you started to behave rascally [ty nachal 
shalit’]. You were still trying to launch the helicopter on the street and there were so 
many people around. I told you once, twice, you didn’t listen, then I swung my fist and 
you got it in the nose. And the blood began to flow.” (LF 343) 
 
And while this is not an isolated incident of physical violence between father and son, as the 
memoir details, it would seem that this episode made a more lasting mark, as it were, on 
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Shteyngart. The memoir is structured in such a way that, revealed only at the end, the traumatic 
source of his attacks is unknown throughout the narrative. Although narrating from the vantage 
point of having access to this information, Shteyngart structures the memoir so as to recreate the 
experience of not knowing. 
This inability to recall the source of his panic attacks accords with the theory of trauma as 
unspeakable or unrepresentable. Indeed, Shteyngart, who has been in analysis since 1999, seems 
to rely on psychoanalytic paradigms as a way of understanding the self and structuring his self-
narrative (the memoir, after all, is dedicated to his parents and his psychoanalyst).37 Because the 
subject dissociates during the moment of unexpected or sudden violence, the mind does not 
properly process the traumatic event; the unprocessed memory can return later, leaving the 
subject to try to make sense of it. Freud pioneered modern trauma theory as soldiers came back 
shell-shocked after World War I. In theorizing what he calls “traumatic neurosis,” Freud 
conceived of trauma as a wound inflicted on the mind rather than the body, as an unexpected 
“breach of the protective barrier” of the brain.38 In these soldiers, Freud saw a compulsion to 
repeat unpleasurable events. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), he investigated the 
compulsion to repeat and how this seemed at odds with his previous theory of the pleasure 
principle, regulated by the reality principle, which has people seeking out pleasure and avoiding 
things that are unpleasurable. He sees the compulsion to repeat as coming from the repressed 
                                               
37 In the memoir, he describes how he begins to see a psychoanalyst 4 times a week. He 
acknowledges that “it is fashionable now to discredit psychoanalysis. The couch. The four or five 
days a week of narcissistic brooding.” But, he says, “it saves my life” (LF 311–12).  
38 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings, trans. John Reddick (New 
York: Penguin, 2003), 70. 
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unconscious, which wants to unleash and find release, while the ego resists this release to block 
whatever displeasure would come “if the repressed part of the psyche were to break free.”39  
Freud turns to Tasso’s epic poem La Gerusalemme liberate to offer an example of this 
compulsion to repeat. In the poem, the hero Tancred accidentally kills his beloved Clorinda, who 
is in disguise. He then strikes at a tree; blood flows and Clorinda’s voice speaks out from the 
wound. Her spirit had entered the tree, and she reproves him for wounding her again.40 In her 
book Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth takes up Freud’s reading of this episode in order to 
emphasize the unknowable aspect of trauma. Caruth writes that because Clorinda’s death was 
“experienced too soon, too unexpectedly,” Tancred is unable to fully comprehend it and is thus 
doomed to repeat. In her reading, she highlights the voice of Clorinda that bears witness to the 
event of which Tancred himself has no knowledge. Thus, she writes, “trauma is not locatable in 
the simple violent or original event in an individual's past, but rather in the way that its very 
unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely not known in the first instance—returns to haunt 
the survivor later on.”41  
Shteyngart expresses the unknowability of his trauma when he writes that at the source of 
his attacks there is “something” he “cannot articulate” (LF 344). The event then is something 
inaccessible to him, something he cannot narrate, despite its centrality to his experience. He must 
rely on his father to reveal the event that he himself partially knows but cannot remember.  
                                               
39 Freud, 58. 
40 Freud, 60–61. 
41 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3–4. 
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Within the narrative, however, the photograph that triggers the panic attack can stand in 
visually for the unspeakable traumatic event. It offers a way of representing the traumatic 
episode that cannot be fully known (and thus inaccessible and inexpressible in words), where the 
image of the church becomes a visual metonym for the episode. While trauma is often figured as 
unspeakable, the photograph offers an alternative narrative means for representing trauma. The 
photograph of the Chesme Church offers a visual representation of an event that is un-narratable 
because it was not fully assimilated. Appropriately, the photograph of the church is not included 
in the text; this notional photograph represents the trauma as both present and absent, known and 
unknown. It is a photograph that speaks but we don’t know what of.  
 Indeed, it is particularly fitting that a photograph represents or “remembers” the 
traumatic episode that Shteyngart cannot. Various thinkers have elaborated on the idea of a 
connection between the camera and the unconscious mind, perhaps most famously in Benjamin’s 
formulation of the camera’s “optical unconscious.”42 Freud, for example, suggests that trauma is 
akin to the photographic process; just as the unconscious mind registers the imprint of the 
traumatic episode, so too does the light-sensitive paper record impressions of the photographed 
event. These records of an event can be latent for an extended period of time—either in the form 
of the photographic negative or the unconscious memory—and only later get “exposed” or come 
                                               
42 The phrase comes from his 1931 essay “Little History of Photography.” Referring to 
Eadweard Muybridge’s experiments with chronophotography, which revealed the exact 
movements of how a horse actually gallops or how a woman descends the stairs, Benjamin notes 
that photography brings to light the minute visual details that the human eye, and human 
consciousness, cannot perceive. Like the unconscious mind, the camera records sense 
impressions that bypass waking consciousness. Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” 278. 
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to light.4344 The temporal delay of Nachträglichkeit is inherent in traumatic memory. In her study 
of photography and trauma, Margaret Iversen highlights the mechanical aspect of photography: 
despite the presence of a human operating the apparatus, the image recorded by the camera is 
independent of a human consciousness creating it—much like how the traumatic memory is 
recorded unconsciously.45 The photograph thus works as a metaphor for the way trauma is 
recorded (as if mechanically) and remains unknown or unprocessed until later. 
As these theorists reveal, photography and trauma share key aspects such as the indexical 
mark, an absence of consciousness at the moment of imprint, and the latency of the 
“development” of the image or memory. In the case of Shteyngart’s memoir, the blow that he 
sustains from his father is analogous to the image imprinted on the film. Given that photographs 
are conceptually linked with trauma, it is fitting that it is a photograph that plays a key role in 
bringing the source of his trauma to light. The photo remembers what he cannot. 
While these theorists note the connection between the way a traumatic episode is 
registered by the unconscious mind and the way something is imprinted on the camera’s light-
sensitive material, Roland Barthes articulates how looking at a photograph might be related to 
                                               
43 In Moses and Monotheism, Freud writes about experiences in childhood that, because the child 
is unequipped to understand them, cannot be processed. To clarify what he means, Freud offers 
the photograph as a metaphor for the concept: “the process may be compared to a photograph, 
which can be developed and made into a picture after a short or long interval.” Sigmund Freud, 
Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Knopf, 1939), 199. 
44 Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit (‘deferred action’ in James Strachey’s translation or 
‘après-coup’ in Jean Laplanche’s work) describes the process by which something is registered 
but only understood or activated at a later date.  
45 Iversen writes, “Just as photography, to some extent, bypasses artistic intention and 
convention, so also the traumatic event bypasses consciousness. Both involve an indelible 
impression of something generated outside.” Margaret Iversen, Photography, Trace, and Trauma 
(University of Chicago Press, 2017), 1. 
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trauma as well. Barthes’s theory thus offers us a way of conceptualizing Shteyngart’s experience 
of seeing this photograph as traumatic. In Camera Lucida (1980), Barthes aims to determine the 
ontology of the photograph, but to discover this, he also charts its phenomenology: what is the 
experience of looking at a photograph? He introduces the idea of the punctum: the subjective 
element of the photograph that animates the viewer. The photo’s punctum pierces, punctures, 
bruises, and wounds; it is “that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to 
me).”46 If Freud and others theorized trauma (“wound” in Greek) as a wound inflicted on the 
mind,47 then Barthes extends this to consider the affective power of photographs as essentially 
traumatic. 
Barthes’ punctum yields further similarities to trauma in the way that it eludes language 
(“What I can name cannot really prick me. The incapacity to name is a good symptom of 
disturbance”48), as well as the idea that there is a latent aspect to the punctum. The chance detail 
recorded by the camera is only later processed by the spectator as the punctum.49 For it is the 
gaze of the spectator that constitutes the punctum: the punctum “is what I add to the photograph 
                                               
46 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 27. 
47 As Ruth Leys notes, “The term trauma acquired a more psychological meaning when it was 
employed by J. M. Charcot, Pierre Janet, Alfred Binet, Morton Prince, Josef Breuer, Sigmund 
Freud, and other turn-of-the century figures to describe the wounding of the mind brought about 
by sudden, unexpected, emotional shock.” Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 3–4. 
48 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 51. 
49 Indeed, Barthes goes so far as to say that we can best perceive the punctum, paradoxically, by 
looking away from the photograph, allowing the punctum to arise later of its own accord. 
Barthes says that it is often in retrospect, without the image in front of us, that we can best 
discern the punctum. “I may know better a photograph I remember than a photograph I am 
looking at […] in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your eyes.” 
Barthes, 53. 
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and what is nonetheless already there.”50 The punctum needs the viewer to be activated, and, as a 
result, the punctum will be different for each viewer.  
Barthes’ discussion of the punctum re-focuses our understanding of the relationship 
between photography and trauma. He follows the idea that the photograph can act as a metaphor 
for the unconscious mind that archives the trauma when he talks about the punctum as the 
unintended detail that the photograph unconsciously records — but he expands this to consider 
the spectator’s affective relationship to the photograph. The photograph itself can pierce the 
viewer in a manner akin to how traumatic episodes are figured. In Barthes’ text it is not so much 
the photograph itself that works as a metaphor for trauma; rather, the experience of looking at a 
photo (and feeling the “tiny shock” of the punctum) is analogous to the moment of trauma, where 
the event is too much to absorb and must be understood over time.51   
These metaphors of bodily injury to describe the spectator’s relation to photographs 
become realized in Shteyngart’s experience of looking at the photograph and suffering a physical 
attack. But the punctum of the photograph, like the source of the attack, remains unknown until 
later when the father reveals what happened at the Chesme Church. The photo seems to offer 
him insight into his past and his self, but it remains fundamentally unknowable.  
Structurally, the episode where Shteyngart looks at the photograph of the church begins 
the narrative and, I would suggest, also serves as a catalyst for the narrative. The unknowable 
traumatic event, made representable within the narrative through the photograph, generates the 
memoir. It motivates the look back to his childhood and emigration to understand this episode, to 
discover the source of his attacks.  
                                               
50 Barthes, 55. 
51 Barthes, 49. 
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In so doing, Shteyngart situates this individual event of physical violence between father 
and son within a wider context. Indeed, the moment when Shteyngart learns from his father 
“what happened” at the Chesme Church, he also learns of his own father’s past trauma. As they 
walk around the city, Gary’s father leads them to the Mariinskaya Municipal Hospital. His father 
discloses that he spent time there as a mental patient when he was twenty-three years old. After 
suffering some type of seizure, he was diagnosed with “soldering of the vessels in the brain” (a 
false diagnosis) and institutionalized. As he describes it to Gary, “they performed terrible 
experiments on me, and I almost died” (LF 331). He was given bromine to prevent erections. 
Another one of the “treatments” he received as a patient to “‘unsolder’ the blood vessels” in his 
brain involved inserting a needle into his spine to inject oxygen into it. He suffered from anxiety 
and depression upon his release. As Shteyngart writes, “He comes out a wreck, scared of taking 
the tram, afraid of leaving his room. The middle half of his twenties are a wasteland of 
depression and anxiety” (LF 332). This is a major revelation for Gary, one that allows him to 
connect his father’s traumatic experience in the mental ward with his own. By attempting to 
understand himself, he needs to reckon with his parents’ experiences. His father’s experience, 
told to Gary in an offhand manner on a walk, is an example of the wider phenomenon of Soviet 
abuse of psychiatry. The father’s personal narrative thus becomes symbolic of a larger cultural 
trauma, one that is then passed across generations. 
Ultimately, the episode at the Chesme Church becomes a story not merely of a bloody 
nose, but of the Holodomor in Ukraine, Stalin’s Purges, World War II and the Siege of 
Leningrad, and Soviet psychiatric wards, as well as emigration and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This process of recovering the etiology of his trauma, which becomes imbricated with the 
traumas of the Soviet experience and the long 20th century, is mediated by the family archive of 
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photographs. At stake in this is reclaiming his Russian identity, an identity that has perhaps been 
seen as tenuous, given the fact he emigrated as a child. In the memoir, he makes a case for how 
he has been shaped, knowingly and unknowingly, by these larger cultural forces, and thus stages 
an attempt at making sense of his Russian/Soviet inheritance. 
 
The Divided Self: Humor and Mourning 
While the absent photograph of the Chesme Church triggers a traumatic memory and 
sends Shteyngart into panic attacks, the other photographs included in the memoir seem, perhaps, 
more benign. Like the photo on the cover, Shteyngart includes many images from his childhood 
and treats them in a humorous manner. He gets comedic mileage out of presenting the “Soviet” 
aspects of his childhood—his love of cosmonauts and Lenin, for example—to an American 
audience. 
If, as noted earlier, in the promotional material for his earlier works Shteyngart fashions 
an image of the self that both exploits and mocks the stereotypical image of “Russianness” in the 
American imagination (the fur coat, the bear), we also see a humorous attitude in his treatment of 
photographs of himself as a child in Leningrad in Little Failure. However, in these documents of 
his childhood he presents himself as “authentically” Russian. He is no longer consciously 
performing Russianness. Instead, his engagement with these photographs becomes part of the 
memoir’s larger project of acknowledging that he does belong to this culture. If those 
promotional pictures of Shteyngart bedecked in fur were, as Wanner puts it, a “self-ironic 
performance of identity,” then these photographs become a key site in working through and 
sincerely reclaiming this aspect of his identity. Little Failure evinces more of a sincere approach 
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to his Russian identity. And while humor still plays a role in this process, it is utilized now in a 
different way from before.  
Shteyngart addresses the role of humor in the memoir, differentiating it from how he 
mobilized it in his other works. He writes, “On so many occasions in my novels I have 
approached a certain truth only to turn away from it, only to point my finger and laugh at it and 
then scurry back to safety. In this book, I promised myself I would not point the finger. My 
laughter would be intermittent. There would be no safety” (LF 318). Shteyngart identifies 
laughter with security—a means of keeping safe distance from those things that are painful. 
Indeed, we see him receive a lesson in the uses of humor soon after he comes to America. Teased 
mercilessly at school, Shteyngart learns that laughter can be used as a defense mechanism. He 
notices how his teacher Ms. S manages a situation one day where the children mock her. 
Shteyngart is “worried that she will cry, but instead she laughs.” He emphasizes, “She has 
laughed at herself and emerged unscathed!” — a revelation for the young boy (LF 149). Humor 
becomes a survival technique. He establishes ownership of the situation by laughing at it; his 
behavior would no longer appear shameful or wrong if only he laughs at it first. However, in 
Little Failure, he claims he will not use humor to turn away as a defense against fully engaging 
with what is painful.52 
                                               
52 In this way, the memoir does signal a shift from his previous work. In an interview, Shteyngart 
notes that he sees this memoir as inaugurating a new phase in his career: “In a sense, writing this 
memoir was my attempt to clear the palate a little bit. Because after this, the fourth book — the 
three books before have had immigrant, Russian Jewish immigrant protagonists. Time to move 
on, maybe do a character who is not a Russian Jewish male.” Daniel D’Addario, “Gary 





And yet, I would suggest, it is precisely his use of humor that affords Shteyngart the 
ability to ultimately look further and not retreat. How might humor allow us to look further? In 
“Epic and Novel,” Mikhail Bakhtin suggests that laughter forces us into a proximal relationship 
with the comedic object. He writes that laughter “destroys […] distance.”  
As a distanced image a subject cannot be comical; to be made comical, it must be brought 
close. Everything that makes us laugh is close at hand, all comical creativity works in a 
zone of maximal proximity. Laughter has the remarkable power of making an object 
come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it 
familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside out, peer at it from above and below, 
break open its external shell, look into its center, doubt it, take it apart, dismember it, lay 
it bare and expose it, examine it freely and experiment with it. Laughter demolishes fear 
and piety before an object, before a world, making of it an object of familiar contact and 
thus clearing the ground for an absolutely free investigation of it.53 
 
Bakhtin proposes here a vision of laughter as radical intimacy with an object. It is grotesque in 
its closeness; the vulnerable body (for the object takes on a distinctly bodily form in Bakhtin’s 
account) is turned open, undone by the skillfully prying hands of laughter. Thus, we see how 
humor actually forces an almost uncomfortably close relationship with the object. And if we 
return to Shteyngart’s description of his new use of humor, we see that the main shift he notes is 
staying with the object of laughter, rather than retreating “back to safety.” Once the object has 
been figuratively disemboweled by laughter, the challenge is then to sit with the object—exposed 
and broken—after the laughter subsides. As Bakhtin writes, laughter allows “for an absolutely 
free investigation” of the object. From the intimate vantage point that laughter affords, 
Shteyngart is then able to delve deeper into his exploration of these photographs. 
As we will see, this is the pattern that unfolds in Shteyngart’s treatment of his childhood 
images. The photos of his younger self often get read twice. A humorous caption mocking his 
                                               
53 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 23. 
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former self first introduces the image, but then a second reading—one that admits a more serious 
emotional response to the photo—follows later in the text, often to consider the wider context of 
the photograph. The humorous moment enables him to approach the image, to transform and 
defang the object through laughter, and thus offer him the opportunity to inspect the photo more 
deeply later. The comic gives way to the sincere.  
This relationship to the photographs—both humorous and sincere—becomes a way of 
mourning what he lost in emigration. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s remark that comedy is the 
“inner side of mourning,” Alexander Etkind has suggested that humor can be a crucial “marker 
of difference” that allows the mourner to represent the past without reliving it.54 With Bakhtin’s 
theory of laugher in mind, we can see how humor makes possible this proximate relationship 
with the painful object as part of the mourning process. By turning the painful object into a 
source of laughter, Shteyngart transforms it and establishes a new relationship with it.55  
What, then, is Shteyngart mourning the loss of? In this narrative, mourning is bound up 
with the conception and representation of the self. Judith Butler has written about how mourning 
the loss of someone throws the relationship to one’s own self into flux, since we are formed in 
relation to the other. When I lose someone, she writes, “then I not only mourn the loss, but I 
                                               
54 Alexander Etkind, Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 21.  
55 In Freud’s theory of mourning, “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), he argues that successful 
mourning leads the mourner to detach from the lost object, so that the ego is free to form 
attachments to a new, living object. Freud’s detachment theory has since been developed to 
reconsider the kinds of object relations at work in the mourning process. Rather than detaching 
fully from the lost object, the successful mourner goes through “a process of inner 
transformation of both self and object images,” which allows a continued internal relationship 
with the lost object. John E. Baker, “Mourning and the Transformation of Object Relations: 
Evidence for the Persistence of Internal Attachments,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 18, no. 1 
(2001): 56–57. 
 176 
become inscrutable to myself. Who ‘am’ I, without you? When we lose some of these ties by 
which we are constituted, we do not know who we are or what to do.”56 Mourning is thus not 
only grief for the loss of the other, but also the loss of some part of ourselves. It frustrates the 
sense of self, as we find ourselves unmoored from a relationship with the other that defined who 
we are. In Shteyngart’s case, it is less the mourning of a particular person, and more the loss of 
his own identity before emigration.  
Shteyngart’s childhood photos figure within the text as the site where his troubled 
relationship to his childhood is thrown into relief. His relationship to his childhood memories is 
complicated by the experience of emigration, by the revelation of information about his family’s 
experience within the Soviet system, and by the collapse of the Soviet Union which ironically 
makes a physical return to Russia possible for this émigré but a return to his homeland, to the 
Leningrad of his youth, impossible. We can see the double reading of the photos as an attempt to 
come to terms with what they represent, especially the version of his former self that they 
present. 
Before we can turn to those photographs, though, let us consider the series of events 
during emigration that lead Shteyngart to abruptly re-evaluate his experience in the Soviet Union 
and, more crucially, his sense of self. In the memoir, Shteyngart describes his childhood in 
Leningrad as a fairly happy one, and a fairly typical one. Growing up around Moskovsky Square, 
Shteyngart idolizes the nearby statue of Lenin and longs for the day when he can join the 
Komsomol. However, when his family emigrates while he is still just a child, his happy 
childhood memories become re-coded as false. The rupture of emigration influences the way he 
                                               
56 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 
2004), 22. 
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retrospectively narrates his childhood memories in Russia. Those memories have been touched 
and transformed by the future moment of emigration. When narrating events from his Soviet 
childhood, there is a tension between the narrating “I” of the present and the narrated “I” of his 
childhood. This tension is undoubtedly present in any autobiographical account, given the 
retrospective nature of the genre. The narrating “I” possesses more knowledge as well as a sense 
of trajectory that informs how that “I” retrospectively interprets and constructs a narrative of the 
self.57 I would suggest, though, that the divide between the narrated “I” and the narrating “I” is 
compounded in this narrative (even more so than for the other authors considered in this 
dissertation) because the moment of emigration was experienced as a traumatic event that 
significantly revised his childhood memories and sense of self. Thus, when narrating his past 
experience, he often ironically cuts through his youthful sincerity by incorporating his adult 
perspective of the present moment. (And yet, as I will show, this distanced ironic pose will 
ultimately give way to a more nuanced investigation of the child’s perspective.) 
When he describes a vacation he and his family took to Crimea, for example, he balances 
his childhood love for the Soviet Union with his contemporary knowledge: “I, militant 
worshipper of the Red Army, red Pioneer neckties, just about anything bloody red, am not 
allowed to know yet what my father knows, namely that everything I hold dear is untrue” (LF 
14). The temporality of this sentence — “I am not allowed to know yet” — evokes this double 
perspective as he narrates from within the present of the past but with future knowledge. His 
sincere childhood love of these staples of Soviet life is shot through with the ultimate revelation 
                                               
57 For an overview of the narrating “I” and narrated “I” in autobiographical theory, see Sidonie 
Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 71–78. 
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that “everything I hold dear is untrue.” This double perspective on his former self constitutes one 
of the animating forces of his readings of the childhood photographs. 
He sees his memories from that summer in Crimea as “cue cards for an enormous stage 
set that has long evaporated along with the rest of the Soviet Union. Did any of this really 
happen? I sometimes ask myself. Did Junior Comrade Igor Shteyngart ever really huff and puff 
his way across the shoreline of the Black Sea, or was that some other imaginary invalid?” (LF 
11). He figures his memories (and the Soviet Union itself) as an elaborate stage set—theatrical, 
artificial, ephemeral—of yet another Potemkin Village. The country is not just lost to him 
through emigration, but lost entirely to history because of the eventual dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, even when he later “returns” to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, his 
childhood home on Moscow Square in Leningrad has transformed into a post-Soviet landscape 
that bears the marks of global capitalism.58 A qualitative break has transformed the landscape in 
his absence, and so even though he now can and does return (unlike Nabokov or Brodsky), he 
cannot truly return to the same country.59 
                                               
58 Shteyngart details the changes to Moscow Square: there is “the Citibank branch down the 
street, the Ford dealership a little farther down, the ad hoc slot machines around the corner, and 
the intermittent fruit stand hawking bright imported oranges, ethereal red peppers, and glossy 
pears from a distant galaxy. One of St. Petersburg’s 4.8 million McDonald’s (one for each 
citizen) hums along at the southwest corner” (LF 47). 
59 In the New York Times Magazine profile “From Russia with Tsoris” (June 2, 2002) by Daniel 
Zalewski, Shteyngart shares with Zalewski several photographs from his recent trip back to 
Petersburg: “A large statue of Lenin towers out front. His former home, he reveals with disgust, 
has become an ‘all-Mafiya building, with one Mercedes after another out front.’” The profile 
ends with the two back at Shteyngart’s apartment as he looks for more photographs to share with 
the interviewer from his travels back to Russia and the former Soviet Union. Shteyngart shows 
him some of Tbilisi, saying that his trip to Georgia made a deep impression on him. He explains 
that “in Leningrad, too much has changed since I was a kid. There are bad sushi bars and A.T.M. 
machines everywhere. But in the suburbs outside Tbilisi, nothing’s been built in 30 years. It's 
still the Soviet Union. For me, it was a wonderful trip back in time.” Zalewski, “From Russia 
With Tsoris.” 
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Shteyngart narrates the process of emigration as a steadily unfolding revelation that 
undoes his relationship with his past and his former self. He describes how, as they wait at the 
customs line at the airport to leave Leningrad, the customs agent rifles through their belongings, 
tears out pages of their books, rips up their comforter in case they are smuggling things to the 
West. The suspicion and gruff manner in which they are treated startles young Igor. He notes that 
“there is a special grace accorded to children” in the Soviet Union, where he was treated like a 
“little emperor.” Now, however, all that has changed. 
But I am no longer a Soviet citizen, and I am no longer worth according any special 
childhood privileges. I do not know it, but I am a traitor. And my parents are traitors. And 
if a good many people got their wish we would be dealt with as traitors. (LF 79) 
 
This episode thus simultaneously inaugurates a new identity for the young boy (as “traitor”) and 
fractures his relationship with his home country. At the time, Shteyngart was unaware that they 
were leaving Leningrad forever, that they were immigrating to America. His father reveals to 
him that they are going to America only once they arrive in Vienna.  
En route to America, in Italy, Shteyngart’s father sits him down to explain why they, a 
Jewish family, are leaving the Soviet Union. This leads Shteyngart to feel that  
It was all a lie. Communism, […] Lenin, the Komsomol youth league, the Bolsheviks, the 
fatty ham, Channel One, the Red Army, the electric rubber smell on the metro, the 
polluted Soviet haze over the Stalinist contours above Moscow Square, everything we 
said to each other, everything we were. (LF 93)  
 
This revelation challenges his sense of self. Previously, Shteyngart had identified himself in 
opposition to “the enemy,” which is to say, America (LF 83). Shteyngart frequently punctuates 
the narrative of their emigration with the phrase “We are going to the enemy” (LF 83 passim), 
capturing the young boy’s disbelief that they are going to America. But once his father reveals to 
him why they have left, Shteyngart is forced to reformulate his refrain: “We are the enemy” (LF 
93). He writes, “I do not want to be wrong. I do not want to be a lie” (LF 94). In this moment, all 
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that he had thought to be true, stable, reliable has been abruptly upended. Within the child’s 
imagination, animated by Cold War rivalries in which America and Russia are irreconcilably at 
odds with each other, he suddenly feels that what he has left behind is “a lie,” that he has 
unwittingly been “the enemy” all along. Thus, the loss of childhood becomes compounded not 
only by the fact of emigration but also this revelation that what they have left behind is not what 
he thought it to be. And, later, the collapse of the Soviet Union solidifies this separation from his 
previous self. These endings transform the memories that were his, thus complicating the process 
of mourning the loss of everything they had left behind.  
 
Ascending the Ladder: Father and Son 
The photographs in the text play a crucial role in navigating this tenuous connection with 
the past. On the one hand, the photographs offer a way of bridging the gap between past and 
present; they provide a tangible trace of his former self. But, on the other hand, they also throw 
into relief how distant he is, culturally and temporally, from that past self. The meaning of his 
childhood photographs, of little Igor in Leningrad, has now changed for him. The loss of 
childhood through emigration and through the revelation of his family’s history in the Soviet 
Union transforms his relationship to these documents of his past. The gap between himself and 
the child in the photos points up his hybrid identity. How is he to read these photographs? Does 
he read them as a Soviet Jew? As an American? How is he to manage both the experience of 
childhood and the adult perspective on it? He cannot look at the images without ironic distance, 
seeing them as comic, foreign even. But, this comic attitude is then attenuated by plunging 
deeper into these photos with a more serious approach that does reclaim these images as 
representative of his own experience. 
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Consider, for example, the photograph of young Igor atop a ladder that leads us in to 
Chapter Four. He mocks himself in the caption: “To become a cosmonaut, the author must first 
conquer his fear of heights on a ladder his father has built for that purpose. He must also stop 
wearing a sailor outfit and tights” (LF 45). In this photograph caption, and others, Shteyngart 
refers to himself in the third-person as “the author” (rather than I). By using the third-person, 
Shteyngart distances himself from the child in the photo. As Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson 
note in their work on autobiography, using the third-person allows the first-person narrator “to 
disrupt the expectation of first-person intimacy, to create a sense of self-alienation through 
objectification, and to open a gap between the narrating ‘I’ and an implicit narrating ‘he’ or 
‘she.’”60 Moreover, Shteyngart achieves a comic effect by referring to the young child already as 
“the author,” which invests the image with a mock solemnity. 
The humor of this caption further plays on that division between selves, as we have the 
double perspective of the adult narrator looking at the photo from without and the photo that 
depicts the child experiencing it from within. The dream of becoming a cosmonaut, the sailor 
outfit, the tights—all these elements are childhood staples in the late Soviet period. He pokes fun 
at how he wears the sailor outfit, normal attire for a child growing up during this period in the 
Soviet Union. But now, looking back, the narrator mocks these elements as strange or foreign. 
This caption adopts the estranged perspective of an American (or, Russian-American) looking at 
the photograph, positioning it for an American readership. In other words, the caption resembles 
the kind of ironic performance of a Russian identity for an American audience that Wanner and 
others have identified in Shteyngart’s earlier examples of self-fashioning (through book covers 
and book trailers). The difference here, I would emphasize, is that the photograph is not an 
                                               
60 Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, 74. 
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affected performance, but rather an authentic image of his Soviet childhood that he now treats in 
a humorous way as if it were yet another stereotypical image of “Russianness.”  
Within the chapter, though, Shteyngart mentions the ladder in more detail. As a child, 
young Igor suffered severely from asthma, and so his father built him a wooden ladder that 
would “give the housebound patient some exercise” and also help him overcome one of his 
“greatest fears, the fear of heights.” He describes how it is both a beloved object and “one of the 
scariest.” He writes: “Every month I try to scale one more of the dozen bars until, dizzy and dry 
mouthed, I am flying as high as four feet off the ground! Just a little more effort, just a little less 
asthma, and I will be what every Soviet boy aged three to twenty-seven wants to become: a 
cosmonaut” (LF 55–56). He also mentions how, as a child, he genuinely enjoys wearing the 
sailor’s outfit, “with its white tights and little shorts” (LF 56). While the narration in this chapter 
attempts to adopt the child’s perspective (as he tries to recapture his childhood dream of 
becoming a cosmonaut), when looking back at this period in the photograph he describes it 
ironically in the caption.  
As I have suggested, we can see this double reading (or the “double exposure”) of the 
photograph as symptomatic of the effect of rupture at emigration as a child, which threw into 
doubt the reality of his childhood memories, making it difficult to experience them as authentic 
or genuine. The photograph depicts an event that was experienced as genuine but that now, 
because of temporal and cultural distance, appears humorous. Photographs help him to undertake 
the task of reconciling his experience then (as documented in the photographs) and his 
knowledge now. These childhood photographs become a site in the memoir where Shteyngart 
rehabilitates part of what was lost at the moment of emigration that transformed “everything we 
said to each other, everything we were” into a “lie.”  
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We are returned to the ladder photograph again at a critical moment later in the memoir, 
during Shteyngart’s trip back to Petersburg with his parents. It is on this trip that the source of 
Shteyngart’s panic attacks is traced back to the violent encounter between him and his father 
outside the Chesme Church. As the three of them walk through their old neighborhood, moments 
before his father admits to this episode, Shteyngart’s mother recalls how his father made him a 
ladder to help him conquer his fear of heights. At this point, Shteyngart briefly interrupts the 
narrative to bring us into the present moment of his writing, noting that he is looking at the photo 
while writing this section: “As I write this, I hold a photo of myself climbing my father’s 
makeshift wooden ladder in our Leningrad apartment, wearing a sailor’s outfit and a shit-eating 
grin. The photo is dated II/1978, and my mother’s handwriting on the back announces: ‘The 
famous athlete training at home’” (LF 342). This, of course, is the photograph included earlier in 
the memoir that he had mocked. The inclusion of the mother’s caption offers yet another 
perspective on the photograph. In her caption to the photograph, she adopts a mock-serious tone 
about the child’s fantasy of becoming a famous cosmonaut. Shteyngart’s characterization of his 
childlike happy smile as a “shit-eating grin,” on the other hand, is self-deprecating. He sees the 
photo retrospectively, shot through with the awareness of the alternative story that the photo tells 
(or conceals).  
After returning us to this photograph, he resumes the narrative. They reminisce about 
how he used the ladder to try to master his fear of heights. Then, however, his mother introduces 
a new piece of information. “On the other hand,” she tells her son, your father “always pushed 
you […] He wanted you to overcome your fear of heights but then when you got to the top he 
tried to push you off” (LF 342). Shteyngart is surprised by this: “Pushed me?” he asks his mother 
(LF 342). Equally surprising for him, it would seem, is his mother’s comment that she “read in 
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Freud that you should never do such a thing,” to which Shteyngart writes incredulously “She 
read in Freud?” (LF 342). This conversation is then capped off when his father suddenly 
discloses what happened at the Chesme Church all those years ago: that he had punched the five-
year-old Igor in the nose. Thus, we see how these instances of aggression are not isolated but 
rather part of a larger pattern of violence between father and son. Indeed, the memoir details the 
competitive way his father engages with him, always reminding Shteyngart that he is weak, 
small, and unmanly in comparison with him.  
The photograph becomes a touchstone that Shteyngart repeatedly returns to, as our 
understanding of its meaning evolves. It begins as simply a humorous photo, but it is revealed to 
be more complex, to be yet another piece of the puzzle in reconstructing his childhood. The 
multiple readings of the photograph demonstrate how one’s understanding of one’s own self and 
history is always incomplete and dependent on others to fill in these critical gaps.61 The 
photograph seems to offer evidence of the past, but it is inscrutable. The revelation that his father 
would push him from the top of the ladder transforms the significance of the photograph. The 
ladder had been a symbol of his father’s love for him, as he worked hard to create the perfect 
ladder for his son. We had previously heard that the father “begged the workmen at his factory to 
carve out every sleek wooden bar” and that the ladder is “possibly the most gorgeous thing” they 
own (56). But the ladder also becomes a symbol of the father’s aggression. In turn, the father’s 
aggression is rooted in the violence he himself experienced. His father describes his own Oedipal 
power struggle with his alcoholic stepfather, which was bound up with a competition for his 
                                               
61 Here I have in mind Butler’s work on self-narratives, in which she suggests that the subject is 
opaque to herself because she is formed in relation with another and that this formation is not 
entirely accessible or retrievable by us, and yet it is a fundamental part of the story we must tell 
about ourselves. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself. 
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mother’s affection (he insists his mother “loved me more than him”). He “proudly” tells how he 
finally managed to overpower his stepfather: “I beat him! Until he bled! Until he bled!” (LF 
337). In pushing young Igor from the ladder, the father both attempts to strengthen his son for 
survival, but also fears the inevitability of being succeeded by his own son.  
The photograph that he took to represent his childhood fantasy of becoming a cosmonaut 
thus bears an invisible trace of his relationship with his father, a relationship that is marked by 
aggression, physical intimidation, and competition. Shteyngart notes, though, that as a child he 
also experienced his father’s violence as a means of forging a connection between them.62 He 
writes:  
When you hit the child you’re making contact. You’re contacting the child’s skin […] but 
you’re also saying something comforting: I’m here. I’m here hitting you. I will never 
leave you, don’t you worry, because I am the Lord, thy father. And just as I was 
pummeled, so I shall pummel you, and you shall pummel yours forever, ve imru Amen. 
Let us say Amen. (LF 127)  
 
In these ironic words of prayer, we might hear an echo of God’s words to Jacob in Genesis.63 
During Jacob’s dream of a ladder that reaches up to heaven, God appears and says “I am the 
Lord, the God of Abraham your father and the God of Isaac” (Genesis 28:13). He prophesies the 
dispersal of Jacob and his people,64 but despite this physical exile, he offers a promise of spiritual 
constancy: “Know that I am with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring you 
back to this land; for I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you” (Genesis 
                                               
62 He notes that his father has two sayings that express the idea that love is communicated 
through such beatings: “Tot kto ne byot, tot ne lyubit” (He who doesn’t hit, doesn’t love) and 
“Byot, znachit lyubit” (He hits, which means he loves) (LF 125).  
63 I am grateful to Valentina Izmirlieva for bringing this allusion to my attention. 
64 “Your offspring shall be like the dust of the earth, and you shall spread abroad to the west and 
to the east and to the north and to the south” (Genesis 28:14). 
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28:15–17). God’s promise of presence (“I will not leave you”) is ironically transmuted into the 
affirmation “I will never leave you” of his father’s beatings. Shteyngart’s understanding of his 
father’s beatings as a form of connection takes on greater significance when we recall that, soon 
after the dream of the ladder, Jacob wrestles with God and is blessed with the new name of Israel 
(Genesis 32). This physical contest of strength between God and man seems to stand as the 
origin of brutality that Shteyngart claims is passed down across the generations. Shteyngart 
perceives this violence as his birthright, as a covenant between father and son that binds them 
together.  
The symbol of the ladder, then, is an ambiguous one. It represents both his filial bond to 
his father and the repressed memory of his father’s violence. In directing us back to the Biblical 
story of Jacob’s ladder, the photograph of the ladder suggests that this relationship replays an 
ancient struggle. Ascending the steps of the ladder, thus, comes to work as a metaphor for 
negotiating his own place within the familial legacy as well as his Jewish heritage. Shteyngart 
finds in the seemingly innocuous photograph of the ladder a way of excavating the layers of the 
past that would otherwise remain inaccessible to him but that have nonetheless shaped him.  
To better understand this uneasy inheritance, Shteyngart turns to the family archive of 
photos. Photographs, after all, can help to constitute the family. As Susan Sontag writes, 
photographs “supply the token presence of the dispersed relatives. A family’s photograph album 
is generally about the extended family—and, often, is all that remains of it.”65 Marianne Hirsch 
suggests in her work on family photo-albums that the way we look at family photographs creates 
and sustains family narratives and myths.66 These photos, thus, become a means of preserving 
                                               
65 Sontag, On Photography, 9. 
66 Hirsch, Family Frames. 
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the memory of those who have been lost as well as of understanding one’s place in relation to 
this familial history. 
Shteyngart draws our attention to how such an archive of family photographs 
inadvertently attests to the atrocities of history. He notes that his mother has a “meticulous 
collection of family photos,” with a filing system that includes entries such as “Uncle Simon, 
Wife, Murdered Children” under the subheading “World War II” (LF 73). To file these 
photographs with such captions and subheadings seems to admit no emotional reaction; it treats 
this photograph as soberly as any other. We see the way in which history intrudes on this 
collection of family photos. 
Consider, for example, the inclusion of a photograph of his father’s entire family in 
Ukraine in 1940. In the caption, after identifying his father’s position within the photo, he 
laconically writes “Just about everyone else is going to die soon” (LF 25). This might remind us 
of what Barthes termed the second punctum that all photographs share: Time. Barthes suggests 
that, while photos depict what has been, they also remind us of mortality, that the subject of the 
photo will die. As he says, “the photograph tells me death in the future.”67 We feel the strange 
temporality of photographs in this image of Shteyngart’s family. It preserves the living presence 
of these family members, and yet we know that they will — they have already — died.  
Shteyngart, however, refuses to use the photograph to sentimentally meditate on 
mortality. Unlike with the Chesme Church photograph, he is not “pierced” by this photograph, to 
borrow Barthes’ vocabulary, even if it is of these ancestors who will soon die. His caption 
undercuts the tragedy. It is not reverential. It is not touched with elegiac pathos. In fact, some 
critics have suggested that Shteyngart, in his other works, has been critical of the so-called 
                                               
67 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 96. 
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American “Holocaust industry” of suffering and memorialization.68 Arlene Stein, for example, 
has suggested that Shteyngart’s second novel Absurdistan provides “a relentless, irreverent, 
critique of the ‘Holocaust industry’ and the commodification of suffering.”69 In the caption to the 
photo of his Ukrainian relatives, we see how he resists this kind of memorialization. The 
humorous caption defies our expectations of the typical reaction to a photograph that documents 
a family just before its dissolution, that seems to foretell their death. I would suggest that the 
humor here has an estranging effect; because their death is expressed so bluntly, it becomes all 
the more vivid.  
Indeed, the blunt, matter-of-fact tone with which he narrates this photograph 
communicates the fact that this kind of suffering has become all too routine. In this regard, 
Shteyngart here draws on a rich vein of Jewish comedy about suffering. The caption might 
remind us, for example, of the kind of humor at work in Sholem Aleichem’s short story 
“Otherwise, There’s Nothing New” (1907). In the story, a Jewish immigrant to America 
corresponds with his relative Yisrulik who is still in Europe to ask about life in the Old Country. 
“What can I say? There’s really nothing new,” Yisrulik says, “Thank God, all is well now.”70 He 
                                               
68 The term “Holocaust Industry” was coined by Norman G. Finkelstein in his book The 
Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (New York: Verso, 
2003). 
69 Arlene Stein, Reluctant Witnesses: Survivors, Their Children, and The Rise of Holocaust 
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 166. Stein’s book counters the idea 
of Holocaust fatigue, reminding us that this “Holocaust consciousness” had to be fought for and 
should not be so easily dismissed now. Adrian Wanner has also noted that Absurdistan mocks 
the Holocaust industry, and he suggests that the scene in The Russian Debutante’s Handbook 
where the main character visits Auschwitz is also a “parody of the Holocaust commemoration 
cult.” Wanner, Out of Russia, 125. 
70 Sholem Aleichem, Some Laughter, Some Tears; Tales from the Old World and the New, trans. 
Curt Leviant (New York: Putnam, 1968), 239. 
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goes on, though, to catalogue a litany of horrors that has recently befallen the shtetl community. 
There have been three pogroms, he reports, but luckily they have all survived:  
No one from our family was hurt, except Lipa, who was killed along with his two sons, 
and Noah and Melekh, two workers with golden hands, and poor Moishe-Hersh who was 
dragged down from an attic, and Perl-Dvora, who was later found dead in a cellar with 
her tiny infant, Reyzele, at her breast…. Including children, then, the grand total of our 
family’s losses was seven dead.71  
 
Inured to suffering and loss, Yisrulik rapidly moves from stating that “no one” in the family was 
hurt to recalling that, in fact, seven lives were lost. Throughout the letter, he punctuates his 
narrative of other tragedies with the title phrase: “Otherwise, there’s nothing new.” The joke, of 
course, is that he is right: this is nothing new. As Jeremy Dauber notes, the dark humor of the 
story comes from Yisrulik’s “ironic resignation, borne of long traumatic experience.”72 We see 
what some would call the “incongruity theory” of laughter at work in this story, as the 
disjunction between the events being narrated and the unruffled tone with which the story is told 
both makes the horror of the story vivid and also makes for a comic delivery.73 A similar 
incongruity between tone and content marks the way Shteyngart narrates these photos that attest 
                                               
71 Sholem Aleichem, 240. 
72 Jeremy Dauber, Jewish Comedy: A Serious History (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2017), 34. 
73 The incongruity theory of humor suggests that a discrepancy between expectations and reality 
is the source of laughter. When our expectations are not met, we laugh. Aristotle, in Rhetoric, 
suggests that when a speaker sets up an expectation and then defies it, he can expect a laugh 
form his audience. The Scottish philosopher James Beattie was the first to use the term 
“incongruous” in theorizing humor. Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Søren 
Kierkegaard also subscribe to the idea that humor works by setting up expectations and then 
frustrating or violating them. For a summary of the incongruity theory, see John Morreall, 
"Philosophy of Humor", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 
2016 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/humor/. Last accessed 
December 17, 2018. 
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to the succession of traumatic events his family endured. It is a violence that has been 
normalized. 
 These photos become a way of understanding his father’s past and also his own. The 
innocent photo of Igor on the ladder built by his father comes to take on new meanings over the 
course of the narrative. It becomes emblematic of his fraught relationship with his father, one of 
the central concerns of the memoir. What begins as a humorous reading of the childhood photo 
ultimately gives way to a more serious consideration of the violence that has marked and shaped 
his family. 
 
The Worried Look: Mother and Son 
Another childhood photograph of Shteyngart opens up a web of associations that bind 
him together with his family’s history, specifically the matrilineal line. At the beginning of 
Chapter Two, there is a photo of Shteyngart as a young child clutching a telephone. He has a 
pained expression on his face. In the caption, he quips “The author is told that the breadline does 
not, in fact, deliver” (LF 19). The humor depends on the double perspective he adopts in the 
caption. He mixes two sensibilities: acknowledging the lived reality of standing on breadlines in 
the Soviet Union, while also invoking the comic archetype of the New Yorker who gets 
everything delivered. The breadline becomes a joke by bringing his future adult identity as a 
New Yorker to bear on this image from childhood.  
This caption transforms this fearful, anxious image of him as a child into something he 
can laugh at and thus approach. Later in the chapter, however, he describes the photograph in 
more detail. In this discussion of the photograph, he takes seriously the fear revealed in the 
photo, rather than mocking it: 
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There is a photograph of me at one year and ten months taken at a photo studio. Wearing 
a pair of children’s jogging pants with their outline of a cartoon bunny on one of the front 
pockets, I hold a phone in my hand (the photo studio is proud to exhibit this advanced 
Soviet technology), and I am getting ready to bawl. The look on my face is that of a 
mother in 1943 who just received a fateful telegram from the front. I am scared of the 
photo studio. I am scared of the telephone. (LF 25)  
 
He goes on to catalogue the other things he is scared of at this age: the world beyond the 
apartment, the snow, the cold, the heat, heights, electricity, and the list goes on. The tension 
between his full description of the photograph within the text and his treatment of it in the 
caption deserves our attention. In the caption, he treats his pained expression in a humorous 
manner. The joke—that he looks so terrified because he just learned that the breadline doesn’t 
deliver—is from the perspective of a New Yorker accustomed to getting whatever he wants. He 
makes light of Soviet breadlines (as well as his own pain). It takes the sting out of the actual pain 
that young Igor did suffer, as evidenced by his fuller description of the photograph within the 
chapter, as he details his fear of just about everything. When, as an adult, he asks his mother why 
he was so afraid of everything as a child, she succinctly replies: “Because you were born a 
Jewish person” (LF 25).  
 His mother sees being anxious and fearful of the world as part of his Jewish identity, as 
his lot in life. Indeed, the fearful look on his face that he focuses on in this photograph becomes a 
point of connection between his childhood and his mother’s. A photograph of his mother as a girl 
opens Chapter 5. The caption reads: “The author’s mother at age eleven, with the worried adult 
gaze he will grow to know well” (LF 64). By singling out her worried expression—all too adult 
for a young child—he subtly establishes an association between this photo of his mother and his 
own photo at a young age. He describes the photograph in more detail again at the end of the 
chapter:  
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My mother, in the first despairing bloom of youth, looking, as she would say, 
ozabochena, a combination of worried and moody and maybe lovesick, a Soviet-era bow 
crowning the top of her puffy, full-lipped face as if to inform us that the woods behind 
her do not belong to a sunny summer camp in the Catskills. It is 1956. She is eleven years 
old in a striped summer dress, resembling, already, a worried young Jewish adult. (73)  
 
Once again, we can see the connection between her worried expression and his own. He 
mentions that she is not in the Catskills, which further solidifies the sense that their childhoods 
are potentially interchangeable, as it is only the bow in her hair—what Barthes would call part of 
the studium or the information of the photograph—that reveals she is in the Soviet Union, not in 
America like he was at the age of eleven.74 The way in which Shteyngart reads this photograph 
of his mother, and the way he links his own childhood image to hers, is part of what Marianne 
Hirsch calls the “familial look.”75 Through his readings of these family photographs, Shteyngart 
weaves together his mother’s childhood and his own. They share the same worried look, a look 
that both his mother and Shteyngart identify as part of their Jewish identity.  
Shteyngart’s description of the photograph locates us in 1956, during the period of the 
Thaw, which witnessed a relaxation in repression, an increase in freedom of speech, and the 
rehabilitation of many innocent people (often posthumously) who had been purged under Stalin. 
The fleeting reference to the year grounds this private familial image within a wider historical 
framework; the worried look on her face could be read not only as an individual image but also 
as related to a cultural moment in which these traumas are returning to the surface.  
 Indeed, he connects this photograph with another one that also speaks to larger historical 
events—a photograph of his mother around age four that ostensibly is only “one of several” in 
                                               
74 Barthes writes that the studium provides us with “the very raw material of ethnological 
knowledge.” It gives us facts about the past: teaching us, for example, how people dressed in a 
certain era. Barthes, Camera Lucida, 28. 
75 Hirsch, Family Frames.  
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which she looks “young and happy” (LF 72). But this photograph works not only as an innocent 
document of his mother’s childhood, for he draws our attention to the fact that “its upper-right 
corner has been torn off, and one can discern a crescent of needle holes” (LF 72). This 
photograph, we learn, was “‘sewn into the case file’ (podshyto k delu)” of his Great-uncle Aaron, 
who was arrested on false suspicion of counterrevolutionary activity and sentenced to 10 years in 
a Siberian labor camp (LF 72). The photograph of Shteyngart’s mother as a young girl had been 
sent to Aaron in Siberia and somehow made its way into his case file. Shteyngart marvels at the 
absurdity of the bureaucratic processes that underpinned the whole system. How, he wonders, 
could “the beaming face of a four-year-old” be deemed “important enough to sew into a 
prisoner’s case file” (LF 73). He writes, “Perhaps the greatest unanswered question I have 
toward the entire Land of the Soviets is this: Who did the sewing?” (LF 73). Thus, even those 
ordinary photographs of childhood that seem unremarkable ultimately attest to larger historical 
traumas. They can be read as a cultural document of the time as well as a personal or familial 
image. 
The fact that the photograph is literally pierced becomes symbolic of how the photo’s 
meaning has been transformed. It is no longer just a standard image of childhood within a family 
album. The photograph preserves the trace of the referent as well the image’s material history. 
Placed in a new context—the case file—the childhood photograph bears the marks and material 
traces of that experience. The pierced photograph becomes a vivid emblem of Hirsch’s concept 
of “postmemory,” the inherited memory of the second generation after a traumatic event, as the 
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mother’s childhood photograph is literally marked by an event she was not witness to.76 The 
punctum here is no longer merely figurative.  
 The family photographs within Shteyngart’s text create a network, as one photo connects 
to another. In this case, the discussion of the photo of young Igor on the phone bears similarity to 
the way he describes the photos of his mother; through his “affiliative look,” his reading of these 
photographs establishes a web of connections between their shared worried expressions and the 
larger historical traumas that provide the unseen background to these documents. These 
historical events have marked his mother and, by extension, him as well. 
Moreover, if we return to Shteyngart’s description of the photograph of him on the 
telephone, we notice that he makes a striking comparison between the look on his face and that 
of a mother who has just received a telegram that a loved one has died on the front in 1943. The 
simile yokes together disparate elements, as he makes a bold claim for commensurability not 
only with a mother, but one who has just suffered the loss of a beloved in war. Why make this 
claim for connection? Surely their experiences are worlds apart. Later in the memoir, though, we 
see just such a telegram, notifying his paternal grandmother of her husband’s death fighting in 
the Siege of Leningrad:  
To Citizen Shteyngart P., NOTIFICATION, Your husband Sergeant Shteyngart Isaac 
Semyonovich, fighting for the Socialist Motherland, true to his military oath, evincing 
heroism and courage, was killed 18 February 1943. (LF 39)  
 
Thus, his simile compares him not to just any woman, but more specifically his own 
grandmother. He establishes a connection between her experience and his. This simile that cuts 
across generations and gender lines is an assertion of fellow feeling. It is not incidental that he 
                                               
76 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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identifies with this community of bereaved women. By aligning himself with the mother who has 
just received word of her husband or son’s death, Shteyngart envisions himself as being like 
those at home, not on the front lines. He is with those who mourn, those who were not literally 
on the battlefields, but nonetheless marked by what happened there.  
The Siege of Leningrad figures as one of the defining events in his own and his family’s 
life, but also one of the events that fundamentally shaped the city. On the trip back to Petersburg 
with his parents, Shteyngart writes about how the landscape of the city is still marked by the 
siege, how the traces of this trauma are written into the streets. He notes the “mass grave in its 
northeastern suburbs along with the 750,000 citizens who died of hunger and German shelling 
during the 871-day siege.” 
Petersburg never truly recovered. It is impossible to walk down Nevsky, alone or with my 
parents, and not feel the oppression of history, the weight on our own family and on 
every family that has lived within this city’s borders since 1941. CITIZENS! a preserved 
sign at the northern mouth of Nevsky declares, DURING ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT THIS 
SIDE OF THE STREET IS THE MOST DANGEROUS. And so it is. (LF 328–29) 
 
In the memoir, Shteyngart attempts to write himself into the tradition as a child of Leningrad. 
There is the sense that this trauma remains unburied, that it persists into the present day. Indeed, 
in these lines we might detect an echo of Brodsky’s writings on Leningrad and the siege: 
The siege is the most tragic page in the city’s history, and I think it was then that the 
name ‘Leningrad’ was finally adopted by the inhabitants who survived, almost a tribute 
to the dead, it’s hard to argue with tombstone carvings. The city suddenly looked much 
older, it was as though History had finally acknowledged its existence and decided to 
catch up with this place in her usual morbid way by piling up bodies. Today, thirty-three 
years later, however repainted and stuccoed, the ceilings and facades of this unconquered 
city still seem to preserve the stain-like imprints of its inhabitants’ last gasps and last 
gazes. (LTO 91) 
 
The siege becomes the defining event of Leningrad’s history. The very architecture and structure 
of the city is thought to still bear the traces of the 900-day siege. The legacy of that trauma 
endures. 
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Shteyngart explicitly ties himself to this event when he suggests that the death 
notification for his paternal grandfather, who died fighting in the Siege of Leningrad, marks the 
beginning of his own life. He writes that his “life begins” with this “much-mimeographed piece 
of paper” (LF 39). By looking back to this event and marking it as the beginning of his life—
similar to how he creates an affiliative connection between himself and his grandmother in the 
photograph—he lays claim to being part of this tradition. He later insists that “those of us who 
are Russian, or Russian-American, or Russian anything, are the offspring of these battles,” 
referring to the Siege of Leningrad (LF 346). It is through historical events, such as the Siege of 
Leningrad, that he links himself with all Russians and makes a claim for himself to be considered 
one of them. Judith Butler, for one, has argued against the idea that mourning is private to 
suggest instead that the experience of profound loss can reveal the ties between the individual 
and others, and thus mourning has the capacity to create a larger community of those bound 
together by a shared vulnerability in their grief.77 In Shteyngart’s memoir, the process of 
mourning those who fell in the Siege of Leningrad has the power to create community. Through 
an appeal to this shared experience of loss, of being fundamentally marked by this loss, 
Shteyngart attempts to connect himself with “every family” that has lived in the city. 
If the memoir explores how his inheritance of this past is complicated by his 
“hyphenated” identity, since his status as Russian is always seen as tenuous, we see here how he 
lays claim to his Russian identity. Part of staking his claim to this past is mediated through the 
family archive of photographs. Through the imaginative work of reading family photographs, 
Shteyngart creates a web of associations and linkages that suggest continuity and connect him to 
his past: both his own personal history and the inherited past of his family and city. The 
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humorous caption that initially introduces the photograph of young Igor on the phone soon gives 
way to a critical investigation into how this image fits within a larger familial narrative. The 
family photograph album plays a central role in helping him work through his family’s history.  
 
Conclusion: The Mourner’s Kaddish 
The Siege of Leningrad again plays an important role at the end of the memoir. During 
the trip back to Petersburg with his parents—after the revelations about the source of his panic 
attacks and his father’s stint in a Soviet psychiatric hospital—they take a trip to the village of 
Feklistovo, where Shteyngart’s paternal grandfather was killed during an attempt by the Red 
Army to break through the blockade in 1943. He is buried there in a mass grave. Shteyngart 
again reproduces the notification of his grandfather’s death, the one he earlier said could be seen 
as the marker of the beginning of his own life (346). They look for his name on the lists of the 
dead, but do not find it.  
His father asks Gary to read the Kaddish prayer for the dead. However, he forestalls this 
moment of prayer, as Shteyngart brings us to the present moment of writing. He says that he is 
looking at a photograph of his father:  
As I write this, I’m looking at a photograph of my father in his early seventies holding an 
umbrella in the forecourt of Versailles, his right foot raised off the ground as if he is Gene 
Kelly, one of my Stuyvesant sweaters billowing out above his khaki pants. He is smiling 
at my mother and her camera, smiling fully, with teeth, in the American manner. ‘Singer 
in the rain,’ my mother has written on a Post-it note in her careful English script. She has 
stuck the note above my father’s dancing figure. (LF 348) 
 
The description of the photograph interrupts this moment, as it introduces a moment of levity, 
bringing us away briefly from the field where they are. Indeed, the forecourt of Versailles feels 
worlds away from the soldiers’ mass grave in the small village of Feklistovo. Why this 
photograph? On one level, there is the associative link of singing: between singing the Kaddish 
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and the image of his father imitating Gene Kelly singing in the rain. But more importantly, 
perhaps, is the fact that in this photograph his father looks decidedly American: imitating Gene 
Kelly, wearing a Stuyvesant High School sweatshirt, smiling fully “in the American manner,” 
complete with a caption in English. The photograph seems to recognize that his father also has 
this “hyphenated” identity. It offers a different portrait of his father, perhaps one that has been 
obscured in the depiction of his father in the rest of the text.  
It is another one of the many photographs that Shteyngart verbally describes but excludes 
the image from the text. It matters less what is depicted in the actual image itself and more what 
the photograph signifies for Shteyngart, how it acts upon him. The image here works almost like 
a talisman, enabling Shteyngart to narrate this difficult moment. It conjures up a semblance of 
the father’s presence. By introducing this photograph, Shteyngart draws attention to the act of 
writing this final scene. While Shteyngart’s father memorializes his father within the scene, 
Shteyngart makes us aware that he too is memorializing his own father with this memoir. 
After this brief digression, he returns to the scene at Feklistovo. Before reciting the 
Kaddish, Shteyngart reads aloud Psalm 15, one of the psalms typically read to memorialize the 
dead during the funeral ceremony in the Jewish tradition. The psalm opens with the question 
“Lord, who should sojourn in thy tabernacle?” and goes on to list the qualities of those who are 
righteous enough to be admitted into the Temple.78 It is a psalm about gaining entry into the 
Temple, but also into God’s presence and a religious community. The psalm guarantees to those 
who lead a righteous life a metaphorical place within the community that you cannot be removed 
from. And as a eulogy for the dead, it assures the deceased’s passage from this world into the 
                                               
78 Scholars suggest that this psalm was originally part of a ritual in which worshippers were 
initiated and admitted into the Temple. Michael David Coogan et al., eds., The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible: With the Apocrypha, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 784. 
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next. The psalm ends with an affirmation of belonging: “He that does those things shall never be 
moved” (LF 348). This final line with its emphasis on movement, which Shteyngart quotes, 
seems particularly poignant in this memoir about emigration. In the context of the narrative, this 
line takes on an added significance for his own experience of displacement, as it affirms his 
belonging to this place. In the face of physical displacement, instability, and movement, the 
psalm promises an unshakeable spiritual permanence. Despite his physical separation from his 
homeland, he too can “never be moved.”    
After reciting Psalm 15, he reads aloud the mourner’s Kaddish for his grandfather. He 
says: “I can read the prayer, but I cannot understand it.” As he chants the prayer, he finds himself 
“tripping over the words, mangling them, making them sound more Russian, more American, 
more holy” (LF 349). Despite not understanding the words he reads (the prayer is in Aramaic), 
despite “mangling” and “tripping over” them, the prayer itself is strengthened by this admixture 
of Russian and English pronunciation as it becomes “more holy.” The recitation of the prayer 
offers him the opportunity to bring together his different identities into one unified whole, as the 
final lines of the memoir reproduce the conclusion of the prayer in his three languages: Hebrew, 
English, and Russian.79 
. ןֵמָא ּורְמִאְו  
Ve’imru, Amen. 
Let us say, Amen. 
И СКАЖЕМ: АМЕН! (LF 349) 
 
The incorporation of these different languages suggests a reconciliation with his “hyphenated” 
identity. Indeed, the prayer itself is bilingual. It comprises both Aramaic and a few lines in 
Hebrew. The hybrid language of the prayer follows from the Jewish diaspora, as Aramaic began 
                                               
79 Although the prayer is largely in Aramaic, the final line is in Hebrew.  
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to replace Hebrew as the lingua franca among Jews during the period of Babylonian captivity in 
the 6th century BCE. Thus, the fact that this prayer, so central to the Jewish faith, is spoken in a 
foreign tongue seems particularly apt for this memoir about negotiating different languages in 
emigration. If much of the memoir has focused on the seemingly irreconcilable paradox of 
Shteyngart’s tripartite identity, then the Kaddish offers a rare moment where those three 
identities are not seen as mutually exclusive or at odds with each other. By giving the final lines 
of the prayer in three languages, he insists on the possibility of translation among these three 
languages. The repetition of the same word “Amen” across these three languages proclaims a 
unified expression of affirmation (“so be it”). It is the only time that the text produces the 
Cyrillic and Hebrew alphabet rather than transliterating these words into the Latin alphabet, as if 
no longer forcing these scripts to have to conform. Translation but not transliteration affirms 
commensurability and mutual intelligibility among the three, while also allowing for difference.   
 The ritual of reciting the Kaddish binds the speaker together with a larger community, 
across space and time. Traditionally, the Kaddish can only be recited in the presence of a 
minyan, a quorum of ten adults. Not to be said in isolation, it is a public prayer that affirms 
community and continuity. Although Shteyngart does not have the correct number of people with 
him to say the prayer, the scene still works to inscribe him into this community. It is as if he is 
not alone by virtue of saying the Kaddish. (Note that he singles out the final line which prompts 
a collective response from the congregation: “Let us say, Amen / И скажем, амен.”)  
The mourner’s prayer becomes an instantiation not only of his Jewish identity, but also 
an affirmation of his identity as a grandson of the Siege of Leningrad. And the prayer offers a 
means of connecting with his own father. His father tells him that he has not visited the grave 
before and that he feels guilty for this. He says to Shteyngart, “Oh, son, why didn’t me and my 
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mother come here earlier? I don’t know why she didn’t care about these things. We could have 
been here a hundred times” (LF 348). He has not properly mourned his father before. Now, they 
can do it together. As one son mourns his father, his own son looks on. It offers a powerful 
intergenerational moment, as Shteyngart sees his father as a son as well. In fact, the significance 
of the son saying Kaddish for his parents is so marked that in Yiddish, the firstborn son can also 
be referred to as “kaddish” to represent the fact that the son is “the guarantor that there would be 
someone to say the prayer for his parents when they died.”80 The Kaddish prayer that closes the 
memoir thus offers a ritual that they can take part in together, allowing father and son to speak in 
unison, rather than fighting. Indeed, these final lines (“Let us say, Amen”) return us to the earlier 
moment in the memoir when he ironically used the language of prayer to express the connection 
between him and his father founded on violence and abuse. Now, by speaking these words 
together, father and son forge a new connection based on a shared expression of loss. Rather than 
turning loss into anger, it is transformed into a lateral connection that unites. 
Ultimately, the Kaddish prayer enables him to mourn not only the loss of his grandfather, 
but also those losses incurred in emigration. As we have seen, it is these losses and endings that 
have generated the narrative, and it is the moment of mourning them properly that allows the 
excavation of the past to be completed. It “sanctions” the narrative, to borrow Benjamin’s 
phrase. The narrative has been building up to this release of mourning, and that mourning was 
made possible by the excavation into the familial past to understand more fully what has been 
lost. Writing about the “warped” manner in which the catastrophes of the Soviet experience have 
been mourned, Etkind cautions that “when the dead are not properly mourned, they turn into the 
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undead and cause trouble for the living.”81 When we fail to properly mourn, we cannot move on. 
At the climax of the memoir, many specters from the past are raised. The violent encounter 
between father and son that has haunted Shteyngart is revealed to originate from the father’s 
traumatic experience in a Soviet psychiatric ward, as well as from the unmourned loss of his own 
father. Finally brought to the light of day, the work of mourning can begin. 
As if to mark this resolution, the memoir ends with an image of his parents: a photograph 
of mother and father sitting across from Shteyngart (presumably), as they stare at the camera lens 
and at their son. This is the main relationship of the memoir distilled: the author looking at them, 
as they look at him, each side trying to figure out the other. It is the only photograph in the book 
that does not have a caption. This photo breaks the pattern of the captions serving the function of 
mocking the photos or making light of them. Here there is no ironic gloss on the photo. Now he 
does not need to hide, however briefly, behind a humorous caption. Instead, he presents it simply 
and without comment. And if we think that a caption typically functions to fix the meaning of the 
photograph, to ground it in a particular time and place, to identify the subjects within the image, 
then the absence of the caption here seems a refusal to do so. It leaves the photograph open, 
suggestive of a new stage in their relationship.  
By ending the memoir not with an image of the self, but with an image of his parents, 
Shteyngart visually marks how much his self-narrative has been about understanding his parents 
as a way of understanding the self. To narrate the self has involved undertaking an effort to 
understand his parents and their experience, which becomes entangled with navigating the family 
archive. As he writes earlier in the memoir, it is “through the stories, the photographs, the 
archival evidence” that he has “tried to know” his parents as they were before him (LF 75). He 
                                               
81 Etkind, Warped Mourning, 16–17. 
 203 
admits the impossibility of this task, which involves the way in which we remain ultimately 
enigmatic and unknowable to ourselves. And yet, the photographs and stories of this self-
narrative speak to the imperative to try to recover something of this familial past, as a 
fundamental part of the story we must tell about ourselves.  
In this memoir, photographs function as affective images that can re-animate past 
traumas, but also as archival documents that can enable reconciliation with a painful past through 
readings of photographs that are at times creative and humorous and at other times seek to 
establish affiliative links across generations. The photograph of the church sends him into a 
panic attack and necessitates his look back to his childhood to interrogate the events that have 
formed him. If the memoir begins with him trying to come up with an etiology of his own 
trauma, he ultimately finds that it leads back to these larger collective traumas of the twentieth 
century that his family endured. The photographs in the text enable him to lay claim to his 
heritage that has been questioned because of his “hyphenated” status as Russian-American (as 
we saw with Iossel). He accepts his Russian identity in a way that goes beyond the “immigrant 
chic” aspect that Wanner identifies in Shteyngart’s previous novels and self-promotional 
material, in which he self-consciously plays at being Russian. In the memoir, and through the 
photographs, he tells this aspect of his life more fully, more sincerely. Through the family 
archive of photos, he is able to work through his relationship to his parents, family history, and 
his experience of emigration.  
 




Return to Sincerity: The Family Archive in Kabakov’s Installations and Paintings 
 
Early in his career, Ilya Kabakov paints Self-Portrait (1962), a rare example of self-
representation for the unofficial artist who would become known for attributing his works to 
invented characters and fictional artists. The painting pictures Kabakov in a bust-length, three-
quarter pose, dressed in a thick jacket. A blue pilot cap hugs his head, covering his ears. He 
gazes at the viewer with a serious expression. Against the muted background of dark greens, 
blues, and browns, the brief patches of pink on his cheeks, upper eyelids, and lips offer the only 
relief from this somber mood. 
The Cézannesque expressionistic brushstrokes, characteristic of Kabakov’s early period, 
show the influence of Robert Falk on his work. In 1957, after graduating from the Surikov 
Institute of Art in Moscow and beginning his official work as an illustrator for children’s books, 
Kabakov began to study with the Russian painter Robert Falk (1886–1958) twice a week.1 Falk, 
who had been a member of the early avant-garde group Jack of Diamonds (Bubnovyi valet), was 
heavily influenced by Cézanne and post-impressionism. Serving as a link between the historical 
avant-garde and the artists of the post-Stalin period, Falk was an important figure for Kabakov 
and other artists of his generation. As Kabakov writes, studying with Falk was like making 
“contact with Great Art” (kontakt s Velikoi Zhivopis’iu).2 Under his influence, Kabakov’s earliest 
works are largely post-impressionist still-lifes and landscapes. 
                                               
1 Ilya Kabakov, 60–70-e: Zapiski o neofitsial’noi zhizni v Moskve (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe 
Obozrenie, 2008), 15.  
2 Kabakov, 15. 
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Such overt self-representation is relatively singular in Kabakov’s oeuvre. And yet, even 
here, one begins to get the sense that Kabakov constructs a portrait of the self in which he wears 
a mask, tries on another identity. The pilot cap seems to invoke the aesthetics of cosmonaut Yuri 
Gagarin. Just the previous year, on April 12, 1961, Gagarin had become the first man to go into 
space. The cosmonaut was one of the structuring myths of the Thaw era, and flight would 
become a prominent theme in Kabakov’s oeuvre, most famously in his installation The Man Who 
Flew into Space from His Apartment (1985).3 The utopian aspirations of flight into the cosmos 
seem foreclosed in this painting, with the dark background suggestive of confinement. Above the 
pilot cap, a brief line of white paint that seems to emanate from Kabakov’s head rises up, but 
then dips and fades away. The line introduces a vertical ascent, suggestive of the possibility of 
flight or escape, only to have it disappear into the darkness. Kabakov’s serious expression 
departs from Gagarin’s boyish looks, often pictured with a grin across his face. Kabakov 
deconstructs the heroic stance of the cosmonaut, ironically taking on the image of the New 
Soviet Man to expose the futility of these fantasies of flight. Even here in this early self-portrait, 
it would seem he is already in costume. 
Indeed, on closer inspection, Kabakov’s face seems to take on a mask-like quality. Thick 
dark strokes of paint separate his face from the blue cap. Perhaps a shadow cast by the cap, 
although the depth of the shadow is too exaggerated. In this painting that relies on expressionistic 
brushstrokes and subtle gradations of color to build up texture and definition, these dark lines are 
                                               
3 As Slava Gerovitch notes, “The cosmonaut myth played a major role in Khrushchev’s attempts 
to de-Stalinize Soviet society—to break up with the Stalinist past and to reconnect with the 
original revolutionary aspirations for a Communist utopia.” Slava Gerovitch, “The Human inside 
a Propaganda Machine: The Public Image and Professional Identity of Soviet Cosmonauts,” 
James T. Andrews and Asif A. Siddiqi, eds., Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet 
Culture (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 79. 
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striking. The strong line delineates his face from the rest of his head, setting it off in such a way 
that the face begins to resemble a mask, as if it could easily be detached. Kabakov paints this 
masked self-portrait during this period when he first began his official work as a children’s book 
illustrator while also working unofficially, searching for his own artistic voice free from the 
demands of the State. Kabakov begins his memoir about unofficial art of the 1960s and 70s by 
describing the slow struggle to break free of creating work that was not “for them” (dlia nikh) 
but for himself (dlia sebia).4 This self-portrait gives expression to the double life of Kabakov’s 
artistic practice during this period. Already in this self-portrait we can sense the way in which 
Kabakov would go on to create characters in his work, to playfully subvert the myths 
underpinning Soviet society.  
Soon after completing this self-portrait, though, Kabakov writes in his memoir that 
“somehow his interest in painting from nature was extinguished” (kak-to i pogas interes k 
zhivopisi s natury).5 Around this time, in the winter of 1961–62, Kabakov began his series of 
drawings “Showers,” which he considers to be the true beginning of his own artistic style.6 
Although he became a full member of the Artists’ Union in 1965 and continued to work in an 
official capacity as an illustrator, Kabakov also developed as an unofficial artist of the Moscow 
Conceptualist group. From here, he turned to making his “picture-objects” (kartiny-predmety), 
                                               
4 Kabakov, 60–70-e, 11. The memoir was written in the 1980s and first published in 1999 by 
Weiner Slawistischer Almanach. 
5 Kabakov, 19. In the memoir Kabakov dates the portrait to 1966, however this would seem to be 
a typo as it disrupts the chronology of the narrative. Elsewhere, including the Catalogue 
Raisonné of his paintings, the date of the painting is given as 1962.  
6 Kabakov, 19–21. 
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such as Cubes (1962) and albums, such as Ten Characters (1972–75).7 It would not be until later 
in his career, after emigration, that we would see a return to self-representation in his 
installations and recent paintings, which will be the focus of this chapter. 
This early self-portrait thus poses a question that the rest of his work would go on to 
frustrate: who is Ilya Kabakov? For in most of his works, Kabakov invents various personae and 
creates pieces in their style. Paintings such as The Answers of the Experimental Group (1970–71) 
take on the style of ZhEK (Soviet Housing Committee) noticeboards, schedules, and other 
official signs. Another series of paintings, Holiday (1987), was presented as the work of a 
socialist realist hack who returns 30 years later to his commissioned paintings and decides to 
place colorful candy wrappers on the canvases “to renew the series, to return to it once again 
those qualities it once possessed.”8 Perhaps the most audacious example of Kabakov’s play with 
fictional personages might well be the installation An Alternative History of Art (2008), which 
introduced three fictional artists, Charles Rosenthal, Ilya Kabakov, and Igor Spivak, into the 
canon of Russian modern art.9 Imitating the genre of the museum retrospective, the installation 
presented a series of artworks attributed to these invented artists, complete with detailed 
biographies of the artists and art historical commentaries. By endowing a fictional artist with his 
own name in this installation, Kabakov literalizes the game with authorship he has played 
throughout his career. 
                                               
7 Matthew Jesse Jackson, The Experimental Group: Ilya Kabakov, Moscow Conceptualism, 
Soviet Avant-Gardes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 62. 
8 Renate Petzinger, Emilia Kabakova, and Willem Jan Renders, eds., Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 
1957–2013: Catalogue Raisonné, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Museum Wiesbaden, 2008), 199. 
9 Ilya Kabakov and Emilia Kabakov, An Alternative History of Art: Rosenthal, Kabakov, Spivak, 
ed. Thomas Kellein and Björn Egging (Cleveland: Museum of Contemporary Art Cleveland, 
2005). 
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Given that much of Kabakov’s work involves creating works in the guise of fictional 
characters and artists, it has become a critical commonplace to suggest that, in fact, there is no 
Ilya Kabakov. For example, Boris Groys has cautioned:  
In speaking about Ilya Kabakov’s art, one should first of all ask whether there is actually 
an artist called Ilya Kabakov. For Ilya Kabakov’s installations almost always relate to the 
history of other artists—showing their works, telling their biographies, commenting on 
their artistic methods, their aspirations and their disappointments. […] Kabakov has 
adopted a practice that could be described as a mode of self-expropriation, whereby he 
attributes his own works to other, fictitious artists.10  
 
Critics have interpreted this play with authorship in various ways: as an example of 
postmodernist play, as indebted to poststructuralism’s death of the author, as a reaction to 
institutional structures, and as representative of Kabakov’s double consciousness as both an 
official and unofficial artist. Groys, for example, attributes Kabakov’s characteristic 
“pseudonymity” to the dual system of authorship that Kabakov and others found themselves 
within in the Soviet Union, as both official and unofficial artists.11 These two roles offered 
differing conceptions of what an author is, and Groys suggests that out of this is born Kabakov’s 
playful relationship to authorship in his works. He likens Kabakov to a “theatrical director” who 
“astutely choreograph[s] this drama of authorship.”12 Matthew Jesse Jackson also situates 
Kabakov’s authorial play within the historical conditions of authorship under late socialism. He 
suggests that Kabakov’s double identity as both a successful official and unofficial artist led him 
“to adopt tactics that confronted his professional labor in his unofficial practice.”13 By creating 
                                               
10 Boris Groys, History Becomes Form: Moscow Conceptualism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2010), 105. 
11 Groys, 108–109.  
12 Groys, 108. 
13 Jackson, The Experimental Group, 86. 
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unofficial works that mimic the official illustrations, forms, notices (what Jackson terms 
Kabakov’s “bureaucratic expressionism”), Kabakov interrogated his own career as an official 
artist.14 
But Jackson also sees Kabakov’s work (and Moscow Conceptualism in general) as a 
reaction to the lack of institutional structures more broadly in the Soviet Union. As Jackson 
notes, there was a vast difference between art production in the Soviet Union and in the West, 
with its international art system. While conceptualist artists in the West were engaged in 
institutional critique, challenging the question of what constitutes a work of art, in the Soviet 
Union there was an absence of these institutions, from museums, criticism, the art market, and so 
on. Khrushchev’s reaction to the Manezh exhibit in 1962 ensured that unofficial art would 
largely stay underground.15 And so, unofficial artists created their own institutional forms within 
their art. By attributing his art to other artists, then, Kabakov steps into the role of curator or 
historian.  
The creation of fictional biographies is evident in the work of other unofficial artists as 
well. Consider, for example, Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid’s 1973 conceptualist 
installation about the (invented) 18th-century serf artist Apelles Ziablov, whom they heralded as 
the first abstract artist. The installation included some of Ziablov’s paintings, a biography of the 
painter, as well as art historical writings about Ziablov. Jackson sees the installation as an 
attempt to position themselves not only as artists but also as curators and publicists, thus 
                                               
14 Jackson, 91. 
15 The period leading up the 1962 Manezh Exhibit in Moscow had witnessed a slightly more 
open atmosphere for displaying modern art. However, when Khrushchev attended the Manezh 
exhibit, he shut it down. The artists displayed at Manezh who were in the Artists’ Union were 
stripped of their Union membership. Kabakov had not been part of the exhibit, but several of his 
fellow unofficial artists had attended and were interrogated. Jackson, 52–53. 
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simulating in their own work the institutional frameworks of the museum and an international art 
market that existed in the West but were absent in the Soviet Union.16  
This playful interrogation of authority and ironic appropriation of the conventions and 
discourse of art history is part of a larger postmodern artistic practice more generally. 
Postmodernism, as Jean-François Lyotard writes, shows an “incredulity toward metanarratives”17 
because the grand narratives—of history, of progress, of enlightenment—have undergone 
“delegitimation.”18 Mark Lipovetsky locates the beginning of postmodernism in Russia in the 
1960s during the period of the Thaw, as Youth Prose and samizdat writing began to deconstruct 
the metadiscourse of Socialist Realism through their use of non-standard language, slang, irony, 
and confessional style.19 Moscow Conceptualism and Sots-Art took up this mantle, as they 
ironically re-appropriated the visual language of socialist realism in order to deconstruct the 
prevailing myths of official society. 
Despite Kabakov’s postmodern practice of creating fictional characters and biographies 
in his work, there is a striking shift towards the autobiographical in his work after emigration. In 
1987, the year he emigrated, Kabakov created My Mother’s Album, an album based on his 
mother’s unpublished memoir that she had written at his request. He subsequently went on to 
                                               
16 Jackson, 126. 
17 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), xxiv. 
18 Lyotard, 37. 
19 Lipovetsky writes that “The writers of the sixties were the first to play with the Soviet myth, 
after decades of Socialist Realism’s monopoly on culture, and hence they outlined the logic of 
subsequent postmodern play with myth and mythological discourses.” Mark Lipovetsky, Russian 
Postmodernist Fiction: Dialogue with Chaos, ed. Eliot Borenstein (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1999), 125. 
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make a series of installations that were also based on the mother’s self-narrative and family 
photographs: Mother and Son (1990), Labyrinth: My Mother’s Album (1990), The Operating 
Room (Mother and Son) (1994).20 During this same period, he created another autobiographical 
installation entitled On the Roof (1996) that drew heavily on family photographs and the 
narratives we tell about them. More recently, since around the year 2000, Kabakov has turned 
back to painting after his experiments with total installation. As part of this return to painting, 
Kabakov has created two series of paintings— Three Paintings with the Black Spot (2009) and 
They are Looking (2010)—that also engage heavily with the family archive of photographs. In 
these paintings and installations, we see the emergence of a new kind of autobiographical voice, 
one no longer inventing personae to inhabit but rather speaking from the first person.  
This chapter takes up the question of why Kabakov, who is known for obscuring his own 
identity in his works, suddenly begins to tell these narratives of the self. How are we to 
understand Kabakov’s autobiographical turn to the family archive of diaries, letters, memoirs, 
and photographs in these pieces? As we will see, many of the same family photographs recur 
across these installations and paintings. What do we gain, then, by reading these various works 
together? Do these works constitute a shift from his earlier artistic practice towards a more 
sincere mode of expression? Or is the version of the “self” that he puts forward here just as 
playful and constructed as the biographies he created for his invented artists? As we will see in 
                                               
20 Mother and Son was part of an exhibit at the Tacoma Art Museum, June 15–September 9, 
1990. It was shown again at the Jewish Museum’s exhibit From the Inside Out: Eight 
Contemporary Artists in New York in 1993. Labyrinth (My Mother’s Album) was first exhibited 
as part of a larger show called He Lost His Mind, Undressed, Ran Away Naked at the Ronald 
Feldman Fine Arts Gallery in New York, January 6–February 3, 1990. The Operating Room 
(Mother and Son) was initially meant for the Centre Pompidou in Paris, but the installation was 
not realized. It was exhibited at the Nyktaiteen Museo in Helsinki (Feb 3–April 10, 1994) and 
then at Museet for Samtidskunst in Oslo (October 8, 1994–January 8, 1995). 
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this chapter, there is a tension between sincerity and ironic play in these works. While I will 
argue that Kabakov does indeed begin to engage in a more sincere or open expression of the self, 
this self-expression is not without the knowledge of the fiction that underrides any 
autobiographical project.  
In part, we can situate this shift in Kabakov’s artistic practice as part of a larger trend of 
what has been called the “New Sincerity,” a phenomenon in reaction to postmodernism that has 
been ascendant in Anglophone and Russian spheres since the 1980s.21 Trading postmodern irony 
for a renewed interest in sincerity and authenticity, the New Sincerity emerged at the time of 
perestroika and glasnost’ and offered a new appraisal of the Soviet experience and its legacy 
after postmodernism.22 Beginning in 1984, the conceptualist poet Dmitri Prigov turned away 
from ironic detachment towards what he called “New Sincerity” (novaia iskrennost’). He 
published a series of poems in samizdat that enjoined his readers to adopt a sincere attitude. And 
in the years that followed, he took up the term “New Sincerity” in lectures, poetry collections, 
                                               
21 Ellen Rutten notes that this turn to sincerity occurred at roughly the same time in America and 
in Russia, although entirely independent of each other. In Russia, the post-conceptualist turn to 
sincerity harks back to Vladimir Pomerantsev’s 1953 essay “On Sincerity in Literature” (‘Ob 
iskrennosti v literature’). This classic Thaw-era essay argued for a renewed sincerity against 
socialist realism in the wake of Stalin’s death. Rutten, Sincerity after Communism. In the Anglo-
American literary context, David Foster Wallace’s essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. 
Fiction” (1993) is often taken as an unofficial manifesto for this new style of literature that 
returns to authenticity, sincerity, and emotional honesty as opposed to maintaining a cool, 
detached, ironic distance. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are also often noted as a 
turning point in the move away from irony and cynicism towards sincerity and authenticity. For 
more on New Sincerity in the Anglo-American context, see Kelly, “The New Sincerity.” 
22 Mark Lipovetsky concludes his book on Russian postmodernism with some thoughts on the 
return to realism and to sincerity after postmodernism, suggesting that in Russian and 
Anglophone postmodernism “another kind of fiction is gaining ground” as writers turn anew to 
realism. Lipovetsky, Russian Postmodernist Fiction, 242–43. 
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and in his poetic performances.23 Mikhail Epstein has noted the irony that it is the postmodernist 
conceptual artists like Prigov who “have turned out to be most susceptible to the aesthetics of 
sentimentality.”24  
In some respect, this shift seems an inevitable reaction to the postmodern moment. 
Inverting the temporal chronology implied in the “post-” prefix, Lyotard has suggested that the 
postmodern is, in fact, the vanguard of the modern, rather than what follows in its wake. He 
writes, “A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus 
understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.”25 
Much as Yuri Tynianov suggested that literary evolution is a dynamic process (“O literaturnom 
fakte” [On Literary Fact] 1924), Lyotard posits an ongoing dialectical struggle as each 
successive generation challenges what came before; it is this challenge that constitutes the 
postmodern and ushers in the modern. And so, just as modernism gave way to realism (albeit 
realism with a difference) during the interwar years,26 so too does the ironic signature of 
postmodernism eventually lead to a renewed interest in sincerity. This “new” sincerity cannot 
look the same, of course, after postmodernism; it is inflected by it.27  
                                               
23 In 1991, the poet Sergei Gandlevsky wrote an essay entitled “Razreshenie ot skorbi,” which 
introduced a similar idea, using the term “critical sentimentalism” (kriticheskii sentimentalizm).  
24 Mikhail Epstein, Aleksandr Genis, and Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover, Russian Postmodernism: 
New Perspectives on Post-Soviet Culture (Berghahn Books, 1999), 457. 
25 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 79. 
26 Devin Fore, Realism after Modernism: The Rehumanization of Art and Literature (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2012). 
27 As Ellen Rutten writes, new sincerity cannot be understood “without an understanding of the 
paradigm to which is responds and whose lessons it incorporates: postmodernism.” Rutten, 
Sincerity after Communism, 7. Mark Lipovetsky makes a similar point when he writes that it is 
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In her recent book Sincerity after Communism, Ellen Rutten argues that the 1980s era of 
perestroika witnessed a fascination “with the new and with sincerity” in general, as works once 
banned were republished and the policy of glasnost encouraged free, sincere, open expression in 
public.28 As Rutten defines it, new sincerity is linked with “the discursive gesture of honest self-
disclosure” and the performance of a “trope of emotional transparency.”29 I would suggest that 
we see a similar shift towards “sincere” expression in Kabakov’s works as he engages with his 
mother’s history.30 In this chapter, we will see how Kabakov removes the mask of other 
personages and other voices to seemingly give expression to his own self-narrative and his 
family’s.  
Relevant for our understanding of Kabakov’s engagement with self-narration is Rutten’s 
concept of “curative sincerity.”31 The rhetoric of sincerity, according to Rutten, offers a 
                                               
“a movement that is clearly rooted in the realistic tradition but that just as clearly has learned 
from the experience of postmodern art.” Lipovetsky, Russian Postmodernist Fiction, 243. 
28 Rutten, Sincerity after Communism, 82–83. 
29 Rutten, 9. 
30 Although Kabakov has not aligned himself explicitly with the new sincerity, he did exhibit 
some of his work as part of the exhibition Neo Sincerity: The Difference Between the Comic and 
the Cosmic is a Single Letter at Apexart Gallery in New York in 2006. Writing about the exhibit, 
Rutten suggests that it “emphatically configured sincerity as a sociopolitical tool: the makers saw 
it as an aesthetic strategy for coping with historical traumas such as the Soviet experiment and 
the Holocaust.” Rutten, 107. The exhibition, curated by Amei Wallach, included pieces by 
Kabakov and fellow Soviet conceptualist artist Alexander Melamid, as well as Art Spiegelman. 
The show’s title “neo-sincerity” was attributed to Spiegelman himself. According to Spiegelman, 
neo-sincerity is “sincerity built on a thorough grounding in irony, but that allows one to actually 
make a statement about what one believes in.” In the exhibition brochure, Wallach notes the 
recent shift from postmodern irony to a new sincerity. The brochure and details about the 
exhibition are available at http://apexart.org/exhibitions/wallach.php (accessed February 8, 
2018). 
31 Rutten, 89. 
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therapeutic way of coming to terms with the traumas of the Soviet past. Rutten’s concept of 
“curative sincerity” builds on Alexander Etkind’s work on the “warped mourning” of late and 
post-Soviet society, as the traumas and terror of Soviet life were left unburied, unprocessed, and 
unmourned.32 It is through this new mode of sincerity and authenticity that cultural producers 
can re-engage with and re-evaluate the past.  
Walter Benjamin writes in “The Storyteller” that “Death is the sanction of everything that 
the storyteller can tell.”33 In Kabakov’s autobiographical works, it is a series of endings—the 
final end of the Soviet epoch and the premature end in the experience of emigration, as well as 
the death of the mother—that “sanction” and generate these reappraisals of the past. These 
endings confer meaning back onto the Soviet experience. It is the sense of an ending that 
prompts these self-narratives, retrospective in nature, to look back on the past. The personal 
narrative opens a window onto the larger historical narrative.  
I would suggest that Kabakov uses this sincere approach in the use of photographs as a 
way of reflecting on and representing the traumas of the Soviet experience. In his installations 
and recent paintings, Kabakov uses family photographs to critique official narratives of the 
Soviet past, but in turn he goes on to expose the generic quality of family photographs and the 
prescribed forms of self-narrative, thus frustrating our sense of what can meaningfully be done 




                                               
32 Etkind, Warped Mourning. 
33 Benjamin, Illuminations, 94. 
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The Total Installation  
Kabakov first began working on installations in his studio in Moscow in 1982. In 1987, 
he received a grant that brought him to Graz, Austria, which marked the beginning of his work in 
the West. In the West, Kabakov began to work almost solely in the new medium of the “total 
installation,” often incorporating his earlier albums and paintings into these structures. The 
installation is “total” in the sense that the viewer enters a fully constructed space and is immersed 
in the installation. 
As Kabakov describes it, he began working on total installations after he left the Soviet 
Union as way of re-creating the context that he had lost when presenting his work among other 
Soviet unofficial artists. In Moscow, he had made art for an intimate circle of other unofficial 
artists who shared his same cultural background and reference points. After Khrushchev’s 
unfavorable reaction to the Manezh art exhibit in 1962, unofficial art primarily took place 
underground in private, rather than in public. There were small exhibits that did take place in 
public, and while these were very significant in that they exposed unofficial artists to works by 
the historical avant-garde, they were short-lived and unofficial culture mainly took place behind 
closed doors, within the domestic space of the studios.34 But this intimate context of displaying 
your work for a small coterie of artists was lost in emigration. Kabakov writes that it was only 
once he began creating and showing his work abroad that he understood the importance of this 
“context.”35 It was by creating total installations that he was able to re-situate his works within 
                                               
34 Jackson, The Experimental Group, 52–53. 
35 Ilya Kabakov, Über Die “Totale” Installation / O “Totalʹnoi” Installiatsii / On the “Total” 
Installation (Ostfildern: Cantz, 1995), 267. 
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their specific context through creating atmospheric spaces. The total installation enabled 
Kabakov to create an immersive environment that conditions how viewers receive his artworks.  
During this period, Kabakov created several total installations based on the memoirs of 
his mother, Bertha Solodukhina. In 1987, Kabakov had made an album that incorporates the text 
of his mother’s memoirs called My Mother’s Album (Al’bom moei materi). After Kabakov’s 
emigration to the West in 1987 and the death of his mother in February 1988, Kabakov 
repeatedly returned to the memoirs, reshaping them in various installations. While the textual 
material of the mother’s memoir is largely the same in these installations, the presentation of the 
narrative differs greatly in each piece. What is gained and lost as the installation takes on various 
permutations? How can we understand Kabakov’s continual return to the source material of the 
mother’s memoir? How does Kabakov write himself into the narrative through the arrangement 
of these installations? 
 
My Mother’s Album 
Before turning to the various installations, let us first look at the album itself. The subtitle 
«Жизнь как оскорбление» (Life as an insult) ushers us into the album. Evoking Dostoevsky’s 
early novel Униженные и оскорблённые (The Humiliated and the Insulted), this subtitle sets 
the tone of the album, which will look at the hardships Kabakov’s mother Bertha Solodukhina 
endured throughout her life.  
The album opens with a typewritten letter dated 1981, addressed to Brezhnev by 
Solodukhina, which she wrote at the age of 79. She entreats Brezhnev to allow her to exchange 
her private apartment (20 square meters) for a state apartment with facilities (15 square meters) 
because as an elderly woman she says “I don’t have the strength to carry water from afar, to 
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carry firewood, to heat the apartment—all this is too much at this age” (я уже не в силах 
издалека носить воду, носить дрова, отапливать квартиру—в этом возрасте все это не по 
силам).36 For two years she has requested a change of residence but has consistently been 
denied. Frustrated by the refusal she has met with—after having lived through so much and 
worked so hard in earnest—she offers an indictment of the Soviet system: “I always tried to do 
everything within my power for people and for the state, but in old age I am met with such 
callousness and offence” (Я всегда старалась сделать все мне посильное для людей и 
государства, а в старости встречаю такую черствость и обиду).37 In this letter to Brezhnev, 
the mother speaks out directly about her suffering, demanding that something be done in 
recompense for her hard work. It is the voice of a woman who seems finally disillusioned with a 
power that she once put great store in. Accompanying the letter to Brezhnev are several sketches 
of Solodukhina, presumably done by Kabakov.38 Some are yellowed with age, one has a large 
yellow stain on the upper left-hand corner. All studies of her face from different angles, most of 
these drawings show her with her face in her hands. Together with the letter, they give 
expression to her weariness.  
However, according to Kate Fowle, the letter is a fictional one, written by Kabakov 
himself.39 Here, Kabakov adopts the identity of his mother to write a fictional letter to Brezhnev. 
Fowle suggests that, through the letter, Kabakov “is mocking the blind conviction” of his mother 
                                               
36 Ilya Kabakov, My Mother’s Album (Paris: Flies France, 1995), 15. 
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and others of her generation who “believed there was always someone ‘up there’ who could save 
the situation, if you could just reach them.”40 In what way, then, does this fake letter destabilize 
our understanding of this narrative as entirely sincere or honest? In the pages surrounding the 
letter, facsimile copies of the mother’s handwritten narrative are included providing a material 
trace of the mother’s hand, as if to insist on the reliability of the text. However, by beginning the 
album with this invented letter in her voice, doubt is cast on the veracity of the narrative that 
follows. 
The text of his mother’s memoir proper begins with an address to Kabakov in the form of 
a letter, dated January 22, 1982. From her opening lines, we learn that Kabakov has asked her to 
write the story of her life: “Dear son! You asked me to write the story of my life. I decided to 
fulfill your request” (Дорогой сынок! Ты просил написать историю моей жизни. Решила 
исполнить твою просьбу). By adopting the form of a letter, with an addressee, the self-narrative 
takes on a nominally dialogic form. The son requests the mother to tell the narrative of her life, 
which he then responds to by shaping it and housing it within the album.41 The album, and the 
installations that will follow, become a work of co-creation between mother and son. Through 
his mother’s personal story, Kabakov offers an allegory for the Soviet experience writ large. 
The narrative that follows is a harrowing one. She speaks first of her parents, how they 
were both orphans and were taken in by a couple who didn’t have children. She describes how 
they suffered because, before she was born, her parents lost two of their children. In 1920, she 
graduates from school at the age of 18. By the time she is 20, though, both of her parents have 
                                               
40 Kate Fowle, “On Labyrinth (My Mother’s Album),” 49. 
41 Judith Butler has argued that “giving an account of oneself” is always shaped by the demand 
of the other to tell one’s story. See Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself. 
           
 
 220 
died and it becomes her responsibility to care for her other siblings. This passage of her life 
proves difficult; she describes a near-constant situation of not having enough money and a 
scarcity of food.42 At 27, she finds herself married (unofficially) to a man whom she rented a 
room to. The marriage is an unhappy one. She notes that on September 30, 1933 she gave birth 
to a child.43 Although the child is Ilya, she does not call him by name, nor does she acknowledge 
that he is the presumed addressee of the narrative. She goes on to narrate how they survive the 
war by being evacuated to Samarkand, how her son attends art school there and shows great 
aptitude for drawing, and how they eventually move to Leningrad, and then to Moscow. In 1958, 
she moves to Berdyansk to visit her sister Riva and remains there. Despite the fact that she is 
writing this account at her son’s request, she does not directly refer to him in the narrative after 
the initial address to him at the beginning. She seems, then, to take seriously the idea that she is 
writing her memoir for a general audience, not just for him.  
The formal structure of the narrative gives the impression that she is writing it all at once, 
without taking the time to shape the fabula into an artfully crafted siuzhet. There are several 
moments in the text where she reveals that she had previously forgotten to mention a crucial 
detail and so just adds it in wherever she happens to be at that point in the narrative. For 
example, one such moment arises when she suddenly remembers that she had omitted to note 
that she had earlier attempted suicide by taking pills, but failed.44 A little later, she again 
interjects another detail she had forgotten to mention earlier: that she had officially married her 
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husband on the day that Ilya was born.45 Once again, she does not go back and add in these 
events where they belong in the narrative’s chronology. It seems remarkable that these three 
events—her attempted suicide, marriage, and the birth of her first child—are the ones that are 
supposedly “forgotten.” What might ordinarily be seen as momentous events in one’s life are 
here not granted much narrative space. Rather than crafting her life according to the principles of 
literary eventfulness, Solodukhina seems to accord no one moment more significance than 
another. She narrates the story of her life as it occurs to her, thus creating the effect of an 
“authentic” or unedited narrative, given spontaneously.  
After she finishes recounting a retrospective narrative of her life, she continues to write 
about her life in the present. It is at this point that the narrative begins to make us aware of the 
passage of time in the process of writing the narrative, as we become aware of the temporal leaps 
in her narrative of the present. For example, in one paragraph she writes about how she is 
currently staying with her sister Riva and that she plans to “stay here for April, and in May I’ll 
have to go back to my place. I am well taken care of. I help with what I can. I read, rest. I will be 
80 years old soon.” In the next paragraph she writes, “I’m 80 years old,” thus signaling that time 
has passed. She continues:  
I’m losing my strength. I get tired quickly. I still haven’t returned home. I did a little 
remodeling, and I think I’ll go home from the first of July. Riva promised to live with me 
for a month. She’s still sick, coughs, and complains of pain in her heart. I came home 
from the first of July with Riva. We lived together for July and August.46  
 
In this passage, we seamlessly move from a future plan to return home on the first of July, to a 
retrospective account of how she went home on July 1, to locating us in the present moment of 
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September. After this, the narrative that begins as a letter switches to the form of a diary. The 
diachronic form of the diary allows the passage of time to be marked, unlike the synchronic form 
of the letter. The first diary entry is marked as March 8, 1983. We recall that her letter was dated 
January 22, 1982, and so ostensibly over a year has passed since she first began the process of 
narrating her life. She notes that time has passed since the last section of her narrative in 
September: «Прошло не мало времени пока я снова взялась за биографию» (A lot of time 
passed before I picked up my biography again).47 And, unlike a letter, a diary is typically without 
an addressee. It is a private document of one’s daily life, kept for oneself. She even begins to call 
it her diary (dnevnik) and comments on those times when she lets long intervals pass in between 
entries.48 Although much of her narrative at this point describes the pain she is in, making it hard 
for her to write, nonetheless she continues on. If Solodukhina’s decision to write this memoir 
was initially in a letter in response to her son’s request, it soon becomes apparent that she has 
assumed ownership of her own self-narrative. 
Not only does she continue to write a narrative of the self in her diary, she notes that she 
recommends to a friend that she should start writing her memoirs as well: “I wrote to my friend 
so that she would begin to write her memoirs. She has lived a difficult life. She was arrested, 
served for 8 years and was repressed” (Написала своей знакомой, чтобы она занялась писать 
свои мемуары. Она прожила тяжелую жизнь. Была арестована, сидела 8 и была 
репрессирована).49 These are the stories that need to be documented before they are lost. For, as 
she notes in the next breath, her generation is dying out, giving urgency to this turn to the 
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memoir-diary form: “My friends who I met with for cups of tea for many years have died. 
Regina Pavlovna, Irina Andreevna. Our circle is no longer. Our guard is irretrievably leaving. 
Soon my turn will come. It must” (Умерли мои друзья с кем встречалась на чашке чая много 
лет. Регина Павловна, Ирина Андреевна. Нет теперь нашего кружка. Уходит наша гвардия 
безвозвратно. Скоро дойдет и мой черед. Так надо).50 The diary becomes a necessary form 
for preserving the fragments of the past, of bearing witness to what she and her generation have 
lived through.  
Kabakov’s My Mother’s Album emerges at the beginning of a period that saw a flood of 
memoir publications that reflected on the Soviet experience. In her book Stories of the Soviet 
Experience, Irina Paperno locates the beginning of this publication wave in 1988, with the 
publication of Nadezhda Mandelstam and Evgeniia Ginzburg’s memoirs during glasnost.51 As 
Paperno writes, the memoirs of this period share a common impulse “to make private documents 
public as a record of the end. In this sense, all of these personal records, regardless of when they 
were written, belong to the present moment, when they are assembled, framed, and put into the 
public domain for everybody to see. This moment is the end of an epoch.”52 And so, with his 
request that his mother write her life narrative and his repeated return to it in his artwork, 
Kabakov here participates in a wider phenomenon of making public these private narratives that 
document the Soviet past. This sense of the impending “end of an epoch,” further compounded 
by Kabakov’s emigration to the West, motivates this autobiographical imperative to record. By 
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creating an album out of her memoirs (rather than a fictional character), Kabakov engages in a 
newly sincere way with the traumatic history of the 20th century through the story of his mother.  
The album thus marks a transition in his artistic style, and yet the arrangement of the 
narrative in the album maintains some of the ironic play of his earlier work. As in his 
conceptualist pieces, Kabakov here reveals the falsity of the image of reality produced by Soviet 
ideology. He does this not by inventing yet another personality, but instead by speaking from a 
more autobiographical position. In My Mother’s Album, Kabakov juxtaposes the text of his 
mother’s memoir with official images from magazines and newspapers of the 1950s that depict 
the joy and prosperity of Soviet life. Groys notes that Kabakov uses these “impersonally 
optimistic images” of official Soviet photography “to symbolize the impersonal social 
background of life.”53 He dismantles the official version of life, as depicted in the photos, to 
represent the actual experience of Soviet citizens. Kabakov’s album refuses to create a narrative 
that accords with the standard Soviet narrative of the self. Much of the memoir describes the 
mother’s difficulty finding food, work, and housing, and this story of her suffering is then 
pointedly juxtaposed with official images of the bright and prosperous Soviet life. For example, 
at one point in the memoir Solodukhina describes how both of her parents have died when she is 
20 and it is her responsibility to care for her other siblings, but she doesn’t make enough money 
and there is not enough food.54 One of the “official” images that is paired with this section of the 
narrative is a family celebrating a wedding anniversary with a large meal, with everyone 
gathered at the table. Or when she describes how she became seriously ill from malnourishment, 
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Kabakov juxtaposes this section of the text with photos of people in sanatoriums, relaxing, 
looking healthy, and eating.55 The juxtaposition between text and image in these instances 
starkly exposes the distance between reality and its glossy representation.  
Indeed, the use of blank space in Kabakov’s presentation of the text and image 
underscores this fundamental distance: the “official” photo is pasted onto the top of the page and 
then about 5 inches below there is a short fragment of text of about 7–11 lines. This empty space 
takes up much of the page; it visually represents the wide chasm between the image of life 
depicted in these photos and the mother’s actual lived experience. All the “official” photos have 
their own captions that glorify the scene depicted in the image, but the memoir text serves as an 
alternative caption or text that challenges this “official” text. And so, this memoir works in 
opposition to the official images of Soviet life; Kabakov thus reveals the gap between reality and 
appearances. The installation offers a critique of the official narratives about Soviet life. 
It is at this point that we must acknowledge that the memoir, and especially the diary 
portion of the narrative, seems similar to the kinds of narrative that Kabakov had invented for the 
fictionalized biographies in his other albums. If those albums were exercises in boredom, what 
Jackson calls “total nonexperiences,” then the mother’s diary also flirts with the tedium of 
everyday life.56 In each entry, she reiterates her daily schedule that does not seem to change. 
From an entry on March 13, 1983 she writes, “In the morning until 11:00 I still move around, but 
from 11:00 my back and spine ache so and I have to lay down. After two hours of rest I can 
move again. Nonetheless, I do what I can around the house. I wash dishes, sweep, dust. I can’t do 
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anything more than that.”57 The entry on June 1 records a similar daily routine: “I take a walk in 
the morning for 1-1 ½ hours. Then there’s breakfast. I wash the dishes and at 11:00 I become a 
casualty. My spine and back begin to ache. Then during the day I lay down for 1 hour. Then I do 
something, I read. At 5:00 there’s supper. Then I wash the dishes again. I read the paper, watch 
the television.”58 Another entry from June 30 tells a similar story: “It’s difficult to walk. My 
spine and lower back ache. I rest from 11:00 to 1:00 in the afternoon. Then the more difficult 
things come, laundry, cleaning. It’s hard for me, but at least I’m home.”59 With its investigation 
of boredom, repetition of meaningless actions, the barely endurable slog of days in a Beckettian 
key (“I can’t go on. I’ll go on.”), the diary portion of the narrative is in keeping with the kinds of 
experiments in boredom that Kabakov played with in his earlier albums. 
Rather than trying to resolve the question of whether the diary is authentic, I would 
suggest that it is precisely this indeterminacy that animates the form. It is this uncertainty that 
encourages us to read the diary less as a “transparent” document of the self and more as an 
aesthetic work. As an actual diary, it is a normal recording of the minutiae of everyday life, of an 
unchanging routine; but once the diary is framed and arranged in the album by someone else, it 
becomes an aesthetic object.60 Placed into the context of the album, the memoir no longer 
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functions as a private document that would offer direct access to her interiority. Rather, it 
becomes an aesthetic text that foregrounds the peculiar form of the diary as genre. The form of 
the diary bears symbolic or allegorical meaning: it reveals the emptiness of experience. And as a 
cultural and historical document, the diary has the potential to reveal something about the time in 
which it was written. With its catalogue of daily chores, the diary offers a portrait of late Soviet 
life, drained of the utopian aspirations of reforging the self or of joyous work. The diary stands in 
stark contrast to the official images of Soviet life. 
If the revelation of the emptiness of official narratives about Soviet culture is familiar 
territory for Kabakov, it is the inclusion of his mother’s narrative that distinguishes this album 
from his previous works. In his description of the album, he explicitly addresses how the two 
parts of the installation work in opposition to create a “real portrait of life”: 
Серия «Альбом моей матери» составлена из автобиографических записок матери 
художника, Бейли Солодухиной, написанных ею, когда ей было 83 года. Это 
подробный рассказ о детстве в дореволюционной России, о тяжелых годах в 
перестраивающейся после революции стране, о жизни в «Великую Сталинскую 
эпоху» и после нее. Это и трогательный и мучительный рассказ о жизни, полной 
бесконечных страданий, приходящих и исчезающих надежд. Но у «Альбома» есть 
и другой, параллельный ряд. В верхней части каждого листа помещены цветные 
фотографии: вырезки из официальных журналов 50х годов—эпохи «цветущего 
социализма». Все эти «картины счастья» и подписи под ними повествуют о 
сбывшейся мечте человечества—о построенной наконец «справедливой и 
прекрасной стране»… Два этих ряда—«Праздник Труда и Побед» и беспрерывные 
мучения реального человека—пересекаясь, создают реальный портрет жизни в 
России начала и середины нашего века.61  
 
The series “My Mother’s Album” consists of autobiographical notes of the artist’s 
mother, Beila Solodukhina, written by her when she was 83 years old. It is a detailed 
story about childhood in pre-revolutionary Russia, about the difficult years in a country 
undergoing post-revolutionary reform, about life during the “Great Stalinist Era” and 
afterwards. It is a touching and agonizing story about a life full of endless suffering, of 
                                               
Gérard Genette, Fiction & Diction, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993). See especially Chapter One, "Fiction and Diction." 
61 Kabakov, My Mother’s Album, 10–11. 
           
 
 228 
appearing and disappearing hopes. But “Album” has another, parallel level. There are 
color photographs on the top part of each page—cut-outs from original magazines from 
the 1950s, the era of “flourishing socialism.” All of these “pictures of happiness” and the 
inscriptions beneath them recount the realization of humanity’s dream—the building, 
finally, of a “just and beautiful country”… The intersection of these two series—
“Holidays of Labor and Victories” and the unending suffering of a real person—creates a 
realistic portrait of life in Russia during the beginning and middle of our century.62 
 
He insists that we are dealing here with the life of a real person (real’nogo cheloveka), which 
differentiates this album from his other demythologizing works that engage with socialist 
realism. By reminding us that she is a real person, not a character, Kabakov increases the 
emotional power of the narrative. Moreover, this introduction to the album emphasizes the 
emotional quality of the narrative. The mother’s autobiography is “touching” (trogatel’nyi), 
“agonizing” (muchitel’nyi), and “full of unending suffering” (pol’noi beskonechnykh stradanii). 
The revival of such sentimental terms is part and parcel of the “new sincerity.” The adjective 
trogatel’nyi evokes the language of Sentimentalism, but also insists on the affective capability of 
the narrative to touch the viewer. Epstein has noted the revival of such sentimental terms in the 
new sincerity after postmodernism. While conceptualism traded in exposing the banality of such 
“lofty” concepts, “then the radical courage of postconceptualism is to be found in the way it 
takes up these same clichéd words and uses them in their literal meaning, which has by now split 
into two: into a ‘dead’ meaning and a ‘born-again’ meaning.”63 Kabakov here resurrects these 
clichéd terms in an effort to return to them some sincere meaning. If agony or torment (muka) 
had earlier been invoked only obliquely through the ubiquitous figure of the fly (mukha) in 
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Kabakov’s work, here the ironic play with near homophones is given over to baldly pronouncing 
the word itself. 
In the album, Kabakov deconstructs the false type of sincerity that we see in the overly 
optimistic or utopian images of the bright Soviet life, but he replaces this with a more serious 
kind of sincerity that forces us to look honestly and openly at the struggles of his mother. This is 
the double-edged nature of sincerity that Kabakov engages in this album; as Rutten notes, 
sincerity was both a “myth” to be deconstructed and “a potential curative force in digesting a 
troubled past.”64 While Kabakov’s other works have long dealt with dismantling or 
demythologizing the façade of a simple and sincere image of Soviet life, it is a new addition in 
his work to offer the underside — to offer a “touching” and authentic narrative of this kind. The 
mother’s album becomes an oblique or indirect autobiographical piece. As I have suggested, we 
can understand this turn to self-narrative as part of the New Sincerity after postmodernism, a 
need to turn to the traumatic past of the 20th century and to reckon with the Soviet experiment.  
 
Mother and Son 
In emigration and after the death of his mother, Kabakov would repeatedly return to this 
material in his installations. In 1990, Kabakov returned to the material from My Mother’s Album 
(1987) to create a total installation called Mother and Son.  
In this installation, the text and images from the album My Mother’s Album are framed 
and placed around the perimeter of the room. In the middle of the room, random objects—such 
as a bottle of pills, a crushed beer can, an empty pack of cigarettes, some thread—hang from 16 
pieces of rope stretched across the room. Attached to each object is a piece of paper that has 
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fragments of speech spoken by the son to his mother. These are everyday phrases, snippets of 
unexceptional speech: “Could you lend me some money? I’ll return it to you in a month” or “But 
I don’t want any tea. Why are you pouring me some?!”65 Quotidian as they may be, these 
phrases conjure up specific scenes of everyday life between two people. In this regard, the 
phrases are reminiscent of the conceptual poet Lev Rubinshtein’s piece “Appearance of the 
Hero” (Poiavlenie geroia, 1986) which consists of a series of index cards, each inscribed with a 
conversational but strikingly idiomatic phrase that evokes a particular situation of enunciation, 
such as «Ты, кстати, выключил утюг?» (By the way, did you turn off the iron?) or «Не 
слышно? Я перезвоню» (Can’t hear? I’ll call back).66 Kabakov conceives of these texts as 
utterances that the viewer can hear. He writes: 
These resounding utterances, belonging to a concrete person whose name, patronymic 
and surname are often unknown, create a special effect while reading a phrase: we hear it, 
but we don't see the person saying it. But the authenticity, the excerpt quality, the 
ordinariness of such a word creates the feeling that the person speaking is standing 
somewhere very close by. A substitution arises, an illusion of the existence of the one 
whom we don't see, but clearly hear, and hence a written text can replace the material 
object.67 
 
The structure of this part of the installation clearly recalls 16 Ropes (1984), another of Kabakov’s 
installation that exhibits a similar archival tendency to arrange and “classify” the detritus of 
everyday life. First installed in his Moscow studio, 16 Ropes also displays a collection of 
forgotten junk objects with white labels that display chance fragments of speech. However, while 
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those fragments represented a multitude of voices in 16 Ropes, in Mother and Son the hanging 
objects represent phrases spoken only by one person: the son addressing his mother.  
The installation still maintains a polyphonic quality, as the son’s utterances resound with 
the mother’s self-narrative. The mother’s narrative frames the son’s voice, giving shape and 
coherence to his diffuse and fragmented remarks. In the description of the installation, Kabakov 
writes that the “compositional meaning” of the piece comes from the relationship between these 
two voices: the son’s words to the mother “filled with purely undeserved grievances and belated 
regrets” and “the surrounding story of her life as told by her.”68 Kabakov’s self-narrative cannot 
be told in isolation, but rather must include two voices speaking to each other. There is 
something mournful about the dialogue, not only because they fail to speak directly to each 
other, but also because even this dialogue, imperfect as it may be, can no longer take place. As 
Kay Larson wrote in a review of the installation, Mother and Son is “a work of devotion and 
contrition.”69 
The somber mood of the installation is further heightened by the fact that the room is 
bathed in darkness, with only a single lightbulb dimly illuminating the space. In his book On the 
Total Installation, Kabakov describes the psychological effect of a semi-darkened installation. 
He suggests that it “encourages the emergence of a semi-awake-semi-dream state. This state, like 
no other, activates our recollections, flows of fantasies, associations, analogies, all arising to the 
surface of our historical and cultural memory.”70 Within the darkened room of Mother and Son, 
suggestive of the womb, visitors are given a flashlight which they can direct at the objects to 
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illuminate them. Julie H. Reiss, the Assistant Curator of the 1993 exhibit at the Jewish Museum, 
writes about the experience of viewing Mother and Son:  
The Kabakov piece, Mother and Son, allowed the viewer to enter the room and be 
surrounded by the environment that Kabakov had created. To some extent, the experience 
was tightly controlled by the artist. Only six people were allowed in the room at one time, 
and to ensure this, a guard was hired to stand near the entrance of the space. The room 
was almost completely dark; the only light source was a painted-over lightbulb hanging 
from the ceiling. Visitors were required to use a flashlight when entering the space, but 
only six flashlights were provided, so people had to wait for someone to come out before 
they could get a flashlight and go in. Once inside, the viewer had to duck under the 
strings of refuse and Russian and English texts strung across the room. The flashlight 
could be used to illuminate works on the walls as well, at the viewer’s own discretion. In 
that respect, the viewer controlled his or her own perception of the piece.71 
 
Reiss highlights the tension between Kabakov’s controlled environment and the viewer’s 
freedom within it. While Kabakov restricts the number of people allowed within the installation, 
the viewers are ultimately in control of which objects they will focus on. They can view the son’s 
objects and the mother’s narrative at random, out of sequence. The text of the mother’s memoir 
is already presented in a fragmented state, broken up and placed into 42 frames, but it is further 
fragmented by the viewer’s interaction with the space. Indeed, in the description of the 
installation, Kabakov calls attention to the fragmented nature of the installation’s narrative. As 
the viewer casts his flashlight around the room, she finds only “the chance fragments of the past, 
a past that is now already impossible to recapture or to change.”72 This again gives the 
installation a mournful aspect, as we feel the fragmentary quality of memory, the inability to 
piece it all back together and create a coherent whole. And, all the while, a voice singing old 
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Russian romance songs can be heard in the darkness, which adds to the installation’s atmosphere 
of melancholic longing. 
By translating the mother’s album into the medium of an installation, Kabakov 
transforms the meaning of the text. No longer is it a text to be read in a linear fashion, from 
beginning to end, in the form of an album. In the form of the installation, it invites the viewers to 
absorb the text at random, at their own discretion. The narrative now functions less as a text to be 
read and more as a visual to be seen. If the logic of the album hinged on the contrast between the 
shining images of Soviet life and the mother’s memoir, the installation places greater emphasis 
on the relationship between mother and son. The dialogic relationship between Kabakov and 
Solodukhina, through the contrapuntal arrangement of their voices, takes on new importance. 
Within the darkened intimate space of the installation, these fragments of voices create a kind of 
melancholy or mournful atmosphere. The installation exhibits a more serious engagement with 
affect, emotion, and sentiment that we can read as part of the “curative sincerity” Rutten 
describes.  
After exhibiting Mother and Son at the Jewish Museum for the museum’s re-opening in 
1993, Kabakov recast the installation in a different key. The new installation, Operating Room 
(Mother and Son) (1994), bears some structural similarities to Mother and Son. As in Mother 
and Son, the mother’s memoirs line the walls. However, instead of darkness, the room is 
“flooded with intense, bright, even white ‘operation room’ light.”73 In the center of the 
installation, instead of the objects hanging on pieces of rope, there is a labyrinth of white tables 
on which many of Kabakov’s previous works, including the album Ten Characters, are 
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displayed. These works “represent everything that is going on in the author’s mind.”74 Indeed, 
when viewed from above, the labyrinth of tables comes to resemble a cross-section of the brain. 
Like Mother and Son, this installation offers a representation of the son’s consciousness. While 
the darkened atmosphere of the first installation suggests a dream-like exploration of the 
unconscious, the sterile bright light of Operating Room takes a more clinical approach. 
Although the materials in the center have changed, the essential structure between the 
frame and the center remains the same. Both Mother and Son and Operating Room stage a 
dialogue between the mother’s self-narrative and the son’s expressions of the self, but this 
relationship is configured differently in each installation. While in Mother and Son the mother’s 
memoir frames the son’s fragmentary utterances within the darkened space, in Operating Room 
the memoir frames the son’s artistic creations. Just as the mother’s narrative is broken up into 
frames that surround the room, so too are Kabakov’s artistic creations also in frames. The 
installation thus invites a comparison between the invented biographies that populate Kabakov’s 
artistic work and the mother’s autobiographical narrative. 
In the description of the installation, Kabakov discusses the relationship between the 
frame and the center:  
Both the ‘labyrinth’ and the ‘ring’ surrounding it are portraits of the consciousness of two 
real people: the author, Ilya Kabakov, and his mother, B. Solodukhina. Moreover, it is as 
though the ‘mother’s consciousness’ — her genuine description of her life — surrounds 
the ‘consciousness’ of the son, encloses it inside itself, and a dialogue arises between 
them.75  
 
The mother envelops the son — the classic iconography of mother with child transformed into a 
non-figurative embrace. The spatial arrangement of these installations recreates what the 
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psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott would call the “holding environment” between mother and son, 
in which the mother physically holds the infant. If the holding environment is “good enough”—if 
the mother not only meets the child’s needs but also “survives” the child’s aggression, anger, 
grief—then the child’s psyche is able to develop.76 In these installations, the mother’s narrative 
frames or holds the son’s “consciousness” (to borrow Kabakov’s phrase) within the center of the 
installation. The mother’s surrounding self-narrative not only gives shape and meaning to the 
son’s pieces, but also enables the son to express himself. If, as we recall, the mother’s memoir 
was demanded by the son, here he offers a response to her story. It is by shaping and arranging 
her narrative, placing it in connection with his own, that he attempts to express his own 
consciousness.  
 As mentioned earlier, Kabakov began his experiments with the total installation in an 
effort to re-create the context that he had lost in emigration: the presentation of his albums and 
paintings within the familiar space of his studio to a group of fellow artists who understood the 
social conditions that shaped his creative work. In these installations, however, the context that 
defines his work is recast as the fundamental relationship between mother and child. This is the 
relationship that structures and gives meaning to his work. In the space of the “operating room,” 
all of his albums and artworks are reconceived as an attempt to communicate with the mother.  
 
Labyrinth: My Mother’s Album 
Kabakov would again return to the autobiographical material from My Mother’s Album to 
create another installation: Labyrinth: My Mother’s Album (1990). But in this installation, 
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Kabakov takes a different approach to the material. Unlike Mother and Son or Operating Room, 
this installation does not create a dialogue through the juxtaposition of the son’s fragments of 
speech with the mother’s narrative. We have only the mother’s narrative. Nor does it pitch us 
into a dark room with only a flashlight to illuminate the narrative that surrounds us. Instead, the 
installation is constructed, as the title suggests, like a labyrinth.  
The narrow corridors, low ceilings, and bad lighting evoke the halls of a communal 
apartment. Given that much of the mother’s memoir is about the struggle to find a place to live, 
the location of her memoir within the space of the installation is fitting: the corridor seems to 
offer the possibility of finding a home. And yet, the inability to find the right door in the corridor 
that would allow you to enter into a living space denies us a place to rest. Moreover, the 
ephemerality of the installation reminds us that even the haven of the corridor will soon 
disappear.  
On the walls hang frames that combine photographs with the text from his mother’s 
memoirs. However, the images from official magazines that were used in My Mother’s Album 
have been replaced by photographs taken by Kabakov’s uncle Yu. G. Blekher (his mother’s 
brother-in-law). The use of these photos from the family archive differs from his usual artistic 
practice. Kabakov has written about his use of stock photographs to create his “realistic” 
paintings in the style of Socialist Realism. He writes that for these paintings it was critical to use 
anonymous photographs, rather than personal ones:  
I would use photographs of what should be depicted in the painting. But which 
photographs? They had to be ‘alien’ to me—taken by people I don’t know and depicting 
places and people I don’t know; this was the most important thing—that I did not know 
any of this and did not want to know! Furthermore, right up until today (with the rare 
exception), I would always make use, one could say, of material twice removed from me: 
reproductions of these photographs printed in Soviet magazines of the 1950s with all 
their accompanying qualities: the poor quality of the print, dull colors, misalignments, 
hackwork in terms of coloring and editing. In other words, I required that very 
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anonymous, disinterested ‘product’ that ostensibly everyone needs but no one in 
particular actually needs; this ‘product’ corresponded precisely to that understanding of 
‘reality’ discussed above. […] And I would like to reiterate, or rather to clarify: in all of 
these cases, I used not the photograph, but the reproduction to achieve my goals, that is, a 
double mechanical re-creation which has already twice distorted that which exists ‘in 
reality.’77  
 
While Kabakov continued this practice by using stock photos for My Mother’s Album and the 
other installations, in Labyrinth he replaces these stock images with personal photos. If before 
Kabakov had taken on the roles of curator, archivist, and art historian when putting together 
installations such as Alternative History of Art that exhibited artworks by fake artists, now he 
again steps into the role of curator but in order to bring together the private voices from his own 
family. Although the installation still presents us with biographies of other people and images 
created by other artists, we would be hard pressed to call this the same kind of “self-
expropriation” of authorial voice that Groys sees as typical of Kabakov’s oeuvre. Instead, 
although it is the memoir of his mother, this narrative obliquely also tells us of Kabakov’s own 
life. Rather than his typical ironic play with clichéd images of Soviet life or with invented 
characters, Kabakov here speaks from a more autobiographical position. Writing about 
Labyrinth, Kate Fowle observes that “we are given a rare glimpse of Kabakov in plain sight. To 
embrace that this installation is devoid of actors is to be given an extraordinary window into a 
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reality that underpins the artist’s usual ‘experiments in biography’. We are made witness to facts 
that have been camouflaged in a lifetime of elaborate fictions.”78 
The photographs are of the Ukrainian city Berdyansk, where Kabakov’s mother lived for 
the last few decades of her life. These sepia-toned photos sharply diverge from the colorful and 
joyous representation of Soviet life in the “official” photographs. Blekher’s photos are more 
melancholic, sentimental, and personal than the photos taken from Soviet magazines. Often of 
empty landscapes, these images have a quietness to them. There is a shift, then, from the album 
and the previous two installations that include generic images from Soviet magazines to the 
presentation of the memoir in Labyrinth where these images are replaced by the unofficial 
photographs taken by his uncle. 
 Directly underneath the fragments of text, however, are thin cutouts from Soviet 
postcards. The photos of official “Soviet life” that had dominated the visual field in My Mother’s 
Album are now reduced to slivers. Now, priority is given to Blekher’s photographs. Given their 
fragmentary presentation, these images of official Soviet life are no longer legible. Instead, they 
simply give a dash of color. Relegating these fragmented bright images to a space beneath the 
text and the other image also signals a shift in Kabakov’s approach to this material. If the visual 
logic of My Mother’s Album operated on the principle of radical juxtaposition, then Labyrinth 
operates on the principle of correspondence or consonance. The elements within the frame do not 
fight each other, rather they reinforce each other. Blekher’s melancholy photographs form a 
unity with the mother’s narrative, as opposed to the sharp divide between image and text in the 
album. I would suggest that we can read the interplay between text and image in this installation 
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as part of Kabakov’s increasing turn to a more sincere engagement with the Soviet past. 
Labyrinth offers a sentimental portrait of his mother’s life free of Kabakov’s typically playful, 
ironizing, demythologizing treatment of official images of socialist realism and Soviet life. 
All of these fragments—Blekher’s photographs, the memoir text, and the postcard 
cutouts—are pasted on pink wallpaper, which are in turn framed. In his installation of family 
photographs On the Roof, which we will turn to later, Kabakov also includes several of Blekher’s 
photographs. He describes how Blekher, a professional photographer, “most of all loved to take 
pictures for himself—to wander around his beloved city and photograph ‘selected’ corners—a 
wonderful collection of these photographs was left by him.”79 After developing his photos, he 
would “glue them on colored cards, outlining each photograph with a color frame.”80 As we can 
see, the presentation of the photographs framed by colored paper and pasted on pieces of 
wallpaper in the installation seems indebted to his uncle Blekher’s method. The wallpaper brings 
a bit of color to the dreary environment of the installation, but moreover a certain domesticity to 
the presentation of the memoirs that was absent from the earlier grey frames. Each frame now 
bears the title «воспоминания моей мамы», the title of the photograph, and then «биография 
мамы», all in Kabakov’s handwriting. The repetition of these handwritten titles on each frame 
emphasizes the handmade quality, as opposed to being mass-produced. Kabakov writes that he 
“brought all of these elements from Moscow, including the old grayish-pink wallpaper on which 
all of this is glued.”81 Kabakov emphasizes the provenance of these elements to insist on their 
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authenticity, their ability to recreate a world within the space of the museum. As opposed to the 
kitschy reproductions of socialist realist images or the austere, anonymous background of the 
grey paper, these materials evince a more intimate, emotional presentation of the narrative.  
The sentimental aspect of the installation is heightened by the fact that Kabakov’s voice 
can be heard singing old Russian romance songs. Labyrinth was the first installation, Kabakov 
notes, in which he included a “musical part.”82 And the importance of the voice in this 
installation, as he describes it, is to set off the boredom the viewer experiences while moving 
through the labyrinth. He suggests that the viewer would be “permeated with fatal boredom and 
not just from the content of the text, the appearance of the ‘poor’ images and the corridor, but 
from the vexation that he had wound up in such a tedious, monotonous, ‘bad’ installation—if it 
weren’t for the voice and its important role in this work.”83 He suggests that the voice is 
important because it is first audible just when the viewer is likely to be seized by boredom, as he 
encounters yet another corridor. The voice grows louder as you move towards the center, and 
this leads the viewer on to continue walking. Reaching the center of the labyrinth, where the 
voice is loudest, the viewer expects to finally see the person singing; instead, the viewer is 
confronted with a small, empty room in disarray. And as the viewer moves away towards the 
exit, the voice again gradually weakens.  
By structuring the installation as a labyrinth, Kabakov invokes the Greek myth of the 
Cretan Labyrinth created by Daedalus to house the Minotaur. As the myth goes, Theseus enters 
the Labyrinth to slay the Minotaur, aided by a ball of thread given to him by Ariadne to help him 
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find his way out of the maze. By stepping into the labyrinth, we are transported to a shadowy 
otherworld. We move deeper into the labyrinth in order to eventually re-emerge into the light, 
transformed by the obstacles encountered and vanquished within. In this respect, the journey into 
and out of the labyrinth also works as a powerful metaphor for rebirth. Indeed, in Book 6 of 
Vergil’s Aeneid an ekphrastic description of the Cretan labyrinth engraved by Daedalus on the 
temple doors of Cumae prepares the reader for Aeneas’ imminent descent into the Underworld. 
The Underworld, like the mythic Labyrinth, is easy to enter, but difficult to exit: “Easy” is the 
way into Dis, “but to recall your steps to rise again / into the upper air: that is the labor” (VI.175–
79).84 Journeying into the depths of the labyrinth to emerge back into life thus connotes a 
symbolic rebirth or transformation.  
The labyrinthine structure of the installation thus comes to signify the mother’s journey 
through life, which we as spectators must retrace. However, if this mythic Labyrinth animates 
the installation, it is not without significant changes. At the center of the Labyrinth, we find not a 
Minotaur but an abandoned room littered with rubbish. The center structures the classical 
labyrinth, as it is here that the hero undergoes the climactic test which gives meaning to the 
journey. With nothing at the center of Kabakov’s labyrinth, the hope for regeneration or 
transformation is dashed. The center has been emptied of significance. There is no ultimate 
center that would stabilize meaning, no center that makes sense of the mother’s suffering. In 
short, we have moved from the epic myth to the prosaic novel. There is no beast to slay, no 
recognizable foe to be vanquished, just an endless string of days spent in suffering. 
Indeed, part of the myth’s deflation stems from the very unreadability of the mother’s 
narrative in this installation. The viewer is not expected to actually read the entire narrative while 
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moving through the installation.85 Once her memoir is placed within the frame, it is taken out of 
the context of the album that is read cover to cover.86 ⁠ As noted above, the darkened room in 
Mother and Son also made it difficult to “read” the narrative in its entirety. And although the 
structures of these two installations differ greatly, there are similar impediments to reading the 
narrative smoothly in Labyrinth. The placement of the frames within the corridor of Labyrinth 
are such that the photographic images are roughly at eye-level, but you need to stoop down or 
hunch over somewhat to read the text that is placed below eye-level. You must engage your body 
actively to try to read it. It is not an installation that you can passively take in. Or, rather, you 
can, but this would involve simply glancing at the frames and moving on. To actually “read” 
each frame, all 76 of them, would take hours. The viewer can either engage in the difficult 
process of attempting to read each frame, or speed through the corridor of the labyrinth. 
And yet, while the presentation of the frames belabors the process of reading the 
narrative, the installation is also configured in such a way that makes it difficult for the viewer to 
simply disregard the frames and walk quickly through the corridor. When the installation was 
originally exhibited at the Ronald Feldman Gallery in New York, vertical wooden beams 
punctuated the corridor.87 ⁠  These beams influence the way a participant or viewer could move 
through the space; as the beams obstruct the path, the viewer has to physically step around them. 
By impeding the viewer’s progress through the hallway, the installation forces the viewer to slow 
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down — an example of what Viktor Shklovsky called zatrudnenie or “making difficult.” 
Shklovsky argued that the artistic device of zatrudnenie helps to de-automatize our perception of 
the world. In this case, the beams seem to encourage the viewer to turn back and look more 
closely at the frames on the corridor wall. The journey is made difficult. 
Nonetheless, Kabakov acknowledges that the viewer is ultimately at liberty, according to 
the logic of the installation, to move around and linger longer over certain parts than others. In 
his description of how a viewer might move through the Labyrinth, he writes: “He immediately 
enters its dull gloom, and the speed of his movement depends only upon his willingness to read 
the text on each ‘painting.’ Instantaneously, the viewer understands that there won’t be anything 
besides the paintings and that he is free to walk as quickly as he wishes along the corridor.”88  
Indeed, this is what I witnessed when Labyrinth was shown as part of the Kabakovs’ 
recent exhibition “Not Everyone Will be Taken into the Future” at the Tate Modern.89  Viewers 
of the installation at the Tate Modern initially attended closely to the frames, dutifully reading 
the text and looking at the photographs. But soon they realized, as the corridor twists and turns, 
that there are many more of these frames—too many for them to take in. They then moved 
swiftly through the installation.  
Whether the viewer moves slowly or quickly through the installation, it is clear that the 
installation privileges form over content. We are not expected to read every word. Rather, it is 
about the affective or bodily experience of struggling to read the narrative when the form is so 
forbidding. The fragmented frames force you to slow down your reading process, as you hunch 
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over and strain your eyes in the dim light to read the small print, while the beams obstruct your 
path. The installation forces the viewer into an uncomfortable position, no matter how brief, as 
they make their way through the installation. To be a viewer in Labyrinth is to experience a 
physical demand on your body. In this way, the form of the installation attempts to produce in 
the viewer some semblance of what his mother suffered over her long life as we wander the 
corridor and grow tired. In this regard, the installation seems to offer something of a challenge, 
as the viewer can either take up this struggle or hurry out in search of the exit, trying to escape.  
As we have seen, Kabakov continually returns to his mother’s memoir, reworking it in 
different ways. The repeated return to the mother’s memoir seems informed by the medium of 
installation art itself. Ephemeral by nature, the installation does not last. It will be taken down. 
The impermanence of the installation is thus challenged with each successive transformation of 
the piece, as it is revived in different configurations. The world of his mother has disappeared but 
is brought back to life briefly in the installation, although with the knowledge that it will soon 
again disappear. 
We could also read this return in a psychoanalytic key, as a metaphor for the compulsion 
to repeat, as Kabakov returns to the traumatic narrative of the mother in order to master it. 
Indeed, with each successive revision, it is primarily his relation to the mother’s narrative that is 
transformed. Sometimes it is cast as a dialogue between her life narrative and his creative works 
as in Operating Room, or his everyday utterances as in Mother and Son, while at other times her 
narrative takes center stage as his presence diminishes as in Labyrinth. While Kabakov 
demanded a self-narrative from his mother, it is in his shaping and re-shaping of it that he also 
provides something akin to his own expression of the self through his response to her narrative. 
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These installations dramatize the fact that every self-narrative negotiates the relationship 
between self and other.  
 
On the Roof 
The cluster of installations around Solodukhina’s memoir reveal Kabakov’s increased 
interest in using autobiographical materials. These installations presented us with a kind of 
oblique narrative of the self in dialogue with the mother. Kabakov’s later installation On the Roof 
(1996) offers a more explicit form of self-representation, as hundreds of Kabakov’s family 
photos are displayed and narrated. Exhibited at the Palais des Beaux-Arts in Brussels, the 
installation creates the space of a roof. The viewer emerges onto the walkways of the “roof” 
among the sloping sides of the roof and windows that look into 10 different rooms. These 
windows are at eye-level, so viewers can easily peer into these rooms and there is a door to each 
that they can enter. The décor of the rooms suggests comfortable middle-class living spaces. The 
rooms have the appearance of being lived in; some have children’s toys scattered casually around 
the room, others have chairs that look recently occupied. In each room, a projector displays a 
slideshow of family photographs onto the wall. There are several chairs assembled so that 
viewers can sit down and watch the slide show. A voiceover narrates the slideshow; in some 
rooms it is a man’s voice and in other rooms a woman’s voice. The slideshow in the first room 
shows scenes from childhood and each successive room depicts another stage of life. Each room 
shows about 25 photos, with 237 photographs in all. 
Given that (as noted above) Kabakov typically prefers to use photographs of anonymous 
figures rather than of people he knows, the use of family photographs in this installation makes it 
singular in his oeuvre. Moreover, as Margarita Tupitsyn has noted, photography was not the 
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medium of choice for many unofficial artists because of the government’s use of photography for 
mythologizing Soviet life.90 Tupitsyn writes that unofficial artists saw photography as “a prime 
suspect in the success of the deceptive political apparatus,” and thus dismissed its ability to offer 
“a potent creative realm.”91 As Ekaterina Degot points out, photography was low in the hierarchy 
of the arts in the Soviet Union, but that this low ranking actually signals its “extreme 
importance” since “the Soviet art system […] radically privileged ‘non-art.’”92 Unofficial artists 
displayed distrust or skepticism about this purportedly objective medium when it was known to 
be an organ of propaganda.93 Tupitsyn shows how Kabakov and other artists turned to the 
photographic archive as a productive site. In several of his works, Kabakov delves into this 
archive of mythologizing photos and repurposes it in his work, revealing the images’ constructed 
nature. This tendency, as we have already seen, structures the relationship between word and 
image in the album My Mother’s Album and the installations Mother and Son and Operating 
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Room that deconstruct photographs from Soviet magazines by juxtaposing them with his 
mother’s harrowing memoir. 
In On the Roof Kabakov takes a different approach to the use of photographs. Rather than 
mining photos from the Soviet archive, he turns to the archive of family photographs. The 
installation displays photographs of Kabakov and his family, as well as his wife Emilia and her 
family. If photography was used to mythologize life in the Soviet Union, then these personal 
photos from the family archive do the opposite. These photographs show the underside of the 
mythic vision of socialist realism. They represent the ordinary, uneventful, everyday moments 
that make up a life. The use of personal photographs combined with first-person narratives about 
the family indicates a turn to sincerity. And yet, as we will see, this more emotional engagement 
with the past and with memory in the first-person is nonetheless tempered with the conceptualist 
artist’s awareness of the limits of such an endeavor. 
The installation follows the pattern of displaying a photograph accompanied by a 
description that often begins with “This is…” (Это…). Kabakov seems to be playing with the 
idea of photography as a referential medium. The verbal narrative insists that these images refer 
to figures beyond the installation (“This is Galya”). But, over time, the endless repetition of this 
formula begins to deconstruct this idea. Who are these people that the photos and narration refer 
us to? Do they remain out of reach?  
Here it might be illustrative to compare this piece with one of his paintings Where Are 
They? (1971). The canvas is framed by a light blue border on the top and bottom, although the 
border on the bottom is a shade darker than the blue on top. The white space between the borders 
is broken into five columns. All of the columns are empty, save the one on the far left. In 
handwritten script, the whereabouts of 27 people are asked: «Где Ефим Борисович 
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Теодоровский? Где Иннокентий Борисович Райский? Где Софья Алексеевна 
Костороженская?» and so on. We know nothing about these characters, only that they are 
absent. The absence of any figuration and the emptiness of the following columns strengthens 
the feeling of their absence. And yet, by calling these people by name, a sense of their presence 
is conjured up, if only to be immediately banished. The painting stimulates a desire for narrative: 
to know more about these people who are gone. Where have they gone and why? Does their 
disappearance speak to the Purges, or is this a more quotidian question about the inhabitants, say, 
of a communal apartment? But the ultimate lesson of the painting is simply that they are not real, 
they are nothing more than text painted on the canvas. They are empty signs that refer to nothing. 
As Mikhail Epstein writes, Conceptualism reveals “the emptiness of its own signs,” as it 
“discloses the contingency of all concepts and refuses to ground itself in any reality.”94 While the 
slideshow of On the Roof, with its repetition of “This is…”, still plays with the conceptualist idea 
of the elusive signifier, of reminding us that these are signs detached from their referent, the 
tenor of that game shifts as the question (gde) becomes an affirmative statement of presence (eto) 
and photographs are introduced. The photographs give an affirmation of presence, however 
spectral and fleeting.  
With the repetition of “This is…” to narrate a succession of photographs, the installation 
calls to mind the conceptualist poet Lev Rubinshtein’s 1995 piece “That’s Me…” («Это я…»).  
Written on 119 index cards, the poem presents a fragmentary self-portrait through a description 
of photographs: 
1. Это я. 
2. Это тоже я. 
3. И это я. 
4. Это родители. Кажется, в Кисловодске. Надпись: «1952». 
                                               
94 Epstein, “The Philosophical Implications of Russian Conceptualism,” 69. 
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5. Миша с волейбольным мячом. 
6. Я с санками. 
 
1. This is me. 
2. This is also me. 
3. And this is me. 
4. This is my parents. In Kislovodsk, it seems. Caption: “1952”. 
5. Misha with a volleyball. 
6. Me with a sled.95 
 
In a reading of this piece, Mark Lipovetsky suggests that the photographs work to embody the 
dislocated voice of the “I” in the poem. While he notes that Andrei Zorin has characterized 
Rubinshtein’s poetic world as being “populated by bodiless voices calling out in the void,” in 
this poem Lipovetsky argues that “the device of the photographs’ names gives a very concrete 
and, in fact, bodily significance to words that are extremely general (indeed, to pronouns).”96 
According to Lipovetsky, by attaching deictic shifters such as the pronoun “I” to photographs, 
the poem claims some referential power. And yet, it seems crucial that those photographs are not 
shown. I would suggest that, rather than the notional photos giving concrete bodily form to the 
pronouns, we witness the reverse process. The photos of one’s self come to be seen as dependent 
on context to signify as the slippery pronoun “I.” If anything, the “I” in this poem seems less 
securely connected with a physical body given the very profusion of supposed bodies found in 
the photographs that the poetic “I” claims to refer to.  
The ninth index card—“Рынок в Уфе. Надпись: ‘Рынок в Уфе. 1940 г.’” (“A market in 
Ufa. Caption: ‘Market in Ufa. 1940.”)—neatly encapsulates how these “captions” foreground 
questions of representation, as it presents us with the (notional) photograph of a market in Ufa, a 
                                               
95 Rubinshtein, Bolʹshaia kartoteka, 569. See also Rubinshtein’s piece “Я здесь” (Here I am, 
1994), 555–66. My translation. 
96 Lipovetsky, Russian Postmodernist Fiction, 148. 
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textual inscription, and a recapitulation of the caption. It does something similar to Joseph 
Kosuth’s classic conceptualist piece One and Three Chairs (1965) which offers a lesson in 
semiotics by presenting three modes of representing a chair: a full-scale photograph of a chair, a 
wooden chair, and an enlarged dictionary definition of a chair. In Rubinshtein’s poem, the 
repetition of the textual signifiers reveals the emptiness of these signs. 
Unlike Rubinshtein’s poem, though, On the Roof does include actual photographs. Even 
though On the Roof still plays with the gap between the verbal description/narration and the 
photographs, the use of actual photographs gives a bodily presence to the disembodied voices of 
the speakers. 
The installation, with its narrated slideshows projected in living rooms, simulates the 
intimate readings of his work that Kabakov would give in in his studio in Moscow. As noted 
earlier, unofficial culture took place in private, domestic studio spaces, not in museums and 
gallery spaces. Not only did Kabakov share his work with his fellow artists in studios and view 
the masterpieces of the Russian avant-garde in George Costakis’ living room, but many of his 
works also explore the domestic spaces of late Soviet culture, such as his Kitchen Series (1981–
82). As Jackson writes, Kabakov’s installations offer a “domestication of the utopian 
imagination.”97 On the Roof is no exception, as the viewers are invited to step out of the museum 
space and into the domestic realm. If in Labyrinth we were consigned to wander the empty 
corridor, trying to open doors and finding that they led nowhere, then here we are invited to enter 
into the rooms of this family. We are privy to hearing them narrate their lives. The fifth room in 
this installation (the centerpiece of On the Roof) even recreates Kabakov’s artist studio in 
Moscow, which further invites the comparison between this installation and the readings 
                                               
97 Jackson, The Experimental Group, 59. 
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Kabakov would give as an unofficial artist in Moscow. Indeed, Kabakov’s studio was located in 
the attic of a building on Sretensky Boulevard. There are several photographs in the installation 
of Kabakov on the roof of the building; one such image pictures Kabakov with his daughter 
Galya, accompanied by a voice that comments: “The entire roof of that building, or rather under 
it, also housed artists’ studios who, seeing us passing by, would invite us in and we would drop 
in through the window. It was really interesting, this journey from a room to the roof and then 
into a room again…”98 This itinerary—travelling from room to room via the roof—describes, of 
course, the installation’s setting “on the roof.” The installation thus tells the story of this family 
while also recreating the spaces in which the underground world (or, perhaps more accurately, 
the attic world) of Moscow Conceptualism flourished. 
In his description of the installation, Kabakov highlights the banality of the slideshow of 
family photos. As he says, this is a ritual that all families partake in, and such showings are 
interesting only if you have some attachment to those who are involved or pictured. The viewer 
can feel like an outsider watching slides of people he does not know. Kabakov’s works often flirt 
with the banal, emptiness, and boredom. Kabakov’s performances of albums such as Ten 
Characters could last up to four hours. Indeed, Kabakov once described the performances of his 
albums, which he began to do in the 1970s, as being similar to “a situation entirely familiar to 
everyone, when we arrive at someone’s house and the hostess, not knowing how to occupy us, 
begins to show us the fat ‘family’ album with family photographs. ‘This is our aunt, this is our 
brother-in-law, these are my sister’s acquaintances from the institute…’”99 Kabakov thus 
literalizes the correspondence between his artistic work and the family photo album in this 
                                               
98 Kabakov, On the Roof, 164. 
99 Quoted in Jackson, The Experimental Group, 150. 
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installation: viewers drop into someone’s room and are shown family photos while disembodied 
voices narrate the slides. Jackson writes that Kabakov’s album performances “furnished total 
nonexperiences” and exposed the “invisible hollow core of Soviet […] consciousness.”100 A 
similar dynamic seems to be at play in this installation. Hundreds of photos are shown, each 
receives a brief description. The cumulative effect of these images, though, is an evocation of a 
lost world.  
The arrangement of the installation follows the general structure of the Bildungsroman; 
as we move from room to room we progress chronologically from childhood to adulthood. The 
typicality of the installation’s structure leads the viewer, Kabakov suggests, to potentially begin 
to feel that these images are somehow also about him. He writes that the viewer might eventually 
begin to feel that he is included in the family history unfolding in the slideshow:  
Он, зритель, то абсолютно посторонен судьбе людей внутри комнат, он ‘человек с 
крыши’ — то, с другой стороны, зайдя в любую из них, погрузившись в 
незатейливую ‘семейную’ историю, он понимает, что это и ‘про него’, и у него, в 
его жизни было то же самое, и он такой же, как ‘они’, такой же, как все…101  
 
He, the viewer, is either a complete outsider vis-à-vis the fate of the people inside the 
room, he is a ‘person from the roof,’ or on the other hand, dropping into any one of these 
rooms, submerging himself into an ordinary ‘family’ story, he understands that this is 
also ‘about him,’ and he experienced the same things in his life, and he is just the same as 
‘they’ are, the same as everybody else…102 
 
The banality of the family album opens it up to a kind of universal experience. They could be of 
anyone. Everyone’s family album looks more or less the same. Indeed, this is the point that 
Pierre Bourdieu makes in his sociological study of photography (1965). Describing what he calls 
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the “family function” of photography, Bourdieu suggests that photos of families are a means of 
reaffirming the cohesion of the group.103 Moreover, the types of photographs that families, or 
other groups, take to affirm their connection are socially conditioned. Although photography 
seems to open up infinite possibilities about what could be represented, which could lead to a 
situation of “anarchy,” Bourdieu argues that photography is in fact highly structured. “There is 
nothing more regulated and conventional than photographic practice,” for people “obey implicit 
canons” of composition and subject matter when deciding what and how to photograph.104 
Kabakov’s implication that his family photographs are potentially interchangeable with the 
viewer’s thus seems to share common ground with Bourdieu’s understanding of photographs, 
and family photographs in particular, as implicitly shaped by societal norms. To revise Tolstoy’s 
famous phrase: all family albums, happy or unhappy, are alike. 
The narratives that accompany the photographs in On the Roof thus function differently 
from the captions to photographs in Nabokov’s autobiography. As we recall, Nabokov worked to 
authorize the captions as his singular creations—by pointing out the falsity of some of the poses 
that made the family look like something it wasn’t, by drawing our eye to specific details, or 
digressing to tell stories attached with the image—in part so that they would not be the kind of 
generic photos you would find in anyone’s album. Kabakov here takes the opposite approach. 
While there are spoken “captions” to each photo in the installation, and while they do tell stories 
                                               
103 Bourdieu, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art, 19–21. Susan Sontag would later go on to make 
a similar point when she observes that “Photography becomes a rite of family life just when, in 
the industrializing countries of Europe and America, the very institution of the family starts 
undergoing radical surgery. As that claustrophobic unit, the nuclear family, was being carved out 
of a much larger family aggregate, photography came along to memorialize, to restate 
symbolically, the imperiled continuity and vanishing extendedness of family life.” Sontag, On 
Photography, 8–9.  
104 Bourdieu, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art, 7.  
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about the images and identify the people in them, it is the sheer quantity of them and their 
repetitive quality that makes them all begin to blend together, giving the sense that there is 
perhaps nothing unique about these images at all. 
In this way, On the Roof seems to recall the French conceptual artist Christian 
Boltanski’s 1971 installation Album de photos de la famille D., 1939–1964 (Photo Album of the 
Family D., 1939–1964).105 The installation presented 180 photographs that were enlarged so that 
they were all a uniform size. They were placed in tin frames and arranged in a uniform pattern. 
The photos came from the family photo album of Boltanski’s friend Michel Durand-Dessert, a 
gallery owner in Paris. Although Boltanski did not know the people pictured in the photographs, 
he invented a family history for them by imposing a chronology on the images and “identifying” 
the figures within the photos. Of the installation, Boltanski notes that “these images were only 
witnesses to a collective ritual. They didn’t teach us anything about the Family D. … but only 
sent us back to our own past.”106 He makes a similar point in a 1989 interview about the 
installation:  
In this album you have 25 years of the life of a family. You see all the photos of a normal 
family album. What I wanted to say is that we all have the same kind of family album. In 
fact, we don’t learn anything about this particular family, we learn about ourselves. When 
we see the little child on a beach, for example, we already know this photo. We 
remember our first time on the beach or the photo of our little brother.107  
 
                                               
105 Whether Kabakov was familiar with this particular installation is unclear. However, Kabakov 
would have been familiar with Boltanski’s work in general. The two artists both exhibited 
installations in 1993 as part of the re-opening of the Jewish Museum. Kabakov exhibited Mother 
and Son, while Boltanski’s piece involved an “archaeological” perspective on the bat and bar 
mitzvah ceremony. For more details, see the catalog of the show: Susan Tumarkin Goodman, 
ed., From the Inside Out: Eight Contemporary Artists (New York: Jewish Museum, 1993). 
106 Bernhard Jussen, ed., Signal: Christian Boltanski (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004), 115. 
107 Irene Borger, “Christian Boltanski,” Bomb Magazine, January 1, 1989, 
https://bombmagazine.org/articles/christian-boltanski/. 
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Following Bourdieu’s approach, Boltanski presents these family photos not as unique 
representations of an individual family, but rather as part of a larger societal ritual. Boltanski’s 
idea that we see ourselves represented or reflected in these frames is consonant with Kabakov’s 
suggestion that the viewer of On the Roof comes to see the family photos as “about him.”  
Unlike Boltanski’s installation, On the Roof does make use of Kabakov’s own family 
photos. However, despite the use of these autobiographical narratives and images of the self, this 
installation does not claim to represent a personal or individual history but rather a collective 
one. Kabakov suggests that we recognize ourselves in these photos since we too have such 
family photos. Because cultural codes determine what we deem worthy of photographing, the 
photos in the family photo albums are, in some way, identical.  
While critics such as André Bazin and Roland Barthes have created theories of 
photography founded on the idea that the essence of photography is its power to preserve a trace 
of a unique referent, a perennial concern in the history of photography is the photograph’s 
tendency to make the individual homogenous, repeatable, and interchangeable. Daniel Novak, 
for example, has argued that the popular Victorian practice of composition photography, which 
treated bodies as interchangeable and anonymous, reveals that the Victorians considered 
photography to be “a medium with the potential to efface particularity and individuality.”108 
Writing in the 1920s, Siegfried Kracauer stresses the typological aspect of photographic 
representation in his essay “Photography.” Imagining a scene in which young children look at a 
photograph of “Grandma,” he suggests that this family photograph comes to represent not the 
grandmother in her singularity but rather someone of her generation. While the children might 
                                               
108 Daniel Novak, Realism, Photography, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Cambridge, UK: 
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accept that this image represents their grandmother, he writes “in reality it’s any young girl in 
1864.”109 Walter Benjamin’s now classic essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” (1935) articulates how the reproducibility of the image eliminates the “aura” of 
the original and “substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.”110 Although they make for 
strange bedfellows, we might hear an echo of Benjamin’s ideas in the fear Nabokov expressed in 
his Pushkin lecture that photography makes everyone look the same, thus refusing people their 
individuality. He writes that “the ambience” of photographic practices has become “so familiar 
to our present-day sensibilities that latter nineteenth-century celebrities assume the appearance of 
distant relatives—shabbily dressed, all in black as though they were in mourning for the 
iridescent life of yesteryear, invariably relegated to corners of somber, melancholy rooms, 
against a background of dust-laden drapery.”111 By collapsing “celebrities” and “distant 
relatives” into one category, Nabokov faults photography for failing to distinguish and capture 
individuality. The tension between seeing photos as singular and as typical is one that resurfaces 
throughout the history of photography, and it would seem that Kabakov takes up the idea of 
photographs as generic, non-particular, and reproducible. But to do this in an ostensibly 
autobiographical installation challenges the idea of these images as able to represent him as an 
individual.  
                                               
109 Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans. Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 48. 
110 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” in The 
Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott and Harry Zohn (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2008), 22. 
111 Vladimir Nabokov, “Pushkin, or the Real and the Plausible,” trans. Dmitri Nabokov, New 
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Despite the heavy use of autobiographical material, the installation offers a generic self-
portrait, or a portrait of a whole society and culture. In this way, the installation reveals the 
constructed nature of family photographs, as we see repeated again and again the typical shots, 
the typical stories and anecdotes. Similar to the typicality of the family photograph, the 
narratives that accompany such family albums also tend to follow (or pointedly digress from) 
established narrative forms. As de Man notes, other narratives give us a model of how to shape 
the narratives of our own life stories.112 Much like previous photographs dictate the type of 
photos that people take (according to Bourdieu), established literary forms come to dictate the 
representation of the self. 
I would suggest that the uniformity of the generic self-narrative as presented in this 
installation can best be understood by situating it within the context of official Soviet narratives 
of the self. The autobiography or life narrative was a politicized form in the Soviet Union. The 
trajectory of an individual life was seen as an allegory for historical progress, as individuals 
moved forward according to the “masterplot” of socialist realism, to use Katerina Clark’s term, 
into a brighter future.113 The role of diaries and autobiographies as powerful forms that shaped 
Soviet subjectivity have recently been explored by Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck.114 Halfin, in 
his work on autobiographies and the “Communist hermeneutics of the soul,” argues that 
narratives of the self—in the form of autobiographies, confessions, and self-criticism—were a 
                                               
112 de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement.” 
113 Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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114 Halfin, Terror in My Soul; Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind [Electronic Resource]. For a 
cautionary word about the tendency of these approaches to create a monolithic image of a 
singular type of Soviet subjectivity, see Eric Naiman, “On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars Who 
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crucial part of distinguishing oneself as a true Communist. It was through giving an account of 
oneself that the New Soviet subject could be not only represented but actively forged. The form 
of that account was prescribed: the eschatological narrative of Communism was the roadmap for 
an individual’s own journey towards the light.115 As a result, Halfin argues that “the Communist 
autobiography deindividualized lives. Details could be pruned, embellished, or ignored in order 
to fit the author into the Communist literary conventions and write him into the Soviet order.”116  
In contrast, On the Roof presents a narrative of the self that is devoid of this larger 
overarching narrative of progress or enlightenment. The future is stalled. There is no grand 
narrative according to which you must structure your life. Details about this family’s life simply 
accumulate without being shaped into a meaningful plot. And yet, at the same time that On the 
Roof disavows the “deindividualized” or standardized narrative of the self that was demanded by 
the Soviet state, to say that the self-narrative of the installation is not highly standardized would 
be inaccurate. Instead of offering the official standard line, where everything leads up to 
attaining political consciousness and maintaining it, On the Roof presents the standard narrative 
of the everyday: the typical life narrative of Soviet citizens.  
Although the family album trope structures both Boltanski and Kabakov’s installations 
and they seem to share an interest in deconstructing the notion of the individuality of the family, 
they do so in reaction to different forces, within different cultural contexts. Kabakov divorces the 
self-narrative from the ideological framework of Soviet self-narratives, but not in the service of 
writing a unique narrative that celebrates his individuality. Instead, it reaffirms the standardized 
narrative of the self, but simply standardized according to a different model. 
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Nonetheless, the installation does still reveal an emotional desire to maintain a 
connection with the past, to preserve the material traces that are left of his family. If photography 
was a politicized form and treated with suspicion by artists who knew that it could manipulate 
and be manipulated, then these personal family photographs seem to offer a refuge from that. 
Once again, it is the photographs of his mother that Kabakov narrates with an emotional sincerity 
unusual in his work. The eighth room of the installation is entitled “Mama” and is dedicated to 
photographs of her, with a narrative voiced by Kabakov. The first photos depict her as a young 
woman, just graduated from the gymnasium. One of these portraits is from when she was in her 
early twenties. The caption reads: “Mama here is so sad, so sorrowful. This is probably at 22–23, 
her parents had died and mama was the only one working, she had to feed and raise three sisters 
and a brother who were all a lot younger than she was. These were terribly hungry years after the 
revolution.”117 The photograph itself shows damage and is torn in the lower right-hand corner, as 
if the materiality of the photo itself were a metaphor for the mother’s condition at the moment it 
was taken. The photos in the slideshow depict her at different points in her life, sometimes 
pictured with her son, other times with her sister Riva.  
The final photograph in the room depicts her in the last years of her life: “This is the last 
photograph of mama, when she was already very weak and could only walk from the room to the 
kitchen to eat with difficulty. Aunt Riva was always near her, she always looked after her—it 
was hard for her to go outside, and she couldn’t anymore.”118 In this photograph, she is seated at 
a table, with a bowl in front of her and a piece of bread in her hand. The room is dark, but light is 
coming through the window, illuminating part of her face. She looks directly into the camera, 
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over the rim of her glasses. Her gaze into the camera involves Kabakov, beyond the frame. Like 
with the installations based on her memoirs, this image stages a dialogue or connection between 
mother and son.  
In My Mother’s Album, we observed that the “official” narratives’ fictitious 
representations of life are contrasted with his mother’s memoir. In On the Roof, we see a tension 
between the generic or typological aspects of family photographs that would suggest the family 
album (structured by socio-cultural norms and narratives) is not a unique expression of the 
individual family and, on the other hand, a sincere, emotionally vulnerable, and personal attempt 
to speak from the first-person to maintain a connection with a past that is fast disappearing.  
This tension is nicely expressed in the use of the name “Tolya” for Kabakov in the 
installation. The female voice consistently identifies pictures of Ilya Kabakov as “Tolya.” On the 
one hand, this name seems like an estranging device. We might wonder whether this is yet 
another pseudonymous alter ego for the artist. On the other hand, Tolya is the nickname 
Kabakov was given in childhood and is still called this by his close friends and family.119 Thus, it 
also works as a marker of intimacy. The figure we see in the photographs of the installation is 
not the “Ilya Kabakov” of the international art market, but the Tolya known by friends, family, 
and fellow artists working in the attic studios of Moscow’s unofficial art world. Kabakov offers 
pays homage to this community in the slideshow images of his Moscow studio, in turn reflecting 
on the benefits of having formerly been outside (and here again the peripheral position of the 
roof setting is critical) the globalized art market: guaranteed studio space, not subject to the 
capitalist art market, a coterie of engaged interlocutors. The installation stands first and foremost 
as a document of Kabakov’s family, but also of this community of artists he left behind. 
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On the Roof stages an investigation of the everyday. Hundreds of family photographs are 
shown as stories are told about them by disembodied voices. In the installation, there is an 
overarching life narrative in the progression from room to room, but within the rooms 
themselves, narrative takes a backseat to spectacle. Akin to the workings of memory, each 
slideshow offers a paratactic accumulation of isolated moments that appear and then just as 
suddenly disappear. The installation’s slideshows thus follow the logic of what Tom Gunning 
has called the “cinema of attractions,” a dominant form of early cinema.120 Rather than narrative 
storytelling, the cinema of attractions emphasizes “the act of display”121 and favors “temporal 
irruption” instead of “temporal development.”122 The attraction provides the spectator with “a 
jolt of pure presence,”123 and visual pleasure derives from the unpredictability of the appearance 
and disappearance of each spectacle.124 Gunning links early cinema’s logic of 
appearance/disappearance with Freud’s analysis of the fort/da game, in which the child gains 
mastery over the disturbing experience of his mother’s absence (over which he has no control) 
by actively throwing away and then retrieving a wooden spool.125 The alternation of presence 
                                               
120 Gunning’s term is developed from Sergei Eisenstein’s 1923 essay “The Montage of 
Attractions” (Montazh attraktsionov). 
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and absence likewise structures Kabakov’s slideshow installation, as spectators symbolically 
replay the experience of loss and recovery.  
The optical logic of the magic lantern slideshow or the cinema of attractions in 
Kabakov’s installation becomes a fitting metaphor for thinking about collapse, disappearance, 
and loss at the end of a century that witnessed so many moments of rupture. Exhibited in 1996, 
the installation both looks ahead to the new millennium and is inflected by the latest sudden 
reversal: the collapse of the Soviet Union. The interplay between presence and absence animates 
the installation. Although the slides are “typical” or generic images of the family, more important 
than the content of the images themselves is the temporal experience of their appearance and 
disappearance. The installation enacts, with each new slide, a brief recovery of a lost world, 
followed by its ghostly evaporation.  
 
The New Baroque: Self-Portraits in Painting 
I began this chapter by looking at Kabakov’s early self-portrait (1962), in which Kabakov 
offers a sly glance at the viewer. After this self-portrait, Kabakov rejected such explicit self-
representation in his art, preferring to invent characters and ascribe his works to them. As we 
have seen, however, Kabakov would return to self-representation through several of his 
installations done in emigration. He continually reworked the material of his mother’s memoir, 
which, as I have argued, evinces a more sincere and personal engagement with the traumas of the 
Soviet experiment than his previous conceptualist work. And his installation On the Roof 
featured hundreds of family photographs, thus breaking with Kabakov’s typical practice of using 
anonymous photographs of official Soviet life to instead offer a self-portrait of him and his 
family. 
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More recently, since 2000, Kabakov has increasingly turned back to painting after his 
experiments with total installations. The art historian and curator Karin Hellandsjø notes in a 
catalogue of his recent paintings that these works are distinguished from his earlier work by the 
fact that they are “no longer represented by another, fictitious person, a personnage, but signed 
by himself.”126 In addition to being signed by Kabakov himself, many of these recent paintings 
also attest to an increased interest in self-representation and the use of family photographs, a 
pattern that I would argue began in the installations discussed in this chapter.  
For example, in his series Three Paintings with the Black Spot (2009), Kabakov offers 
self-portraits and portraits of his wife, Emilia. These three paintings are vast, dark canvases that 
play with a collage effect in paint. Based on photographic images of Kabakov and his wife 
Emilia receiving a medal, the paintings are disorienting as these images are turned sideways and 
are overlaid with white, black, and brown spots. The edges of the paintings on the right and left 
seem to resemble pieces of postcards or photographs. Robert Storr writes of these paintings as 
being akin to “pages from a scrapbook autobiography, on which flotsam and jetsam of various 
kinds have settled, epitomizing the constant flux of his existence and a long experience of 
making the most of meager resources.”127 
Writing about this series, Kabakov notes that they are a departure from “the modernist 
tradition with its interest in the surface of the painting, in flat bright light, in the contours of 
                                               
126 Ilya Kabakov, Ilya Kabakov: A Return to Painting, 1961–2011 (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2012), 40. 
127 Robert Storr, “Painting In Spite of Itself,” in Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: Catalogue 
Raisonné, ed. Emilia Kabakova and Willem Jan Renders, vol. 3 (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2013), 14.  
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objects and their self-sufficiency.”128 Indeed, elsewhere Kabakov had previously affirmed this 
modernist affinity for the flat surface of the canvas. He writes that he had  
lost faith in three-dimensional, representational reality for my painting. Reality, in and of 
itself, has three dimensions, but when it encounters the depth of white space in my 
painting, it loses its spatiality. I treat it like a surface, essentially like a reproduction. As if 
one had affixed a piece of cloth or paper to the surface, like a curtain shrouding my white 
three-dimensionality. That’s the best explanation for my painterly intention: a painting 
covering up ‘the white.’129  
 
In this statement on the white canvas, Kabakov affirms an artistic practice that highlights the 
two-dimensionality of the painting.130 However, Kabakov now claims to revise these modernist 
ideas of the flatness of the picture plane in his recent paintings, with a return to the baroque and 
an emphasis on depth. These new canvases, he writes, “appeal to and make use of the tradition of 
the 16th–17th centuries, the tradition of the baroque, where what was considered to be the most 
important thing was the development of the depths of the painting, its spatiality and the 
submersed state of all the objects in the atmosphere that appear to have taken shape beyond the 
frame.”131 How can we understand this turn to the baroque? 
                                               
128 Kabakov, A Return to Painting, 108. 
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130 Clement Greenberg famously wrote about how the avant-garde modernist painting focused on 
the two-dimensional flat surface of the painting in his essay “Towards a Newer Laocoon” 
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Kabakov notes that these paintings employ the “baroque technique of the tunnel 
perspective” that was used in painting ceilings by artists such as the Italian painter Giambattista 
Tiepolo.132 It would seem that Kabakov has in mind the illusionistic perspectival techniques for 
ceiling painting of di sotto in sù (from below upward), which makes use of extreme 
foreshortening so that figures pictured on the ceiling seem to be standing above the viewer, and 
of quadratura, which gives the appearance of the ceiling opening up, a sense of depth to the 
ceiling in the middle. Can we say that these techniques are truly operative in Kabakov’s series? 
Yes, we have fragmentary figures surrounding the edges of the frame, but they are hardly 
foreshortened. And while the centers of the paintings are dominated by an amorphous dark mass, 
it does not entail an opening up of the space suggestive of architectural depth. Indeed, although 
Kabakov avers that he is turning away from a modernist preoccupation with flat surface, the 
collage effect of the painting counteracts such a claim, as the spots disrupt any experience of 
depth as they lie flat on the picture plane. What we have here is a postmodern approach to the 
baroque, which still makes use of the modernist techniques of collage and pastiche, thus 
balancing a sense of depth with the flatness of the plane.133 
The visual experience of beholding these various parts of the paintings is enhanced by the 
sheer scale of the paintings. Two of the canvases are 510 x 786 cm, while the third is 510 x 467.5 
cm. Kabakov discusses the size of the painting as a factor that contributes to how the viewer of 
the painting will experience the depth of the painting because it is so large the viewer “cannot 
                                               
132 Kabakov, 108. 
133 Other critics have written that in these paintings “Kabakov stages an enormous painterly 
event, one that references the conversion of collage into painting, one that dissolves the distanced 
experience of sight and takes us into an immaterial space formed from the addition and 
interconnection of numerous individual pictorial elements.” Kabakov, 16. 
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take in the entire painting.”134 He suggests that the effect of the dark, vast depth of the paintings 
is such that “the viewer might concentrate on this effect of submersion in space and not tilt his 
head in the hopes of discovering who these people are and ‘what they are doing here.’”135 In 
other words, at this moment when he incorporates his own image into the paintings, he also 
suggests that he is actively discouraging the viewer from seeking him out, from focusing on his 
presence—tilted and sidelined—within the frame.  
  More important for our purposes, though, is Kabakov’s recent series of four paintings 
They Are Looking (2010), which features portraits of his mother and other family members. In 
these paintings, Kabakov relies on family photographs (many of which also appeared in the 
installation On the Roof) to create these portraits. Ulrich Krempel notes that this series of 
paintings “represents a radical break in Kabakov’s oeuvre” as it engages with “memory in such a 
personal dimension, outside the roles and fictitious personalities.”136 Krempel writes that these 
paintings are like “a large-scale epitaph, the evocation of an irretrievable past.”137 As Willem Jan 
Renders observes, “this is the first time that Kabakov paints a subject that is intimately related to 
his personal life, to people he loved.”138 He goes on to suggest that these paintings are Ilya 
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138 Renders, “Whose Painting Is This?,” 26. Indeed, in an interview with Willem Jan Renders, 
Kabakov confirms that the use of personal photographs in these works is a unique in his oeuvre. 
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Kabakov’s paintings, unlike his previous works that could be by anyone, that are anonymous, 
that are by invented characters.  
 The first painting, They Are Looking. Mother, Aunt Riva, Aunt Tania, features Kabakov’s 
mother and his two aunts, while other figures loom in the background. Kabakov uses aerial 
perspective to depict the figures in the background, as they appear fainter, less distinct, 
ultimately merging and dissolving into the reddish-brown brushstrokes. In Krempel’s words, the 
figures “appear from out of the shadows as if from the depths of one’s own memory before being 
able to be identified.”139 The second, They Are Looking. Mother, Aunt Sonia, Uncle Joseph, 
features more figures. This painting also draws on several family photographs that were included 
in On the Roof. The figures, unmoored, seem to float in the realm of memory. The painting 
makes strong use of chiaroscuro, as some faces are shrouded in darkness, eyes are hollowed out, 
others with shadows falling across their cheeks. The receding planes, the encompassing shadow 
in the background, the aerial perspective together all imply a depth of space without describing it 
fully. The third and fourth paintings, unlike the first two, depict heads floating at the top of the 
frame as well as full figures in the foreground against a Rothko-like background of color fields 
of blue, green, and red.  
In a description of the four paintings that comprise They Are Looking, Kabakov 
references his experience of looking at Rembrandt’s paintings The Night Watch (1642) and The 
Syndics of the Drapers’ Guild (1662) in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. He feels strongly the 
gaze of the men depicted in The Syndics, and claims that only Rembrandt achieved this effect. 
He feels held by their gaze. His fascination with the painting “wasn’t that I was staring at these 
people painted 300 years ago and dressed in strange clothes,” he says, “it was that they, not 
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turning away and not saying anything, were looking directly inside of me and into my soul.”140 
He says that he wanted to try to create such an effect in these paintings. Kabakov goes on to note 
that  
all those depicted on my paintings have died, either long ago or very recently. They are 
already ‘there,’ and I would like to convey that gaze—not the faces, nor the poses, nor 
the clothing—all of that is drawn rather primitively, if not to say, poorly—but I would 
like to convey that gaze aimed directly at me, when they have something to say to me but 
they cannot say it…141  
 
Kabakov here emphasizes the importance of the gaze of these relatives who are deceased. The 
painting attempts to create a moment of communication or contact between the spectator and the 
figures presented, as if they are on the verge of speaking.  
To achieve this effect, Kabakov claims to take inspiration from the baroque. Baroque 
painting introduced psychology and the sense of an emotional inner life into painting. Painters 
such as Rembrandt worked now to “endow the portrait with an intimation of spiritual as well as 
corporeal presence.”142 This, in part, seems linked with Kabakov’s turn to sincerity and exploring 
his personal past in his work, paired with his self-described interest in the baroque as a rich 
source for these new paintings. The baroque then offers a model for incorporating emotion, 
investigations into the soul, and interiority, which is a new aspect of his painterly style.  
Given the title of the series, “They Are Looking,” and Kabakov’s discussion of trying to 
achieve a Rembrandtesque gaze that transfixes the beholder, it is striking that at the center of the 
second painting we have a crucial instance of gazes that fail to meet our eye. To the left of 
                                               
140 Ilya Kabakov, Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: Catalogue Raisonné, ed. Emilia 
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Kabakov and his mother, a woman in a blue dress is in profile as she looks off to the left. Behind 
her, a man in a hat tilts his head and gazes down. The woman in glasses also looks off to the left. 
And at the center of the painting, Kabakov’s mother looks down at her son who sits in her lap, 
while he gazes off to the right. The depiction of her looking down seems to reinforce the feeling 
of separation, since we cannot meet her gaze. And yet, her gaze is trained on her son, but within 
the world of the painting (and the photograph that serves as a model for the painting). The 
centrality of these three gazes that are directed elsewhere stand in marked contrast to the fixed 
gaze of the other figures who stare out at us with intense concentration.  
The effect of the gaze is influenced by the vast size of the canvas (284.5 x 175.2 cm). The 
scale of this wide painting means that the figures appear almost life-size, thus increasing the 
illusory sense of their actual presence beyond the picture plane. When hung on a museum wall, 
then, the figures would be at eye-level of the viewers. Moreover, the monumental scale of the 
painting lends it a certain baroque drama. While many baroque canvases play on vertical space to 
create a vertiginous effect that adds emotional drama to the viewer’s experience of beholding the 
painting, Kabakov’s canvas makes dramatic use of horizontal space. At a little over 9 feet wide, 
the canvas dominates the wall so that if you are standing in front of the center of the canvas, the 
canvas would seem to extend indefinitely in both directions, thus absorbing you fully within the 
seemingly infinite space of the painting.   
A feature of Baroque painting is the use of illusion and trompe l’oeil as means of 
investigating infinite space as painters “dissolve the barrier imposed by the picture plane 
between the real space of the observer and the perspective space of the painting.”143 John Rupert 
Martin argues that these illusionistic practices allow the observer to become “an active 
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participant in the spatial-psychological field” and that the point of this illusion is for the viewer 
to shift her mind “from material to eternal things.”144 Martin notes that one of the illusionistic 
tricks for exploring coextensive space is the transgression of the picture plane through the use of 
“emphatic gestures” as we see, for example, in Rembrandt’s The Night Watch (which, as we 
recall, Kabakov mentions in connection with this series).145 At the center of this painting that 
depicts a militia company, Captain Frans Banning Cocq steps forward towards the edge of the 
foreground and extends his hand so that it “protrudes illusionistically beyond the surface of the 
canvas.”146 Such a gesture suggests the continuity of space between the fictive realm of the 
painting and the space of the viewer. Kabakov achieves a similar effect in the second painting in 
They are Looking. At the center of the painting is the mother with young Ilya on her lap. While 
looking down at him, she points her finger at us, the viewer. The mother’s hand reaches out 
towards the viewer, piercing the barrier of the picture plane and thus seeming to dissolve the 
boundary between real and fictive space.  
The mother’s pose also invokes the iconography of the seated Madonna and Child. While 
in many Eastern Orthodox icons the Theotokos points her hand at the child of God, in this 
painting the mother’s hand now points out at us, the viewer of the painting. Given that the finger 
almost seems to break through the picture plane, as if she could reach out and touch us, the 
painting, like the icon, holds the promise of serving as a point of contact between two worlds.  
Although Kabakov uses family photographs in the painting to stage a point of contact 
between him and those absent family members, we are nonetheless reminded of the distance 
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separating them and the impossibility of this meeting. At the edges of all the paintings are white 
panels that encroach on the figures. The use of white spaces that disrupt the painting is a typical 
feature of Kabakov’s paintings; we can think of such works as the 1974 series Along the Edge or 
the paintings attributed to the “artists” Charles Rosenthal and Igor Spivak. In these earlier 
paintings, the white spaces reveal the device. They foreclose any illusionistic sense of 
perspectival depth, bringing us back to the inescapable fact of the two-dimensionality of the 
canvas.  
In this series of paintings, the white panels seem to operate in a different manner. The 
white panels seem to highlight the illusion of depth, working almost as a trompe l’oeil that 
frames the interior scene and lends it depth. In this regard, the white panels begin to seem 
indebted less to Malevich than to seventeenth-century Dutch painters and their conventional use 
of curtains, doorways, windows, and other architectural details to frame paintings. Think, for 
instance, of the stone window frame as a compositional trope in Gerrit Dou’s niche paintings, 
such as Woman Peeling Carrot, The Grocer’s Shop, or Maid at the Window. While the 
difference between Dou’s intricate surfaces and Kabakov’s is clear, we can see the panels as a 
postmodern version of the frame. The white slabs of paint that align with the picture plane give 
the sense that beyond the two-dimensional surface of the canvas there exists another world. 
Indeed, the more we look at the white panels, the more we notice that we can see the black and 
grey inner edges of the panels on both the left and the right side of the painting. The perspective 
is thus distorted so that we see more than what would be visible if these panels were parallel to 
the picture plane. This gives the impression, then, that the panels are actually at an angle, almost 
jutting out beyond the picture and into the viewer’s space. As Kabakov writes, these white panels 
are like a “half-broken border or wall in the foreground dividing the two worlds, not permitting 
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the viewer to cross the boundary, to enter into the painting.”147 If we consider how the painting 
will look hung on the white walls of a museum, the illusion is enhanced. As it seems that the 
white panels almost blend in with the museum’s walls, giving the impression that we have found 
a jagged gap that offers an entry point to a space beyond the wall—but of course a boundary that 
we cannot actually traverse. Indeed, the thick white streaks of paint seem also to threaten the 
figures within the painting. They suggest an erasure, a painting over of the past. Here we might 
read the white marks as symbolic of the failures of memory, the inevitability of oblivion. Or we 
can see it as a historically charged comment on the persecution of these people, of the willful 
forgetting of the past.  
  Thus, we see that the white panels in this series has a more affective purpose than in his 
earlier works. They serve to mark the division not only between reality and representation, but 
also between two worlds. They suggest an insuperable gap between past and present, between 
the here and now and the beyond. It is not an ironic interruption of space, intended to remind us 
of the painterly illusion of space and depth. Instead, it serves to underscore the distance between 
“them” and “us” with a sincere desire to overcome that gap.  
Just as we find ourselves falling into the depth of the painting, though, we are pulled out 
of this illusion by the line that runs down the middle of the painting. A seam divides the painting 
into two; the large canvas is composed of multiple panels. The fact that the line interrupts the 
painting over Kabakov’s image, dividing his face in two, further reflects the fractured nature of 
this self-portrait. The seam returns us to the materiality of the painting—to the paint as paint, the 
canvas as canvas—again reminding us that we cannot step into this image, much less into the 
past or the world beyond.  
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These paintings seem to represent a real shift in Kabakov’s work from his earlier 
paintings. They display an affective engagement with the past, mourning the loss of these family 
members and attempting to transcend the divide between past and present, reality and 
representation. Let us take a closer look, then, at who precisely are these figures that look so 
intently at us. The figures in the second painting borrow from several photographs that we will 
recognize from the family photographs in the installation On the Roof. As we have seen, the 
photograph of Kabakov on his mother’s lap figures prominently at the center of the painting. 
Other photographs from On the Roof also appear as models for the figures in the painting. 
The group of three figures furthest to the right in the painting come from the photograph of his 
mother’s choir in Berdyansk.148 The group of adults and children to the right of Kabakov’s 
mother comes from a photo of Emilia’s grandparents, her sister Rosa, and a boy named Grisha 
(according to the caption in On the Roof).149 Kabakov thus brings together these different figures 
into the frame of the painting by combining multiple photographs from the family archive. Some 
are relatives, while others are figures Kabakov would only have known through his mother’s 
photographs. 
Most striking, though, is that the mother figures twice in the painting. The woman at the 
very bottom of the painting on the left-hand side is painted from an image of the mother with her 
fellow graduates from school in Mariupol in 1920. The figures surrounding her are also painted 
from this photograph of the gymnasium class.  
In the caption to this photograph in On the Roof, Kabakov narrates: “Mama, when she 
had just finished the gymnasium, that was still before the revolution, entered the medical 
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department along with her very close friend, that’s her sitting on the floor in a black dress and 
mama is right above her. It was completely different time then, different faces…”150 The 
mother’s second appearance, this time on the margins of the painting amidst a crowd of 
anonymous faces, seems to complicate the narrative that Kabakov creates in his artist’s statement 
about the series. Unmarked, she disappears in the sea of faces in the corner, recognizable only to 
those few who know her. She otherwise remains anonymous, just another unidentified face 
looming out “from there.” The emotional impact of the painting comes from the idea that this is 
his mourning project: as he writes in the description of the painting, these are his deceased 
relatives and his attempt to see them again. Having her appear twice disrupts the “realism” of the 
image, as she could not occupy both places within the crowd. Does the depiction of her twice, as 
if she were two different people, challenge the idea that these are representations of unique 
individuals whose absence Kabakov tries to give shape to through this portrait? Or does it stand 
as a hidden, private detail (akin to Barthes’s punctum) that intensifies the painting’s affective 
longing for the mother?151 
Now it would seem we are back in the realm of Kabakov’s playful engagement with the 
archive. Even here, in this painting that seems committed to a kind of sincere or personal 
representation, there is a refusal to allow the painting to serve as some kind of documentary 
evidence or transparent expression of Kabakov’s experience. Although these paintings offer a 
melancholy meditation on the past, they stop short of a fully sentimental approach. At the risk of 
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stating the obvious, the Kabakov’s exploration of sincerity in these works is sincerity after 
conceptualism; this return to sincerity cannot look the same as it did before the ironic play of 
postmodernism. Even in this series that offers a sincere engagement with the past through his 
familial history, there is still the trace of ironic distancing and dissembling.  
In these works—the album and the installations based on his mother’s memoirs, and the 
installations and paintings that take family photographs as their source material—we witness a 
turn to the family archive. Although Kabakov is known for his deconstruction of the position of 
the author or artist, these works reveal a counternarrative that runs through Kabakov’s late 
period. These works tell the story of an artist who returns again and again to the documents of 
his own personal experience. If his earlier conceptualist works probed the experience of Soviet 
consciousness from within for fellow unofficial artists, then these later works are now told from 
outside that position for an international art market. From this distanced, retrospective 
perspective, a different side of the Soviet experience comes to the fore in Kabakov’s works. 
Composed in emigration, in the wake of his mother’s death as well as the transformations of 
perestroika and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, these autobiographical works evoke a 
world that has been lost. Even as his works play with the generic quality of family photographs 
or with the prescribed form of autobiographical narratives, these documents nonetheless attest to 
the power of the private archive to tell a narrative that runs counter to the official one. 
 





At the beginning of his autobiographical work Berlin Childhood around 1900, Walter 
Benjamin writes that in 1932 he realized his state of exile was likely to be permanent and that he 
“would soon have to bid a long, perhaps lasting farewell” to Berlin. To reckon with this 
separation, he decided to undergo a “process of inoculation” that ultimately takes the shape of 
the book in hand. 
I deliberately called to mind those images which, in exile, are most apt to waken 
homesickness: images of childhood. My assumption was that the feeling of longing 
would no more gain mastery over my spirit than a vaccine does over a healthy body. I 
sought to limit its effect through insight into the irretrievability—not the contingent 
biographical but the necessary social irretrievability—of the past.1 
 
Benjamin’s metaphor of inoculation figures images as an infectious agent, a synecdoche of the 
larger disease of nostalgia. He “deliberately” recalls these images of childhood, administering 
them to himself as one would a vaccine, before experiencing them involuntarily in the throes of 
exilic nostalgia. Immunity from, rather than indulgence in, nostalgia is the aim here. The cure 
does not come from preserving the past through representation (of setting down these 
recollections in writing and thus recuperating them), but rather from meditating on the very 
“irretrievability” of the past and trying to gain “insight” into it. The images offer an occasion for 
a critical reflection on the past, a way of writing with and against nostalgia.  
 In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to show how the figures of this dissertation 
have likewise engaged with photographs in a way that moves beyond a merely sentimental 
nostalgia. While Sontag’s statement that “photographs actively promote nostalgia” has become 
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something of an axiom, in the works considered here photographs do more than stimulate 
longing for the past.2 They emerge as a space of critique, of self-reflection, of interrogating those 
very nostalgic impulses that often accompany our forays into the family album. Here it is 
instructive to consider Svetlana Boym’s distinction between restorative and reflective nostalgia. 
In The Future of Nostalgia, Boym theorizes that restorative nostalgia attempts a total 
reconstruction of what has been lost, whereas reflective nostalgia accents the longing (algia) for 
the past, always with an awareness of the insuperable distance between past and present. It is this 
attention to the separation between past and present that allows for reflective nostalgia’s critical 
distance on the lost object and its penchant for playful irony. As she writes, “longing and critical 
thinking are not opposed to one another, as affective memories do not absolve one from 
compassion, judgment or critical reflection.”3 She thus recuperates nostalgia from pure kitsch 
and suggests the critical capacities and aesthetic potentials of nostalgia. 
However, in her chapter on Nabokov, Boym suggests that photographs are an “example 
of restorative nostalgia,” as they deliver up the past in a seemingly perfectly preserved form, 
absent any “reflective longing.”4 I would challenge this claim, as I have endeavored to show in 
this dissertation how photographs become a crucial place for critical reflections. As in 
Benjamin’s process of inoculation, the photographic images in these texts work as both symptom 
of and cure for an uncritical nostalgic longing for the past. If a “naïve” reading of the 
photographs sees these images as an emanation of the past, this quickly gives way to a more 
critical appraisal of the photograph’s referential status.  
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This dissertation has charted the critical ambivalence to photographs in these works, how 
they stage a back-and-forth between an affective or nostalgic attitude to images and a sharp 
awareness of the limits or dangers of such an attitude. Thus Nabokov repeatedly challenges the 
truth claims of the photographic medium in Speak, Memory. In his essay about his parents, 
Brodsky locates in the two-dimensional photograph a metaphor for the workings of memory in 
its failure to fully preserve the past. From this failing emerges an anti-elegiac stance that refuses 
an easy restoration of the past and foregrounds loss, rupture, and fragmentation. Shteyngart, in 
his memoir, discovers in the archive of family photographs a means of coming to terms with his 
past and his Russian cultural identity. He balances the estranged perspective of an American 
looking back ironically at his Soviet childhood with an attempt to make sense of the cataclysmic 
events of the twentieth century that marked his family’s history. Kabakov uses family 
photographs to critique official narratives of the Soviet past in his autobiographical installations 
and late paintings. In turn, though, he goes on to expose the generic quality of family 
photographs and the prescribed forms of self-narrative, thus frustrating our sense of what can 
meaningfully be done with such photographic “evidence.” 
The divided attitude to photographs that we see in these works, I have argued, stems in 
part from a crisis in vision. From the semiotic appraisal of photographs to the disciplinary and 
propagandistic abuses of photography, to see the photograph as an uncomplicated restoration of 
the past is no longer possible by the second half of the twentieth century (if, indeed, it ever was). 
And yet, it is the very losses of the twentieth century that make urgent the need to collect and 
preserve the fragments that remain.  
To extend these thoughts, I would like to turn briefly to the German writer W. G. Sebald 
whose composite works of photo-texts also wrestle with this ambivalence around photographs 
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and more generally the crisis of representation.5 Indeed, Sebald has been seen as a literary child 
of Nabokov. Nabokov’s own image haunts the pages of Sebald’s The Emigrants in multiple 
forms: first a photograph of him with butterfly net in the Alps is included in the text (he bears 
resemblance, we are told, to Henry Selwyn); another character reads Nabokov’s autobiography; 
and finally he appears spectrally as the “butterfly man.”6 It is no surprise that Sebald finds in 
Nabokov a literary forebear: both are cosmopolitan émigré writers marked by the traumas of the 
twentieth century; they weave patterns into their works, blend fact and fiction; their works are 
distinguished by a highly visual form of memory.7   
                                               
5 Sebald was born during the war (1944). His father had fought in the Wehrmacht and returned 
home when Sebald was 3 from a French POW camp. Sebald came of age during the 1960s, a 
period marked by the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial and student protests in an effort to break the 
culture of silence that had shrouded post-war Germany. Sebald emigrated to England as a young 
man and taught German literature at University of East Anglia until his death in 2001. For more 
on photography in Sebald’s work, see Adrian Daub, “Sphinxes without Secrets: W. G. Sebald’s 
Albums and the Aesthetics of Photographic Exchange,” in On Writing with Photography, ed. 
Karen Beckman and Liliane Weissberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); 
Lisa Saltzman, “Orphans: On Émigrés and Images in W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz,” in 
Daguerreotypes: Fugitive Subjects, Contemporary Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015); Lise Patt and Christel Dillbohner, eds., Searching for Sebald: Photography After 
W.G. Sebald (Los Angeles, CA: Institute Cultural Inquiry, 2007); Mark M. Anderson, “The Edge 
of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald,” October 106 (Autumn 2003): 102–121. 
6 Sebald also wrote a short piece on Speak, Memory entitled “Dream Textures: A Brief Note on 
Nabokov,” in Campo Santo, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: The Modern Library, 2005), 141–
149. For more on the significance of Nabokov in Sebald’s work, see: Karen Jacobs, “Sebald’s 
Apparitional Nabokov,” Twentieth-Century Literature 60, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 137–68, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/0041462X-2014-3004; Leland de la Durantaye, “The Facts of Fiction, or 
the Figure of Vladimir Nabokov in W. G. Sebald,” Comparative Literature Studies 45, no. 4 
(2008): 425–45; Adrian Curtin and Maxim D. Shrayer, “Netting the Butterfly Man: The 
Significance of Vladimir Nabokov in W. G. Sebald’s The Emigrants,” Religion and the Arts 9, 
no. 3 (November 1, 2005): 258–83, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852905775008868.  
7 And yet, as Marijeta Bozovic has suggested, the freedom that Nabokov seems to experience 
through his art of memory is foreclosed to Sebald. See the Conclusion of Nabokov’s Canon. 
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In addition to providing an afterlife for Nabokov’s image, Sebald’s texts offer a fitting 
coda to the works considered here as they engage a similar conflicted attitude to photography. 
Sebald’s use of photographs in fictional works inevitably raises questions about their status as 
documentary evidence, especially in the German postwar context with the awareness of the 
widespread manipulation of images by the Nazi regime. Consider, for example, the prominent 
role that the propaganda film about the Theresienstadt concentration camp plays in the novel 
Austerlitz (2001). Or the final story of The Emigrants (1992), which includes a newspaper 
photograph from 1933 of the book-burning in Würzburg that has been doctored.8 These 
examples point to a crisis in vision: the inability to verify what we see plainly presented before 
us. However, as Mark Anderson has noted, to say that such propaganda photos are manipulated 
implicitly acknowledges that all photographs are potentially suspect, which brings us to difficult 
impasse: how then do we respond to Holocaust deniers who claim that the photographic evidence 
of the camps is a hoax?9 There is thus a need to rely on those images as having evidential power, 
to bear witness to what happened. Sebald navigates this representational crisis by not including 
documentary images of the Holocaust, but rather images that seem to evoke the trauma and come 
to signify obliquely this unrepresentable past. The Emigrants, for example, opens with a grainy 
black-and-white photograph of a graveyard with an oak at the center, symbolizing life and death, 
nature and culture, regeneration and destruction. But the positive life force of the oak, an ancient 
                                               
8 W. G. Sebald, The Emigrants, trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions, 1997), 183–
84. 
9 Anderson, “The Edge of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald,” 109–110.  
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Germanic symbol, is also complicated by its association with German nationalism, thus raising 
questions about blood, lineage, and belonging that haunt the story.10  
By introducing photographs into a fictional text without any captions, context, or 
attribution, Sebald also manipulates photos, making them mean something new. This is what 
Anderson calls the “contradictory logic” of Sebald’s use of images: “every image, every ‘reality 
scrap,’ is precious and must be conserved as a memorial to what has disappeared. It can serve as 
a corrective to the unreliability of human memory. But also, every image lies, or is capable of 
lying, and must be subjected to careful scrutiny and interpretation.”11  
The two central images in “Dr Henry Selwyn,” the first story in The Emigrants, vividly 
present this contradictory logic. The first is a photograph shown during a projected slideshow 
(although not included in the text); the slide is displayed for such an extended period of time that 
“the glass in the slide shattered and a dark crack fissured across the screen.”12 As if collapsing 
under the burden of representation, the photograph literally breaks down. This fracture of the 
photographic image (and its absence from the pages of the story) would seem to emblematize an 
anti-representational stance. However, in this story photographs also serve as a material trace of 
the past that cannot be erased. The end of the story presents the narrator’s chance encounter with 
a newspaper photo about Selwyn’s friend, Naegeli, who had disappeared in 1914, presumed to 
be dead after falling through a crevasse in the Alps. His remains had just been revealed by the 
                                               
10 The photograph visually echoes Gustave Courbet’s painting The Oak of Vercingetorix (1864) 
that appears in the collection’s final story “Max Ferber.” The character Max Ferber (Max Aurach 
in the German original) uses Courbet’s painting as a model for his own painterly “exercise in 
destruction” when he creates a painting blackened and “overworked to the point of being 
unrecognizable.”  Sebald, The Emigrants, 179–80. 
11 Anderson, “The Edge of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald,” 109. 
12 Sebald, The Emigrants, 17. 
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melting ice of the glacier. Like the glacier that preserved the unburied body, so too does 
photography offer a way to “embalm time, rescuing it from its proper corruption” as André 
Bazin wrote.13 The archaeological exhumation figures as the unbidden return of the repressed, a 
remnant of the past that risks being lost to oblivion but returns to the surface. In defiance of time, 
the past here intrudes unexpectedly into the present moment. These two images are inextricably 
bound together in the story through the semantic association of the crack. The fissure across the 
screen that seems to suggest the rupture of history and the inadequacy of representation 
prefigures the crevasse in the glacier that Naegeli falls into, but simultaneously it is this chasm 
that ultimately preserves the unburied body and returns it to the surface. Thus, we see in the 
image of the crevasse an emblem of the double-sided nature of the photograph, as it is at once 
the site of oblivion, erasure, and the failure to represent but also of preservation, witness, and 
testimony. 
Like Sebald, the authors in this dissertation also respond to moments of historical rupture, 
the existential experience of exile and emigration, and the weight of cultural memory. Their texts 
interrogate what role photography can play in understanding and making sense of the violence, 
trauma, and upheavals of the twentieth century. Photographs are both valuable as material traces 
of a past that has disappeared and highly suspect.  
Unlike Sebald, however, these authors do not fold photographs into fictional texts but 
into autobiographical works, which opens up different questions about photography’s claim to 
represent reality through reference to a real-world referent. The images offer pointed moments 
where we see the authors involved in the process of reading themselves—moments where the 
autobiographical project of picturing the self is vividly represented as they encounter an image 
                                               
13 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 14. 
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created by another, an image that turns them into an object, just as they are turning their own 
subjective experience into an object of scrutiny. 
I began this dissertation with Khodasevich’s poetic metaphor of double exposure. I 
suggested that we could understand double exposure not only as emblem for the experience of 
exile, but also for the doubled or divided way in which photography signifies in the works 
studied here. To close, I would like to turn now to an actual double exposed photograph to 
illustrate this tension between an affective reading of photographs and a critical or skeptical 
reading of the photograph as yet another constructed sign with no more purchase on the real than 
any other mode of representation (fig. 4). Although Brodsky was never allowed to return to 
Russia after he was forced into exile in 1972, a fortuitous case of double exposure placed him 
back on Pestel street in front of his home, the “room and a half” of the Muruzi house. In 1991, 
Brodsky’s Swedish translator, Bengt Jangfeldt, shot half a roll of film in Stockholm when 
Brodsky and his wife Maria Sozzani were visiting Jangfeldt and his family. Soon after, Jangfeldt 
went to a symposium in Petersburg, where he took photographs of Brodsky’s former home that 
he planned to send back to him in New York. When the film was developed, however, he found 
that somehow all the photographs had come out double exposed. As if enacting Khodasevich’s 
poetic metaphor, the photographs of Brodsky in Stockholm had been superimposed onto the 
images of his former Leningrad haunts. In one of the images, Brodsky and the others are but a 
ghostly trace against the background of the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral at the end of his old 
street. While all the others face the camera, Brodsky alone looks upwards, almost as if he were 
finally gazing at the balcony of the room and a half once more.  
This image exemplifies photography’s seemingly magical ability to give presence to 
absence through the indexical trace and to collapse multiple temporalities. The double-exposed 
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image of Brodsky in Leningrad creates a palimpsest that illustrates the experience of exile, in 
which one’s present reality is projected onto the past, as if overcoming the boundaries of time 
and space. It is an image that, in its spectral transference of one space onto another, 
emblematizes the way photographs are caught between what Boym would call restorative and 
reflective nostalgia. For just as we fall into the illusion of seeing Brodsky once again in front of 
the cathedral, a moment later we notice the intrusion of a car and two other faces piercing 
through into the foreground, disrupting the sleight of hand. The double exposure flickers 
between overcoming the separation between these two spaces and throwing into sharp relief the 
very real distance between them. Ultimately, it remains just an image. No more, no less.  
 
 
Figure 4. Double-exposed Brodsky, photograph by Bengt Jangfeldt. Lev Loseff Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East 
European History and Culture, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (unprocessed). 
 
 







Lev Loseff Papers. Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. 
 
Vladimir Nabokov Papers. The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and 
American Literature, The New York Public Library. 
 





Adams, Timothy Dow. Light Writing and Life Writing: Photography in Autobiography. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Alexandrov, Vladimir E., ed. The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov. New York: 
Garland, 1995. 
 
Anderson, Mark M. “The Edge of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald.” October 106 (Autumn 2003): 
102–121. 
 
Andrews, James T., and Asif A. Siddiqi, eds. Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet 
Culture. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. 
 
Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Space. Translated by Maria Jolas. New York: Orion Press, 
1964. 
 
Baker, John E. “Mourning and the Transformation of Object Relations: Evidence for the 
Persistence of Internal Attachments.” Psychoanalytic Psychology 18, no. 1 (2001): 55–
73. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Edited by Michael Holquist. 
Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2004. 
 
Balaev, MIchelle, ed. Contemporary Approaches in Literary Trauma Theory. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
 
Banfield, Ann. “L’Imparfait de l’Objectif: The Imperfect of the Object Glass.” Camera Obscura 
8, no. 24 (1990): 64–87. https://doi.org/10.1215/02705346-8-3_24-64. 
 
Baran, Dominika. “Hyphenated Identity.” In Language in Immigrant America. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
           
 
 286 
Barkhatova, Elena Valentinovna. Russkaia svetopisʹ: pervyi vek fotoiskusstva: 1839-1914. Sankt-
Peterburg: Liki Rossii, 2009. 
 
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Translated by Richard Howard. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1981. 
 
———. Image–Music–Text. Translated by Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 
 
Batchen, Geoffrey, ed. Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes’s Camera 
Lucida. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009. 
 
Bazin, André. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” In What Is Cinema?, translated by 
Hugh Gray, Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
 
Beaujour, Elizabeth Klosty. Alien Tongues: Bilingual Russian Writers of the “First” Emigration. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
 
Beaver, Aaron. “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky’s Elegiac Verse.” Slavic Review 67, no. 3 
(2008): 591–609. https://doi.org/10.2307/27652941. 
 
Beckman, Karen, and Liliane Weissberg, eds. On Writing with Photography. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. Berlin Childhood around 1900. Translated by Howard Eiland. Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
———. Illuminations. Edited by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968. 
 
———. “Little History of Photography.” In The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, translated by Edmund Jephcott and 
Kingsley Shorter. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. 
 
———. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Edited by Peter Demetz. 
Translated by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken Books, 1978. 
 
———. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” In The Work of Art 
in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, translated 
by Edmund Jephcott and Harry Zohn. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Benveniste, Émile. Problems in General Linguistics. Translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral 
Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971. 
 
Berger, John. The Sense of Sight. Knopf Doubleday, 2011. 
 
           
 
 287 
Berger, John, and Jean Mohr. Another Way of Telling. New York: Vintage International, 1982. 
 
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998. 
 
———. Henri Bergson: Key Writings. Edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and John Ó Maoilearca. 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014. 
 
———. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Translated by Cloudesley Brereton 
and Fred Rothwell. London: Dodo Press, 2007. 
 
Berlina, Alexandra. Brodsky Translating Brodsky: Poetry in Self-Translation. Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2014. 
 
Bethea, David M. Joseph Brodsky and the Creation of Exile. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994. 
 
Bingham, Juliet, ed. Not Everyone Will Be Taken Into the Future. London: Tate Publishing, 
2017. 
 
Blasing, Molly Thomasy. “Through the Lens of Loss: Marina Tsvetaeva’s Elegiac Photo-
Poetics.” Slavic Review 73, no. 1 (2014): 1–35. 
https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview.73.1.0001. 
 
———. “Writing with Light: Photo-Poetic Encounters in Tsvetaeva, Pasternak and Brodsky.” 
PhD diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2014. 
 
Borger, Irene. “Christian Boltanski.” Bomb Magazine, January 1, 1989. 
https://bombmagazine.org/articles/christian-boltanski/. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Photography: A Middle-Brow Art. Cambridge, England: Polity, 1990. 
 
Boyd, Brian. Stalking Nabokov: Selected Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
 
———. Vladimir Nabokov: The American Years. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1991. 
 
———. Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1990. 
 
Boym, Svetlana. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994. 
 
———. Death in Quotation Marks: Cultural Myths of the Modern Poet. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
           
 
 288 
———. “Estrangement as a Lifestyle: Shklovsky and Brodsky.” Poetics Today 17, no. 4 (Winter 
1996): 511–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/1773211. 
 
———. The Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic Books, 2001. 
 
———. “Vladimir Nabokov’s False Passport.” In The Future of Nostalgia, 259–83. New York: 
Basic Books, 2001. 
 
Bozovic, Marijeta. “Bergson and The Texture of Time.” In Nabokov’s Canon: From Onegin to 
Ada. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016. 
 
———. Nabokov’s Canon: From Onegin to Ada. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
2016. 
 
Breton, André. “Max Ernst.” In Beyond Painting: And Other Writings by the Artist and His 
Friends, edited by Robert Motherwell. New York: Wittenborn, Schultz, 1948. 
 
Brodsky, Joseph. Chastʹ rechi: stikhotvoreniia 1972-1976. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1977. 
 
———. Collected Poems in English. Edited by Ann Kjellberg. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2000. 
 
———. Less than One: Selected Essays. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986. 
 
———. On Grief and Reason: Essays. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995. 
 
———. Sochineniia Iosifa Brodskogo. Edited by Gennadii Komarov. Vol. 1. 6 vols. Sankt-
Peterburg: Pushkinskii fond, 1997. 
 
———. Stikhotvoreniia i poemy. Edited by Lev Loseff. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Sankt-Peterburg: 
Lenizdat, 2017. 
 
———. Uraniia. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1987. 
 
———. Watermark. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992. 
 
Brodsky, Joseph, and Cynthia L. Haven. Joseph Brodsky: Conversations. Jackson, MS: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2002. 
 
Brown, Clarence. “Nabokov’s Pushkin and Nabokov’s Nabokov.” Wisconsin Studies in 
Contemporary Literature 8, no. 2 (1967): 280–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/1207106. 
 
Brown, Elspeth H., and Thy Phu, eds. Feeling Photography. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2014. 
 
Brunet, François. Photography and Literature. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. 
           
 
 289 
Brunson, Molly. Russian Realisms: Literature and Painting, 1840–1890. DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2016. 
 
Bruss, Elizabeth W. Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
 
Bryson, Norman. “Intertextuality and Visual Poetics.” Style 22, no. 2 (1988): 183–93. 
 
Burke, Seán. The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, 
Foucault and Derrida. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992. 
 
Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. 
 
———. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004. 
 
———. Senses of the Subject. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. 
 
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
 
Chalfen, Richard. Snapshot Versions of Life. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State 
University Popular Press, 1987. 
 
Cheeke, Stephen. “Photography and Elegy.” In Writing for Art: The Aesthetics of Ekphrasis. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008. 
 
Chéroux, Clément, Andreas Fischer, Pierre Apraxine, Denis Canguilhem, and Sophie Schmit. 
The Perfect Medium: Photography and the Occult. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005. 
 
Cicero. On the Orator: Books 1–2. Translated by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Loeb Classical 
Library 348. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. 
 
Clark, Katerina. The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2000. 
 
Conall, Cash. “Picturing Memory, Puncturing Vision: Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire.” In 
Goalkeeper: The Nabokov Almanac, edited by Yuri Leving. Brighton, MA: Academic 
Studies Press, 2010. 
 
Connolly, Julian W. “The Challenge of Interpreting and Decoding Nabokov: Strategies and 
Suggestions.” Cycnos 24, no. 1 (2007). 
 
Connor, Linda, Giovanna Borradori, Marcia Brennan, Mary Ann Doane, Angus Fletcher, Peter 
Geimer, Gloria Kury, et al. “Notes from the Field: Contingency.” The Art Bulletin 94, no. 
3 (2012): 344–61. 
           
 
 290 
Coogan, Michael David, Marc Zvi Brettler, Carol A Newsom, and Pheme Perkins, eds. The New 
Oxford Annotated Bible: With the Apocrypha. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
 
Cornwell, Neil. “From Sirin to Nabokov: The Transition to English.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Nabokov, edited by Julian W. Connolly, 151–169. Cambridge, Eng.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Crary, Jonathan. Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. 
 
Creekmur, Corey K. “Lost Objects: Photography, Fiction, and Mourning.” In Photo-Textualities: 
Reading Photographs and Literature, edited by Marsha Bryant. Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1995. 
 
Curtin, Adrian, and Maxim D. Shrayer. “Netting the Butterfly Man: The Significance of 
Vladimir Nabokov in W. G. Sebald’s The Emigrants.” Religion and the Arts 9, no. 3 
(November 1, 2005): 258–83. https://doi.org/10.1163/156852905775008868. 
 
D’Addario, Daniel. “Gary Shteyngart: ‘I’ve Left Russia. I’m Just Trying to Save Brooklyn.’” 




Daub, Adrian. “Sphinxes without Secrets: W. G. Sebald’s Albums and the Aesthetics of 
Photographic Exchange.” In On Writing with Photography, edited by Karen Beckman 
and Liliane Weissberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 
 
Dauber, Jeremy. Jewish Comedy: A Serious History. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017. 
 
Degot’, Ekaterina. “Sotsrealizm okazalsia nad divanom.” Ogonëk, November 6, 2005. 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2296045. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by Eric Prenowitz. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
 
Didi-Huberman, Georges. Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
 
Diment, Galya. “English as Sanctuary: Nabokov’s and Brodsky’s Autobiographical Writings.” 
The Slavic and East European Journal 37, no. 3 (1993): 346–61. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/309281. 
 
———. “Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Autobiography.” In Nabokov and His Fictions: New 
Perspectives, edited by Julian W. Connolly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
           
 
 291 
Doane, Mary Ann. The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
———. “The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity.” Differences 18, no. 1 (2007): 
128–52. https://doi.org/10.1215/10407391-2006-025. 
 
Draaisma, Douwe. Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas about the Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Durantaye, Leland de la. “The Facts of Fiction, or the Figure of Vladimir Nabokov in W. G. 
Sebald.” Comparative Literature Studies 45, no. 4 (2008): 425–45. 
 
———. “The Pattern of Cruelty and the Cruelty of Pattern in Vladimir Nabokov.” The 
Cambridge Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2006): 301–26. 
 
Ellenbogen, Josh. “On Photographic Elegy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Elegy, edited by Karen 
Weisman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Elliott, David, ed. Photography in Russia 1840-1940. London: Thames and Hudson, 1992. 
Epstein, Mikhail. “The Philosophical Implications of Russian Conceptualism.” Journal of 
Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1 (January 2010): 64–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2009.11.008. 
 
Epstein, Mikhail, Aleksandr Genis, and Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover. Russian Postmodernism: 
New Perspectives on Post-Soviet Culture. Berghahn Books, 1999. 
 
Etkind, Alexander. Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. 
 
Evans, Robin. “Figures, Doors and Passages.” In Translations from Drawing to Building and 
Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
 
Finkelstein, Norman G. The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish 
Suffering. New York: Verso, 2003. 
 
Fore, Devin. Realism after Modernism: The Rehumanization of Art and Literature. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2012. 
 
Forgács, Éva. “Personal Documents as History-Writing in the Works of Christian Boltanski and 
Ilya Kabakov.” In Exposed Memories: Family Pictures in Private and Collective 
Memory, edited by Zsófia Bán and Hedvig Turai. Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Foster, John Burt. Nabokov’s Art of Memory and European Modernism. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
           
 
 292 
Foster, Jr., John Burt. “Nabokov before Proust: The Paradox of Anticipatory Memory.” The 
Slavic and East European Journal 33, no. 1 (1989): 78–94. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/308385. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias.” In Rethinking Architecture: A 
Reader in Cultural Theory, edited by Neil Leach. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Frank, Siggy. Nabokov’s Theatrical Imagination. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings. Translated by John 
Reddick. New York: Penguin, 2003. 
 
———. Moses and Monotheism. Translated by Katherine Jones. New York: Knopf, 1939. 
 
———. The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious. Translated by Joyce Crick. New York: 
Penguin, 2003. 
 
Freund, Gisèle. James Joyce in Paris: His Final Years. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1965. 
 
Friedman, Natalie. “Nostalgia, Nationhood, and the New Immigrant Narrative: Gary 
Shteyngart’s The Russian Debutante’s Handbook and the Post-Soviet Experience.” Iowa 
Journal of Cultural Studies 5 (Fall 2004): 77–87. 
 
Furman, Yelena. “Hybrid Selves, Hybrid Texts: Embracing the Hyphen in Russian-American 
Fiction.” The Slavic and East European Journal 55, no. 1 (2011): 19–37. 
 
———. “Hybridizing the Canon: Russian-American Writers in Dialogue with Russian 
Literature.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 58, no. 3 (September 2016): 205–28. 
 
Garcia, Michael Nieto. “Nabokov’s Index Puzzle: Life and Art Transcendent in Speak, 
Memory.” Nabokov Studies 13, no. 1 (2015 2014): 167–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/nab.2014.0007. 
 
Genette, Gérard. Fiction & Diction. Translated by Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993. 
 
———. Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation. Translated by Jane E. Lewin. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Gitelman, Zvi Y., ed. The New Jewish Diaspora: Russian-Speaking Immigrants in the United 
States, Israel, and Germany. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016. 
 
Glad, John. Russia Abroad: Writers, History, Politics. Tenafly, NJ: Hermitage & Birchbark 
Press, 1999. 
 
           
 
 293 
Glynn, Michael. Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Formalist Influences in His Novels. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Golla, Robert, ed. Conversations with Vladimir Nabokov. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2017. 
 
Gombrich, E. H. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1960. 
 
Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1968. 
 
Goodman, Susan Tumarkin, ed. From the Inside Out: Eight Contemporary Artists. New York: 
Jewish Museum, 1993. 
 
Greenberg, Clement. “Towards a Newer Laocoon.” In Pollock and After: The Critical Debate, 
edited by Francis Frascina. New York: Harper & Row, 1985. 
 
Grinberg, Marat. “The Hollowing of Gary Shteyngart.” Commentary Magazine (blog). Accessed 
October 24, 2016. https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-hollowing-of-
gary-shteyngart/. 
 
Groys, Boris. History Becomes Form: Moscow Conceptualism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2010. 
 
Grudzińska-Gross, Irena. Czeslaw Milosz and Joseph Brodsky: Fellowship of Poets. Yale 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Gunning, Tom. “‘Now You See It, Now You Don’t’: The Temporality of the Cinema of 
Attractions.” The Velvet Light Trap 32, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 3–12. 
 
———. “Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, Magic Theater, 
Trick Films, and Photography’s Uncanny.” In Fugitive Images: From Photography to 
Video, edited by Patrice Petro. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. 
 
Halfin, Igal. Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Halkin, Hillel. After One-Hundred-and-Twenty: Reflecting on Death, Mourning, and the Afterlife 
in the Jewish Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
 
Hamilton, Geoff. Understanding Gary Shteyngart. Columbia, South Carolina: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2017. 
 
Hamrit, Jacqueline. Authorship in Nabokov’s Prefaces. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2014. 
           
 
 294 
Heffernan, James A. W. Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
Hellbeck, Jochen. Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
———, ed. The Familial Gaze. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999. 
 
———. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
 
Hirsch, Marianne, and Nancy K. Miller, eds. Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics 
of Memory. Gender and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
 
Hunter, Jefferson. Image and Word: The Interaction of Twentieth-Century Photographs and 
Texts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
 
Hutchings, Stephen C. Russian Literary Culture in the Camera Age: The Word as Image. New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2004. 
 
Huyssen, Andreas. Miniature Metropolis: Literature in an Age of Photography and Film. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. 
 
Iversen, Margaret. Photography, Trace, and Trauma. University of Chicago Press, 2017. 
 
Jackson, Matthew Jesse. The Experimental Group: Ilya Kabakov, Moscow Conceptualism, Soviet 
Avant-Gardes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
 
Jacobs, Karen. “Sebald’s Apparitional Nabokov.” Twentieth-Century Literature 60, no. 2 (June 
1, 2014): 137–68. https://doi.org/10.1215/0041462X-2014-3004. 
 
Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Jussen, Bernhard, ed. Signal: Christian Boltanski. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004. 
 
Kabakov, Ilya. 60–70-e: Zapiski o neofitsial’noi zhizni v Moskve. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe 
Obozrenie, 2008. 
 
———. “About My Paintings.” In Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: Catalogue Raisonné, 
edited by Emilia Kabakova and Willem Jan Renders, Vol. 3. Bielefeld: Kerber, 2013. 
 
———. Auf Dem Dach / On the Roof. Dusseldorf: Richter Verlag, 1997. 
           
 
 295 
———. Der Text Als Grundlage Des Visuellen / The Text as the Basis of Visual Expression. 
Köln: Oktagon, 2000. 
 
———. Ilya Kabakov: A Return to Painting, 1961–2011. Bielefeld: Kerber, 2012. 
 
———. Ilya Kabakov: Installations 1983-2000: Catalogue Raisonné. Edited by Toni Stooss and 
Kunstmuseum Bern. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Düsseldorf: Richter Verlag, 2003. 
 
———. Ilya Kabakov: Installations 1983-2000: Catalogue Raisonné. Edited by Toni Stooss and 
Kunstmuseum Bern. Vol. 2. 3 vols. Düsseldorf: Richter Verlag, 2003. 
 
———. Ilya Kabakov: Installations 1983-2000: Catalogue Raisonné. Vol. 3. 3 vols. Düsseldorf: 
Richter Verlag, 2003. 
 
———. Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: Catalogue Raisonné. Edited by Emilia Kabakova 
and Willem Jan Renders. Vol. 3. 3 vols. Bielefeld: Kerber, 2013. 
 
———. My Mother’s Album. Paris: Flies France, 1995. 
 
———. Über Die “Totale” Installation / O “Totalʹnoi” Installiatsii / On the “Total” 
Installation. Ostfildern: Cantz, 1995. 
 
Kabakov, Ilya, and Emilia Kabakov. An Alternative History of Art: Rosenthal, Kabakov, Spivak. 
Edited by Thomas Kellein and Björn Egging. Cleveland: Museum of Contemporary Art 
Cleveland, 2005. 
 
Kelly, Adam. “The New Sincerity.” In Postmodern/Postwar and after: Rethinking American 
Literature, edited by Jason Gladstone, Andrew Hoberek, and Daniel Worden. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2016. 
 
Khodasevich, V. F. Sobranie stikhov: v dvukh tomakh. Edited by Iurii Kolker. Vol. 2. 2 vols. 
Paris: La Presse Libre, 1983. 
 
Klots, Yasha. “The Ultimate City: New York in Russian Immigrant Narratives.” The Slavic and 
East European Journal 55, no. 1 (2011): 38–57. 
 
Kracauer, Siegfried. The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays. Translated by Thomas Y. Levin. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind. “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America.” October 3 (1977): 68–81. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/778437. 
 
———. “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America. Part 2.” October 4 (1977): 58–67. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/778480. 
 
           
 
 296 
———. “The Photographic Conditions of Surrealism.” October 19 (1981): 3–34. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/778652. 
 
Kukulin, Ilya. “Documentalist Strategies in Contemporary Russian Poetry.” Translated by 
Josephine von Zitzewitz. The Russian Review 69, no. 4 (October 2010): 585–614. 
 
Larson, Kay. “The Tie That Binds.” New York Magazine, July 12, 1993. 
 
Lee, Steven S. “‘Borat,’ Multiculturalism, ‘Mnogonatsional’nost’’.” Slavic Review 67, no. 1 
(2008): 19–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/27652764. 
 
Lejeune, Philippe. On Autobiography. Edited by Paul John Eakin. Translated by Katherine M. 
Leary. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
 
Leving, Yuri, and Frederick H. White. Marketing Literature and Posthumous Legacies: The 
Symbolic Capital of Leonid Andreev and Vladimir Nabokov. Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2013. 
 
Leys, Ruth. Trauma: A Genealogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
 
Lilly, Ian K. “The Metrical Context of Brodsky’s Centenary Poem for Axmatova.” The Slavic 
and East European Journal 37, no. 2 (1993): 211–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/309215. 
 
Lipovetsky, Mark. Russian Postmodernist Fiction: Dialogue with Chaos. Edited by Eliot 
Borenstein. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. 
 
Livak, Leonid. How It Was Done in Paris: Russian Émigré Literature and French Modernism. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003. 
 
———. Russian Émigrés in the Intellectual and Literary Life of Interwar France: A 
Bibliographic Essay. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. 
 
Loseff, Lev. Joseph Brodsky: A Literary Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. 
 
Lyaskovets, Tetyana. “Time, Photography, and Optical Technology in Nabokov’s Speak, 
Memory.” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 16, no. 3 (2014): 4. 
 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
 
Malikova, Maria. “Nabokov’s Photo-Biography.” Translated by Alexander Ponomariov. 
Nabokov Online Journal 8 (2014). 
 
Man, Paul de. “Autobiography as De-Facement.” In The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984. 
           
 
 297 
Marien, Mary Warner. Photography and Its Critics: A Cultural History, 1839-1900. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Martin, John Rupert. Baroque. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 
 
Matich, Olga. “Mobster Gravestones in 1990s Russia.” Global Crime 7, no. 1 (February 1, 
2006): 79–104. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440570600650158. 
 
Matich, Olga, and Michael Henry Heim, eds. The Third Wave: Russian Literature in Emigration. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1984. 
 
Merridale, Catherine. “Revolution among the Dead: Cemeteries in Twentieth-Century Russia.” 
Mortality 8, no. 2 (May 2003): 176–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/1357627031000087415. 
 
Miller, Andrew D. Poetry, Photography, Ekphrasis: Lyrical Representations of Photographs 
from the 19th Century to the Present. Oxford University Press, 2015. 
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
———. Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Nabokov, Vladimir. “Good Readers and Good Writers.” In Lectures on Literature, edited by 
Fredson Bowers. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980. 
 
———. Lectures on Literature. Edited by Fredson Bowers. San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1980. 
 
———. Lectures on Russian Literature. Edited by Fredson Bowers. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich/Bruccoli Clark, 1981. 
 
———. “Les Écrivains et l’époque.” Le Mois: Synthèse de l’activité Mondiale, July 1931. 
———. Letters to Véra. Edited and translated by Brian Boyd and Olga Voronina. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 
 
———. “Pushkin, or the Real and the Plausible.” Translated by Dmitri Nabokov. New York 
Review of Books, March 31, 1988. 
 
———. Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. New York: Vintage International, 1989. 
 
———. Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. New York: Everyman’s Library, 1999. 
 
———. Strong Opinions. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. 
 
———. Vladimir Nabokov: Selected Letters, 1940-1977. Edited by Dmitri Nabokov and 
Matthew J. Bruccoli. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. 
           
 
 298 
Nadar, Félix. When I Was a Photographer. Translated by Eduardo Cadava and Liana 
Theodoratou. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. 
 
Nafpaktitis, Margarita. “Multiple Exposures of the Photographic Motif in Vladislav 
Khodasevich’s ‘Sorrentinskie Fotografii.’” The Slavic and East European Journal 52, no. 
3 (2008): 389–413. 
 
Naiman, Eric. Nabokov, Perversely. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
 
———. “On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars Who Make Them.” The Russian Review 60, no. 3 
(2001): 307–15. 
 
Nepomnyashchy, Catharine Theimer. “King, Queen, Sui-Mate: Nabokov’s Defense against 
Freud’s ‘Uncanny.’” Intertexts, no. 1–2 (2008): 7–24. 
 
Neumaier, Diane, ed. Beyond Memory: Soviet Nonconformist Photography and Photo-Related 
Works of Art. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004. 
 
Newhall, Beaumont. The History of Photography: From 1839 to the Present. New York: 
Museum of Modern Art, 1982. 
 
Nicolaevsky, Boris I., Lazarʹ Fleishman, Robert P. Hughes, and O. Raevskaia-Kh’iuz, eds. 
Russkii Berlin 1921-1923: po materialam arkhiva B.I. Nikolaevskogo v Guverovskom 
institute. Literaturnoe nasledstvo russkoi ėmigratsii. Paris: YMCA-Press, 1983. 
 
Novak, Daniel. Realism, Photography, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Olin, Margaret. “Roland Barthes’s ‘Mistaken’ Identification.” In Touching Photographs. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 
———. Touching Photographs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 
Olney, James, ed. Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980. 
 
Paperno, Irina. Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Parker, Stephen Jan. “Critical Reception.” In The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov, 
edited by Vladimir E. Alexandrov. New York: Garland, 1995. 
 
Patt, Lise, and Christel Dillbohner, eds. Searching for Sebald: Photography After W.G. Sebald. 
Los Angeles, CA: Institute Cultural Inquiry, 2007. 
 
           
 
 299 
Peirce, Charles S. “Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs.” In Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce, edited by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, 1955. 
 
Petit, Laurence. “Speak, Photographs? Visual Transparency and Verbal Opacity in Nabokov’s 
Speak, Memory.” Nabokov Online Journal 3 (2009). 
 
Petzinger, Renate, Emilia Kabakova, and Willem Jan Renders, eds. Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 
1957–2013: Catalogue Raisonné. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Wiesbaden: Museum Wiesbaden, 2008. 
 
———, eds. Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 1957–2013: Catalogue Raisonné. Vol. 2. 3 vols. 
Wiesbaden: Museum Wiesbaden, 2008. 
 
Pilling, John. “A Tremulous Prism: Nabokov’s Speak, Memory.” In Autobiographical 
Statements in Twentieth-Century Russian Literature, edited by Jane Gary Harris. Studies 
of the Harriman Institute. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Plato. “Philebus.” In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, 
translated by Dorothea Frede. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1997. 
 
———. “Theaetetus.” In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, 
translated by M. J. Levett. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1997. 
 
Polukhina, Valentina. Brodsky Through the Eyes of His Contemporaries. Academic Studies 
Press, 2008. 
 
Rabb, Jane M., ed. Literature & Photography Interactions, 1840-1990: A Critical Anthology. 1st 
ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995. 
 
———, ed. The Short Story and Photography, 1880’s-1980’s: A Critical Anthology. 1st ed. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998. 
 
Raeff, Marc. Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Ramazani, Jahan. Poetry of Mourning: The Modern Elegy from Hardy to Heaney. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Reischl, Katherine M. H. Photographic Literacy: Cameras in the Hands of Russian Authors. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018. 
 
Reiss, Julie H. From Margin to Center: The Spaces of Installation Art. Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1999. 
 
Remennick, Larissa. Russian Jews on Three Continents: Identity, Integration, and Conflict. 
Transaction Publishers, 2013. 
           
 
 300 
Renders, Willem Jan. “Whose Painting Is This?” In Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: 
Catalogue Raisonné, edited by Emilia Kabakova and Willem Jan Renders, Vol. 3. 
Bielefeld: Kerber, 2013. 
 
Rubenstein, Joshua, and Vladimir Pavlovich Naumov, eds. Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar 
Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005. 
 
Rubinshtein, Lev. Bolʹshaia kartoteka. Edited by A. R. Kurilkin. Moskva: Novoe izdatelʹstvo, 
2015. 
 
Rugg, Linda Haverty. Picturing Ourselves: Photography and Autobiography. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Rutten, Ellen. Sincerity after Communism: A Cultural History. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2017. 
 
Said, Edward. Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000. 
 
Saltzman, Lisa. “Orphans: On Émigrés and Images in W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz.” In 
Daguerreotypes: Fugitive Subjects, Contemporary Objects. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015. 
 
Schiff, Stacy. Vera (Mrs. Vladimir Nabokov). New York: Modern Library, 2000. 
 
Schönle, Andreas. Architecture of Oblivion: Ruins and Historical Consciousness in Modern 
Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011. 
 
Sebald, W. G. “Dream Textures: A Brief Note on Nabokov.” In Campo Santo, translated by 
Anthea Bell, 141–149. New York: The Modern Library, 2005. 
 
———. The Emigrants. Translated by Michael Hulse. New York: New Directions, 1997. 
 
Seidel, Michael. Exile and the Narrative Imagination. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
 
Shapiro, Gavriel. The Sublime Artist’s Studio: Nabokov and Painting. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2009. 
 
Sholem Aleichem. Some Laughter, Some Tears; Tales from the Old World and the New. 
Translated by Curt Leviant. New York: Putnam, 1968. 
 
Shteyngart, Gary. Absurdistan. New York: Random House, 2006. 
 
———. Little Failure: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 2014. 
 
           
 
 301 
———. “O.K., Glass.” The New Yorker, August 5, 2013. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/05/o-k-glass. 
 
———. Super Sad True Love Story. New York: Random House, 2010. 
 
———. “The New Two-Way Street.” In Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and 
What It Means To Be American, edited by Tamar Jacoby. Basic Books, 2004. 
 
———. The Russian Debutante’s Handbook. New York: Riverhead Books, 2002. 
 
Shute, Jenefer. “Nabokov and Freud.” In The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov, edited 
by Vladimir E. Alexandrov. New York: Garland, 1995. 
 
Slezkine, Yuri. The Jewish Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Slobin, Greta. Russians Abroad: Literary and Cultural Politics of Diaspora (1919-1939). 
Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2013. 
 
Smith, Sidonie, and Julia Watson. Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life 
Narratives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 
 
Snyder, Joel. “Picturing Vision.” Critical Inquiry 6, no. 3 (1980): 499–526. 
 
Snyder, Joel, and Neil Walsh Allen. “Photography, Vision, and Representation.” Critical Inquiry 
2, no. 1 (1975): 143–69. 
 
Sontag, Susan. On Photography. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977. 
 
———. “The Last Intellectual.” New York Review of Books, October 12, 1978. 
 
Spargo, R. Clifton. “The Contemporary Anti-Elegy.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Elegy, 
edited by Karen Weisman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Stanton, Rebecca. “Talking Back to Nabokov: A Commentary on a Commentary.” Ulbandus 
Review 10 (2007): 212–21. 
 
Stein, Arlene. Reluctant Witnesses: Survivors, Their Children, and The Rise of Holocaust 
Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Steiner, Wendy. The Colors of Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation between Modern Literature 
and Painting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
 
Storr, Robert. “Painting In Spite of Itself.” In Ilya Kabakov: Paintings 2008–2013: Catalogue 
Raisonné, edited by Emilia Kabakova and Willem Jan Renders, Vol. 3. Bielefeld: Kerber, 
2013. 
           
 
 302 
Stuart, Dabney. “The Novelist’s Composure Speak, Memory as Fiction.” Modern Language 
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1975): 177–92. https://doi.org/10.1215/00267929-36-2-177. 
 
Tatarsky, Alexandra. “Land of Plenty? The Russian-Jewish-American-Post-Soviet-Immigrant-




Toker, Leona. “Nabokov and Bergson.” In The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov, edited 
by Vladimir E. Alexandrov. New York: Garland, 1995. 
 
Trachtenberg, Alan, ed. Classic Essays on Photography. New Haven, CT: Leete’s Island Books, 
1980. 
 
Tsivian, Yuri. Early Cinema in Russia and Its Cultural Reception. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Tupitsyn, Margarita. “Against the Camera, for the Photographic Archive.” Art Journal 53, no. 2 
(1994): 58–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/777486. 
 
———. “Becoming Kabakov.” Art in America 102, no. 1 (2014): 66–69. 
 
———. Margins of Soviet Art: Socialist Realism to the Present. Milan, Italy: Giancarlo Politi 
Editore, 1989. 
 
———. Sots Art: Eric Bulatov, Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid, Alexander Kosolapov, 
Leonid Lamm, Leonid Sokov, Kazimir Passion Group. New York: New Museum of 
Contemporary Art, 1986. 
 
———. The Soviet Photograph, 1924–1937. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. 
Turoma, Sanna. Brodsky Abroad: Empire, Tourism, Nostalgia. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2010. 
 
Ugrešić, Dubravka. The Museum of Unconditional Surrender. New York: New Directions, 1999. 
 
Vapnyar, Lara. “The Writer as Tour Guide.” In The Writer Uprooted: Contemporary Jewish 
Exile Literature, edited by Alvin H. Rosenfeld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008. 
 
Vertov, Dziga. Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov. Edited by Annette Michelson. 
Translated by Kevin O’Brien. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
 
Vinokur, Val. “The Russians Came!” Boston Review, November 13, 2014. 
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/val-vinokur-the-russians-came. 
 
Virgil. The Aeneid of Virgil. Translated by Allen Mandelbaum. New York: Bantam Books, 2004. 
 
           
 
 303 
Vries, Gerard de, and D. Barton Johnson. Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Painting. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. 
 
Wagner, Peter, ed. Icons, Texts, Iconotexts: Essays on Ekphrasis and Intermediality. New York: 
W. de Gruyter, 1996. 
 
Wallace, David Foster. “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction.” In A Supposedly Fun 
Thing I’ll Never Do Again: Essays and Arguments. London: Abacus, 2011. 
 
Wallach, Amei. Ilya Kabakov: The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away. New York: Harry N. 
Abrams, 1996. 
 
Wanner, Adrian. Out of Russia: Fictions of a New Translingual Diaspora. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2011. 
 
Warner, Nicholas O. “The Footnote as Literary Genre: Nabokov’s Commentaries to Lermontov 
and Puškin.” The Slavic and East European Journal 30, no. 2 (1986): 167–82. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/307594. 
 
White, Duncan. Nabokov and His Books: Between Late Modernism and the Literary 
Marketplace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
 
Winnicott, D. W. The Child, the Family, and the Outside World. Cambridge, MA: Perseus 
Publishing, 1987. 
 
Wood, Michael. The Magician’s Doubts: Nabokov and the Risks of Fiction. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Yates, Frances A. The Art of Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
 
Zalewski, Daniel. “From Russia With Tsoris.” The New York Times, June 2, 2002. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/02/magazine/from-russia-with-tsoris.html. 
 
Zhang, Dora. “A Lens for an Eye: Proust and Photography.” Representations 118, no. 1 (2012): 
103–125. 
 
